

The Jewish Refugee

By

ARIEH TARTAKOWER

AND

KURT R. GROSSMANN

NEW YORK

INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS

OF THE

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

1944


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THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF
JOCHANAN TARTAKOWER
PFC., U.S. ARMY
WHO AT THE AGE OF NINETEEN WAS KILLED IN ACTION
IN FRANCE ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1944
AND WHOSE SACRIFICE IS TYPICAL OF THE
MANY THOUSANDS OF JEWISH REFUGEES
WHO HAVE GIVEN THE LAST FULL MEASURE OF DEVOTION
TO THEIR PEOPLE
AND TO THE COUNTRIES THAT GAVE THEM REFUGE

Gift

12-4-44

P R E F A C E

Roughly speaking, the Jewish position in Europe during the Long Truce (1919-1939) was dominated by the following factors: The functioning of international protection of minorities coupled with resurgent local economic nationalisms, the Palestinian colonization effort, the Soviet experiment in solving the Jewish problem within the framework of a specific ideology, racist neo-antisemitism of international scope, and, finally, the Jewish refugee problem as one of the consequences of modern racist theories.

The Institute of Jewish Affairs, which by its frame of reference has to summarize Jewish experiences of the last quarter of a century, has so far published a special volume on the workings of the international arrangement for the protection of minority groups* and devoted much attention to other aspects of Jewish life and its various problems. Now we present this book on the Jewish refugees, embodying the results of long research in this field.

In compiling this volume we were faced with many serious difficulties, some of them concerning the very sources available, and others of a methodological nature.

There are special difficulties involved in writing a work on a subject with such vast international ramifications in time of war, when difficult communications and censorship render the supply of material very precarious. We were keenly conscious of this handicap because of our policy not to confine ourselves to printed material but to use unpublished, first-hand material, of which a great deal was utilized for the purposes of this book. We are quite aware that the files of governments, of governmental and inter-

* *Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?* New York: 1943.

governmental institutions, as well as of private organizations and individuals contain materials which, when the war is over and they become available, may throw new light on facts discussed in this volume.

Methodologically, too, we were confronted with special difficulties. For one thing, the very definition of "refugee" as a special type of displaced person presents, not only in theory but even more so in practice, tremendous difficulties. It was not always easy to find the line of demarcation between an ordinary immigrant and a refugee. Many measures taken by governments in regard to immigrants affect mostly refugees. While we confined ourselves to a discussion of the Jewish refugee, we were once more faced with the realization that the Jewish refugee is not always identified as such and very often refugees are not classed as Jews when, in fact, it is Jewish refugees who are dealt with. Lastly, the Jewish racial refugee of peacetime should not be confused with the Jewish refugee of wartime. Each type has its specific elements, but our study, which covers a period of eleven years, embraces both types.

Obviously our conclusions are of a tentative nature and we admit that under new light shed by new facts they may be subject to revision. However, our approach to the problem of the Jewish refugees is something that cannot be affected by any new evidence that may come to light. We regard this problem as one of the tragedies of Jewish existence in a Gentile world. While fully alive to the humanitarian aspect of the problem, we do not stop there, but consider it in the general framework of the possibilities of Jewish survival in the modern world. Hence we link the refugee movement with the migratory movement, the migratory movement with Jewish experiments in colonization, which in turn leads inevitably to the problem of Jewish concentration in Palestine and the function of the Jewish refugee in the building of the Jewish National Home.

It may be argued that the period of the Jewish refugee movement under consideration is not yet over. This may be true, but only in part. With the war in Europe nearing its end, some new migratory movement, possibly originating in the liberated areas, may arise; but this will be of a different character from that of the refugee problem created and accentuated by Nazi Germany and her satellites.

While the book as a whole is the joint responsibility of the two authors, the chapter on France was written by Henri Sinder.

Valuable aid in the preparation of the chapter on Great Britain was given by Mrs. Sophie Grinberg-Vinaver, who made a study of British laws and regulations pertaining to aliens and refugees. Miss Frieda Ramm, librarian of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, assisted greatly in the compilation of the bibliography.

Maximilian Hurwitz, the Editor of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, is the editor of this volume.

JACOB ROBINSON

Director, Institute of Jewish Affairs

October, 1944



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*The
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The Era of Refugees—Definition and Characteristics of the

Refugee Movement—Jewish Migration

1. THE ERA OF REFUGEES

The history of international migration in the past thirty years has been largely a history of refugees. Other times and other centuries witnessed groups of migrants, small or large, fleeing from persecution to seek liberty and a livelihood in new countries. Many, like the Huguenots, the Pilgrim Fathers, and the Boers played an honorable part in the history of their new homes. But in our generation the refugee movement has spread like wildfire through the continents of the Old World. Refugees from Soviet Russia, from Greece, from Turkey, from Bulgaria, from Armenia, from Iraq, from Italy, from Germany, from Spain, from China,—all these before the present war,—such is the long procession of uprooted humanity. The present conflict has seen the rise of a fresh crop of refugee problems in nearly all European countries; Polish, French, and Soviet refugees are outstanding examples. Indeed, no other period has had so many refugees as the last three decades, so that ours may truly be called the era of refugees.

Jewish refugees constitute a major element in the present-day refugee problem. The many migrations of Jews for thousands of years have generally borne the character of refugee movements. But in extent and severity they are all surpassed by the present flight.

2. DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUGEE MOVEMENT

It is not easy to give an exact definition of the term "refugee." Human wanderings have always been rather complicated, but they are more difficult to define in their various aspects today than they were a few years ago. Let us first explain the all-embracing term "displacement of population," by which is meant any change produced in the geographical distribution of mankind by the process of migration. The three most important forms this process may assume are emigration, flight, and deportation.

Emigration is essentially a voluntary movement. It involves people who, mainly for economic reasons, decide to change their place of residence. They are free to leave whenever they choose and to go—within the limits of the rather severe immigration restrictions of today, of course—wherever they please. In this form the process is as old as the history of mankind; there have always been persons who migrated for a variety of reasons, and there always will be.

This purely voluntary character of the movement is largely lost in the case of refugees. A refugee is a person who leaves his place of abode not of his own free will but because he is driven to do so by fear of persecution, or by actual persecution, on account of his race, religion, or political convictions. Such persecution may break out at any time in human history, but it is most likely to occur in revolutionary periods, when one regime is overthrown in favor of another, with consequent oppression of the partisans of the old regime, who are thus forced to flee the country. A special category is formed by war refugees, who flee before the advancing enemy for fear of being oppressed by him. Generally speaking, economic motives play a minor, if any, part in the movement of refugees; people take flight not because they are dis-

satisfied with their economic position, but because they fear for their personal safety. Refugee movements, although not unusual in the history of mankind, are certainly less frequent than normal emigration. While the stream of wandering people has continued almost uninterrupted throughout the ages, rising at times to great heights (as during the nineteenth century, for example), the movement of refugees is spasmodic and involves more or less limited groups of people.

Yet in one sense the refugee movement retains some voluntary character, inasmuch as the refugee is free—within very strict limits, of course—to choose the exact moment of his departure and the place to which he is to go. This freedom, to be sure, is much more restricted in the case of war refugees, whose movement is generally dictated by the authorities of the country, yet, to some extent, it exists even then. All trace of voluntarism is lost in the case of the third category of displaced people, the deportees. These are persons compelled by physical force to leave their homes and go elsewhere. They are free neither to choose the time of their departure nor—with very few exceptions—to go wherever they like. As a rule, both their emigration and their new place of residence are fixed for them by the deporting authorities. The reasons for the deportation are of no importance, as far as the will of the deportee is concerned; they originate wholly with the deporting authorities, who may have decided on this step in order to get rid of the population of a certain region, or in order to use their services elsewhere, or for any other reason. Deportation is the least frequent of the three main forms of human displacement; only in exceptional cases are people deprived altogether of their personal freedom and driven like slaves or cattle from place to place. In antiquity it happened rather frequently that entire vanquished peoples were forcibly removed from their homes, but in the succeeding centuries this practice lapsed more

and more into desuetude. It is one of the doubtful distinctions of the Nazi regime to have renewed it, and that, too, on a scale hardly equaled before.

There are also certain economic concomitants of these three types of wandering, especially as regards the disposal of property. The emigrant, as a rule, has ample opportunities to liquidate his assets and take along all his fortune. In the case of flight these opportunities are much more limited, and they vanish altogether in the case of deportation, which only too often is accompanied by confiscation of the property of the deportees.

There is still one question, of more than theoretical importance, to be taken up, namely, how long a refugee is to be regarded as such. In the case of an emigrant or a deportee the answer may not be very difficult. As a rule, the emigrant leaves his country forever or, at any rate, for a considerable period of time; he ceases to consider himself, and to be considered, an emigrant as soon as he finds a more or less permanent source of income in his new country. The deportee remains a deportee as long as he is deprived of his personal liberty and forced against his will to remain where he is. In the case of the refugee, the answer is not so simple, since he left his old country against his will and still remains bound to it by sentimental and often also political ties. The mere fact that he has succeeded in establishing himself in the new country is, therefore, not enough to deprive him of the character of refugee. It is only when it becomes more or less evident from his attitude and his way of life that he does not intend to return to the old country that he ceases to be a refugee and becomes a regular resident of the new. Generally speaking, it takes much longer for this stage to be reached in the case of a refugee than in that of an ordinary emigrant.

In the light of the foregoing, it may be of interest to examine some of the definitions of the term refugee as given in various

laws and conventions since 1933. The political factor figures quite prominently in nearly all such definitions. The fact is stressed that refugees for the most part cannot rely upon the protection of their original countries *de facto*, and in many cases their governments have declared their citizenship forfeit *de jure*. Thus the Geneva Convention of 1938, repeating with slight modifications the wording of the Provisional Arrangement of 1936 concerning refugees coming from Germany,¹ defines them as

- (a) Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any other nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German Government;
- (b) Stateless persons not covered by previous Conventions or Agreements who have left German territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German Government.²

A resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at the Brussels Conference in 1936 defined refugees as persons who have left or been forced to leave their country for political reasons, who have been deprived of its diplomatic protection and have not acquired the nationality or diplomatic protection of any other state.³

Present-day political or "ideological" refugees often arouse misgivings on the part of countries granting them asylum. In the past, refugees frequently met with greater hospitality in their new homes than ordinary immigrants. Because they were victims of

¹League of Nations, *Intergovernmental Conference for the Adoption of a Status for Refugees coming from Germany*. Appendix I, "Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, Geneva, July 4, 1936," Ch. I, Art. 1.

²League of Nations, *Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, Geneva, February 10, 1938*, Ch. I, Art. 1.

³*Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International*, 1936, Vol. II, p. 294.

persecution, and because they migrated not in search of material advantage but out of devotion to an idea, they were given a warmer welcome, and were generally held to be a morally and intellectually superior type of immigrants. But today it is feared that the political refugee may embroil the admitting country in his feud with the government of his country of origin. The danger is pronounced when the émigré uses his new home as a base of operations against the regime that forced him to leave his old home; and even when this is not the case, the country of origin may not be any too pleased to see its expelled enemies securely established elsewhere.

Finally, the present-day political refugee often labors under special difficulties in getting adjusted in his new home. All refugees, driven from their homes as they are in a manner and at a time not of their choosing, are likely to encounter great hardships in adjusting themselves to new conditions, for which they are not always well prepared.

3. JEWISH MIGRATION

In Jewish history, the distinction between ordinary migrants and refugees are of little practical value. The Jews have not become the classic example of a migrant people because they have a special inclination for wandering; they have been driven from country to country either by actual violence or by fear of violence. Voluntary migration prompted mainly by economic motives is, among them, the rare exception.⁴

No real distinction exists between economic and other reasons in Jewish migration. Jewish poverty has generally been due more

⁴We may mention, for instance, the nineteenth-century movement of Jews from former Polish provinces in Germany to Berlin and other interior cities; or the migration to Egypt from Palestine during the period of the Second Jewish Commonwealth. In the latter case, however, political motives were also of some importance. Cf. Simon Dubnow, *Die Weltgeschichte des juedischen Volkes*, Vol. II, pp. 212 ff and 334 ff.

to persecution than to normal economic causes. Hence, in most cases, it is impossible to state whether a Jew leaves his country for purely economic reasons or under the pressure of persecution. Thus, in the tremendous Jewish emigration from Czarist Russia before the First World War, political motives were almost as pronounced as economic.

In large measure, therefore, the history of Jewish migration is a history of refugees. Jewish flight has been more or less continuous for thousands of years. Nevertheless, there have been flood tides and ebb tides in the Jewish refugee movement. Four outstanding periods, preceding the Jewish refugee movement of today, may be noted, viz.: the first, following the destruction of the First Jewish Commonwealth in 586 B.C.; the second, after the downfall of the Second Jewish Commonwealth in 70 C.E.; the third, after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492; the fourth, after the anti-Jewish riots in Russia in 1881. In each case, multitudes of Jews were forced to leave their homes by direct violence or threat thereof. In the first two cases, political motives were dominant, a great part of the refugees being war prisoners and exiles. In 1492, a whole community was expelled for religious reasons. After 1881, religious and political motives prompted persecution of the Jews, manifested both in chronic and acute forms, which together with the abject poverty of the Pale of Settlement drove Jews overseas.

The present-day Jewish refugee movement, however, not only bears the characteristic marks of all refugee movements, but possesses certain peculiarities of its own which distinguish it from previous Jewish migrations, as well as from the general refugee movement of our times.

To begin with, *the last possibility of choice has been eliminated.* Other refugee movements were given the alternative of changing their religious or political views. But the "reasons" for which

Jews are expelled today cannot be changed at will. Under the Nazis, Jews are treated as outcasts not on account of their religion or social views, but because of their race. This, then, is the first distinctive mark of the present Jewish refugee movement: its clear-cut and mercilessly compulsory character. Whole Jewish communities are in a position paralleled only by the war captives of Nebuchadnezzar and Titus.

The second distinctive feature of the contemporary Jewish refugee movement is its magnitude. Among non-Jews only a small fraction of the population is involved in the refugee movement. But even in the history of the Jewish people, where mass flight is certainly not the exception, we can find no comparable case. Before the present war, all German, Austrian, Czechoslovakian, and, to a certain extent, also Italian Jews were potential refugees, altogether more than a million people. Now, early in 1944, *nearly all the surviving Jews of Europe*, with the exception of those in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and a few neutral countries, are either refugees or deportees.

The third distinctive trait of the Jewish refugee movement today is the glaring disproportion between the extent of the problem and the prospects of solving it. We have seen that political refugees in the last two decades have had to contend with special difficulties of readjustment. Nevertheless, all previous refugee problems were solved in a more or less satisfactory manner. They were dealt with either by exchange of populations (as in the case of the Greek and Turkish refugees),⁵ by resettlement of the refugees in other countries (as in the case of the Assyrian or Russian refugees), or by repatriation to their former countries after the main cause of their flight had ceased to exist (as in the

⁵The resettlement of Greek refugees was in reality the sanctioning of an already existing situation, since large numbers of Greeks in Asia Minor fled to Greece following the defeat of the Greek army by the Turks in 1922 and had to be resettled there.

case of the Spanish refugees, a great many of whom were repatriated).

Of these three ways, only resettlement has been tried with some success in the case of the Jewish refugees. All other efforts, whether made by private organizations or by governmental agencies, have proved futile. To a certain extent difficulties already arose for Jewish migrants shortly after World War I. Legal restrictions in immigration countries, which, with few exceptions, had previously been open to wanderers, grew more complicated from year to year, beginning with the first American quota law of 1921.

The problem is not merely one of numbers. Certainly the task of resettling several hundred thousand refugees at a time when hardly any country is willing to admit them is one of the most difficult in the history of human migration. But of no less importance are the underlying motives for raising barriers against immigrants. In the years following the First World War, immigration laws, especially in the United States, were intended either to regulate the distribution of immigrants according to country of origin or to maintain a given "racial" composition of the population, or else to protect the labor market from the competition of new job-seekers.

The difficulties of Jewish refugees today are complicated by a third motive of still greater effect: antisemitism. The same factor which produced the problem of Jewish refugees in Germany and then in other countries, makes it almost impossible to solve it. A large number of immigration countries have closed their doors either because they are themselves influenced by antisemitism, or because they are afraid of becoming infected with it. The motives may be radically different in these cases, the consequences remain the same. This in reality is the deepest cause of the failure of all international efforts to solve the Jewish refugee problem. It is

impossible to solve by means of organization a problem which is rooted in a most complicated process of psychology, occurring and recurring throughout the world.

In this difficulty, the present problem of Jewish refugees surpasses anything experienced by their predecessors in the annals of Jewish migration. No difficulties of reception were encountered by the refugees who left Palestine after the downfall of the First and Second Jewish Commonwealths. After 1881, too, Jewish migrants found the overseas countries open to them. In fact, throughout Jewish history, Jewish refugees from one part of the world found other countries where they were admitted and frequently welcomed. Only the refugees from Spain in the XVth century met with comparable difficulties in finding new homes. There was scarcely a country in Europe willing to admit them and give them shelter. The newly discovered Western Hemisphere was too far away and too little known to serve as a haven of refuge at first. As soon as the first Jewish refugees tried to establish themselves in the South American countries during the XVIth century, religious intolerance overtook them there, too.⁶ Temporary asylums in Portugal, Navarre, and Italy turned into new infernos for the Jews in a few years, as has happened to the Jewish refugees from Germany in our time.⁷ The plight of the Jewish refugees in those two centuries may thus, to some extent, be compared with that of their present-day counterparts.

But if there can be degrees in such catastrophes, the disaster of the contemporary Jewish refugees is by far the greater, exceeding that of all previous Jewish refugee movements. The Spanish Jews, for one thing, were better prepared in spirit for their fate than the modern Jewish refugee. Their religion had long been adapted to a situation in which persecution, humiliation, and exile were

⁶Dubnow, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 445 ff.

⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 405 ff.

recurrent phenomena. Moreover, the expulsion of 1492 was one of the last acts of the tragedy of the Middle Ages. In Holland, Turkey, and even far-away Poland, the Jews of those days found hospitality and promise of a new and brighter future.

Much the same factors continued to buoy up the spirit of the Jews who fled from Czarist Russia. Among large sections of the population, religious faith and sturdy Jewish resistance to misfortune persisted. Those who no longer shared religious belief were strong in their liberal and humanistic faith in progress. They were persecuted by a regime which was despised by the best elements of its own country, and by virtually all other European countries, and whose eventual downfall was, therefore, felt to be certain. The knowledge that the sympathy of the world and the wave of the future was on their side, and that not only a more secure home but liberty awaited them in the hospitable New World, enabled the Russian Jewish refugees to bear their fate and not to succumb to despair.

The psychological position of a Jewish refugee today is much different. His past, particularly that of the West European Jew, was that of a free man, secure in the belief that his was the century of progress and civilization. When the present cataclysm broke over him, it appeared like the beginning of a new dark age. Until the commencement of effective resistance to the Nazis, Jewish refugees had little reason to hope for the future. Against an era of persecution they were not fortified by faith as were their ancestors before them. Besides, the problem of finding a place to end their wanderings loomed larger to them than it did to Jewish refugees of any other time. Even today, after war has been joined against the Hitler menace, there is still no sign of a solution to the problem of resettling the masses of Jewish refugees.

Like other political and religious refugees, the Jews remained attached to their home countries—not only to their original home

in the Holy Land but to the subsequent native lands from which they were driven out. The refugees from the First and Second Jewish Commonwealths came from Palestine and remained strongly bound up with that country. By the rivers not only of Babylon, but also of many another country, Jewish refugees sat and dreamt their dream of a new life in their beloved homeland. This sentiment of attachment to their former country was characteristic, though in a somewhat lesser degree, of the Spanish and Russian refugees. The last remnants of Spanish culture have not yet vanished—after 450 years—among the Sephardic Jews. Still weaker was the bond with Russia; yet the Russian language and culture long survived among hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from that country. Whether the same will be true of the German Jewish refugees remains to be seen.

As against these differences in the relations of the Jewish refugee with his old country, his deep devotion to the new country is the invariable rule. This was true in a rather paradoxical way even of those driven into exile after the fall of the First and Second Jewish Commonwealths: loyalty to the new country, even though an enemy country, was considered a religious duty. The words of the prophet Jeremiah,⁸ exhorting the Jewish exiles in Babylon to work for the benefit of their new country, remain one of the most remarkable documents in the history of refugee movements. This attitude has been strictly observed in all succeeding centuries. Whether Jews fled to Turkey, or to Holland, or to the United States, gratitude, as well as the dictates of their religion, made them in all cases loyal citizens of the new country. This may be set down as one of the common features of Jewish refugee movements in all ages.

⁸Jer. xxix. 7.

CHAPTER II

JEWISH REFUGEES DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR I

Introductory—Austrian Jewish Refugees—Russian Jewish Refugees and Deportees—War Refugees from Other Countries—Refugees from Russia after the October Revolution

1. INTRODUCTORY

Many features of the contemporary Jewish refugee movement were paralleled by the Jewish refugee movement during the First World War. The cause of that movement was not only the terror of war but also fear of antisemitic oppression. The masses of Jews who fled from Austrian Galicia to the interior of the Dual Monarchy did so because they knew the antisemitic character of the Czarist government and army. On the other side of the frontier, hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews were forced to remove from the border provinces of Russia simply because they were Jews, besides the many thousands who fled in order to escape the horrors of war.

In many ways the present movement was also paralleled by the great exodus following the October (*i.e.*, Communist) Revolution. The Jewish refugees who streamed from Soviet Russia emigrated out of sheer necessity, whether fleeing from pogroms or famine.

The system of refugee aid in use today was initiated during the last war. A great American Jewish relief apparatus was set up—the Joint Distribution Committee—which has functioned uninterruptedly to this day. Efforts to enable at least part of the refugees to proceed to countries overseas were also made. Thus the two provisional solutions of the refugee problem, direct assistance and emigration, were already tried a generation ago.

2. AUSTRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES

The refugee movement from Austrian Galicia began right after the declaration of a state of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, as soon as Russian troops crossed the frontier and commenced to occupy that province. There were many Gentiles who followed the retreating Austrian army, but Jews formed the majority of refugees, since they had every reason to fear anti-Jewish riots organized by the invaders.

It is not easy to state the exact number of the Austrian Jewish refugees, for the statistical data for that period are scant and the movement was in a constant state of flux. According to a very rough and probably exaggerated estimate, about half of the Galician Jews—that is, 400,000—fled; a more nearly correct estimate would be between 200,000 and 300,000.¹ A report of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior published in the fall of 1915 disclosed that Vienna alone harbored 137,000 refugees, of whom 77,090, or approximately 60%, were Jews. Bohemia sheltered 96,607, of whom 57,159 were Jews. Moravia took care of 18,429 Jews out of a total of 57,501.² Altogether the report showed a total of over 340,000 refugees of all faiths in the sections covered. However, these official figures comprised only part of the refugees; no statistics were published for Hungary.

Notwithstanding difficult wartime conditions, this gigantic refugee movement was well organized. The Austrian authorities provided transportation, and assisted in the maintenance of the refugees, with the liberal aid of the civilian population of the interior communities to which they were removed. Refugee camps were established in many parts of the country, especially in Mo-

¹I. Schipper, "Żydzi galicyjscy w dobie wojny światowej," *Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej*, Vol. I, p. 413 (Polish).

²Figures quoted by Abraham G. Duker, "Jews in the World War," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, September-October, 1939, p. 14.

ravia and Styria. Refugees were free either to live at such camps or to settle wherever they pleased. Conditions in the camps were satisfactory, sanitary requirements were observed, and the refugees were given food and, in many cases, also clothing, without being hampered in their freedom of movement.

The majority chose to settle in the interior of the Empire. In many cases they went to Vienna, hoping to receive more effective aid at the seat of the central government. The Jews settled in the Jewish sections of the city (the second and twentieth wards), where they found relatives or friends. Their situation was difficult, of course, but in no way calamitous. The Government, the Municipality, and the Jewish Community cooperated in a remarkable refugee-aid program. Soup-kitchens were set up, subsidies were granted to refugees, schools were established for their children. The local non-Jewish population displayed much sympathy at first, although after a time its attitude changed to indifference and even unfriendliness because of the growing hardship of the war period.³

This refugee movement was of short duration. In the spring of 1915, when the Austrian army broke through the Russian lines and regained the major part of Galicia in a few weeks, the bulk of the refugees returned to their homes. The authorities helped them to rebuild what had been destroyed. However, some sixty or seventy thousand Jewish refugees remained, chiefly in Vienna, for the duration of the war and even afterwards. (According to one author, of the 38,772 destitute refugees in Vienna on April 1, 1918, 34,233 were Jews.⁴)

At first the refugees were legally and politically secure, all of them being Austrian subjects. Anti-Jewish propaganda was of

³For contemporary journalistic sketches of the Jewish refugees in Vienna and their life there, see Otto Abeles, *Juedische Fluechtlinge, Szenen und Gestalten*.

⁴Franz Riedl, "Die Juden in Oesterreich," *Volk und Reich*, Vol. 14, March, 1938, p. 171.

much smaller proportions than in Czarist Russia. After the war and the resultant dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire, most of the refugees became citizens of Poland and other succession states, and their position deteriorated greatly. For Vienna, formerly the heart of a great empire, was now a metropolis without much of a hinterland, and the unemployment, as well as the food and housing shortage, under which the inhabitants labored in the years immediately after the war produced a violent propaganda against those ever handy scapegoats, the Jews. Feeling ran particularly high against the Jewish refugees from Galicia. Their expulsion was urged and decreed, but repeatedly deferred owing to the intercession of Jewish organizations and the governments of the succession states, notably Poland.⁵ Finally, in 1920, the Austrian authorities decided to go through with the expulsion. In response to the complaint of the Polish Government, and to representations by the Committee of Jewish Delegations, the League of Nations intervened. The Council of the League considered the matter at its sessions of March 1 and 3, 1921; and while conceding Austria's legal right to expel the Galician Jews as foreign nationals, prevailed upon her, on humanitarian grounds, to make certain exceptions which reduced the expulsions to a bare minimum. Poland, in turn, pledged herself to facilitate the return of any persons the Austrian Government might suggest.⁶

The Jewish refugees were mainly middle or upper class people. In postwar Austria, the opportunities for commercial enterprises were few. Thus, although some of the refugees succeeded in establishing themselves satisfactorily, the majority suffered great poverty. Aid was extended to the needy by the newly established

⁵See *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), March 7, 1919, p. 10; May 2, 1919, p. 10; August 8, 1919, p. 9; Sept. 19, 1919, p. 30; Oct. 10, 1919, pp. 10-11.

⁶League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 2nd Year, No. 3, March-April, 1921, pp. 175-176; *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), March 4, 1921, p. 9; March 11, 1921, pp. 9 and 12.

Vienna office of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, acting through important local organizations, whose relief activities it supported with considerable sums of money.

The number of refugees declined slowly. Many returned to Poland, many emigrated to other countries, while some attained material security in Austria. But there always remained a considerable number of poor people. When Austrian Jewry was overtaken in the year 1938 by the same fate which had overwhelmed German Jewry, it broke down in a short time, being overburdened with poor people mostly from World War I refugee families.

It should be mentioned that, besides voluntary refugees, a large number of Galician Jews were deported to the interior of Russia after the Russian occupation in order to prevent possible activities by them against the occupying forces. Many deportees died of epidemics and as a result of the harsh treatment by the Czarist authorities. The majority, an estimated fifty thousand persons, were allowed to return to their homes in the early months of 1916. While under Russian domination, the refugees were assisted by the All-Russian Zemstvo organizations and by the Central Jewish Aid Committee of Kiev.⁷

3. RUSSIAN JEWISH REFUGEES AND DEPORTEES

The Russian Jewish refugee movement of the First World War was quite different from the Austrian, but there were two common features. First, the Russian movement, like the Austrian, was temporary; for, following the Russian collapse and revolution in 1917, a large part of the refugees returned to their former homes. Second, relief work in Russia was carried on along the same lines as in Austria, being strongly supported both by the local Jewish population and by foreign Jewish organizations, especially the Joint Distribution Committee, and, to some extent, also by the

⁷Schipper, *loc. cit.*, p. 418.

Russian authorities (e.g., the Tatyana Committee). But, apart from these two common features, there was a great difference between the two movements. The Austrian Jewish refugees fled of their own accord; the Russian Jews, by and large, were deported by the authorities. The Austrian Jews took flight because they feared the antisemitism of the Russian military; the Russian Jews had no special reason to be afraid of the Germans at that time. They were deported because the Russian Government suspected that they might cooperate with the Germans. The Austrian flight was a general catastrophe which struck both Jews and non-Jews; in Russia, only Jews were singled out for expulsion.

There was also a numerical difference. The number of the Russian Jewish refugees was much greater than that of the Austrian. As early as August and September, 1914, the entire Jewish population of a number of towns in the provinces of Radom, Lomza, and Lublin was expelled by the Russian authorities. In the last months of that year, although it was not yet a front zone, Jewish communities in the province of Warsaw were ordered evacuated. Most of them flocked to the city of Warsaw, where over 80,000 Jewish refugees were soon gathered.⁸ The subsequent German occupation of the Polish provinces prevented the further expulsion of Polish Jews from their homes, but the evacuation continued in other border areas and the Jewish inhabitants of the provinces of Kovno, Kurland, and Grodno were deported to the Russian interior.

It is even more difficult to estimate the total number of Jewish refugees in Russia than in Austria. A large proportion of the Austrian refugees went to Vienna, but the Russian Jewish refugees were widely dispersed over the immense territory of their country. Because of this and the short duration of the movement, we have only few and uncertain sources on the number of Russian

⁸Simon Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte des juedischen Volkes*, Vol. X, p. 511.

Jews deported by the military authorities. There was no official registration of relocated Jews. However, according to a report submitted to the Russian Duma by the Laborite deputy Dzubinsky, there were more than half a million Jews deported, of whom 150,000 were removed from the province of Kovno, 60,000 from the province of Grodno, 200,000 from Congress Poland, and the remainder from other provinces of the Russian Empire.⁹ Similar figures were published by the Central Committee for the Relief of Jewish War Sufferers of Petrograd, which estimated that the total number of Jews made homeless by expulsion from Congress Poland and the northwestern region at approximately 600,000.¹⁰ In the province of Vilna alone there were 200,000 exiles. More than 250,000 crowded into the province of Volhynia. Most of the refugees were soon overtaken by the German armies and returned to their homes. But at least 211,691, according to a 1918 report of the Central Committee for the Relief of Jewish War Sufferers, still remained in the interior of Russia.¹¹

The Russian Jews were evacuated as potential spies for the enemy and treated accordingly.¹² The deportations were carried out ruthlessly. In many cases, no adequate provision was made for the transportation or reception of the refugees. Frequently trains bearing deportees were shifted from place to place with no opportunity given the passengers to alight. In some instances, Jewish communities were not permitted to assist their homeless brethren. There were even cases where Jews deported by the governor of one province to another province were not admitted by the governor of the latter, and were shuttled back and forth between

⁹Quoted by S. Kalischer, *Die Lage des juedischen Volkes in Russland*, p. 20.

¹⁰*The Jews in the Eastern War Zone*, published by the American Jewish Committee, p. 64.

¹¹Duker, *loc. cit.*, p. 12 f.

¹²Violetta Thurston, *The People Who Run* (Chapter IX, "Jewish Refugees"), p. 20 ff.

the two provinces.¹³

Another peculiarity of this movement, although of great benefit in later years, rendered the immediate situation of the refugees still more difficult. Since the Jews were ordered removed from many provinces of the so-called Pale of Settlement, the Russian authorities were obliged, at least temporarily, to abolish the existing restrictions and permit Jews to settle elsewhere in Russia.¹⁴ As against the new opportunities to earn a living thus opened up to the Russian Jews, there was the difficulty of adjustment to the strange environment.

Refugee-aid work was therefore most urgently needed and had to be conducted on a much larger scale than in Austria, especially as governmental and municipal help was given in a much smaller measure. This work of succor was carried on by Russian and American Jews with great devotion and success. Refugee relief committees were established in nearly all towns, and the existing organizations for vocational retraining and public health developed new activities in aid of refugees. The Russian ORT (abbreviation of *Obshtchestvo Remeslennovo i Zemledeltcheskovo Truda sredi Yevreyev v Rossii*, meaning Society for the Promotion of Crafts and Agriculture among the Jews of Russia) succeeded in placing tens of thousands of refugees in the new war industries, especially in plants manufacturing clothing for soldiers. A Central Committee for the Relief of Jewish War Sufferers (*Yevreyski Komitet Pomoshtchi*, popularly called YEKOPO for short) was formed, as well as a "political committee" composed of representatives of several Jewish parties and the Jewish Members of the Duma.¹⁵

¹³Kalischer, *op. cit.* p. 17.

¹⁴About this temporary abolition of the Pale of Settlement and the reaction of public opinion thereto, see *The Jews in the Eastern War Zone*, p. 20 ff.

¹⁵Dubnow, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 512.

YEKOPO, with headquarters in Petrograd, at first directed its efforts to the care of Jews in the Polish war zone, but later concentrated its activity on providing food, shelter, education, religious instruction, and manual training for the hundreds of thousands who had been deported or who had fled from the war-stricken areas. In spite of the non-cooperation and frequently even interference of the civil and military authorities, it continued its work energetically and efficiently and succeeded in raising large sums of money in the Jewish communities of Russia.

American Jewry supplied large funds for the relief work and made great efforts to enable emigration to the United States by way of Siberia. In the years 1917-1918, after the Bolshevik Revolution, thousands of refugees were rescued in this way and brought to America.¹⁶

4. WAR REFUGEES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Groups of Jews also fled or were deported from other belligerent countries. In Rumania, wholesale expulsions of Jews from the border towns took place on the pretext that they were friendly to Germany. In some communities the Jews were driven out by gendarmes without notice. As a rule, they were not permitted to take their belongings with them.¹⁷ Many Rumanian Jews who had never been granted citizenship were interned in Moldavia as aliens.

In Palestine, mass deportations of Jews who were Russian subjects, and therefore enemy aliens, were carried out by the Turkish military authorities.¹⁸ Egypt alone harbored 11,277 Jewish deportees from Palestine. They were aided there by the Russian Central Committee for the Relief of Jewish War Sufferers. A

¹⁶About these relief activities, see Samuel Mason, *Our Mission to the Far East*, p. 13.

¹⁷*The Jews in the Eastern War Zone*, p. 89.

¹⁸Dubnow, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 514.

number of them emigrated from Egypt to the United States. In the spring of 1915, the deportations from Palestine were discontinued.¹⁹

5. REFUGEES FROM RUSSIA AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The tremendous migration which followed the Bolshevik upheaval in Russia had a different character from the movements of war refugees, both in its causes and in its composition. The new refugees did not flee hostile foreign armies, but the oppression of the revolutionary regime, which was particularly severe in the first years of the Revolution. For individuals and classes who did not share the social or political views of the new rulers of Russia, or were regarded by the latter as undesirable, there was no room in the country; they had to leave. The numerous attempts to overthrow the Soviet Government by military uprisings all ended in failure, which, naturally, made the position of its opponents still more desperate. The roads leading to China, Poland, Rumania, Latvia, and several other countries were soon crowded with refugees estimated at more than two million.²⁰ Rarely if ever before in history had there been such a mass flight.

There was also a fundamental difference in the duration of this movement. The Austrian and Russian war refugees were reestablished at the end of the conflict, and in many cases even earlier. Quite different was the lot of the new Russian refugees. Their hope that the Soviet regime would collapse and they would be able to return to their former homes proved wholly unfounded. Years passed and the situation remained unchanged. On the contrary, the new order in Russia became more and more stabilized. Under the circumstances, the physical and moral breakdown of

¹⁹*The Jews in the Eastern War Zone*, p. 95.

²⁰Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 81.

the refugees was almost a certainty, failing efforts to settle permanently in their countries of refuge.

This refugee problem was not a Jewish one. Unlike the situation during the war, when Jews predominated among the refugees both in Austria and in Russia, the new wave of refugees consisted mostly of Russians—soldiers of the various White armies, members of the Russian nobility and bourgeoisie, former government officials, and other opponents of the new regime. Nevertheless, there was a substantial number of Jews among them. These included people who fled the massacres in the Ukraine, during which 60,000 Jews were slain in a few years,²¹ and people who left Russia because they could not adapt themselves to the new order. The total number of Jewish refugees from Soviet Russia was estimated early in the summer of 1921 at 200,000,²² the overwhelming majority of whom—about 180,000—were in the eastern provinces of Poland, and the remainder in Bessarabia, Rumania, Lithuania, and Latvia. There were also many who tried to make their escape by way of the Far Eastern provinces of Russia. Among more than 150,000 White Russian refugees who fled to the Far East from 1920 on, there were 13,500 Jews.²³

The long Russian-Polish frontier afforded much greater opportunities for escape than the other borders of Russia. Also, a large number of Russian Jews, who were natives of places assigned to

²¹Dubnow, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, p. 530. J. Lestschinsky, who made a study of the available data, puts the number of Jews killed in the Ukrainian pogroms as high as 75,000.

²²Lucien Wolf, *Russo-Jewish Refugees in Eastern Europe: Report on the Conference on Russian Refugees Held in Geneva, under the Auspices of the League of Nations, on August 22-24 and September 16-19, 1921*, p. 7 (hereafter cited as Wolf, *Russo-Jewish Refugees*, 1921). The number who fled from their homes on account of the pogroms was estimated at 400,000 to 500,000 (see J. Lestschinsky, "The Terror in Figures," *Zukunft*, 1922, p. 528, Yiddish), but the greater part of them returned after a while and cannot be properly called refugees.

²³Cyrus N. Peake, "Refugees in the Far East," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 59.

Poland and the Baltic States by the peace settlement, claimed citizenship in those countries and the right to return there. Thus, besides refugees for whom Poland was the most convenient way station, there were others who hoped to find permanent homes there. The Polish authorities did not relish the prospect of getting new Jewish citizens. Jews were permitted to stay in Poland with great reluctance and only after long investigations, during which the refugees were detained in special camps and suffered hunger and disease.

After separating the sheep from the goats, Poland, like other countries bordering on Russia, was faced with the problem arising from the circumstance that the refugees who could not prove Polish citizenship had also been deprived of Soviet nationality, with the result that they had no passports and so were unable to emigrate further to countries which might be willing to admit them. To meet this difficulty, the Polish Government issued nearly 90,000 passports to stateless aliens in 1921.²⁴ It was not until July, 1922, that the system of so-called Nansen Passports was adopted by an intergovernmental conference. Even afterwards intervention by the League of Nations and private organizations was frequently necessary to ward off the deportation of refugees to Russia.²⁵

Besides the efforts of the League of Nations to save Russian refugees from starvation and secure their legal status, a special campaign had to be conducted for Russian Jewish refugees. It was clear from the outset that such a campaign had a twofold purpose: first, to provide the minimum necessities of life for refugees during their stay in the countries of temporary refuge; second, to find

²⁴Lucien Wolf, *Russo-Jewish Refugees in Eastern Europe: Report on the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Committee of the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, Held in Geneva on April 20, 1923*, p. 9 (hereafter cited as Wolf, *Russo-Jewish Refugees*, 1923).

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 7 ff.

new homes for them in other countries, or—in the case of those who would no longer be in danger in Russia—to arrange for their repatriation. The first was done by local relief organizations and by American Jews, but special bodies had to be created to arrange for speedy removal of the refugees to new countries. Such organizations were chiefly subsidized by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) of America and met with considerable success in their efforts. The Jewish Colonization Association (ICA), which called a special conference of the leading Jewish emigration and transmigration committees of Europe in Brussels in June, 1921, also played an important part in this work.²⁶

The number of Jewish refugees in Poland declined from an estimated 180,000 in 1921 to 20,000 in 1922 and 10,000 in 1923. In Rumania the number of Russo-Jewish refugees, estimated as late as March, 1922, at 45,000 by the League of Nations agent in Bucharest, was reduced to less than 11,000 by the beginning of 1923.²⁷

The great majority of the refugees went to the United States, others emigrated to France, Palestine, South Africa, and elsewhere, while still others were repatriated to Soviet Russia.

²⁶Wolf, *Russo-Jewish Refugees, 1921*, p. 17. ICA was represented on the Committee of Private Associations established in 1921 to cooperate with Dr. F. Nansen, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Russian Refugees.

²⁷Wolf, *Russo-Jewish Refugees, 1923*, p. 9.

CHAPTER III

THE PRESENT JEWISH REFUGEE PROBLEM

Introductory—The German Jewish Refugees—The Austrian and Czechoslovakian Jewish Refugees—Jewish Refugees from Italy—The Jewish War Refugees

1. INTRODUCTORY

The number of Jewish refugees today, including those evacuated on account of war developments, is nearly two and a half million. If the number of Jews before the outbreak of the present war is considered, it would appear that every sixth Jew in the world and every fourth Jew in Europe is now a refugee. In reality the ratio is even higher, since, at a minimum, from three to four million Jews have died or been exterminated by the Germans and their satellites during the war. But even these figures, terrible as they are, may not suffice to describe the real situation, since they do not include the tremendous number of Jews deported from country to country and from place to place within the confines of the same country.¹ The aggregate number of uprooted Jews—refugees, evacuees, and deportees—was well over five millions at the end of 1943. Today, with the new developments set in motion by the total occupation of Hungary by the Germans, it can safely be said that there are not many Jews left in Nazi-occupied or Nazi-influenced Europe who do not fall within the category of displaced Jews.

No such dimensions were ever attained by the greatest of the earlier refugee movements. The number of refugees after the October Revolution in Russia was estimated two million. This, to

¹For details, see Chapter XI.

be sure, is a larger figure than the aggregate of actual Jewish refugees (exclusive of evacuees and deportees) today, but an insignificant fraction of the 150-million population of the Russian Empire at that time. The number of Russian refugees has declined steadily either through repatriation or through naturalization in various countries, so that today there are no more than three or four hundred thousand still unsettled. The number of Jewish exiles has grown rapidly since 1933, and constitutes the major refugee problem of our time.

There are two phases to the present Jewish refugee problem. The first arose from the program of persecution initiated by Nazi Germany in 1933 and taken up by several other countries allied with or dominated by her. The second phase is a direct consequence of the war. There is, however, a close connection between the two. Not only was the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany a psychological preparatory measure for the present world conflict, but the flight of most Jewish war refugees was caused not so much by fear of the perils of war as of Nazi persecution after the occupation of their country by the Germans.

Nevertheless, it is convenient chronologically to make a distinction between the two phases of the contemporary Jewish refugee movement.

2. THE GERMAN JEWISH REFUGEES

No one in the world, least of all the German Jews themselves, could foresee twelve years ago that in so short a time they would be ousted from the political, economic, cultural, and social life of Germany, and finally exiled from their homes. Although anti-semitic propaganda and antisemitic government policies were not unknown in Germany, especially before the First World War, the German Jews were securely established as participants in the culture and economy of their country. Under the democratic

regime of the Weimar Republic, discriminatory practices against the Jews were abandoned. The majority of German Jews were thus in favorable economic circumstances, closely bound up with the multifarious life of the country, and they considered themselves faithful sons of the German nation. There had been no considerable emigration of Jews from Germany since the 1870's. On the contrary, many Jews from Eastern Europe had come to Germany and established themselves without great difficulty. The small community of about half a million Jews, less than one percent of the population of Germany, was regarded as one of the most fortunately situated branches of the Jewish people in the world.

The blow of Nazi persecution, therefore, fell unexpectedly. Within a few years the Jews of Germany lost their positions, their fortunes, and their homes. The circumstances of this new martyrdom of German Jewry cannot be compared with the persecutions of past centuries, for its victims were people of high standing who had no idea of the meaning of misery or flight, and who were strongly attached to their country.

Several distinct periods may be noted in the history of the German Jewish refugee movement. The first extended from the beginning of Jewish persecutions in April, 1933,² to the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws in September, 1935. This was a period of voluntary and unorganized Jewish emigration. The Jews left Germany under the first impact of the persecutions, without being compelled to emigrate, and without knowing where to go. It was an exodus full of tragedies, to be sure, but with many mitigating features. The refugees were able to take with them a good part of their capital. Although the world was by no means completely open to them, Jews from Germany were less restricted

²On April 1, an anti-Jewish boycott was proclaimed in "protest" against foreign reports of anti-Jewish excesses by the Nazis following their victory in the March 5 elections. On April 7, the first legislative use of the term "non-Aryan" was made in a law banning Jews from the public service.

by existing immigration laws than emigrants and refugees from other countries. A general atmosphere of sympathy, too, enabled them to surmount many obstacles which blocked the way of other emigrants.

During this first period the refugee movement had a rather tentative character. To many it seemed that the anti-Jewish excesses would pass, to be followed by a new Jewish policy, embodying moderate restrictions and disabilities. It was hoped that there would be only a limited exodus, and that the bulk of the Jewish population could remain in Germany. The number of emigrants was, therefore, rather small. No more than 80,000, including "Aryan" political refugees and "racial non-Aryans" not of the Jewish faith, left for other countries. Before 1936, only a small part of these refugees tried to settle overseas, mostly in Palestine.³ There were even cases of persons unable to adjust themselves abroad who returned to Germany. But things changed sharply after September, 1935. The refugees already outside Germany now sought permanent resettlement. According to the 1938 reports of the League High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, about three-fourths of the original 80,000 had either been resettled abroad, chiefly in Palestine, or, in the case of persons of non-German nationality, repatriated to their countries of origin.⁴

The Nuremberg Laws inaugurated a new period of German Jewish emigration. Now the Jews realized that there was no place left for them in Nazi Germany. The well-organized machinery of German Jewish social work, with the cooperation of the Jews of other countries, especially Great Britain, the United States, and Palestine, undertook to evacuate the German Jews within a lim-

³Mark Wischnitzer, "Jewish Emigration from Germany, 1933-1938," *Jewish Social Studies*, January, 1940, pp. 26 and 29.

⁴*League of Nations Questions: The Refugees*, p. 39.

ited period of time. The rate of emigration did not speed up particularly; but it was now a steady and regulated process, with a definite goal. By the end of 1937, it has been estimated, some 140,000 Jews had left Germany. It was believed that the remainder of not more than 360,000⁵ could be evacuated at the rate of twenty to twenty-five thousand annually in about a decade and a half. Although it became clearer from year to year that Jewish emigrants would have to leave behind most of their fortunes, and the attitude of the immigration countries grew less and less favorable, it was hoped the problem could be solved without too much individual hardship.

This hope was shattered after the pogroms of November, 1938, when the Nazis embarked upon a ruthless policy of expulsion without regard to legal or material possibilities of immigration. It was now evident that the German authorities would never consent to an orderly removal of the Jews, but would insist on getting rid of them in the shortest time possible, regardless of the suffering of the victims. All efforts to organize Jewish emigration from Germany broke down within the space of a few days. Whereas the total Jewish emigration from Germany for the years 1933-1937 amounted to 140,000, it has been officially estimated that some 120,000 to 140,000 left Greater Germany in 1938 alone.⁶ More conservative estimates put the number at about 98,000.⁷

⁵Wischnitzer, *loc. cit.*, p. 30. It would perhaps be more correct to put the number of remaining Jews at approximately 330,000 to 340,000. According to the census of 1933, there were 499,682 Jews in Germany. The Jewish population of the Saar Basin, which must be added, was 3,177 in 1935. From the total number there must be deducted not only the loss through emigration, but also the loss through excess of deaths over births.

⁶League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1939*, p. 7.

⁷Wischnitzer, *loc. cit.*, p. 38 ff; Erika Mann and Eric Estorick, "Private and Governmental Aid of Refugees," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 144.

A period of chaos ensued, surpassing by far anything witnessed in the first years of the Nazi regime. In the meantime most of the immigration and transmigration countries had closed their doors. The Jews who now left Germany had been deprived of all their means. Thousands were driven over the border by the German police without visas for the adjacent countries; thousands were put aboard ships and sent overseas with invalid visas or with no visas at all⁸; thousands were tossed back and forth interminably between the frontier guards of Greater Germany and those of neighboring countries.

The Jewish organizations in Germany itself and abroad were almost powerless in the face of this wholesale disaster. International agencies, especially the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany and the Intergovernmental Committee, whose activities had not been very fruitful in previous years, were stumped by the new developments. All semblance of planned individual emigration vanished. As in the war evacuations of an earlier day, camps were set up in a number of countries adjoining Greater Germany for the concentration and sheltering of the refugees until they could proceed further.⁹

This, the third period, witnessed a vast increase in the number

⁸The Palestine Government turned back large numbers of refugees without visas. The first case of a refugee boat denied entry because of invalid visas was the SS. *St. Louis*, which sailed from Germany for Cuba on May 15, 1939. The 907 refugees on board were refused admission into Cuba and ordered back to Europe. After frantic efforts by Jewish organizations, the Governments of England, France, Holland, and Belgium agreed to admit them under financial guarantees totaling \$500,000 given by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Cases like that occurred frequently thereafter.

⁹Walter Adams, "Refugees in Europe," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 41. Such camps were also advocated by leading figures in the field of social work as the best provisional solution of the refugee problem. See Lawford Childs, *Refugees, a Permanent Problem in International Organization*, VI, "The First Step Towards Settlement—Transitional Centres."

¹⁰*Dziennik Ustaw*, 1938, No. 22, poz. 191. (Polish.)

of persons caught up in the tidal wave of Nazi-made refugees. Until 1938, foreign Jews residing in Germany were under no pressure to emigrate. On March 31 of that year a law was promulgated in Poland which provided, among other things, that persons who had spent a minimum of five years in continuous residence abroad after the restoration of the Polish State might be deprived of their Polish citizenship and forbidden to return to Poland.¹⁰ This was aimed primarily at the tens of thousands of Polish Jews living in Austria and Germany. The Nazi Government reacted with characteristic ruthlessness. On the night of October 28, 1938, over 15,000 Polish Jews long resident in Germany were arrested and deported to Poland. Only part of these deportees were admitted into their native country. Five thousand were detained by the Polish authorities in an internment camp at the border town of Zbonszyn for almost a year under extremely hard conditions.

The years 1938-1939 also saw the German occupation of Austria and the Czech provinces of Czechoslovakia, which brought upwards of 300,000 more Jews under Nazi rule. Both Austria and the Czech provinces contributed their share to the stream of Jewish refugees. The High Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Herbert Emerson, has estimated the number who left Germany from 1933 to 1939—both Jews and non-Jews—at 400,000.¹¹ The number of Jewish refugees alone during that period has been put at 329,000, of whom 215,000 were from Germany, 97,000 from Austria, and 17,000 from Czechoslovakia.¹²

The territorial spread of the Jewish refugee problem reached

¹¹Luncheon given by Myron C. Taylor in Honor of the Right Honorable Earl Winterton, the Honorable Paul Van Zeeland, and the Honorable Sir Herbert Emerson, New York, October 19, 1939, p. 18.

¹²League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Supplementary Report to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations* by Sir Herbert Emerson, *High Commissioner for Refugees*, 1939, p. 2.

its climax in the fourth and latest period, following the outbreak of the present war. German occupation of one European country after another caused the stream of Jewish refugees to swell to huge proportions. German Jewish refugees residing in other countries of Europe were forced by the advance of German troops to flee for the second and, in many cases, for the third time.

Even before German occupation, new problems confronted the refugees in the countries to which they had fled. The war turned the German Jewish refugees living in France and Great Britain into enemy aliens on account of their former nationality. Fifteen thousand refugees were interned in France on the outbreak of war; 27,000 were interned in Great Britain in May and June, 1940, that is, in the period of the French collapse.

Inside Germany, the process of clearing out the Jews continued, with modifications made necessary by the war. Instead of driving them across the border into an adjacent land, the German authorities sent them away to the newly occupied or Nazi-controlled countries. Several thousand were deported from Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to Poland, first to the newly created Lublin "Reservation" and then to other parts of the Gouvernement General. The entire Jewish population of the German provinces of Baden and the Palatinate (some 10,000 persons) was deported to camps in unoccupied France. Notwithstanding wartime difficulties of emigration, Jews were continually sent to concentration camps and released on condition that they would leave German territory within a few days.

By the end of 1943, the number of Jews in Germany and Austria had thus been reduced to less than 20,000, a tiny fraction of what it had been before Hitler. As a normal community, German Jewry ceased to exist two or three years ago.

Not only was the number of German Jewish refugees greater in the later periods, but their material position grew steadily

worse. As mentioned above, in the early days of the exodus from Germany it was still possible for emigrants to take out of the country a goodly part of their fortune. But soon this possibility became very limited, and ultimately vanished altogether. In the years immediately preceding the present war, Jews could leave Germany only after forfeiting all their property. They were completely dependent on relief organizations.

Individuals leaving Germany in 1933 were entitled to take with them RM 200 in foreign currency; later on, RM 50, and after 1937, only RM 10. The export of their other property was entirely dependent on official authorization.¹³ Under the law of May 18, 1934, persons possessing a capital of more than RM 50,000 or having an annual income in excess of RM 20,000, were to pay a "flight tax" (*Reichsfluchtsteuer*) of 25% in case of bona fide emigration. The remaining 75% of their capital had to be deposited as blocked marks, the value of which soon dropped from 30% to about 6% of their face value.¹⁴ In November, 1938, a special "atonement fine" (*Suehnsteuer*) in the amount of one billion marks was imposed on all Jews possessing more than RM 5,000 as "reparation" for the killing of Ernst vom Rath by the Jewish youth, Herschel Grynszpan. Originally set at 20% of the entire fortune of each individual, it was increased to 25% on the outbreak of war. Upon emigration, another 5% was to be paid for a passport—altogether 30%.¹⁵

Of the mass of more than four hundred thousand refugees,—probably the largest number of refugees from a single country in Jewish history,—the greater part consisted of young people. It was mainly a movement of married persons, the overwhelming

¹³James G. McDonald, *The German Refugees and the League of Nations*, p. 29.

¹⁴Wischnitzer, *loc. cit.*, p. 43.

¹⁵Oscar Karbach, "The Liquidation of the Jewish Community of Vienna," *Jewish Social Studies*, July, 1940, p. 271.

majority of them from the middle and upper classes—professionals, merchants, and industrialists.¹⁶ While their youth was an advantage, their other characteristics certainly were not. Having families and being concentrated in professions in which placement in the immigration countries was not easy, the German Jewish refugees faced an extremely difficult situation. That they were accustomed to a relatively high standard of living made the adjustment still harder.

3. THE AUSTRIAN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN JEWISH REFUGEES

Although they were part and parcel of the German Jewish refugee stream and shared its problems and hardships, the Jewish refugees from Austria and Czechoslovakia had characteristic features of their own.

The breakdown of Austrian Jewry came five years later than the doom of German Jewry. This was not such good luck as may appear at first sight. The tragic fall from economic security and freedom to beggary and enslavement, which took more than six years in the case of the German Jews, was accomplished in Austria in the space of a few months. The exclusion of the Austrian Jews from active participation in the life of their country was already complete in January, 1939.¹⁷ Almost immediately after the German occupation, a policy of forced Jewish emigration was proclaimed by the new masters of Austria and carried out with the utmost speed and severity. Figures compiled by the Jewish Community of Vienna in the last days of 1940 revealed that the Jewish population of that city had declined since the German occupation from 180,000 to 48,000. Nearly two-thirds of the remainder were women; more than 3,000 were infants and minors.

¹⁶For details, see Chapter XI.

¹⁷Karbach, *loc. cit.*, p. 269.

Unlike the German Jews in the early period, only very few Austrian Jews had fortunes to take with them, even if permitted to do so. Many of them derived from the refugees of the First World War. Even before the German occupation they were mainly poor people struggling hard for their daily bread. Thus their emigration had to be subsidized in most cases.

The situation in the immigration countries, too, was more difficult now than that which had confronted the early Jewish refugees from Germany. The barriers had been raised higher. Desperate efforts were made by the Austrian Jews to overcome immigration difficulties by means of vocational retraining. In the first two years after the German occupation, 24,000 men and women were trained for vocations suitable for emigrants: 4,351 for domestic service, 3,473 for the clothing industry, 2,409 for the metal industry, and 1,667 for agriculture.¹⁸ However, this proved of no great value. Nearly all countries continued to refuse admission to refugees. Even Palestine, the main receiving country for German Jews, now admitted smaller numbers on account of the riots and the new restrictive immigration policy of the Mandatory Power.

Thus the Austrian Jews had to flee, or were dumped by the authorities, illegally over the frontiers into adjacent countries, where they lived in constant danger of deportation. The tragic ordeal of being driven into No Man's Land, living in small boats on the Danube between countries, or drifting precariously from port to port, became a common experience among Austrian Jews. The first case of refugees being driven into a kind of No Man's Land was that of a group of sixty Austrian Jews who were expelled from Burgenland and placed upon an old, vermin-infested barge anchored in the Danube near the Hungarian shore. Thereafter thousands of both Austrian and German refugees were

¹⁸Dr. Abraham Schmerler, *Die Umschichtungsaktion der Auswanderungsabteilung im ersten Jahre ihres Bestandes*, pp. 33-37.

treated in the same manner.

Czechoslovakian Jews had to flee German domination on two separate occasions. The first flight occurred after the occupation of the Sudeten area in October, 1938, when twenty thousand Jews were included among those who fled, chiefly to the remaining territory of the Republic.¹⁹ A number of Jews crossed into Poland. At the insistence of the Polish Government, they were removed to England, partly also to Norway and Sweden.²⁰

The second wave of emigration followed the occupation and dismemberment of the Republic in March, 1939. In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia which was then established, the Gestapo took steps to hasten Jewish emigration. An order was issued to the Jewish community of Prague, requiring the emigration of 30,000 before the end of 1939, and 70,000 in 1940. 20,684 Jews actually left between October, 1938 and July, 1939. This number included both Czechoslovakian Jews and Austrian and German Jewish refugees. In the puppet state of Slovakia, which was simultaneously carved out of the Republic, an anti-Jewish policy was pursued along the same lines as in Germany. Fifteen thousand Jews left Slovakia in the period from October, 1938 to July, 1939; at the same time the Slovak Government announced that the rest of the Jews would have to leave the country within three years. The outbreak of war largely halted regular emigration, but after the German conquest of Poland a policy of deportation to that country was substituted.

Although the same cannot be said of the Jews who had to flee from Slovakia, the Jewish refugees from the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia enjoyed certain advantages over

¹⁹Official figures published in January, 1939.

²⁰League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations* by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1939, p. 6.

their counterparts from Germany and Austria, especially in the period before the German occupation. The financial condition of Czech Jews was better than that of the Austrian Jews, and for a time they enjoyed greater opportunities than the German Jews of salvaging and exporting part of their fortunes. Antisemitism was not supported by the Czech people even after it had become the official policy. Finally, efforts were made by the Czechoslovak Government itself, in the interval between the Munich Pact and the establishment of the Protectorate, to help the mass of refugees within its borders²¹ and to arrange for their emigration.

The British and French Governments supported this effort by guaranteeing a loan of eight million pounds sterling to be floated in England by the Czechoslovak Government, and, in addition, decided to make a contribution of four million pounds each.²² The British-Czech loan agreement defined as refugees both inhabitants of ceded Czechoslovak areas before May 31, 1938 and Austrians who had fled to Czechoslovakia before September 30, 1938. The money was to be used both for the relief of refugees and for their emigration. Of the total loan, the following sums were allotted to facilitate migration: £500,000 for emigration to Palestine, £500,000 for emigration to Canada, and £300,000 for emigration to other countries. The sum allocated for Palestine was to be assigned to 500 Jews, each with a capital in Czechoslovakia amounting to £1,000, so that they might be able to present that sum to the Palestine authorities and qualify for admission as "capitalist" settlers. Families desiring to settle in Canada had to be allotted £200 to £800 each.

A special Czechoslovak refugee institute was established in

²¹There were four groups of refugees in Czechoslovakia at the time: political refugees from Germany and Austria, Jewish refugees from those two countries, Sudeten Germans and Jews, and Sudeten Czechs; altogether about a quarter of a million people, of whom some forty thousand were Jews.

²²*Bulletin of the Coordinating Committee for Refugees*, No. 2, p. 3 ff.

Prague to help all refugees, regardless of religious creed, political views, or race, who had to migrate further. During his visit to Prague in January, 1939, Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations, appointed a special representative in that city with the consent of the Czechoslovak Government. The program adopted by the relief agencies provided for emergency aid to the refugees while helping them to emigrate to other countries. Camps were built for Jewish refugees, and local Jewish organizations were granted considerable subsidies for the relief of destitute refugees.

4. JEWISH REFUGEES FROM ITALY

The Italian Jewish refugee problem, although far less extensive than that of the German and Austrian refugees, must be dealt with separately because of its special features. Italy did not enter the list of countries supplying Jewish refugees until a comparatively late date. Its anti-Jewish policy was inaugurated by the decree of September 2, 1938. For many years before this date, even during the Fascist regime, antisemitism had held no sway in Italy. In fact, Italy had been markedly hospitable to Jews, both native, naturalized, and immigrant. Many Jews from Eastern Europe, especially from Poland, had settled there after the First World War. Jewish students, excluded from universities in many European countries, had been admitted to Italian universities—and that, too, free of charge. Several thousand German Jewish refugees had found a haven in Italy.

The decree of September 2, 1938, which marked the end of this long tradition of tolerance and hospitality, ordered all Jews who had arrived in Italy or been naturalized after January 1, 1919, to leave the country within six months. All told, some 20,000 Jews were affected.²³ The date of their departure was postponed several

²³Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 124.

times; but, in the meantime, new decrees directed against the native Jewish population, made it clear that the Fascist Government was determined to get rid of all its Jews. Upon the outbreak of the present war, and especially after Italy's entrance into it on the side of Germany, concentration camps were established for Jews whom previous decrees had exiled. Although conditions in these camps were not so inhuman as in those of Germany, the technique employed was exactly the same: to exert pressure on those detained to make them emigrate, whether legally or illegally.

The number of Jewish refugees who left Italy in the five-year period between September 2, 1938, when the anti-Jewish policy was inaugurated by Mussolini, and September 3, 1943, when the Badoglio Government capitulated to the United Nations, is estimated at 6,000, or about ten percent of the total number of Jews in Italy. Thus the problem of the Italian Jewish refugees was greatly exceeded by that of the Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria, and even Czechoslovakia, both in absolute numbers and in relation to the community affected. As in Czechoslovakia, the civil population did not share the antisemitic attitude of the Government. Even among government officials there seemed to be little enthusiasm for this policy. Consequently the lot of the Italian Jewish refugee was relatively favorable. Inasmuch as only a small number were involved, they were able to find new homes overseas without too much difficulty. They were also allowed to take with them a considerable part of their property.

Most of the Italian Jewish refugees came to the United States, where they were assisted by the Sephardic community. Nearly all of them found positions here, mainly in the fields of medicine, science, engineering, and business.²⁴

²⁴Edward D. Kleinlerer, "The Italian Jewish Refugees and America," *The Jewish Forum*, January, 1942, p. 5.

One more point deserves mention, although its significance is not quite clear. Italy is the only state which tried to solve the Jewish refugee problem within the confines of her empire. Even before the inauguration of its anti-Jewish policy, the Italian Government had plans for creating a Jewish center in newly conquered Ethiopia. The decrees regarding the expulsion of Jews from Italy and her colonies deliberately omitted the name of Ethiopia, thus implying that Jews were free to go and settle there. However, very few Jews, if any, tried their luck in that country. The Italian Government finally gave up the idea of opening Ethiopia to Jewish refugees after receiving unfavorable reports from there.

It may be added finally that, with the capitulation of Italy to the United Nations in September, 1943, and with the subsequent repeal of the anti-Jewish measures by the Badoglio Government, the causes which had led to a Jewish refugee movement from Italy ceased to exist as far as the liberated, southern part of the country was concerned. On the other hand, in Central and Northern Italy, where the Germans retained their hold, and where a new Fascist republican puppet regime was set up, the plight of the Jewish population became as desperate as it is in any territory occupied or influenced by the Nazis. During the confusion which followed the change of regimes, several thousand Jews managed to escape from Northern Italy to Switzerland. But with the complete occupation of Central and Northern Italy by German forces, the possibility of such escape virtually disappeared.

5. THE JEWISH WAR REFUGEES

(a) *The General Situation*

Today, as in 1914, the Jewish war refugee movement is not a mere flight of civilians in a general war panic. It is more specifically motivated by fear of the Jew-hatred of the advancing

enemy. As in 1914, it is a flight marked by enforced separation of families, involuntary idleness, hunger, and epidemics.

But there are problems now of a magnitude and a kind without a parallel. In 1914 the refugees, whether Austrian or Russian, knew that they had to go to the interior of their respective countries. There, if not welcomed, as they were in Austria, they were at least enabled to find new homes for the duration of the war. In the present war, there is no country where the refugees are sure to be admitted. They have to wander abroad, being driven from one country to another.

The problem of maintaining the refugees, which was of secondary importance in World War I, is extraordinarily difficult now. Thirty years ago, the Austrian and even the Russian Government realized their responsibility toward the refugees and contributed toward their maintenance. Such governmental aid plays a very minor rôle today. The main bulwark which now stands between the Jewish refugees and starvation is the support of world Jewry. But even by taxing its resources to the utmost, the Jewish people can hardly maintain by itself the hundreds of thousands stranded without any means of subsistence in various countries.

The refugee problem of the First World War was of relatively short duration. The present war has already lasted more than five years, and nobody knows when it will be over, or whether the restoration of the refugees to their old homes will be possible even after the war is over. Hence the refugee problem today is infinitely more difficult than in the last war.

There are three main effects which the outbreak of war has had upon the refugee problem which arose in 1933. The number of refugees has expanded enormously. As against the several hundred thousand people who were expelled or who fled from Germany, Austria, Italy, and Czechoslovakia prior to the present

war, there are at this writing about one million and a half refugees. The number of countries from which Jews have had to flee has multiplied so that it now embraces practically every country in Europe. The war has rendered even more desperate the problem of placing refugees in new countries. The belligerent countries, including the British Dominions, have closed their doors to further immigration. The neutral countries have tried to admit as few immigrants as possible for fear of disguised spies and Fifth Columnists, or possible involvement in the war. What few opportunities for emigration there remained have been largely nullified by lack of transportation facilities.

At the same time, certain encouraging signs may be noted. With the outbreak of war, the refugee problem was recognized as an outgrowth of the policy of oppression and injustice against which the United Nations were now fighting. Although, for the time being, this recognition cannot find expression in more liberal immigration rules, it may be of importance in the future. The refugee is no longer alone as he was four or five years ago; he is backed by the great democratic Powers whose program calls, among other things, for redress of the wrongs done to him and his kind.

(b) *Refugees from Poland*

The greatest blow struck by the Nazis in this war has been against the Jews of Poland. They fled before the Nazi hordes in a vast stampede for every available border. One group succeeded in escaping from Poland to Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Lithuania. Their number did not exceed a few thousand, owing to the close watch maintained at the frontiers and the rapidity and spread of the German advance. A second and far greater stream, comprising some two or three hundred thousand refugees, flowed from the Nazi-occupied part of Poland to the eastern provinces

of that country which soon came under Russian rule. From their ranks came a third group of nearly 10,000 who tried to get to Vilna, which city they expected to be annexed to Lithuania.

Refugees who crossed the frontiers into neighboring countries like Rumania and Hungary were necessarily penniless, since, in their panicky flight, they were unable to take along even a tiny fraction of their possessions. For the most part they were reluctantly admitted for a few weeks' stay, and the authorities tried to get rid of them as soon as possible. In Rumania, the Government granted aid to refugees out of Polish funds available there; in addition, a Central Relief Committee for Polish Refugees was formed by private organizations. The refugees in that country, numbering about 2,000, were given temporary residence permits, which were periodically renewed. From time to time, however, the refugees were given notice to leave the country within a definite period. Part of the refugees eventually were able to go to Palestine. The majority, in other countries even more than in Rumania, had to struggle desperately for food and legal security. They were constantly threatened with deportation to their places of origin, which were occupied either by Germany or Russia. With the growth of German influence in Rumania and Hungary, many of them were in fact deported or put into concentration camps.

The best off, relatively speaking, were the refugees in the Vilna district. For the first few weeks after its incorporation into Lithuania, the authorities tolerated the influx into Vilna of fugitives from Nazi- and Russian-occupied Poland, whose number grew to some 10,000. An additional 1,800 or 2,000, whom the Germans had ejected from the Suwalki district of Poland, were admitted in the first week of November, 1939, after having spent weeks of untold suffering in No Man's Land. These refugees were distributed among the small towns of Southern Lithuania. Thereafter

the border was closed and no new refugees were admitted. In December, the Government introduced a bill in the Seimas providing for the creation of a refugee commissariat. This authority was to issue residence permits to refugees already admitted and to arrange for the deportation of later illegal immigrants. Refugees already residing in Vilna were permitted to remain there or to settle in small Lithuanian towns and villages.

Food and temporary shelter for the refugees were supplied, at least in part, by Jewish organizations, notably the Joint Distribution Committee and the World Jewish Congress, and by non-Jewish organizations as well. The Lithuanian Government also subsidized refugee aid—according to its announcement of November, 1939, in the amount of one million lits a month—by raising the official exchange rate for American relief funds. It was also possible to carry on certain cultural and social activities for refugees, including the training of youths for settlement in Palestine.²⁵

The Russian occupation of Lithuania in June, 1940, radically altered the situation. Nonetheless, for a time refugees were allowed to leave the country, and a considerable number of them left, mainly for the United States and Palestine. The remainder were given the choice of accepting Soviet citizenship.

In Soviet Russia there was no question of the legal status of refugees, at least in the first few months. The Russian authorities admitted refugees without any difficulty and legalized their stay in the country. Nor was the financial situation so desperate as elsewhere, since the Government tried to help the refugees by finding employment for part of them either in the occupied areas or in the interior. The problem confronting the refugees in Russia were of different nature: they had to adjust themselves to political

²⁵*The Tragedy of Polish Jewry*, edited by the Joint Committee for the Aid of the Jews of Poland, Appendix A, "The Refugee Problem in Lithuania," pp. 63-70.

and economic conditions entirely new to them.

Beginning with the first months of 1940, they faced the tragic problem of mass deportation to the interior. Tens of thousands of refugees were arrested by the authorities and sent to remote provinces, where they were put to work at hard manual labor under the severest conditions. The deportation came in four installments: February, 1940; April, 1940; June, 1940; June, 1941. Of these the second and third were the severest from the Jewish point of view, since those deported in April, 1940, consisted, apart from farm laborers and small farmers, of small traders and shopkeepers, mostly Jews, while those deported in June, 1940, were mainly professional men, merchants, journalists, and teachers, among whom the Jewish percentage was quite considerable. The total number of Polish nationals deported was estimated at one million at the least, of whom some 40 percent were Jews. The deportees were dispersed all over the vast area of the Soviet Union. They were placed in prison and labor camps, as well as in isolated villages, on collective farms, and in mining and industrial centers. A special category of men was mobilized for service in the Red Army or in construction units (the so-called "Stroy Battalions"). The deportees had to leave their homes and possessions on very short notice, rarely more than two or three hours. Once they reached their destinations, they were forced to do hard physical work, to which a great many of them were wholly unaccustomed. Moreover, the climate in the central provinces of the Soviet Union, which is much harsher than in Poland, as well as the lack of adequate shelter and clothing, seriously impaired the deportees' health and resistance to infections, thereby producing an appallingly high death rate. There certainly was no antisemitism in this brutal policy, affecting as it did Poles and Jews alike, but that did not lessen the suffering of the deported refugees. This phase of the problem came to an end in July, 1941,

when a Polish-Russian agreement was signed releasing such refugees. The problem of providing for their material needs, however, remained acute.

Relief activities for the Polish refugees were, until the break in Russian-Polish diplomatic relations in April, 1943, directed by the Polish Embassy. In order to extend aid from the Embassy offices first in Moscow and later in Kuibyshev, a network of local relief committees was established in the widely scattered places where refugees were concentrated. The cost of the relief activities was defrayed by the Polish Government out of its own means and from loans granted by the Russian and United States Governments. Further details about this relief work will be found in Chapter VIII.

Special relief activities have been undertaken by Polish and Jewish organizations in the United States. Among the Jewish organizations are the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Labor Committee, the World Jewish Congress, and the American Federation of Polish Jews. Prior to the diplomatic rupture, relief funds and supplies were forwarded to the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev. A certain part, however, was sent direct to individual refugees, under an agreement between the Polish and Russian Governments by virtue of which parcels shipped from the United States to Polish refugees in Russia were admitted duty-free.

Despite these considerable relief efforts, the great number of the refugees and their dispersion over the vast territory of the Soviet Union make their condition still very hard. Attempts have been made to enable part of them to emigrate to other countries, especially to Palestine, but the results are not very encouraging. No more than a few thousand refugees, mostly children, have so far gone to Iran and from there to Palestine. All the others have been refused exit permits by the Russian authorities. In view of its claims to the eastern provinces of Poland, the Soviet Govern-

ment is inclined to consider all Polish Jewish refugees Russian citizens, who are not allowed to leave the country.

Upon the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities and the subsequent occupation of Soviet-held territories by German armies, the Polish refugees living there had to flee before the enemy once again, this time together with great numbers of local Jews. It is impossible to state even approximately the number of these new fugitives, but it must certainly have run into the hundreds of thousands. They have been taken care of in Russia in the same way as the previous refugees.

The establishment of ghettos and the mass expulsions in Nazi-held Poland have created a final group of displaced persons. Strictly speaking, these cannot be regarded as refugees, since they remain in their own country. However, the degree of privation among these unfortunates, as regards the primary needs of food and shelter, is exceptional even for these days of mass suffering. How many of them have managed to survive, especially after the policy of mass extermination inaugurated by the Germans in the middle of 1942, it is hard to estimate. The general belief is that, of the over three million Jews in Poland before the war, no more than a few hundred thousand are left today.

(c) Refugees from France and Belgium

Eight months after the invasion of Poland, the German move on Western Europe caused a new wave of refugees. Only a few escaped from Denmark, Norway, and Holland, which were occupied with great speed. A much larger number left Belgium and sought refuge in France. After the French collapse and the subsequent occupation of the greater part of France by the Germans, the stream of refugees was still further swollen.

As against the more than two million Polish Jews forced to leave their homes, the number of refugees from France, includ-

ing the Belgian and German Jewish fugitives, was not much more than a hundred thousand. There is also a difference in the composition of these two refugee movements. In contrast to the almost homogeneous mass of Polish Jewish refugees, the Jewish refugees in and from France consisted of at least three distinct groups: (1) French Jews; (2) Jewish refugees from Belgium; (3) German Jewish refugees resident in France. Even the first group was far from homogeneous, since French Jewry itself is largely conglomerate, comprising French citizens, aliens, and stateless persons.

Unlike the Polish Jews, these refugees virtually had no choice as to where to go. With the exception of Portugal, there was no country in Europe to escape to. Even in Portugal they were admitted on condition that they proceed overseas. In most cases consequently, the refugees had to remain in unoccupied France. Before long, nearly 100,000 Jewish refugees, besides hundreds of thousands of non-Jewish, were gathered there at a time when chaos and want almost had the upper hand over the French Government. In their flight to Southern France, they must have cherished the hope that the new France would receive them in the traditional French spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Instead the refugees, especially those who were not French citizens, were coldly received and subjected to a violent campaign of hatred and persecution.²⁶ Upon the extension of the German occupation to the whole of metropolitan France in November, 1942, some of them managed to escape to Switzerland.

(d) *War Refugees from Other Countries*

Compared with the two large groups of Jewish war refugees from Poland and France, the others are of minor importance. They must nevertheless be mentioned here, albeit briefly, since,

²⁶For details, see Chapter VI.

in the aggregate, their number is larger than ever before in Jewish history. Jews fled from almost every country occupied or dominated by Germany—in great numbers where this was physically possible, as in the case of Poland, Belgium, or France, and in small groups where this possibility did not exist, as in Denmark, Norway, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

In addition, the mass deportations started by the Germans even before the war, became a common practice in the years following. Apart from the deportation of larger masses, two of the most tragic cases were those of the Jews of Alsace and Luxembourg. Of the 30,000 Alsatian Jews, some had been removed for their own safety to the interior by the French authorities; the Germans deported the rest to Southern France almost immediately after occupying Alsace. Owing to their French citizenship, they were treated by the Vichy Government somewhat better than other refugees. In September, 1940, the Jews were ordered to leave Luxembourg within a few weeks. Some of them were deported to Poland; others made their way to Portugal, from which, with the help of the Luxembourg Government-in-Exile, they went to overseas countries.

With the spread of the war to the Balkan countries, fresh groups of Jewish refugees made their appearance. Over 25,000 Rumanian Jews fled to Bessarabia when that province was occupied by Russia. Much smaller was the number of Jewish refugees from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, partly because the rapidity of the German occupation gave the Jews of these countries no time to escape, and partly because they would not have known where to flee even if there had been time.

There are no exact dates available on the number of Jewish refugees from the German-occupied territories of Soviet Russia, but it certainly must have run into the hundreds of thousands. All such refugees have been cared for by the Russian Government.

With the liberation of these territories, a return movement of the majority of the refugees may be expected.

These various refugee movements are sure to have a great, perhaps even a decisive, influence upon the future adjustment of Jews in Europe.

CHAPTER IV

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT

A. PALESTINE

Introductory—Characteristic Features—Immigration Laws and Policies—Illegal Immigration—Character and Importance of the Refugee Immigration into Palestine

1. INTRODUCTORY

From the very beginning of the present refugee movement and continuing up to now, Palestine has occupied a position of unique significance. Until 1937 it surpassed by far all overseas countries as a haven for refugee Jews from Europe. Even after political disturbances and immigration restrictions cut down the flow of refugees, it still admitted relatively large numbers. Together with the United States, Palestine remains one of the few countries still admitting refugees during the present war.

A couple of figures will serve to show the importance of Palestine as a country of refuge and settlement. From 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany, until the outbreak of the present war in September, 1939, Palestine absorbed almost ninety thousand Jewish refugees (including the so-called "illegal immigrants") from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. And despite the extremely difficult transportation conditions created by the war, and despite the growing reluctance of the Palestine Administration to permit any considerable influx of Jews into that country, the number of immigrants—all of them refugees—arriving there from the commencement of hostilities until the middle of 1943 exceeded thirty thousand.

2. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES

The prominent part played by Palestine in absorbing Jewish refugees is conditioned by certain factors not present elsewhere. First among these is its position as the Jewish National Home. Favored by the British Government in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, whose terms were later embodied in the Mandate for Palestine,¹ the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was also securely anchored in the will of the Jewish people. The concentration of Jewish immigrants in Palestine was therefore facilitated by international compacts and had behind it the psychological drive both of Jewish tradition and Jewish hope.

A second factor was the rapid economic development of the country, which made possible relatively easy absorption of refugees. The beginning of anti-Jewish persecution in Germany in 1933 found the world in the midst of a great economic crisis, during which the tremendous number of unemployed made admission of refugees almost impossible in most countries. In those same years Palestine enjoyed a period of economic prosperity which enabled masses of immigrants to find work or opportunities for investing their capital and to establish themselves at a decent standard of living. The refugees themselves, like earlier Jewish immigrants, contributed to the economic expansion which was based primarily on immigration and investment of capital, brought in by immigrants or contributed by Jews abroad. This was evident after 1937, when the restriction and contraction of immigration caused a decline in economic indices. Even in those years, however, the absorptive capacity of Palestine remained large and the number of unemployed, despite the constant stream of immigration, never assumed serious proportions.

¹Given effect by the Council of the League of Nations as of September 29, 1921 and endorsed by the United States in a treaty signed on December 3, 1924.

The ordinary type of anti-refugee feeling is scarcely known in Palestine. No trace of it can, of course, be found among the Jewish population, which is not only ready but anxious to receive as many refugees as possible, seeing in them collaborators in the work of building the Jewish National Home. Considerable difficulties are made by the Arab population and, under pressure from it, by the Mandatory Government of the country; but even these are not directed against the refugees as such. The attitude of the Arabs is dictated by their bitter opposition to the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and by their fear lest the constant influx of Jews may turn the latter into a majority of the population in a country which the Arabs regard as their own. This point of view has been largely adopted by the Mandatory Government, whose policy of curtailing Jewish immigration, especially since the riots of 1936, is a consequence of the will to appease the Arabs rather than of any economic considerations, or of general political or social considerations, as is the case in other immigration countries.

The Jews in Palestine form a third of the population, a far larger proportion than any other Jewish community. This numerical strength enables them to exert greater pressure in behalf of refugees than Jews do elsewhere; and although this pressure has not prevented increasing restrictions upon refugees of late years, it may be of greater effect at a future date. In assisting the refugees practically to adjust themselves in Palestine, the relatively great number of Jews and their economic strength have been factors of prime importance.

A final factor peculiar to Palestine is the existence of quasi-governmental Jewish institutions, notably the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which administer a systematic over-all policy directed toward the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home. The Jewish Agency is recognized in the Mandate as the legally accredited

agent of the Jewish people, for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Mandatory in matters of Jewish interest in Palestine, and helping to develop the country. Its Department of Immigration takes the responsibility for the transportation of refugees to Palestine and their absorption in the country. A highly organized apparatus enables the refugees to overcome many difficulties encountered in other countries. They are thus made to feel as equal members in their own national community, and their psychological adjustment is greatly aided. Of no less importance in this respect are the self-help institutions of Palestinian Jewry mentioned in Chapter XIII.

In no other country did Jewish refugees make difficult occupational readjustments so readily and in such numbers as in Palestine. This process was far easier in Palestine than in other countries. Economic opportunities arising out of the influx of capital were greater and psychological hindrances smaller than elsewhere. The painful consciousness of being forced into a "lower" occupation by changing from liberal or commercial professions to manual labor in agriculture or industry was eliminated or, at least, compensated in Palestine by the special value which the more strenuous work was felt to have for the upbuilding of the National Home.

It should be stressed, on the other hand, that in the consciousness of the Jewish people throughout the world, as well as of many non-Jews who are concerned about the problem of Jewish refugees, Palestine holds quite a different position as a haven of refuge than all other countries which have so far admitted refugees, or may possibly do so in the future. The fact that Palestine has succeeded in absorbing such a great number of refugees, and that it is deeply rooted in the hearts of Jews all over the world, leads almost automatically to the conclusion that it ought to be regarded as *the* haven *par excellence* for Jewish refugees,

and that its doors should possibly be open to all of them. This conviction has been expressed a number of times during the last few years at both Jewish and non-Jewish conferences, conventions, and meetings. Especially as regards Jewish children, it is being stressed again and again that it is the duty of mankind to bring them over to Palestine and assure their education and happy existence there. This may be the main reason for the important movement known as the Youth Aliyah (immigration of children to Palestine), which was successfully organized in the very first years of Nazi domination in Germany.² The immigration of children to Palestine has continued even during the present war, and it is significant that it has found its way to the Jewish Homeland even from such countries as the Soviet Union, where the emigration of people considered Soviet citizens—and all or nearly all refugees residing on the territory of the Soviet Union are so considered today—is generally not permitted.

3. IMMIGRATION LAWS AND POLICIES

Article 6 of the Mandate for Palestine instructs the Administration of Palestine to “facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions.” An authoritative interpretation of these terms was given in the Churchill White Paper published on July 1, 1922, after grave anti-Jewish riots staged by Arabs in May, 1921. While affirming that the Jewish people was in Palestine³ “as of right and not on sufferance,” the White Paper laid down the policy of restricting immigration according to economic absorptive capacity. New restrictive regulations were considered as a result of the anti-Jewish riots of 1929, in accordance with suggestions made by a governmental commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Shaw and by the land expert, Sir

²For an account of the Youth Aliyah, see pp. 444 and 482.

³Defined in the same document as including only the area west of the Jordan River.

John Hope Simpson. However, the new statement of policy (the so-called Passfield White Paper), issued in October, 1930, and declaring that there was no land available for further Jewish settlement and hence Jewish immigration ought to be more stringently controlled, was practically rescinded by a letter to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency, in February, 1931, wherein Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald laid down the principle that economic absorptive must be the sole limit restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine. This principle was also supported by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.

In practice the admission of Jewish immigrants to Palestine was based on certain selective principles and an administrative system in which the Government and the Jewish Agency both shared. Under the Immigration Ordinance of 1933 the following categories were eligible for admission to Palestine as immigrants:

A. Persons of independent means, which term includes:

- (i) Persons in bona fide possession and freely disposing of a capital of not less than £1,000;
- (ii) Members of liberal professions in possession of a capital of not less than £500; provided that the Director, Department of Migration, is satisfied that the need exists in Palestine for additional members of such professions;
- (iii) Skilled craftsmen in possession of a capital of not less than £250; provided that the Director, Department of Migration, is satisfied that the economic capacity of Palestine is such as to allow such persons to be absorbed in the practice of their trade or craft;
- (iv) Persons with a secured income of not less than £4 a month, exclusive of earned income;
- (v) Persons in *bona fide* possession and freely disposing

of a capital of £500; provided that the Director, Department of Migration, is satisfied that the capital of such persons is sufficient to secure them reasonable prospects of success in the pursuit they intend to enter, that they are qualified and physically fit to follow their proposed pursuits, and that their settlement in Palestine will not lead to the creation of undue competition in the proposed pursuits;

- B. (i) Orphans whose maintenance in or by public institutions in Palestine is assured until such time as they are able to support themselves;
- (ii) Persons of religious occupations whose maintenance is assured;
- (iii) Students whose admission to an educational institution in Palestine and maintenance are assured until such time as they are able to support themselves;
- C. Persons who have a definite prospect of employment in Palestine;
- D. Dependents of permanent residents or of immigrants belonging to categories A, B, and C.⁴

For the most part, persons meeting the requirements of Categories A, B, and D were freely admitted. The limit of absorptive capacity was of most practical importance in determining the number of persons of Category C admitted from time to time. Quotas or schedules were set up for such immigrants every half year, on the basis of statistically documented requests by the Jewish Agency. These requests, based on an estimate of the absorptive capacity of the labor market for the half-year, were checked and amended by the Government. The High Commissioner then granted a number of certificates for labor immigrants,

⁴Palestine Royal Commission, *Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by the Command of His Majesty, July, 1937*, pp. 282-283.

valid for a period of six months. Most such certificates were turned over to the Jewish Agency for distribution through its offices in various parts of the world. They were then granted to prospective immigrants, according to the Agency's accepted principles of selection.

The number of labor immigrants admitted under the C schedules was undoubtedly determined in the main by the economic situation. However, Jewish immigration was made a bone of political contention in Palestine and met with strong Arab opposition, partly spontaneous, and partly provoked by enemies of England and the Jews. Whenever a refugee boat arrived in Palestine, German and Italian broadcasting stations made extensive use of this in their propaganda in the Arab language. In an effort to sow discord in British Empire possessions and win allies for the coming war, these Powers incited Arabs to revolt and promised them independence in return for aid against Britain. This campaign was the more embarrassing because of the support lent to the rebellious Palestinian Arabs by already independent Arab states. Culminating in the Arab terrorism of 1936-1939, this political pressure had its effect on the number of labor immigrants whom the Government permitted to enter the country. Immigration schedules began to fall consistently below the Jewish Agency's estimates of absorptive capacity.

An open break with the previous rules of immigrant admission was made in the report of the Palestine Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel in July, 1937, in which they proposed a new conception of "absorptive capacity": "Speaking generally, the Administration so far as immigration is concerned has taken no account of political, social or psychological considerations, and indeed estimates of any such matters would have been directly contrary to the instruction in the Prime Minister's letter that the 'considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are

purely economic considerations.' We are satisfied that the situation in Palestine is such that immigration must be reviewed and decided upon all considerations and not on economic considerations only . . . the principle of economic absorptive capacity, meaning that considerations of economic capacity and these alone should determine immigration, is at the present time inadequate and ignores factors in the situation which wise statesmanship cannot disregard. Political and psychological factors should be taken into account."⁵

The Commission suggested that a "political high level" of 12,000 Jewish immigrants yearly for the next five years be laid down. Even this break with principles of the Mandate, as previously understood, they regarded as palliative only. The basic conclusion of the Royal Commission was that there was no hope of lasting peace under the Mandate. They therefore recommended partition of the country into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and several sections retained under British Mandate.

These suggestions, naturally, had the most shattering and confusing effect upon the Jews. A period of debate and negotiation followed during which severe immigration restrictions were maintained by the Administration. At the same time, the pressure on Jews in Europe and the menace of Nazi expansion grew greater with every day. Bitter conflicts took place in the offices of the Jewish Agency abroad, when they were confronted with the painful task of dividing the few immigration certificates among the many who desperately needed them. Refugees sent urgent telegrams to their relatives, who brought pressure on Jewish organizations, which in turn demanded action by the Jewish Agency.

When the November, 1938, pogroms took place in Germany, a plea was raised to admit 10,000 Jewish children from Germany. The Palestine Jewish community, together with World Zionist

⁵Palestine Royal Commission, *loc. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

Organization, was ready to assume all expenses for their transportation, maintenance, and education. When the full extent of the pogroms became known, the Jewish Agency offered its assistance and financial support for the absorption of 100,000 Jews in Palestine. The Government was willing to make only small concessions in its immigration policy during this critical period.

In November, 1938, also, the British Government published a summary of the report of a technical commission (the so-called Woodhead Commission) which had investigated the feasibility of plans for partitioning Palestine proposed by the Royal Commission. On the basis of this report the Government declared in a statement issued on November 9, that the plan of partition was impracticable. The implication was that the Mandate would remain the basis of administration. The statement gave specific assurance that "the international character of the Mandate . . . and [England's] obligations in that respect" would be kept "constantly in mind." In returning to the Mandate as the basis of its policy, England proposed to hold a conference with both Jews and Arabs in an effort to reach a common understanding. Failing agreement, the Government would then announce and enforce its own policy.

The Palestine Conference was convoked in London. On March 15, 1939, the Secretary for the Colonies submitted the British suggestions to both delegations and both sides rejected them. The Government then proceeded to implement its policy. On April 12, the *Palestine Gazette* published a new immigration ordinance, authorizing the High Commissioner, at his own discretion, to impose a maximum number for each category of immigration certificates, and a general overriding maximum for total immigration within a specified period. Finally, on May 17, 1939, appeared the British White Paper, *Palestine, Statement of Policy*.⁶ The

⁶British White Paper Cmd. 6019 of 1939: *Palestine, Statement of Policy*.

White Paper declared that the British policy in Palestine was to establish an independent Palestine state within a period of ten years, thus terminating the mandate. However, "the complete relinquishment of mandatory control in Palestine (at the end of the ten year transitional period) would require such relations between Arabs and Jews as would make a good government possible." In the meantime the British Government declared it would impose heavy restrictions on land sales to Jews and Jewish immigration into Palestine. With regard to immigration the Government stated that it found nothing in the mandate or in subsequent declarations which required it to limit Jewish immigration only by the country's economic absorptive capacity. It therefore proposed, subject to possible restrictions based on economic absorptive capacity, to limit Jewish immigration during the next five years to a quantity which would bring the Jewish population to about one-third of the whole Palestinian population. As calculated by Government statisticians, this would allow the admission of a total of 75,000 immigrants. Of these, 25,000 were to be refugees and the remainder would be admitted in yearly quotas of 10,000, any shortage in one year being added to the quotas for subsequent years. Measures were also to be taken to stop illegal immigration, and any illegal immigrants who could not be deported would be deducted from the yearly quotas.

The High Commissioner would remain ultimately responsible for deciding economic absorptive capacity, and would consult Jewish and Arab representatives before each periodic decision was taken. After the five years were up, no further Jewish immigration would be permitted "unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."

The White Paper policy was opposed by both Jews and Arabs. The Jewish Agency defined its attitude in an official statement reading as follows:

I

The effect of the new policy for Palestine laid down by the Mandatory Government in the White Paper of May 17, 1939, is to deny to the Jewish people the right to reconstitute their National Home in their ancestral country.

It is a policy which transfers authority over Palestine to the present Arab majority, puts the Jewish population at the mercy of that majority, decrees the stoppage of Jewish immigration as soon as the Jewish inhabitants form one-third of the total, and sets up a territorial ghetto for the Jews in their own homeland.

II

The Jewish people regard this breach of faith as a surrender to Arab terrorism. It delivers Great Britain's friends into the hands of those who are fighting her. It must widen the breach between Jews and Arabs and undermine the hope of peace in Palestine. It is a policy in which the Jewish people will not acquiesce.

The new regime announced in the White Paper will be devoid of any moral basis and contrary to international law. Such a regime can be set up and maintained only by force.

III

The Royal Commission, invoked by the White Paper, indicated the perils of such a policy. Speaking of the Jews, the Royal Commission stated that:

"Convinced as they are that an Arab Government would mean the frustration of all their efforts and ideals, that it

would convert the National Home into one more cramped and dangerous ghetto, it seems only too probable that they would fight rather than submit to Arab rule. And to repress a Jewish rebellion against British policy would be as unpleasant a task as the repression of Arab rebellion has been." The Government has disregarded this warning.

IV

The Jewish people has no quarrel with the Arab peoples. The Arabs are not a landless or a homeless race like the Jews, nor do they need a place of refuge. Jewish work in Palestine has had no adverse effect upon the life and progress of the Arab countries. Jewish colonization has benefited Palestine and all its inhabitants. The Royal Commission pointed out that in so far as the Balfour Declaration contributed to British victory in the Great War it contributed also to the liberation of the Arab race.

The Jewish people has shown its will to peace even in the years of the disturbances. It has refused to retaliate against Arab violence. But neither have the Jews submitted to the Terror, nor will they submit to it even after the Mandatory Government has decided to reward the terrorists by surrendering to them the National Home.

V

It is in the darkest hour of Jewish history that the British Government proposes to deprive the Jews of their last hope and to close their road back to their homeland. It is a cruel blow, doubly cruel because it comes from the Government of a great

nation which has extended a helping hand to the Jews and whose position in the world rests upon foundations of moral authority and international good faith.

This blow will not subdue the Jewish people. The historic bond between the people and the land of Israel will not be broken. The Jews will never accept the closing against them of the gates of Palestine nor let their National Home be converted into a ghetto. Jewish pioneers who in the past three generations have shown their strength in the upbuilding of a derelict country will from now on display the same strength in defending Jewish immigration, the Jewish home, and Jewish freedom.⁷

However, despite the Jewish Agency's declaration, the policy of the White Paper was implemented with regard to both land sales and immigration. And although the Permanent Mandates Commission handed down an opinion August 17, 1939, strongly impugning the White Paper policy as a breach of the mandate, it has been the basis of British administration in Palestine up to this time. No immigration schedule for Jews was approved for the period October, 1939 to March, 1940 (for non-Jews, 300 certificates were granted); for the period April-September, 1940, certificates were authorized for 9,350 persons of all immigration categories. For the period October, 1940-March, 1941, the Jewish Agency applied for 3,150 labor certificates, on the basis of a detailed survey of the economic position of the country. No schedule was approved for that period, but a statement was made to the effect that "replacement immigration certificates [granted to holders of certificates from earlier schedules who were prevented by the war from arriving in Palestine during the period of their validity] in strictly limited numbers may be granted in special circumstances where the admission of the holders of such authorities will be of clear advantage to the country." As a matter

⁷*Manchester Guardian*, May 19, 1939.

of fact, 300 such certificates were issued for all categories.⁸ No quota was granted from April to June, 1941, and only 850 replacement certificates were granted for the period of July-September, 1941 (750 for Jews and 100 for non-Jews), and 1,250 certificates together with 1,750 dependent certificates for the period September, 1941-March, 1942.⁹ For the period April-December, 1942, 5,500 immigration certificates were granted for Jews (an additional 100 were issued to non-Jews), and for the period January-March, 1943, 5,400 certificates. During the war period, as in earlier years, a stream of illegal immigrants continued to arrive in Palestine.

4. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Perhaps the most tragic feature of Palestine immigration history was the harsh treatment of refugees entering the country illegally. Yet, even though the Palestine Administration treated such refugees with the utmost severity, the desperate situation of Jews in Europe caused illegal immigration to continue. It was aided by the Jewish population in Palestine out of sympathy with the refugees and because of its indignation at the attitude of the Palestine administration. Before the outbreak of war, and even to a certain extent afterwards, it was also supported and sometimes even organized by the Nazis themselves.

"With the full knowledge of the governments concerned, the Jews are organized in groups of 3 to 700 in Germany, Poland, what was formerly Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary, then put aboard trains or Danubian steamers which carry them to designated embarkation ports. If they go by train, they are usually sent overland to Athens where they board small steamers for the crossing to Palestine. Most of the groups, however, use

⁸*Report of the Jewish Agency for Palestine for the Year 1940 with Addenda*, p. 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 14 ff.

the Danube and embark for the Holy Land from such Black Sea ports as Constanza and Sulina, Rumania, or Verna in Bulgaria. Hotels along the routes have been set up as way stops where the refugees are lodged and local Jewish groups act as welfare agencies to distribute food and supplies."¹⁰

The conditions of terrorism under which these transports were arranged are well described in the following excerpt:

"The Hamburg American Line in Germany openly advertises 'illegale Auswanderung' [illegal emigration] to Palestine. The lures of advertising circulars are backed by the Gestapo fear campaign. When passengers are needed, Jews are rounded up and threatened with the concentration camp unless they leave Germany. 'Where can we go?' they plead. 'Palestine,' replies the Gestapo. . . . For 'illegale Auswanderung' the Gestapo is ever ready to arrange the transfer of funds; visas and exit-permits appear magically. The German Danube Steamship Company hauls the refugees down the Danube to Rumanian ports. . . . Only the worst craft are used; vermin-infested freighters, discarded cattle-boats, leaky tankers. Accounts of their voyages read like tales of the old slave trade. Often when a boat that is already overloaded is about to sail, the Gestapo will force another 200 or 300 refugees on board."¹¹ There were, of course, some transports organized by responsible Jewish groups who were safely and efficiently landed on the Palestine coast with all possible speed and consideration. The world never heard of most of these. On the other hand, refugees who were taken aboard ship by purely commercial smugglers were often brutally robbed and maltreated.

When a refugee cargo fell into the hands of an unscrupulous Black Sea or Mediterranean skipper, he usually made a huge

¹⁰A. A. Michie, "The Jewish National Army," *The New Republic*, August 9, 1939.

¹¹Samuel Lubell, "War by Refugee," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 29, 1941.

profit on the voyage, sometimes amounting to from \$50,000 to \$100,000 net.¹² The boats were sometimes bought at auction ostensibly for scrap, so that the loss in beaching them in Palestine was of no account. For passage on deck the price of a first-class cabin transatlantic voyage was demanded. Then such things as these would happen: On one boat, the captain suddenly announced there was no water. Water appeared only after \$1,000 in watches, rings, and other jewelry was collected from the passengers. Then they were informed there was no food. When the captain had remained long enough at sea to get everything the passengers possessed, he finally landed the broken, destitute, and sickened cargo of refugees.

On reaching Palestine, it frequently appeared that the troubles of the refugees had only begun. If the refugees were apprehended, they were interned and attempts were made to deport them. This was frequently difficult, because the refugees carried no evidence of their citizenship. But, as late as December 3, 1940, in the midst of the war, a way was found to remove 1,584 refugees from Palestine to Mauritius, a British Empire Possession in the Indian Ocean.¹³

Thousands of other refugees were turned back by coastal patrol boats before they could be landed. A compilation made for only sixty days showed a total of eighteen boats and 5,627 refugees turned back from Palestine.¹⁴ This meant that the weeks of tossing on the sea began again, with all their hunger, illness, and despair. Some boats were five or six months at sea, making repeated unsuccessful attempts to unload their passengers in Palestine or even elsewhere. The *S.S. Liesel* landed 906 "wretched

¹²H. R. Knickerbocker in *Das Neue Tagebuch*, June 30, 1939.

¹³This was done in spite of the blowing up of the *SS Patria*—supposedly by a desperate passenger—in Haifa harbor on November 25, resulting in the deaths of over 200 refugees threatened with deportation.

¹⁴Knickerbocker, *loc. cit.*

and starving men, women, and children on small, uninhabited islands."

The tragedy of ships carrying illegal immigrants which were wrecked on their way to Palestine or after being refused entry, deserves particular mention. The Rumanian vessel *Salvador* sank in the Sea of Marmora in February, 1940, with the loss of over 200 lives; the survivors were brought to Palestine by another boat and immediately interned. In November, 1940, more than 1,770 Jewish refugees reached Haifa in two vessels; they were ordered deported and placed aboard the steamer *Patria*, which was to carry them back from Palestine. The *Patria* exploded in the harbor with the loss of 251 lives, and only then were the survivors allowed to remain in Palestine. In December, 1941, 769 Jewish refugees from Nazified Rumania set out for Palestine in a small, unseaworthy boat, the *Struma*. When they reached Turkish waters off Istanbul, the Turkish Government refused to let the exiles land unless it was assured that the Palestine Administration would permit them entry into Palestine. Repeated efforts by the Jewish Agency for Palestine to secure such permission having failed, the Turkish authorities on February 24, 1942, compelled the *Struma* to put to sea, notwithstanding the insistence of the captain that she was in no condition to do so. On reaching the open sea, the ship exploded with the loss of all but two on board.

The following list attempts to give a picture of the boats at sea in the years 1939-40, all destined for Palestine. This list is not complete, since a number of boats succeeded in landing their passengers unnoticed.

<i>Name of Boat</i>	<i>No. of Passengers</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
<i>Aghios Mikoioros</i>	700	Boat was fired at by the English.
<i>Astir</i>	641	Landing was impossible.
<i>Assini</i>	270	Passengers not allowed to leave the boat.
<i>Atlantic</i>	1875	1,584 passengers transported to Mauritius.
<i>Braslo</i>	650	Pestilence; provisional landing in Beirut.
<i>Flandre</i>	unknown	Passengers allowed to land.
<i>Los Perios</i>	400	Alleged mutiny; boat towed into the port of Haifa.
<i>Liesel</i>	906	Passengers removed from other boats; fate unknown.
<i>Marmora</i>	500	Disappeared.
<i>Marsis</i>	unknown	70-ton boat; landed passengers on Aegean islands.
<i>Milos</i>	709	Passengers removed to <i>Patria</i> .
<i>Osiris</i>	600	Passengers could not land in Palestine.
<i>Orinocco</i>	unknown	Passengers permitted to disembark.
<i>Pentcho</i>	500	Voyage took five months; passengers landed on Dodecanese islands.
<i>Parita</i>	870	Crew ran boat ashore; forced landing of passengers.
<i>Pacific</i>	1062	Passengers removed to <i>Patria</i> .
<i>Patria</i>	1900	Explosion on boat; 251 killed.
<i>Praslo</i>	650	Typhus epidemic; landing permitted.
<i>Panagiya Corrostrio</i>	182	59 ton boat; landing forced.
<i>Rimi</i>	450-500	Fire broke out on boat; passengers disembarked on islands.
<i>Salvador</i>	380	Storm in Sea of Marmora; 200 refugees drowned.
<i>Sandu</i>	unknown	Passengers permitted to land.
<i>Sanloo</i>	400 (approx.)	Compelled to return to Constanza.
<i>Struma</i>	700	Boat sunk with all passengers; two survivors.

<i>Name of Boat</i>	<i>No. of Passengers</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
<i>Thessalia</i>	550	Passengers not permitted to land; fate unknown.
<i>Thessalia</i>	660	Passengers not permitted to land; fate unknown.
<i>Thessalia</i>	780	Rescued—many from SS <i>Salvador</i> —were permitted to land.
2 unknown boats	3000	Greek boats; sailed under Panama flag; fate of boats unknown. ¹⁵

Many refugees who were interned were later legalized, and their number was deducted from the immigration certificates for refugees and other emigrants entering Palestine through the regular channels.

The number of illegal immigrants who succeeded in entering Palestine is, of course, impossible to state precisely. Jewish Agency statisticians estimate that some 30,000 of them got into Palestine during 1938 and 1939. The *London Times*, on May 31, 1939, estimated them at about 7,000. The statistics of the British Government record 11,156 unauthorized immigrants in 1939 and 5,898 in 1940, who remained in Palestine. At the end of 1941, the number of illegal immigrants residing in Palestine was put at 18,411, but in reality it was much higher.

5. CHARACTER AND IMPORTANCE OF THE REFUGEE IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

Statistics on the immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine since 1933, as well as their structure and the capital brought in by them, are given in Chapter XI. From these figures there may

¹⁵The above list was compiled on the basis of following sources: *Jewish Chronicle*, June 9, 1939; *Saturday Evening Post*, March 29, 1941; *Das Neue Tagebuch*, June 30, 1939; *Pariser Tageszeitung*, April 25, 1939; May 19, 1939; June 30, 1939; July 18, 1939; August 3, 1939; *Aufbau*, November 29, 1940; January 31, 1941; *New York Times*, November 26, 1940; February 28, 1942; *Contemporary Jewish Record*, Vol. III, 1940, p. 301; Vol. IV, 1941, p. 428.

be seen the tremendous importance of this movement for the development of the country. Over one-third of the Jewish immigration into Palestine since World War I and one-fourth of the present Jewish population consist of people who came as refugees in the past eleven years. Because of their age and occupational structure (we are speaking of the new occupations chosen after arrival in the country), as well as the considerable amount of capital imported by them, the refugees proved a great boon to Palestine by stimulating the agricultural and industrial activities of the country. The fact that the influx of German Jewish refugees into Palestine began almost immediately after the rise of the Nazi regime, and that in the first years of that regime it was still possible to save part of the refugees' property and invest it in Palestine, was of the utmost importance in this regard. There was a strong interdependence and mutual influence between the economic development of the country and the influx of refugees. On the one hand, Palestine, thanks to its economic vigor, was able to absorb the stream of refugees; on the other, the energies and resources of the country were greatly and continually enhanced by them.

The following few figures regarding the progress of Palestine Jewish economy in the six years of German Jewish refugee immigration preceding the war—1933-1939—may suffice to show the unique economic importance of this immigration. In the course of those six years, the value of Jewish agricultural production in Palestine rose from £P2,200,000 to 4,500,000. Up to November, 1940, 9,530 German Jewish refugees were settled on the land, 1,400 of them in eleven new middle-class settlements, 700 in the old-established colonies, 1,000 in the individual settlements of the Jewish workers (the so-called *Moshave Ovdim*), 3,600 in the cooperative settlements of Jewish labor (the so-called *kvutzoth* and *kibutzim*), and the remainder in several other types of farm

settlements. The capital invested in this colonization alone was close to two million Palestinian pounds.¹⁶ The value of the Jewish industrial output increased from £P5,352,000 to 9,109,000; the number of people employed in industry grew from 20,000 to 38,000, while the amount of capital invested in it mounted from £P5,400,000 to 12,000,000. Indeed, from 1933 to 1937 alone—*i.e.*, during the first four years when the German Jewish influx into Palestine was numerically and economically strongest—the number of Jewish industrial enterprises increased from 3,388 to 5,606, the number of persons employed therein rose from 19,595 to 30,040, the value of their annual output grew from £P5,352,000 to 9,109,000, and the invested capital from £P5,371,000 to 11,637,000.¹⁷ There is no doubt that all these achievements are largely due to the immigration of refugees. The same steady growth may be noted during the war years that followed. As stated above, over thirty thousand new refugees arrived in Palestine from the outbreak of hostilities until the middle of 1943. During the same period, 20 additional Jewish farm settlements were established; the number of people employed in agriculture rose from 20,000 in 1939 to 30,000 in 1942, the number employed in handicraft and industry from 38,000 to 60,000, and the number employed in the building trades and on public works from 14,000 to 24,000. While the great advance of the country's economic life may in large measure be attributed to the war effort of Palestinian Jewry, it is certainly connected also with the influx of refugees, without whom many an important wartime task could hardly have been accomplished.

¹⁶Dr. L. Krolik, "Wirtschaftliche Einordnung in der Landwirtschaft," *Mitteilungsblatt der Hitachduth Olej Germania We Olej Austria* (hereafter cited as *Mitteilungsblatt*), Sondernummer "Sieben Jahre Alijah," November 8, 1940.

¹⁷Dr. Alfred Markus, "Die deutschen Juden im Aufbau der Industrie," *ibid.*

Nor was it only in the economic life of Palestine that the influence of the German Jewish refugees was felt so strongly. It made itself no less felt in the spiritual life of the country. This fact found striking expression in the development of Palestine's highest institution of learning, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which absorbed a considerable number of German Jewish refugee scientists and scholars (21 professors and many junior assistants and research fellows), among them many of great renown (e.g., Professors Julius Guttman, Isaac Fritz Baer, Harry Torczyner, and Hanokh Albeck, of the Institute of Jewish Studies; Richard Koebner, Martin Buber, Hans Lewy, Hans Jacob Polotsky, and Ladislaus Farkas, of the Faculties of Science and of Humanities; Ludwig Halberstaedter, Ernst Wertheimer, Bernhard Zondek, Carl Neuberg, and Leonid Doljansky, of the Pre-Faculty of Medicine and the Post-Graduate Medical School). At the same time there was a very considerable increase in the number of German Jewish students at the Hebrew University, where they now constitute approximately one third of the total enrollment.¹⁸

Quite considerable, too, was the influence of the German Jewish refugees upon the growth of the artistic life of the country. The fact that, from 1933 on, there arrived in Palestine several hundred artists and, along with them, tens of thousands of people accustomed all their lives to be "consumers" of art, turned Palestine into the artistic, as well as economic, center of the Near East. Prominent painters and sculptors opened up new vistas before the Jewish public in Palestine. At the Bezalel Hechadash school of art and crafts, founded in Jerusalem by Joseph Budko in 1933, many of the teachers and 70% of the students are German Jews. The German Jewish immigration also made possible the splendid progress of musical life in Palestine under eminent conductors

¹⁸"Die hebraeische Universitaet und die deutsche Alijah," *Mitteilungsblatt*, November 15, 1940.

(Taube, Friedlaender), which fact inspired Bronislaw Huberman with the idea of a Palestine orchestra, an idea which materialized in 1936, with the opening concert conducted by Arturo Toscanini. The German Jewish influence was less felt in the theatrical (and also literary) field owing to the difficulties of language; but even there the development of the two most important theaters in Palestine, "Habima" and "Ohel," was influenced by prominent German Jewish actors and directors (Lindberg, Lobe), while Palestine's only drama publishing house was founded by Margot Klausner, a German Jewess.¹⁹

Even Palestinian sport was strongly influenced by the German Jewish refugees. Whereas, prior to 1933, football had been the only sport of importance in Palestine, the German Jews, among whom were many important teachers of gymnastics and sport, introduced several new ones, especially light athletics and aquatic sports. In addition, they established many new sport organizations and institutions and at the same time helped to strengthen sport relations with the neighboring countries of the Near East.²⁰

The great and, in many respects, decisive influence of the German Jewish refugees on Jewish life in Palestine cannot, however, obscure the fact that they had, and still have, to cope with many grave difficulties. The number of German Jewish immigrants in Palestine before 1933 had been insignificant, the overwhelming majority of the Jewish immigration into that country until then having stemmed from Eastern Europe, mainly from Russia and Poland. The new arrivals from Germany had very few, if any, relatives or friends from whom they might expect guidance and assistance. To be sure, the Jewish Agency for Palestine and, in particular, the Central Bureau for the Settlement of

¹⁹About the influence of German Jews on the artistic life of Palestine, read Manfred Geis, "Metamorphose durch Kunst," *Mitteilungsblatt*, December 13, 1940.

²⁰Cf. Fritz Lewinsohn, "Umwaelzung durch Sport," *ibid.*

German Jews did their best to obviate the bad effects of this situation; but even under the best conditions, this could scarcely take the place of actual personal relations.

Moreover, the German Jews were in general more distant from the life in Palestine than the earlier Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. To begin with, they had to overcome great difficulties in the matter of language. Having been born and educated in a German atmosphere, they had in a majority of cases no knowledge of Hebrew at all and the process of acquiring the language of the Palestine Jewish community, although fostered by them very energetically, proceeded slowly and with many setbacks. For many years German remained the language of their daily life, and it was in that tongue that their newspapers and other publications were issued. The Jewish community of Palestine, very sensitive on this point, resented this and the German Jews were continually accused of disturbing the process of the country's Hebraization. This controversy over the use of German in Palestine has played a considerable part in the life of the German Jewish refugees. While this is of a purely practical character, since in principle there is no difference of opinion as to the need of rapid Hebraization, and while the problem as such does not exist for the second generation born or at least educated in Palestine, it is still quite vexatious.

No less serious are the difficulties created by the mentality of the German Jews, which differs considerably from that of the other elements of Palestinian Jewry. The German Jews, having been brought up in the peculiar German atmosphere, with its somewhat exaggerated sense of order and discipline, being moreover thoroughly assimilated and knowing very little, if anything, about Jewish life, find it difficult to understand the Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. The misunderstanding is mutual. The majority of the Jewish community of Palestine is irritated by

the German Jews' pedantic sense of order, their lack of mental agility, and their insignificant Jewish education. The German Jew, for his part, is often shocked by what he considers the disorder or lack of genuine culture among the East European Jewish immigrants. Thus a gulf is forming between the two sections of the population which cannot easily be bridged.²¹

Not all Palestinian Jews, to be sure, share this critical attitude toward the German refugees. Several efforts have been made to defend them against the various accusations and to express appreciation of the very important services rendered by them to the Jewish community. The controversy over this question still engrosses Jewish public opinion both in Palestine and abroad. The German Jews, of course, are far from admitting the charges made against them, even in the matter of language. They point to their unconditional acknowledgment of Hebrew as the language of the Palestine Jewish community and to their efforts to make it as soon and as efficiently as possible their own tongue. But they are opposed—as is a very considerable part of the Jewish population of Palestine—to a policy of enforcing the dominance of that language in a way which cannot but be detrimental to the cultural interests of the older generation, for whom some literature in German must be provided in the period of transition. Similarly they refute all other accusations leveled at them. But not satisfied with that, the more active elements among them have taken the offensive, emphasizing the rôle which, in their opinion, the German Jewish immigration is destined to play in improving the inner relations of Palestinian Jewry, especially during the emergency created by the present war. Stress is laid upon the harm resulting from the fact that the Jewish population of Palestine is split into so many parties, and upon the need of rallying

²¹Concerning this, read Dr. Erich Kraemer, "Entfremdete Brüeder," *Mitteilungsblatt*, April 5, 1940.

it around the paramount tasks of the present period which are, on the one hand, to win the war and, on the other, to alleviate the misery and hardship caused by it. The question whether it is possible to rally a large section of Palestinian Jewry around such a program, and whether the self-help organization of the German Jews could serve as the center of such a movement, is being heatedly discussed in leading German Jewish refugee circles.²² In this connection, the necessity is stressed of having the German Jewish immigrants participate much more actively in the work of the Jewish community and its various organs. Already the Hitachduth Olej Germania has figured several times as such in various elections (especially to the municipal councils of Tel Aviv and Hadar Hacarmel), scoring rather considerable successes and co-operating mostly with the progressive factions in the respective bodies. The trend to a political movement and perhaps even to a new party thus indicated, has reached its climax in the crystallization of the Alijah Chadasha group, composed mainly of German Jews, which may yet play a considerable rôle in the political life of Palestinian Jewry.

In comparison with the very significant character and achievements of the German Jewish refugees in Palestine, the part played by the refugees from other countries, who have arrived mostly during the present war, is less conspicuous. Nearly all of them found here groups and organizations with which they had previously been connected and were absorbed by them without great difficulty. However, the voluntary character of some of them still finds expression in the formation of groups stressing their ties with the Jewries of their countries of origin, whom they are trying to help, and whose spokesmen they consider themselves even at the present moment. This tendency is particularly noticeable

²²See, for example, Siegfried Moses, Politische Aktion," *Mitteilungsblatt*, November 15, 1940.

among the Jewish refugees coming from Poland, who have constituted in Palestine the political representation of Polish Jewry and are acting on its behalf, but similar tendencies are discernible also among the Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, and other refugee groups.

In general it may be stressed once more, that there is scarcely another country in the world whose social life has been so strongly influenced by the refugee movement since 1933 as that of Palestine. It may even be said without any exaggeration that the economic, cultural, and political life of the country, especially of the Jewish community, would not be what it is today if it were not for those one hundred and twenty thousand men and women whom the most brutal persecution in history has driven to the shores of Palestine, forcing them to build their life anew within the frame of the great and historic work of establishing the Jewish National Home.

CHAPTER V

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT B. THE UNITED STATES

*Introductory—Characteristics of Refugee Settlement in the
United States—Immigration Laws—Wartime Immigration
Regulations—Alien Registration and Control—Refugees
and the War Effort*

1. INTRODUCTORY

In the tradition of the United States of America, and in the view of other nations as well, it has been a distinctive function of this country throughout its history to serve as an asylum for refugees. The leading spirits of the New World have plainly stated the will of this nation to take up those who have been ejected by violence from the Old, and compose with them a freer and more equitable society. In his presidential inaugural address on December 8, 1801, Thomas Jefferson said, "And shall we refuse the unhappy fugitives from distress that hospitality which the savages of the wilderness extended to our fathers arriving in this Land? Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on this globe?"¹ The sentiments of Jefferson have been echoed by the incumbent President of the United States:

Every American takes pride in our tradition of hospitality to men of all races and creeds. One of the great achievements of the American commonwealth has been the fact that race

¹Quoted by Madge M. McKinney, "The Right of Asylum," *Social Work Today*, December, 1939, p. 5.

groups which were divided abroad are united here. . . . Because of the very greatness of this achievement we must be constantly vigilant against the attacks of intolerance and injustice. . . . We must remember that any oppression, any injustice, any hatred is a wedge designed to attack our civilization.²

On February 20, 1941, President Roosevelt again declared in a letter to William Rosenwald, president of the National Refugee Service:

Every American must be proud that throughout these troubled years our country has held fast to its tradition of providing a haven of refuge for those who had to flee from other lands. It is necessary today more than ever before that this tradition of asylum be maintained.³

In line with this tradition of hospitality, the gates of the United States remained relatively open to immigrants, who arrived in large masses, until after World War I. Except with respect to Far Eastern peoples, the first really restrictive measures acting to exclude immigrants from the United States were the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924. Even under the rules initiated by these acts, it has been possible for the United States to absorb nearly 200,000 Jewish refugees since 1933, thus maintaining its ancient and honorable place as a haven for the oppressed. This number is larger than the total of Jewish refugees resettled in any other country.

²Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Letter of March 2, 1940 to the Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born. Quoted from *Our Democracy in Action: The Philosophy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt as found in his Speeches, Messages, and other Public Papers*.

³Refugees . . . 1940: *Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.*, p. ii.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

The capacity of the United States to absorb large numbers of refugees rests primarily, of course, on the vast resources of this country and its extensive and developed productive economy. When the years of deep depression from 1929 to 1934 were behind it, the American economy, more and more overcoming its own difficulties, was easily able to accommodate the thousands of refugees who came.

Their adjustment was greatly facilitated by the highly developed social work organizations characteristic of the American Jewish community, and particularly by the special refugee-serving institutions which were organized. Instrumental also were local and federated *landsmannschaften* or societies of Jews from individual European countries and localities. These organizations kept in close touch with their old homes in Europe and exerted themselves constantly to aid refugees from there. Among German Jews in America, many of whose antecedents had been American citizens for several generations back, there were no such *landsmannschaften*; but their attachment to the memories of their ancestry remained strong enough to cause descendants of German Jewish immigrants of the 1860's and earlier to devote considerable effort to refugee-aid activities.

While these factors mitigated the difficulties of refugee readjustment, there were also circumstances causing problems specifically American. There is a general tendency of Jewish immigrants and refugees to concentrate in big cities everywhere. This reached its high-water mark in the United States where the overwhelming majority of refugees settled in New York City, with its population of seven millions of whom two million are Jews. This concentration in New York had long been noted as characteristic of United States immigration, but in the early years of the refugee move-

ment it was seen to be especially marked among the refugees. 63.2% of them went to the State of New York in 1934, 68% in 1935, and 64.2% in 1936, as against 43%, 48.7% and 51% respectively among other immigrants.⁴ The economic absorption of the newcomers was made harder by this crowding into one place, and the willingness of the general population to receive and welcome them was also likely to be impaired. Consequently, great efforts have been devoted to resettlement of refugees in widespread localities in the United States, and facilities organized to help them to establish themselves there.⁵

The occupational readjustment of refugees is quite a stubborn problem in the United States. Nothing comparable to the shift to new occupations in Palestine under the stimulus of the ideal of the National Home and with the aid of its colonizing apparatus has taken place here. The refugees who came to the United States were older, on the whole, and even more concentrated in the white collar trades than those who went to Palestine. In most cases they attempted to continue in their former professions. In the United States, with its mighty productive resources and highly developed economy, there is obviously some possibility of adjustment in this way. However, such a conservative method of adjustment swiftly approaches its limit. Instead of preparing the ground for the reception of additional refugees, it complicates matters for them and may thus be harmful to all refugees, in the long run.

Another very painful problem for refugees in America arose because of the fact that millions of Germans live in the United States. Substantial groups of this vast population, many concen-

⁴Harold Fields, *The Refugee in the United States*, p. 118.

⁵Regarding the organizational and financial problem of resettlement, see Samuel A. Goldsmith, "Local Organization for Refugee Service," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, September, 1940, p. 119 ff.; Dan S. Rosenberg, "Resettling German Refugees outside of New York," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, December, 1938, p. 254 ff.

trated in the centers of refugee reception, but also exerting an influence throughout the country, were the ideological enemies of the refugees. Anti-refugee propaganda in the United States received strong support from such circles and the refugee, upon arriving in this country, encountered the same hatred on their part as in the country he left. The outbreak of war has reduced German propaganda in this country and somewhat improved the psychological position of the refugees. However, there are still great difficulties in this respect.

Despite all difficulties, there is no country in the world except Palestine and, to a certain degree, Great Britain, where the position of refugees is so fortunate as in the United States. The hate-propaganda conducted against the refugees by Nazi groups in almost every country had only relatively minor effects here. That refugees feel secure here, on the whole, is evident. In many other countries a period of months or even years passes before the refugee finally decides to remain permanently—not to speak, of course, of the large number who travel farther to try their luck in another country. Such cases seldom occur in the United States. The refugees feel a necessity to identify themselves with the new community, as is proved very clearly by the rapidity with which applications for first papers are filed. The records of naturalization agencies show that the largest percentage of current first paper applications comes from German Jewish immigrants.⁶

3. IMMIGRATION LAWS

For European immigrants very few legal restrictions upon entry to the United States existed until 1921. The Immigration Act of 1882 and subsequent legislation excluded criminals (unless convicted of "political" crimes), paupers, and physical and

⁶Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 467.

mental defectives; the Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 forbade the entry of laborers under contract of employment in the United States; and the Immigration Act of 1917 barred illiterates over sixteen years of age. The general run of European immigrants were not affected until the new rules of the 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts.

Under these acts maximum annual quotas were assigned for immigrants of various countries wishing to enter the United States. The intended effect of these quotas was to cut down the total number of immigrants and also to make their nationality distribution, which in the years preceding 1914 was heavily weighted with Eastern and Southern Europeans, conform to that of the general American population. The method of calculating immigration quotas in force during the years of refugee immigration up to the present is the "national origins" plan, provided for in the Immigration Act of 1924 and put into effect by an Executive Order of President Hoover on March 22, 1929. Under this plan the maximum annual total of immigrants admitted under quotas⁷ is about 154,000; the quota for each nationality is determined roughly in proportion to the percentage "of inhabitants" in continental United States in 1890 whose origin by birth or ancestry is attributable to the territory of that nation.

The above laws were generally applicable to refugees as well as other classes of immigrants. The special position of refugees was recognized only by a few exemptions granted them. Thus immigrants who could prove they were seeking admission to the United States in order to escape religious persecution in the country of their last permanent residence were excused from the

⁷The immigration acts also provide for various types of non-quota immigrants, such as children, husbands, and wives of American citizens, students, and ministers of religion.

literacy test.⁸ While this provision was of small significance for Jewish refugees in the period after 1933, another legal provision was of greater importance. Section 7c of the Immigration Act of 1924 reads: "The immigrant shall furnish, if available . . . two copies of his dossier and prison record and military record, two certified copies of his birth certificate, and two copies of all other available public records . . ." The words "if available," intended in behalf of refugees, were inserted in the law only after much discussion in Congress. It was realized that refugees from political or religious persecution would have difficulty in obtaining the required documents from their governments.

The actual application of the United States immigration laws depends to a large extent upon executive and administrative orders, so that it is possible to relax or tighten the restrictions on immigration, within the upper limit of the legal quotas, as circumstances may require. Thus on September 8, 1930, at a time when the financial crisis was assuming an ever more severe form, President Hoover sent instructions to consuls issuing immigration visas tending to restrict the number of immigrants. He ordered the consuls to interpret in a strict sense the provisions of the immigration laws, particularly those requiring that the immigrant must not become a public charge. The immigrant had either to show sufficient financial means himself or guarantors in the United States. Similar requirements which consuls might make before granting "visitors' visas" were to be utilized at the discretion of consuls. Americans who were receiving visitors from abroad might be required to give a sworn statement that their guest intended to remain only for a limited stay; or to give bond guaranteeing their departure after six months or some other

⁸Cf. Read Lewis and Marion Schibsy, "Status of the Refugee under American Immigration Laws," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 74.

period set by the immigration authorities; or to guarantee they would not become public charges.

These regulations were still in effect in 1933, applying both to refugees and to ordinary immigrants. On September 7, 1933, a petition was submitted to President Roosevelt by the American Civil Liberties Union, signed by the officers of the Union and thirty-four distinguished leaders of American public opinion, including such men as Charles Beard, Felix Frankfurter, Dr. Alvin Johnson, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Rev. Percy G. Kammerer.⁹ The petition described the plight of the German refugees and urged President Roosevelt to instruct the American consuls that a liberal policy be applied and as many refugees as possible be admitted within the limits of the quota. In particular it proposed that the order issued by President Hoover on September 8, 1930 be relaxed in all cases where refugees were concerned, and visas be granted to them if it appeared *probable* that they would not become public charges. The petition also suggested that American consuls be reminded that no police certificates need be demanded from refugees; and that their attention be called to the historic tradition that religious and political refugees could claim asylum in the United States.

In response to such pleas, Secretary of State Cordell Hull instructed the consuls to be lenient toward applicants for visas whose lack of "dossiers" and similar documents would otherwise prevent their immigration, and to forego this requirement, especially in cases where the applicant stood in some personal danger.¹⁰ However, in the first five years of the Nazi regime the number of immigrants admitted from Germany never reached

⁹*Asylum for Refugees under our Immigration Laws: Views of some Distinguished Contemporaries and Leaders of Public Opinion of earlier days on Asylum and their Application to German Political and Religious Refugees*, pp. 11-19.

¹⁰Letter from Mr. Cordell Hull to Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, May 12, 1934; cf. also Immigration Act 1924, Sec. 7c.

the full German quota. In part this was because Jews still hoped to find some way of adjusting themselves in Germany, or at least of arranging their emigration in a gradual and orderly fashion.¹¹ As a result, up to June, 1939, only 73,322 immigrants came into the United States under the German quota, although 183,112 immigrants might have been legally admitted.¹²

The full German and Austrian quotas were utilized, however, after 1938. It was necessary for new instructions to be issued to consuls in order to facilitate refugee immigration. The procedure of issuing visas was revised to cut formalities and speed matters up. 90% of the German-Austrian quota was regularly assigned to offices in Vienna, Berlin, Hamburg, and Stuttgart. The remaining 10% was distributed to consuls in other countries for the use of persons resident there who were born in Germany and thus came under the German quota.¹³

At the same time President Roosevelt ordered that visitors' visas which had been granted, it is estimated, to some 15,000 German Jewish refugees, be extended to enable them to stay in the country as long as necessary. The text of this order stated that it would be "cruel and inhuman" to send the refugees back for probable imprisonment or internment in concentration camps. The State Department also issued a public statement urging the democratic governments to redouble their efforts to find a solution for the refugee problem.¹⁴ The efforts of the Government in behalf of refugees were seconded by private individuals and groups. In the United States, more than in any other country,

¹¹See Chapter III.

¹²Richard C. Hertz, "Background of our Present German Refugee Problem," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, December, 1940, p. 247.

¹³Cecilia Razowsky, "How the Refugees Reach This Country," *Social Work Today*, December, 1939, p. 16.

¹⁴Nathan Caro Belth, "The Refugee Problem," *American Jewish Yearbook*, Vol. 41 (1939-1940), p. 379.

refugee-aid work is regarded as the common task of all creeds, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, and of various groups.¹⁵ A fine example of this social responsibility was given by the American public in the field of student refugee aid. A program initiated in 1938 by Harvard University had already succeeded, in its first years, in enlisting for the cause 200 colleges in forty States and the District of Columbia. The refugee students whose admission and maintenance was thus secured were selected by the International Student Service. 270 scholarships were obtained in the first year, and 112 of them with a total value of \$100,000, or an average of \$900 each, were filled by the International Student Service.¹⁶

Several other measures were discussed for increasing the number of refugees admitted. It was proposed to use the unused quotas of past years, to issue visas on account of the quotas for future years, to enact a special refugee law for a limited period, to put the total annual quota of 154,000 at the disposal of refugees no matter what their national origin, to amend the present immigration law and enlarge the quotas, and to admit children outside the quota in view of the fact that they do not compete on the labor market. But nothing so far has been done to put these suggestions into action through existing legislative and administrative channels.

Even the idea of admitting 20,000 German Jewish children beyond the limits of the existing quota, as was done in Great Britain, did not materialize, although the matter was taken up by Congress and thoroughly discussed by the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. The amendments suggested by the Com-

¹⁵Richard C. Hertz, "International Refugee Aid," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, March, 1941, p. 295.

¹⁶Harold Fields, *The Refugee in the United States*, New York 1938, p. 153 ff.; Carnzu Clark, "American Student Action for Refugee Students," *The Menorah Journal*, Spring, 1939, p. 217 ff.

mittee made this project unacceptable to its sponsors. One of the chief arguments raised against this bill was that the admittance of 20,000 refugee children to the United States from Germany and the refusal to admit their parents would be against the laws of God, and therefore would be an opening wedge for a later request for the admission of about 40,000 adults, the parents of the children in question.¹⁷ Instead of new regulations, administrative measures to increase refugee admission were utilized, particularly the granting of visitors' visas which were prolonged from time to time after the refugees' arrival in the United States.

These provisions were of special importance after the collapse of France. Art. 19 of the Armistice agreement between Germany and Vichy threatened political refugees with the fate of being sent back to Hitler. In view of the danger, certain officials appealed directly to the President to initiate action to rescue the political refugees trapped in unoccupied France. A list was drawn up from which a first group of 200 political refugees was brought to America. Formally they were granted visitors' visas only, upon the urgent request of the State Department, but such visitors' visas were soon recognized as a special category of emergency visas to be prolonged for as long as necessary.

When it appeared that the rescue of 200 persons had not solved the problem, the following system was set up for distribution of emergency visas: The President's Advisory Committee was organized to which a full description and a moral and financial guarantee for the refugees who wished to receive emergency visas had to be submitted. The Emergency Rescue Committee and the International Relief Association (now united under the name of International Rescue and Relief Committee), the Jewish Labor Committee (in partial collaboration with the German Labor Delegation), the American Jewish Congress, and the National Refugee

¹⁷*New York Times*, July 4, 13, 14, 16, 31, and August 2, 9, 21, 22, 1940.

Service acted as agencies for preparing the necessary requests and also for examining them in order to ascertain whether the claimant was really a refugee entitled to an emergency visa. The examinations were conducted by appointed commissions, on the basis of recommendations of various prominent refugees and inquiries directed to representatives of these commissions in Europe. By the combined efforts of these committees about 2,000 refugees were brought over on so-called emergency visas.

From July 1, 1933 to December 1941, 41,506 Jews were admitted to the United States on visitors' visas.¹⁸ While some of these left the country, a large proportion returned later as quota immigrants. In September, 1942, visitors and students who legally entered the United States, obtained permission to accept employment without a special permit. "Alien visitors and students will be required to leave the United States when conditions make their departure possible, unless, in the meantime, they have acquired the status of permanent residency through the usual channels available to eligible aliens," it was stated in the release of the Attorney General Francis Biddle, dated September 15, 1942. Most students or visitors unable to leave the country are faced with the necessity of earning their living during the present period. On the other hand, the lack of workers in all industries made it advisable to utilize the manpower of refugee students and visitors.¹⁹

4. WARTIME IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS

Upon the outbreak of World War II, the United States was the only country, with the exception of Palestine, that did not try to

¹⁸Refugees . . . 1941: *The Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.; Interpreter Releases*, Vol. 18, No. 48, "Immigration," No. 15, gives a statistical summary of immigration and emigration for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1941.

¹⁹National Refugee Service, Inc., *Special Information Bulletin*, No. 23, September 16, 1942.

restrict refugee immigration. Instead, efforts were made to increase the number admitted. The Nazi occupation of successive European countries made emigration from them almost impossible, so that the "quota numbers" assigned to the consul in Warsaw, for instance, would have gone unused. This was avoided when on July 1, 1939, all quota numbers for persons of the same "national origin" were made into a single pool, available in any city with an American consul. Further orders in December, 1940, "unblocked" the list of visa applicants—that is, in case the person whose application was made earliest could not find means of emigrating, the next person on the list was granted a visa without delay.²⁰

As the United States drew close to belligerency, it became more difficult to carry out the policy of bringing refugees to safety. On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency. On June 16, 1941, after German U-boats had sunk or attacked a number of American boats, and cumulative evidence showed that the German consuls were the key men in Nazi espionage and propaganda, the State Department demanded that German consulates in the United States be closed. As a result, American consuls were also ordered out of Germany, most of them closing their offices on June 30, 1941. This ended all chances for Jews in Germany, Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, Belgium, occupied France, and Holland, to come to the United States. Prospective emigrants and Jewish organizations hoped to meet this situation by obtaining entry permits to countries like Cuba or Spain, which still had consular representation in German-held territory, so that they could then be admitted to the United States from those countries.

At the same time the increasing concern of the Government

²⁰*Interpreter Releases* (1939), Vol. XVI, No. 26, p. 231; (1940) Vol. XVIII, No. 51, p. 418.

about hostile activities on American soil resulted in new regulations which greatly altered the conditions of entrance into the country. In order to set up a "sieve or screen . . . excluding persons who might be sent into the United States by interested governments in the guise of refugees,"²¹ the control of visa issuance was vested in the Visa Division of the Department of State as of July 1, 1941.

The Visa Division immediately issued rules for a new procedure in connection with visa applications. Previous administrative rulings had ordered consuls to deny visas to persons with close relatives in Nazi-occupied territory, in view of the possibility that such persons could be forced to serve the Nazis for fear of what might befall their relatives. Because of this rule, many refugees in unoccupied France, Africa, England, Portugal, Spain, Shanghai, and Palestine, where American consuls were still stationed, found themselves unable to enter the United States. In addition to the oath of the visa applicant and the financial guarantee of an American sponsor, a moral guarantee, preferably by an American citizen, was required by American consuls. These safeguards were incorporated in the procedure of the Visa Division, and new forms were issued providing for all necessary information and affidavits.

The necessity of sending to Washington for application forms,

²¹Statement of Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, at hearings of a House sub-committee on the Department of State Appropriation Bill for 1942. Legislation authorizing consuls to refuse a visa to an alien when they have reason to believe the applicant desires to enter the country for purposes endangering public safety was passed by the Senate (S.913) on June 5, 1941, and signed by the President on June 20. On June 21 the President also signed the Bloom-Van Huys Bill, H.R.4973. This reenacted a World War I law of May 22, 1918, empowering the President to regulate the entry and departure of all persons, alien or citizens, across United States borders; with the amendment that such powers were granted "whenever there exists a state of war between or among two or more states" and thus not only when the United States itself was at war. President Roosevelt utilized his new powers under the Bloom-Van Huys Act in a proclamation of November 14, 1941.

getting the required guarantees, and supplying the circumstantial information demanded, all delayed and hampered refugees desiring to enter the United States. But the new procedure also included several other checks on immigrant admission.

After all forms were filled out correctly and all documents supplied, the Visa Division submitted the case to an Interdepartmental Visa Committee composed of representatives of the State Department (Presidium), Navy and Army, the Department of Justice, and the F.B.I. If the application was approved by the Interdepartmental Visa Committee, a consul could still refuse to issue the visa on the basis of his own information. In any case, visas would not be issued until evidence was supplied that the immigrant was reasonably sure of transportation and other requirements for reaching the United States.

In October, 1941, the Chief of the Visa Division, Avra M. Warren, made a statement as to the results of the new method. 9,500 applications had been examined up to that time; of which 4,800 had been cleared, and 4,700 were still pending. 15% of the applications had been rejected, but Mr. Warren believed that the percentage would drop. The reasons for refusal were not indicated, but they may have included incorrect completion of documents, in consequence of which the Executive Committee could not obtain a clear picture of the whole case; insufficient financial guarantees, or in some cases failure to obtain any such guarantees because the applicant believed the funds he had in the United States would be sufficient. Finally, there may also have been political reasons for rejection.

Beginning with December 1, 1941, the visa-issuing machinery was again reorganized in a way which gave visa applicants an opportunity to appeal from the decisions of the Interdepartmental Committee. After Pearl Harbor, the Interdepartmental Committee was under instructions to reject all visa applications on the

part of "alien enemies." Their cases, together with appeals from the Interdepartmental Committee's decisions, went to the new reviewing bodies. The first of these was a Committee of Review, which held hearings at which the applicant could be represented by an attorney or his sponsors, or other interested parties, and witnesses could be heard. If necessary, the case could be taken to a Board of Appeals, established on December 3, 1941, and consisting of two persons appointed by the President, whose decision was to be made on the records of the earlier tribunal only. They could remand the case to lower instances for investigation. In case of refusal of an application, the case could again be taken up after six months. If decisions of the Board of Appeals were not acceptable to the Secretary of State, he might substitute his own as the final decision.²²

The regulations for non-enemy-alien cases were relaxed toward the middle of 1944, when the Visa Division of the State Department made the following announcement:

A special committee has been set up in the Visa Division of the Department to expedite action in visa cases and to examine newly received applications. Advisory approvals for the issuance of visas may be sent to American consular officers in cases other than those of alien enemies which are recommended by the committee as not requiring consideration under the Interdepartmental Visa Committee Procedure.

This change signifies that for non-enemy-alien cases the formal Interdepartmental Visa Committee Procedure is eliminated in the first instance, thereby saving considerable time.^{22a}

²²Presidential Proclamations Nos. 2525 and 2526; *Interpreters Releases*, Vol. XIX, No. 5, January 21, 1942; Vol. XIX, No. 8, February 10, 1942; *New York Times*, March 2, 1942; *Aufbau*, January 30, February 6, 13, 20, and March 6, 1942.

^{22a}National Refugee Service, Inc., *Special Information Bulletin*, No. 35, June 16, 1944, p. 1.

Toward the end of 1942, the Board of Appeals made its first report to the President. It contained interesting information about visa issuance during the first eleven months of that year. A summary of this report was published in the *State Department Bulletin* of December 5, 1942. This summary, in turn, was summarized by *Interpreter Releases* of December 22, 1942. From the latter we quote:

Of the 6016 cases in which visa issuance has been recommended, 2957 were cleared by the Primary Committees; 1782 were recommended favorably by the Review Committees which hold hearings on all cases which are disapproved by the Primary Committees; and the rest, 1283, are cases which were recommended favorably by the Board of Appeals after having been passed on adversely by the Review Committees. The summary points out that the number of individuals concerned is considerably larger than the number of applications (6016) approved, since the majority of the applications cover two or more persons.

In considering visa applications the Board of Appeals and the Committees are concerned first with the fundamental question as to whether the applicant may receive his visa with safety to the United States. They are unanimously agreed that only when adequate assurance of safety exists, can weight be given to the second fundamental question, namely, that of benefit to the United States. Their sympathies, the summary says, are daily aroused by the human tragedies revealed in the applications, but "sympathies must be held in control until safety and benefit are determined." Under the terms laid down by the Presidential proclamations, it is necessary to determine that the admission of an alien enemy will benefit the United States before a visa may be issued to him. According to the

summary, *"an early finding of the Board found such benefit in maintaining the traditional American policy of providing a haven of refuge for decent people who are in distress or peril"*; it would seem the Committees are not wholly in agreement on this point. The Board and the Committees alike find "benefit" in the admission of doctors, dentists, nurses and other professionally trained people and of those with technical and industrial skills useful in the war effort. "Indirectly, the effect upon civilian and military morale is also considered, it being believed that a favorable decision, when it may safely be made, will enhance morale and an unfavorable decision will tend to lower it not only among the relatives and friends of the applicants, but throughout a larger group of the same race and background now in the United States, many of them in the armed forces."

The report analyzes the 6152 cases which thus far have been examined by the Board of Appeals. More than one fourth of the individuals involved in these applications are already in the United States as visitors or otherwise for temporary stay, or illegally—one out of every six is here illegally. A tenth of them are, or were, in Cuba and almost another tenth, elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Overseas nearly two fifths of the total are in detention camps; the remainder are in England, Switzerland, or more widely scattered. Thirty-one per cent of the individuals covered by these 6152 applications are German-born; 27 per cent, Polish; 12 per cent, Austrian; 6 per cent each are from Hungary, France and Russia; a somewhat slighter proportion from Spain; the remainder are widely scattered. Birth statistics contrast sharply with those of present residence, more than two fifths of all the applicants having already moved from one country to another before the days of organized persecution or armed invasion.

The Board of Appeals, according to the summary, deplors the fact that frequently an application does not furnish information about the applicant adequate to justify the granting of a visa under war conditions. Even close relatives in this country have in many instances not seen the applicant for years and other sponsors can furnish information only at second hand. Under the circumstances, it becomes the painful duty of the Committees and the Board of Appeals to refuse admission "to people who appear to be decent and deserving" and to do so wholly because of the absence of information adequate to furnish the basis of an informed judgment.

The report discusses the hostage angle which is a matter of constant and vital concern in these cases but the danger from which it seems to think is somewhat exaggerated. It also discusses the delay in the clearing of cases but holds out hope that these delays will be shortened. In conclusion the Board of Appeals expresses its belief that the procedure has a significance far beyond the safety and happiness of the individuals concerned; the *State Department Bulletin* referred to above summarizes this as follows:

"Many persons have been granted visas who by their knowledge and ability in science and the learned professions or by their skill as artisans and mechanics will contribute directly to the well-being of the Nation. Others are courageous men who in their own lands have led in the democratic opposition to the Nazis and whose admission to the United States is an evidence of confidence in, and a source of encouragement to, forces of democracy still working in occupied territories. Many others are persons without distinction, often very humble people, who have suffered grievously under the Nazi tyranny. Ideals of fair treatment of all decent people who are oppressed and who seek such treatment at our hands have been forcefully expressed in

the declaration of the four freedoms and in the Atlantic Charter. Acts of the United States in giving relief to deserving people, the victims of tyranny, furnish present proof by deed of the good faith of these verbal declarations. They exhibit the United States before the whole world as having the strength and courage to stand firm in the common cause of humanity even in stress of war."²³

The question of saving refugees did not disappear from the public forum. A very significant step was taken in September, 1943, by the National Democratic and Republican Clubs which, in identical resolutions, urged immediate action by the Congress to permit victims of "religious persecution to seek temporary refuge in the U. S." The resolutions advocated that the Congress "pass legislation which would admit any alien who shall prove to the satisfaction of the proper immigration officer or the Attorney General that he is seeking admission to the U. S. in order to avoid religious persecution by the Axis." The new regulations sought by both clubs would eliminate for a time certain provisions of the existing immigration laws and remain in effect during the war and six months thereafter.²⁴

The quota situation at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1943, was thus summed up in a recent U. S. Government publication:

The quota situation today is in sharp contrast to that of earlier years. According to the State Department, only 6.4% of the total yearly quota was used in the fiscal year which has just ended (June 30, 1943); in the 1920's between 95 and 98% of the total quota was almost invariably used up. In the fiscal year 1943 only one quota, the quota for Spain, was ex-

²³*Interpreter Releases*, Vol. XIX, No. 57, Series A: "Immigration," No. 13, December 22, 1942.

²⁴*New York Post*, September 13, 1943.

hausted; in the 1920's all, or almost all, of the important European quotas used to be exhausted as soon as the immigration law permitted, that is, by the tenth month of the fiscal year (May) and the registered demand against them was so large that applicants might have to wait several years for their turn to get a quota immigration visa.²⁵

Status of Certain European Quotas as of June 30, 1943

Country	Yearly Quota	First Preference Relatives	Second Preference Relatives	Non-Preference Immigrants	Total Issued	Unused Balance	Percent of Quota Issued
Belgium	1304	3	5	127	135	1169	10.3
Czechoslovakia ..	2874	15	0	395	410	2464	14.2
France	3086	7	5	354	366	2720	11.8
Germany	27,370	26	82	1422	1530	25,840	5.6
Greece	307	57	2	245	304	3	99.0
Hungary	869	7	1	175	183	685	21.0
Italy	5802	12	0	195	207	5595	3.5
Netherlands	3153	7	2	203	212	2941	6.6
Norway	2377	19	1	92	112	2265	4.7
Poland	6542	59	24	1697	1780	4744	27.2
Yugoslavia	845	12	1	91	194	741	12.3

Quota Situation in 1943 Compared with That in Certain Earlier Years

Country	1928	1929	1938	1939	1943
Belgium	100	100	22	29	10
Czechoslovakia	100	100	99	100	14
France	100	100	25	33	12
Germany	100	100	71	100	6
Greece	100	100	100	100	99
Hungary	100	100	100	100	21
Italy	100	100	61	75	4
Netherlands	100	100	12	38	7
Norway	100	100	24	19	5
Poland	100	100	24	100	27
Yugoslavia	100	100	100	100	122 ⁶

²⁵*Monthly Review*, published by the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Vol. I, No. 1, July, 1943, p. 19.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 19-20. In the year ended June 30, 1944, only 8,017 quota immigrants were admitted from European countries. Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. 2, No. 3, September, 1944, p. 37.

On November 26, 1943, at a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on House Resolutions 350 and 352, "providing for the establishment by the Executive of a Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People of Europe," Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long made a statement on the refugee question, in the course of which he declared: "We have taken into this country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 580,000 refugees. The whole thing has been under the quota, during the period of 10 years—all under the quota—except the generous gestures we made with visitors' and transit visas during an awful period."^{26a} This has been widely challenged on the ground that Mr. Long apparently used the figures of the State Department, which cover the number of visas issued, and not those of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Justice Department, which relate to *persons actually admitted*.^{26b}

In the course of an address before the Refugee Relief Trustees, Inc. on February 19, 1944, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Earl G. Harrison stated that "it is difficult to define the word refugee," as our "entire nation can be said to consist of refugees and their descendants." Referring to Breckenridge Long's statement, he pointed out that all immigrants admitted to this country "have come under our regular immigration laws, and, regardless of the motives that brought them here, they were admitted under the same rules by which we would admit any

^{26a}*Rescue of the Jewish and Other Peoples in Nazi-Occupied Territory: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session on H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352, Resolutions providing for the Establishment by the Executive of a Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People of Europe*, November 26, 1943, p. 23.

^{26b}See "Justice Dept. Immigration Figures Knock Long's Story into Cocked Hat," *PM*, Dec. 20, 1943; "Mr. Breckenridge Long's Statement," *Congress Weekly*, Dec. 24, 1943; "Crocodile Tears," *The Nation*, Dec. 25, 1943. See also the statement of the American Jewish Conference published in *PM*, Dec. 27, 1943.

group of immigrants in normal times." The number of such immigrants during the last decade he put at 200,000 to 300,000—a far cry from Mr. Long's figure of 580,000.

The repeated appeals of enlightened public opinion for the rescue of the imperiled refugees in Europe finally bore fruit. On January 22, 1944, the President of the United States, by Executive Order, set up a War Refugee Board, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of War, "to take action for the immediate rescue from the Nazis of as many as possible of the persecuted minorities of Europe—racial, religious or political—all civilian victims of enemy savagery."

This most important document, which aroused hope in the hearts of countless Jewish refugees in Europe living in constant jeopardy, is reproduced here in full:

Executive Order Establishing a War Refugee Board

Whereas it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war;

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to effectuate with all possible speed the rescue and relief of such victims of enemy oppression, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a War Refugee Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board shall consist of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War. The Board

may request the heads of other agencies or departments to participate in its deliberations whenever matters specially affecting such agencies or departments are under consideration.

2. The Board shall be charged with the responsibility for seeing that the policy of the Government, as stated in the Preamble, is carried out. The functions of the Board shall include without limitation the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of havens of temporary refuge for such victims. To this end the Board, through appropriate channels, shall take the necessary steps to enlist the cooperation of foreign governments and obtain their participation in the execution of such plans and programs.

3. It shall be the duty of the State, Treasury and War Departments, within their respective spheres, to execute at the request of the Board, the plans and programs so developed and the measures so inaugurated. It shall be the duty of the heads of all agencies and departments to supply or obtain for the Board such information and to extend to the Board such supplies, shipping and other specified assistance and facilities as the Board may require in carrying out the provisions of this Order. The State Department shall appoint special attaches with diplomatic status, on the recommendation of the Board, to be stationed abroad in places where it is likely that assistance can be rendered to war refugees, the duties and responsibilities of such attaches to be defined by the Board in consultation with the State Department.

4. The Board and the State, Treasury and War Departments are authorized to accept the services or contributions of any private persons, private organizations, State agencies, or agencies of foreign governments in carrying out the purpose of this

Order. The Board shall cooperate with all existing and future international organizations concerned with the problems of refugee rescue, maintenance, transportation, relief, rehabilitation and resettlement.

5. To the extent possible the Board shall utilize the personnel, supplies, facilities and services of the State, Treasury and War Departments. In addition the Board, within limits of funds which may be made available, may employ necessary personnel without regard for the Civil Service laws and regulations and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, and make provisions for supplies, facilities and services necessary to discharge its responsibilities. The Board shall appoint an Executive Director who shall serve as its principal executive officer. It shall be the duty of the Executive Director to arrange for the prompt execution of the plans and programs developed and the measures inaugurated by the Board, to supervise the activities of the special attaches and to submit frequent reports to the Board on the steps taken for the rescue and relief of war refugees.

6. The Board shall be directly responsible to the President in carrying out the policy of this Government, as stated in the Preamble, and the Board shall report to him at frequent intervals concerning the steps taken for the rescue and relief of war refugees and shall make such recommendations as the Board may deem appropriate for further action to overcome the difficulties encountered in the rescue and relief of war refugees.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The White House

January 22, 1944

John W. Pehle, of the Treasury Department, was appointed Executive Director. He thereupon named Ira Hirschmann, a New York business executive, as the War Refugee Board's representa-

tive in Istanbul, and Robert C. Dexter, former representative of the Unitarian Service Committee, as the Board's agent in Lisbon. Representatives of the War Refugee Board were assigned to all important observation points in the neutral countries of Europe.

The importance of the creation of the War Refugee Board lies in this, that it enables all organizations engaged in refugee rescue and relief work to deal with a single U. S. Government agency. Thanks partly to the Board, it is now possible for these organizations to obtain licenses from the Treasury Department to employ American funds in Nazi-occupied territory.

At this writing it is too early to judge the efficacy of the War Refugee Board, especially in view of the difficulty of communicating with enemy-held territory, as well as of establishing underground contacts at a time when major military operations are in preparation or in progress.

Nor should we overlook the moral value of the Board. During the first few months of its existence it was possible to employ a kind of psychological warfare in order to encourage those willing to help the Jewish refugees in the occupied or satellite countries and to warn those who persisted in persecuting them.

During the spring of 1944 there was wide discussion in the American press of a plan to establish free ports for refugees in the United States and other United Nations countries where the refugees might be sheltered for the duration of the war and then returned to their homelands. The chief advocate of this plan was the noted American columnist, Samuel Grafton, who was supported by various Jewish and non-Jewish organizations engaged in refugee rescue work.

This public agitation, combined with the efforts in the same direction of the War Refugee Board, finally bore fruit. On June 12, 1944, President Roosevelt sent a message on the subject to Congress, a body which, he said, "has repeatedly manifested its

deep concern with the pitiful plight of the persecuted minorities in Europe whose lives are each day being offered in sacrifice on the altar of Nazi tyranny." He pointed out that, "as the hour of the final defeat of the Hitlerite forces draws closer, the fury of their insane desire to wipe out the Jewish race in Europe continues undiminished," and that "many Christian groups also are being murdered." The American Government, he wrote, "has not only made clear its abhorrence of this inhuman and barbarous activity of the Nazis, but, in cooperation with other Governments, has endeavored to alleviate the condition of the persecuted peoples." It was in line with this, he continued, that the War Refugee Board had been established. He then dwelt upon the situation in Southern Italy, where, since its liberation by the forces of the United Nations, there had been a great influx of refugees from enemy territory. Many of these refugees, he declared, had been and were being moved to refuges in the territory of other united or friendly nations. However, in view of the many refugees still in Southern Italy, it was necessary to find temporary havens of refuge for some of them in still other areas; and because of the extreme urgency of the situation, "it seemed indispensable that the United States in keeping with our heritage and our ideals of liberty and justice take immediate steps to share the responsibility of meeting the situation." The President concluded his message as follows:

Accordingly, arrangements have been made to bring immediately to this country approximately 1,000 refugees who have fled from their homelands to southern Italy. Upon the termination of the war they will be sent back to their homelands. These refugees are predominantly women and children. They will be placed on their arrival in a vacated Army camp on the Atlantic Coast where they will remain under appropriate security restrictions.

The Army will take the necessary security precautions and the camp will be administered by the War Relocation Authority. The War Refugee Board is charged with overall responsibility for this project.^{26c}

The "vacated Army camp on the Atlantic Coast" selected as the first free port for refugees in the United States is Fort Ontario at Oswego, N. Y., where 984 refugees arrived from Southern Italy on August 5, 1944, having landed the day before at Hoboken, N. J. Included in this group were 918 Jews, 47 Roman Catholics, 14 persons of the Greek Orthodox faith, and 5 Protestants.^{26d}

5. ALIEN REGISTRATION AND CONTROL

Together with restrictions on immigration, the United States took steps to control its alien population in view of the danger of the wartime situation. The Government ordered all aliens in the United States to be registered between August 27 and December 26, 1940. 4,741,971 aliens were fingerprinted, and filled out relatively simple questionnaires, giving their personal description and stating what organizations they had belonged to in the past five years, whether they had any relatives and where, and what military service, if any, they had discharged.

According to the report of the alien registration, 98% of the aliens in the United States complied with the registration order. 80% of the registered aliens had relatives in the United States, and 40% had already applied for citizenship. 3.8% of all the males had had military experience in the past.

American public opinion reacted variously to the registration. It was strongly questioned whether such a general registration

^{26c}*New York Times*, June, 13, 1944.

^{26d}*Ibid.*, Aug. 5 and 6, 1944; National Refugee Service, *Special Information Bulletin*, Nos. 37 and 38, Aug. 3 and 7, 1944; *Aufbau*, Aug. 11, 1944. For an interesting account of the work of the War Refugee Board see Blair Bolles' article, "Millions to Rescue," in the *Survey Graphic*, September, 1944, pp. 386-389.

would succeed in isolating the subversive elements. Moreover, the registration was opposed not only on behalf of the aliens, but particularly because of American suspicion and distaste for the whole system of society which they felt it implied. These views were vividly presented in the following communication printed in the *New York Times*:

No fifth columnists are going to be trapped by this sadistic, hysterical legislation. Any fifth columnist worth his hire will be smart enough to evade the law. But one hundred and thirty million decent Americans will rue the day they muzzled themselves thinking they put only the alien population under control.

Under the smoke-screen of war hysteria this elaborate plan for police surveillance of a whole people is being smuggled into our lives. This will establish a totalitarian routine, not protect "our way of life." If all that our would-be protectors can do is imitate the very thing we fear, why not invite Heinrich Himmler to do it for us?²⁷

During the whole registration procedure the Government took great pains to make it clear that there was no intention to discriminate against or impugn the loyalty of aliens. The Director of Registration, Earl G. Harrison, made the following statement:

If we learned anything from the last war, if we care to profit by the experience of other nations, if we have come to know just a little more about the non-citizens who have signed our guest book and given their fingerprint identification, we will strive to distinguish between the friendly and the unfriendly alien just as we must do with respect to naturalized citizens and native-born. In the grim days of emergency, we must deal with the

²⁷*New York Times*, June 3, 1940.

disloyal in accordance with law, including the additional remedies available when non-citizenship is involved.²⁸

The Japanese attack upon American territory on December 7, 1941, immediately resulted in new measures for controlling the so-called "alien enemies" in the United States. On December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation defining the status of "natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the Empire of Japan," followed on December 8 by similar proclamations regarding German and Italian nationals or subjects.

The decisive section of these proclamations read as follows:

All alien enemies are enjoined to preserve the peace towards the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and Territories thereof; and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States or interfering by word or deed with the defense of the United States or the political processes and public opinions thereof; and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President.

All alien enemies shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by Sections 23 and 24 of Title 50 of the United States Code, and as prescribed in the regulations duly promulgated by the President.

The most important regulations contained in the proclamation and subsequent orders forbade "alien enemies" to travel freely, possess fire arms, cameras, short-wave radio sets, and use air-

²⁸Earl G. Harrison, "Axis Aliens in an Emergency," *Survey Graphic*, September, 1941. Cf. Robert M. W. Kempner, "Full Registration Favored," *New York Times*, February 17, 1942.

planes. It was provided that enemy aliens might be restricted in their movements, detained, or removed from vital areas if necessary upon order of the regional Military Command, and the travel of such aliens into and out of United States territories was to be regulated.

In view of the large concentration of Japanese on the West Coast, special measures were taken to evacuate all Japanese to inland areas. Other "alien enemies" in the West Coast area were ordered to observe a curfew between 8 P.M. and 6 A.M. after March 27, 1942, and to evacuate certain prohibited areas. (The curfew was lifted after April 1, 1944.) In California a wave of anti-alien feeling led to extreme measures. The State Personnel Board undertook to purge the civil service lists of all those who were of Japanese, German, or Italian origin, even if they had been American citizens for years.

On January 7, 1942, the Attorney General announced that all "aliens from enemy countries" were to obtain "Certificates of Identification" during February. It was later revealed on April 1, 1942, that copies of the applications for these certificates were filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, and with the local police, who were to verify the statements of aliens, if necessary, by searching their homes. Changes of address were to be checked, and enemy aliens living in the vicinity of important military areas or employed in defense industries were to be watched particularly. The police districts had to keep files on each enemy alien. If violations of the rules were discovered, the evidence was to be submitted to the F.B.I. for further investigation. Police searches took place, but as far as can be ascertained, they were limited only to districts and groups of enemy aliens where few refugees were likely to be found.²⁹

²⁹*New York Times*, April 1, 1942.

Up to the present, however, although alien refugees have been treated with all consideration, and individuals have been used to further the war effort of the United States, no definite step has been taken to distinguish them from true alien enemies. The President's proclamation covered all German and Italian nationals who were not naturalized American citizens, as well as Japanese nationals, who could not be naturalized under United States law. The President of the United States proclaimed a state of war with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary on July 17, 1942. The natives of these countries, except those who were naturalized American citizens, were also included among those who could be summarily detained. They were not subject to the restrictions imposed on other enemy aliens, however.

In practice, there were many groups who were not held to the "alien enemy" rules although nominally subject to them. Among them were Germans, Italians, or Japanese who had acquired a new citizenship other than that of the United States, provided they did not retain their German, Italian, or Japanese citizenship. Persons who had registered as Austrians, Austro-Hungarians, and Koreans under the 1940 Alien Registration Act were exempted from the alien regulations in practice. In June, 1942, individuals who had erroneously registered as Germans, Italians, or Japanese in 1940 were given the opportunity to re-register as Austrians, Austro-Hungarians or Koreans, thus becoming exempt from the restrictions. In no sense, however, was the exemption absolute. The Attorney General, Mr. Biddle, in allowing the re-registration stressed the condition that these groups "are still subject to apprehension and detention as enemy aliens, if, at any time, such action is considered necessary to the maintenance of national security."³⁰

³⁰Earl G. Harrison, "Axis Aliens in an Emergency," *Survey Graphic*, September, 1941; *Interpreter Releases*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, Jan. 26, 1942; *New York Times*, June 11, 1942; *Interpreter Releases*, Vol. XIX, No. 31, Series C., No. 25, June 11, 1942.

The same reservation applied, of course, with regard to aliens who had acquired non-hostile citizenship. A much more sweeping measure was taken, however, with regard to Italians, entering into effect on October 19, 1942. For them the classification as enemy aliens was simply and unconditionally abolished.

For stateless ex-citizens of enemy countries, who formed the bulk of the refugees, no exemption was granted. However, the registration forms which "aliens of enemy nationality" had to fill out provided space for information by which the refugees could identify themselves as such. In this space refugees could state the reasons why they had fled from the enemy country, specify when their citizenship in that country had been revoked, or attach photostats of the official expatriation list with their names on it, and list two American citizens who would vouch for their loyalty.³¹ This information has not yet been used to establish a special status for the refugees.

The indiscriminate treatment of pro-Axis and anti-Nazi "alien enemies" aroused protests from many sides. Gerhart H. Seger, former German Social Democratic member of the Reichstag and editor of the New York *Neue Volkszeitung*, pointed out that experience did not justify a distinction between foreigners and citizens which would classify the former alone as dangerous. He estimated that for every enemy alien arrested up to December 27, 1941, there were twenty-two American citizens who were members of the German-American Bund alone, not counting other Nazi organizations. In a trial for espionage held in New York, only three of the thirty-two defendants were foreigners, the remainder being American citizens. According to Seger, the German-American Bund had a membership of 22,000 citizens. George L. Warren, Director of the International Migration Service, stated the problem of alien control well in these words: "We

³¹*Interpreter Releases*, Vol. 19, No. 4, January 20, 1942, p. 19 ff.

know from experience that the great majority of aliens are loyal and just as interested in winning the war as anyone. The problem is to keep them loyal, they have a contribution to make to the war, and we must find a way to take advantage of it."

The proposal of these liberals was that the aliens be treated not *en masse* but individually, according to their political attitudes. They proposed that "hearing boards," similar to those which examined aliens detained by the F.B.I., establish the facts concerning each alien. This plan was proposed officially by a House Committee when it was feared a mass evacuation of aliens from the East Coast might be ordered. The Tolan Committee of the House of Representatives held hearings in Los Angeles on March 7, 1942, at which Thomas Mann and Bruno Frank appeared on behalf of the anti-Nazi refugees. Its report recommended setting up machinery to enable individual treatment of "alien enemies:"

The Committee renews its recommendation, contained in its preliminary report, for the immediate creation of a system of hearing boards to pass upon and certify the loyalty of German and Italian aliens. The system of boards should be set up by Executive order, under a War Hearings Authority in the Office for Emergency Management, with the primary objective of obviating mass evacuation. The local boards, in determining priority of examination, should give due regard to special cases of hardship, including persons exempt by categories, refugees and persons whose naturalization proceedings are far advanced. Persons whose loyalty or acceptability cannot be quickly established should be remanded to the special enemy alien hearing boards now functioning in each judicial district under jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

The urgency of such action is manifested by the extension of

military areas to the eastern seaboard, where hundreds of thousands of enemy aliens reside.³²

Even though no mass evacuation of aliens from the East Coast took place, the idea of hearing boards continued to be advocated. In England, such boards had been employed to examine the cases of all alien enemies. Their eminently satisfactory work resulted not only in removing an unjustified stigma from the refugees, but in mobilizing them more fully for the war against the Axis. The chief practical obstacle to this plan was the large number of cases to be examined. This question was considered in the following statement by James G. MacDonald, former League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany:

There are approximately 1,100,000 aliens of enemy nationalities. In their interests and in the interest of national safety some method must be devised which will remove from those who are loyal any stigma that accrues to them because of their technical citizenship status. The civilian hearing boards which have been examining those already apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have done an excellent piece of work. . . . There remain over a million subject to the regulations to be examined. Obviously this poses a problem of numbers alone. However, there is no reason why it should not be undertaken. *It would be possible to reduce the total to be examined substantially by granting temporary exemption to such classes as might be determined in advance.* . . . Cases in which the boards might experience difficulty in reaching decisions might be referred to the Department of Justice for further examination.

. . . If, as the President, our Federal agencies, and those who

³²Tolan Committee Report (Select. Comm. investigating National Defense Migration), House Report No. 2124 (Article VIII), p. 33.

have intimate knowledge of our alien population, believe, and as the experience of the last war demonstrated, we shall eventually be convinced that the great majority of our alien population is loyal, it is but good judgment and statesmanship to reach this decision at the earliest possible moment.³³

The plan of granting temporary exemption to special categories of aliens could be carried out relatively easily on the basis of the information available in the returns of the February, 1942, registration. At the 1942 conference of the National Council of Naturalization and Citizenship, Earl G. Harrison and Joseph P. Chamberlain (chairman of the National Refugee Service) proposed the exemption of the following three categories of aliens:

Wives, parents, or children of men in our armed forces;
petitioners for final citizenship papers; and
refugees because of racial discrimination, or because of
activity against political systems abhorrent to Americans.

On March 24, 1942, Mr. Harrison was appointed Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. Early in May, 1942, he announced that the registration forms of 300,000 "enemy Germans" had been taken out and studied. He proposed to reclassify 150,500, including 45,000 persons recognized as *bona fide* refugees.³⁴

The Harrison proposal has not yet been carried into effect, although in his Columbus Day (1942) speech in New York City, during which the reclassification of all Italian aliens was announced, Attorney General Biddle stated:

I wish to emphasize that in thus removing the label of enemy alien from Italians we do not forget that there are other loyal

³⁴*Aufbau*, May 8, 1942.

³³*New York Times*, April 6, 1942,

persons classified as alien enemies. Their situation is now being carefully studied by the Department of Justice.³⁵

The number of aliens has decreased considerably in the last two years. Whereas, in February, 1944, the number of foreigners in the United States had been 4,250,000, it was about 3,600,000 in the spring of 1944. The cause of the decline was twofold: (a) many aliens had entered the armed forces and thereby acquired American citizenship; (b) the naturalization procedure had been expedited.

Of the estimated 3,600,000 aliens now in the country, 1,623,600 are males and 1,976,400 are females. The median age is 51.7 years as against 29.5 for the population as a whole. This would indicate that the alien community is an old one.^{35a}

6. REFUGEES AND THE WAR EFFORT

The German and Austrian refugees in the United States were composed of various groups, differing from each other in important respects. All of them, however, were eager to serve the United States in its war against the Axis, which was their immediate and bitter enemy. Consequently, they could not suppress their disappointment, while complying loyally with the conditions of their classification as enemy aliens, at being so classed.

Among the refugees there are some who were active in European political movements outlawed by the Axis. Their number is small, and, to some extent, they are divided by political rivalries. These groups do not regard the United States as their home, and are interested primarily in the statements issued from time to time by the State Department about its attitude regarding their political aims and activities.

³⁵*New York Times*, October 31, 1942. See also Kurt R. Grossmann, "Unrecognized Allies," *The Nation*, Dec. 11, 1943.

^{35a}*Monthly Magazine*, published by the Department of Justice, May, 1944.

There is a much larger number of Jewish immigrants not politically organized, and with looser ties with the past, who desire nothing more than to be absorbed permanently as United States citizens.³⁶ These immigrants hate and oppose the Hitler regime just as strongly as do the others. Many of them still bear the indelible marks of their searing experiences in concentration camps. All of them were humiliated, lost all they had, and practically every one lost relatives and friends. They therefore ardently wish to fight and to work for the defeat of the Axis in the Army and on the production lines of this country's war effort; they also wish to be naturalized as American citizens with all possible speed.

After America's entry into the war, rumors spread that the naturalization of enemy aliens was being suspended. A number of courts actually refused to grant them citizenship; whether because of misunderstanding the regulations or because of war hysteria, is not clear in every case. However, Attorney General Biddle announced that "alien enemies" were still eligible for citizenship, although an additional period of ninety days was provided for them during which the authorities could investigate their cases. This applied to several categories of enemy aliens, including Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians, who were exempted from other restrictions: a "native, citizen, subject or denizen of any country, state or sovereignty with which the United States is at war shall be considered an alien enemy for the purposes of the naturalization laws. A native of such an enemy country who subsequent to birth has become a citizen or subject of a nation with which the United States is not at war shall nevertheless be considered as an alien enemy."

According to a Memorandum of the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System, dated April 29, 1942, Austria was

³⁶Cf. Gerhart Saenger, *Today's Refugees, Tomorrow's Citizens*.

declared an "enemy nation," for the purpose of military selective service. The same applies to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Enemy aliens are subject to the selective service regulations and have to register when their age groups are called up. After Pearl Harbor, however, only American citizens were allowed to enlist voluntarily. Moreover, on January 1, 1942, an order was issued modifying the "Draft Status of Aliens" by which "non-declarant aliens" of "all nationalities" and all "enemy aliens" were reclassified and placed in Category IV-C, from which they could not be inducted into the army. This discriminatory action was soon countermanded, however, and by an order of February 23, 1942, the aliens in IV-C were to be reclassified and those placed in class I-A could be drafted. The same order also provided that the aliens of German, Italian, and Japanese nationality who had been drafted for military service before Pearl Harbor were no longer to be regarded as enemy aliens.

The Administration and both Houses of Congress became more and more cognizant of the anomalous situation of "enemy aliens" who were required to risk their lives as soldiers in defense of the United States. It was realized that, for their own protection, such soldiers could no longer be aliens. Consequently, Title XI 2208 of the Second War Powers Bill, signed by the President at the end of March, 1942, provides, "that any alien, who served or hereafter serves honorably in the military or naval forces of the United States in the present war may be naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization law except that

- (1) No declaration of intention and no period of residence with the United States or any State shall be required;
- (2) The petition may be filed in any court having naturalization jurisdiction regardless of the residence of the petitioner;

- (3) The petitioner shall not be required to speak the English language, sign his petition in his own handwriting or meet the educational test, and
- (4) No fee shall be charged . . .”

In this way the naturalization of legally admitted aliens, whether immigrants or visitors, who were serving in the armed forces of the United States was made easier. Much less progress was made in utilizing the manpower and skill of aliens in civilian pursuits for the advancement of the war effort. This in spite of the fact that the growing scale of production was creating labor shortages, and that even in earlier years the economic activity of refugees, far from interfering with the employment of citizens by their competition, had contributed to increase their employment and stimulate production. According to an investigation by the Committee for Selected Social Studies and the Social Science Department of Columbia University, the refugee immigrants have “not displaced American workers, but rather through the exercise of their transplanted skills have been employing American citizens in new trades.” By bringing capital, establishing new enterprises and homes, recent immigrants increased the consumption of goods and gave employment to American workers.^{36a} Nevertheless, there were expressions of hostility to alien employees; and employers who held war contracts required American citizenship where there was no legal necessity for it. In order to clear up the situation, the War Department sent out a circular letter on July 15, 1941, pointing out that “There is no general prohibition either by law or regulation of the employment of non-citizens on War Department contracts.” There were, however, two specific restrictions:

^{36a}*Refugees at Work*, compiled by Sophia M. Robinson and published by the Committee for Selected Studies, Columbia University, 1942.

First, where the employer is engaged in work under "secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts." In such circumstances the law provides that no aliens "shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials unless the written consent of the head of the Government Department concerned has been obtained."

Second, no alien employed in the manufacture of aircraft and parts where the employer is engaged in work under "secret, confidential or restricted Government contracts . . . shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials unless the written consent of the head of the Government Department concerned has been obtained."

However, employers who would not take on aliens did not observe these specific restrictions alone. They sometimes adopted a general policy of discriminating not only against aliens but against native or naturalized minority groups as well, even though the manpower needs of war production grew constantly. The situation was regarded as serious by the Government and on June 25, 1941, the President issued Executive Order No. 8802 which set up a Committee on Fair Employment Practice.³⁷ The most important paragraphs of the Executive Order read as follows:

- (1) All department and agencies of the Government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin;
- (2) All contracting agencies of the Government of the United

³⁷Later transferred to the War Manpower Commission.

States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin;

- (3) There is established in the Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which shall consist of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. The chairman and members of the Committee shall serve as such without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to performance of their duties. The Committee shall receive and investigate complaints of discrimination in violation of the provisions of this order and shall take appropriate steps to redress grievances which it finds to be valid. The Committee shall also recommend to the several departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and to the President all measures which may be deemed by it necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions of this order.

These instructions were renewed in a joint statement on the employment of alien labor by the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Maritime Commission on June 7, 1943.³⁸ Paragraph 8 of the statement declares:

In no case, except those in which an individual alien is denied employment by the specific action of the War or Navy Department or the Maritime Commission, is a contractor justi-

³⁸The full text of the joint statement appeared in *Interpreter Releases*, Vol. XX, No. 30, Series C: "Foreign Born in U.S.A.," No. 9, August 12, 1943, pp. 213-216.

fied in informing an applicant that he is being refused employment because of Government regulations. The same considerations apply to removal from employment.

Similar committees were set up in many States. On July 8, 1941, John Habberton reported in a broadcast that the New York State Committee on Fair Employment Practice had learned that thousands of able-bodied men and women were not being employed merely because they were Negroes, Jews, or Catholics, or of German or Italian extraction. Such practices mean that 37% of the population are deprived of rights granted by the Constitution. The Federal Committee on Fair Employment Practice also ascertained violations of Executive Order No. 8802 in a series of cases, as evidenced by advertisements published by the employers or by witnesses. Time and again both President Roosevelt and Attorney General Biddle have emphasized that such an attitude of employers constitutes not only a violation of American principles but also damages defense work.³⁹

The desire to help win the war by their labor as well as by military service is exceedingly strong among the immigrants. There are a large variety of highly qualified workers among them, of whom only a part have already been put to work.

The National Refugee Service has published a pamphlet, entitled *They Can Aid America*, in which statistical tables are given regarding the abilities of the refugees. However, one must bear in mind that the figures given are only those of refugees who responded to the appeal of the Labor Division of the New World Club. With this reservation, we reproduce below two of these tables.

³⁹*New York Times*, February 3, 1942.

*Individuals Registered With the Roster of Alien Specialized
Personnel By Principal Occupation and Last Nationality*⁴⁰

Principal Occupation	Total	Last Nationality			
		German	Austrian	Other	Unknown
All Individuals	2,250	1,236	547	201	266
SCIENCE AND MECHANICS					
Physicists, Meteorologists, etc.	18	7	5	4	2
Chemists	67	25	24	14	4
Chemical Engineers	37	7	12	12	6
Engineers	162	54	71	20	17
Architects	50	19	22	6	3
Draftsmen	28	8	5	4	11
Mechanics, Operators, etc.	109	30	24	4	51
SOCIAL SCIENCES					
Economists	37	22	10	5	—
Accountants	57	29	14	4	10
Translators, Language					
Teachers	26	13	5	4	4
Journalists, Editors	25	7	11	4	3
Social Workers	10	6	1	—	3
Social Scientists, Lawyers, etc.	35	22	8	3	2
MEDICINE AND MEDICAL WORK					
Physicians, licensed	285	136	83	10	56
Physicians, not licensed	223	135	51	13	24
Dentists	81	59	12	4	6
Pharmacists	49	25	18	5	1
Nurses	116	75	10	10	21
Physiotherapists	25	8	4	1	12
X-ray Technicians	23	12	3	2	6
Laboratory Technicians	48	24	13	3	8
BUSINESS					
Businessmen	739	513	141	69	16

⁴⁰The Nazi regime deprived most of these Germans of their nationality.

Another very interesting table lists the refugees' knowledge of languages, omitting English and German. We quote:

Afrikaans	2	Malay	2
Arabic	7	Norwegian	5
Bulgarian	5	Persian	4
Chinese	1	Polish	130
Croatian	3	Portuguese	29
Czech	128	Rumanian	20
Danish	15	Russian	73
Dutch	52	Serbian	13
Esperanto	2	Slavic	4
Flemish	4	Slovakian	9
French	1,468	Spanish	226
Hebrew	29	Swedish	24
Hungarian	66	Tartar	2
Icelandic	1	Turkish	6
Italian	278	Ukrainian	11
Japanese	3	Yiddish	52
Latvian	1	Yugoslavian	7

This pamphlet has received favorable comment in the American press.

On February 7, 1942, the *New York Times* complained that very little had been done thus far to employ the thousands of refugee physicians. Citing Great Britain as an example where a difficult situation had been met efficiently, the *Times* proceeds:

In our own case very little has been done thus far to make the most of several thousand men and women who have graduated from European medical schools which were among the best in the world before Hitler began his destructive onslaughts. These men and women could be of great use at a time when the Army and Navy are calling for doctors. If depleted X-ray departments and laboratories of the hospitals are now debarred to these foreigners, they should be opened; if English inter-

poses difficulties, it should be taught; if loyalty to the Government is in doubt, it should be settled by investigation. There must be some place in our medical system for these medical émigrés, and it is clearly the business of the hospitals and the county medical societies to find it. This is no time for stiffening our attitude toward a class of professional foreigners who have no liking for Hitler or Mussolini, and who are eager to do what they can to aid the cause of the United Nations.

According to the National Refugee Service, 6,000 physicians have immigrated to the United States from Central Europe since 1933. Following the establishment of a special committee by the National Refugee Service, 2,000 physicians found employment in hospitals and private practice; however, 1,500 are undoubtedly available immediately, that is, 900 more than those registered with the New World Club.

The National Refugee Service also reports that it has set up seventy-five retraining courses in various trades. These courses are intended to open up employment possibilities for the older refugees; but in these difficult times, when older people must replace the young, the training is a valuable contribution to increased production.

There are other ways, also, in which the refugees try to contribute even more directly to the war effort. Former Attorney General Robert H. Jackson pointed out that the refugees expelled by Hitler would constitute an important fighting potential for the United States. They could be employed in a propaganda offensive in Europe, for they are in a position to "out-fifth-column the master fifth columnist himself." "The peoples ruled by Hitler with machine guns and concentration camps are our fifth column. The time has already come for us to take the initiative and assume the propaganda offensive. For this there is no better weapon than the

services of these foreigners. With their assistance we can send messages in Europe's own languages, transmitted by its own sons, which would awake in all occupied European countries new vital forces in the fight for the democracy and against its enemies." Dorothy Thompson has advocated this idea in various articles, in which she expressed her dissatisfaction with the attitude of the authorities toward the refugees and pointed out the tragic errors committed by France toward them:

The War for the Liberation of Humanity. That is the slogan to oppose to the supermen warriors and the new order of industrial feudalism, provided we mean it. The people do mean it. But our officials seem rather inclined to start the old routine grinding. When a war comes, one does this and that—as though this were a war, any war, and not a *particular*, a *unique* war, of revolutionary origins, fought by our enemies in a revolutionary way, a war that must also be fought and won by us, in a revolutionary way.⁴¹

The spirit of the "enemy aliens" themselves is high. In this connection a letter published in the *New York Times* of May 11, 1942, under the caption "Refugees Set Example," is significant:

Recently I went to a café patronized largely by refugees from Germany and Austria. During the evening the Star-Spangled Banner was played and I saw that every one was beaming as he shouted out the words. This was in sharp contrast to the usual perfunctory rendition given around the town, where not one person in ten makes even a pretense of mumbling the words, or following the tune. These refugees obviously loved the song and were happy to be able to sing it.

I mention this incident only because many people are likely to become excited about enemy aliens and forget that the refu-

⁴¹*New York Post*, February 3, 1943.

gees appreciate and love our country more than many of us native Americans, who never stop to think what freedom and democracy mean.

The activities of the "enemy aliens" in the field of civilian defense are restricted. "Generally, aliens are not permitted to become air-raid wardens, auxiliary firemen or participate in other similar activities of the United States Civilian Defense Corps. However, there are opportunities for voluntary work open in the civilian defense program which are not barred to aliens." The aliens make full use of such opportunities.

About 25,000 "enemy aliens" were in the armed forces of the United States in the spring of 1942, and of these several thousand had enlisted voluntarily before December 7, 1941.⁴² In the years 1941-1944, 83,340 alien soldiers became citizens of the United States.^{42a} Many refugees have distinguished themselves on the far-flung battlefields and made the supreme sacrifice for their adopted country.

A Legion of Alien Blood Donors was set up. More than 20,000 enemy aliens donated blood, many of them more than eight times. The immigrant physicians, in an effective demonstration, all gave their blood together on the same day.

"Enemy aliens" eagerly join the knitting groups of the Red Cross, first-aid courses, *etc.* At the beginning of April, 1942, the Loyalty Committee of Victims of Nazi and Fascist Oppression made an appeal for an airplane to be placed at the disposal of the Government by "enemy aliens." The sum of \$48,500 was collected by this committee from 16,000 immigrants, and the fighter plane "Loyalty" was inaugurated at La Guardia Airport in the presence of high Army officials as well as representatives of the State and the City.

⁴²Loula D. Lasker: "Friends or Enemies?" *Survey Graphic*, June, 1942.

^{42a}*Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the year ended June 30, 1943*, Table 21. See also *Monthly Review*, September, 1944, p. 36

On June 15, 1942, the Minute-Men campaign for war bonds was initiated. The *New York Times* reported on June 16, 1942:

On Washington Heights, Minute Men and Minute Women reported 100 per cent results, particularly among the many refugees who live in that quarter.

"Enemy aliens" work in many research offices and Government agencies, where their knowledge of European conditions is particularly useful in the fields of planning and propaganda. Others have been appointed as teachers of foreign languages, European history, economics, etc. under the Army College Program.

In July, 1943, the Immigrants' Victory Council was founded with the slogan "We Do Our Part." Its objects are as follows:

- (1) to centralize the war effort of immigrants, especially their activities in Civilian Defense;
- (2) to intensify those activities and coordinate the individual contributions into the contribution of the group;
- (3) to establish close collaboration of immigrants with the proper authorities in all matters concerning Civilian Defense, and to make available to the immigrant new avenues of activity within Civilian Defense;
- (4) to prepare immigrants for training by the CDVO as recruiting officers as well as incorporation into the ranks of the U. S. Citizens Service Corps;
- (5) to organize all immigrants in the service of the war effort for the purpose of the maximum use of their forces.⁴³

William Rosenwald, President of the National Refugee Service, sums up the activities of the refugees as follows:

Today refugee boys are serving in America's armed forces, eager to defend the country which gave them haven. Refugee

⁴³*Aufbau*, July 2, 1943.

scientists and inventors are contributing their learning and experience both to the war effort and to civilian life. Every phase of American life—business, industry and the arts—has profited in some way from the refugee's enterprise and knowledge—his appreciation of democracy.⁴⁴

In a report by Edward J. Ennis, Director of the Enemy Alien Control Unit (Department of Justice), it is declared that refugees have increased America's population by 0.2 per cent but that "the cultural enrichment is much greater than expressed in this figure." According to Mr. Ennis, the refugees have proven "that the confidence the Government has placed in them was well justified."⁴⁵

America is at war. Every American has the duty to defend his country. The "enemy aliens"—particularly the anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist refugees—do not wish to and cannot stand aside from this war, of which they were the first victims. This fact America should understand just as the refugees understood the words of Emma Lazarus inscribed on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty which we all greeted hopefully and humbly upon our arrival:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

⁴⁴*Refugees . . . 1941: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.*

⁴⁵*New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, September 3, 1943.

CHAPTER VI
COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT
C. FRANCE*

Introductory—Outbreak of World War II—The German Occupation and the Vichy Regime—Deportations to “Unknown Destinations”—The Way Out of France—North Africa

I. INTRODUCTORY

(a) *General Policy of France in Regard to Aliens*

Heir to the ideals of liberty and tolerance of the Revolution of 1789, the Third Republic displayed great hospitality toward all victims of political, religious, or racial persecution, whether they were Russians, Armenians, Italians, Spaniards, or Jews, come to seek refuge in France, especially during the troubled period between the two world wars.

In 1933, upon Hitler's accession to power, it became apparent that, just as in the years 1921-1923, a mass of refugees would turn to France. Now, in the spring of 1933, the economic, social, and political stability of France was far from what it had been in 1921-1923, which witnessed the influx of the first great wave of Russian refugees. Since 1930 France had been laboring under the worldwide economic depression. Unemployment, though less acute than in other countries, made itself felt. The need for foreign labor had greatly diminished. And one already observed certain premonitory signs of the internal social and political discord which in the ensuing years was to become a serious factor

*This chapter was written by Henri Sinder, a member of the Paris Bar now on the staff of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, and is based in part on material supplied by Kurt R. Grossmann.

in the process of disintegration leading to the catastrophe of June, 1940.

Nevertheless, in 1933 the French Government proclaimed aloud that it intended fully to maintain the French tradition of the right of asylum. The then Minister of the Interior, Camille Chautemps, stated on April 5, 1933, in reply to a number of interpellations in the Chamber of Deputies:

As for the attitude of the French Government, I should like to say to you here that not only will the necessary steps be taken but even more: since the first day that the Cabinet took up this matter, I have issued precise instructions in its name, so that those who seek asylum and come to our country will be welcome, in accordance with the traditions of French hospitality.¹

We know that the French social and political malaise widened and deepened particularly in the years following, notably from 1934 on. The stages are well known: the Stavisky scandal, the sanguinary attempt of February 6, 1934, to overthrow the republican regime, the rise of the Popular Front in 1936, the social reforms, the reaction of conservative circles hostile to the republican regime as well as of Big Business and High Finance, the downfall of the Popular Front, and the atmosphere of appeasement before and after Munich. Partly provoked, at any rate sustained and intensified by the propaganda of Nazi agents and reactionary, antisemitic, pro-Nazi groups,—this internal social and political conflict, combined with the troubled and tense atmosphere of insecurity which, since 1936, weighed down upon Europe, and especially upon France, as a result of Hitler's policy of force, could not—and did not—fail to have its effect upon the general situation of aliens in France and, consequently, upon that

¹*Journal Officiel*, April 5, 1933.

of refugees. Acute and transitory crises took place in 1934-1935, in 1937, and in the Munich period, during which the campaign against "undesirables" had free rein and grew violent. To the very end, however, the French Government was faithful to the principle of the right of asylum. This fidelity was again reaffirmed in the preamble to the Daladier decree of May 2, 1938, to which we shall revert in the next section, in the following terms:

France remains open as always to those who come here to seek instruction from its intellectual and moral treasures, to visit its incomparable beauty spots, and to participate fraternally in the labor of the Nation. It also remains wide open to persecuted beliefs and ideals seeking asylum, on condition, however, that no illegitimate use of the honorable title of political refugee is made, which would be a breach of faith. Irreproachable conduct and an absolutely correct attitude to the Republic and its institutions must be the inflexible rule for all those who enjoy French hospitality.²

In fact, not only the Government of the Republic, but French political figures (and not alone those belonging to the Left groups), intellectual and academic circles, and a large section of the French people always manifested a deep understanding of the refugee's problem and endeavored in every way to mitigate the lot of the refugees, especially of those who fled from Nazi persecution.

When the horizon was already overcast, France admitted to her territory Austrian refugees and, a year later, in 1939, Czechoslovakian refugees.

The largest immigration country in Europe and, next to the United States, in the world, France also harbored the largest number of refugees in Europe. In the summer of 1938, their total number was estimated at 180,000, exclusive of those who had

²*Journal Officiel*, May 3, 1938.

become naturalized or those who had left France after sojourning there for some time in order to settle in overseas countries.³ There is no doubt that this number increased after the Munich crisis of September, 1938, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939.

Among these fugitives, what was the number of Jewish refugees who came to France from 1933 on? Precise data are lacking. But we certainly run no risk of erring if we state that, of the 50,000 refugees from Germany and the 4,000 refugees from the Saar officially admitted into France, the great majority consisted of Jews. What must be stressed is that France was the principal country receiving Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi horrors, and that despite constantly stiffening police regulations, the lot of the Jewish refugees in France was a comparatively happy one.

Accordingly, the profound change produced in their condition by the unleashing of World War II and, especially, their lot after the signing of the Petain armistice of June 22, 1940, appear all the more tragic both because of the nature of the treatment reserved for them and because of the number of human beings affected.

(b) *Regulations concerning Aliens and Refugees*

Besides the administrative steps taken with a view to the application in France of measures recommended by the various international arrangements concerning refugees (the Nansen System, the Franco-Belgian Accord), the conditions of residence, of work, and of the permanent settlement of refugees in France were governed by the general regulations regarding aliens.

Owing to the low French birthrate, the influx of foreigners into France had become, especially since 1920, an economic and military factor of the first order. On the eve of World War II, there were close to three million aliens in France, or about 7 per-

³Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 298.

cent of the metropolitan French population. Their percentage among industrial, mine, and farm workers was very high.⁴

Nevertheless, French regulation of immigration was not actuated by long-range administrative policy. It fluctuated, adapting itself to the vicissitudes of the internal social and political struggles. Its characteristic feature during the decade preceding the Second World War, with the exception of the period of the Popular Front government, was a tightening and growing stringency of police control. A stringency, we hasten to add, tempered by the spirit of liberalism as well as of a certain *laissez-aller* which, with some exceptions, was typical of French administration.

By the terms of this regulation, every refugee arriving in France was obliged, within eight days of crossing the border, to apply, like every alien 15 years of age who intended to stay more than two months in the country, for a residence permit known as *carte d'identité*.⁵

The alien had first of all to prove that he had entered France in a regular manner, that is, on a valid national passport, or an identification paper having the same validity under international agreements (as in the case of Belgians and Luxembourgers), bearing a regular visa by a French consular agent.⁶ If the alien wanted to hold any kind of remunerative position, he was required to apply for a worker's identity card. For this he had to submit, in

⁴In 1931, of a total of 1,559,224 aliens gainfully employed in France, 781,917 were industrial workers, 249,646 farm laborers, and 147,455 miners. Cf. Raymond Millet, *Trois millions d'étrangers en France*, p. 32 f.

⁵The conditions for the issuance of identity cards were the subject of a whole series of legislative measures and rules adopted at various times from 1917 to 1939. These regulations, in their final form, were embodied in the decrees of February 6, 1935 and May 2 and 14, 1938.

⁶The decree of May 14, 1938, exempted from the visa requirement all nationals of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Great Britain (including British subjects), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay.

support of his application, a health certificate in the prescribed form and a labor contract approved by the Bureau of Foreign Labor (*Office de la Main-d'oeuvre étrangère*) of the Ministry of Labor. Subject only to the control of the Minister of the Interior, prefects had discretionary power in regard to the issuance of identity cards. They were free to refuse such a card to any alien, even if possessed of all the necessary papers, whose reasons for staying in France did not appear satisfactory to them. Nay, more, the identity card, even after it had been issued, could be taken away from the holder if, in the opinion of the police, he ceased to offer "desirable guarantees." In both cases, the foreigner was obliged to leave French territory within a given time, on pain of expulsion and the penalties that went with it.

Moreover, any person harboring a foreigner was required, within 24 hours of the alien's arrival on his premises, to file with the police or with the mayor's office a declaration giving the place, date, and number of issuance of the identity card presented by the alien or, in lieu of it, of his passport.⁷

It is hardly necessary to point out how rare were the refugees who could fulfill the conditions necessary for the issuance of a residence permit, let alone for obtaining a worker's identity card. A political refugee could not, save in exceptional cases, obtain a passport from his national government. The possession of such a document by a refugee more often than not warranted suspicion. In order to guard against such a contingency, the French Government wisely ordained that political refugees entering France without the required papers might repair to the nearest frontier post and claim the status of political refugees in order

⁷This declaration, originally required only of those who rented out furnished apartments (hotel keepers, lodging-house keepers, and managers of boarding-houses), was extended afterwards (by the decree of May 14, 1938, Art. 6) to apply to those who harbored an alien free of charge, or let unfurnished apartments to private persons, the latter having 48 instead of 24 hours in which to file the declaration.

that the Minister of the Interior might later rule on their case. But, apart from the circumstance that this step was taken too late, when the bulk of the refugees were already on French territory, the fact that regulations of this nature made abroad in the interest of refugees were not published in the German press, did not permit many refugees to know about this measure and to take advantage of it.

As for obtaining work permits subsequently to their arrival in France, few indeed were the refugees who could succeed in getting them. The Bureau of Foreign Labor gave its approval (*avis favorable*) only in the case of aliens with several years' residence in France (varying, according to circumstances, from 5 to 15 years), and provided the applicant had obtained an employment certificate from an employer calling for his services,—no easy matter. The law of August 10, 1932, providing for the fixing of a quota for the employment of aliens (ranging from 5 to 30 percent) hardly made it easier to obtain an approval from the Ministry of Labor.

For about two years access to the handicrafts remained free. A certain number of refugees were thus able to set up as craftsmen who work at home (*ouvriers façonniers*), such as leather goods workers, garment workers, etc. The Laval law-decree of April 8, 1935, "tending to protect French artisans from the competition of alien artisans," was designed to close this haven of refuge to the refugees. It established an artisan's card which was obtainable on the same conditions as an ordinary worker's card, and the issuance of which was subject to approval by the respective craft chambers (*Chambres de métiers*). This decree, moreover, envisaged the introduction by later decrees of quotas for foreign artisan, according to craft and to region, which, however, were not introduced.

Commerce and industry remained open to refugees possessing

the necessary resources to set up in business for themselves. The only formality required was enrollment in the Register of Commerce kept by the clerk of the Court of Commerce. Certain refugees were able to use this means to regularize their status in regard to residence; some even succeeded in creating important business and industrial enterprises and, what is more, did pioneering work in certain branches of economic activity. For obvious reasons, their number was limited. The decree of June 17, 1938, by making enrollment in the Register of Commerce conditional upon first obtaining a non-worker's identity card of normal validity (Art. 2), had the effect of destroying this last possibility of regularization for the refugees. These provisions were reinforced by the decree of November 12, 1938, relative to a merchant's identity card for aliens, which was aimed "against the influx of foreign elements liable to impair our economic activities." In short, if a certain number of refugees who had arrived after 1933 were able, thanks to their initiative and to the support of various French groups, to regularize their status, the majority lived and labored in a state of great insecurity. They could at any moment be subjected to *refoulement* or expulsion.⁸ The position of these refugees was all the more precarious in that, by the terms of the law of December 3, 1849, the Ministry of the Interior enjoyed absolute discretionary power in the matter. The person concerned had no remedy at law whatever, the *Cour de Cassation* (the highest court in France) having in fact ruled that a ministerial decree ordering the expulsion of a foreigner

⁸*Refoulement* was an order by a prefect to quit French territory. In theory, nothing hindered the return of the *refouled* person the moment he possessed himself of a regular visa. Violation of a *refoulement* order did not entail any penalties.

Expulsion, on the other hand, was a more severe measure, being a decree by the Minister of the Interior. The person concerned could not return to France unless the decree was revoked, and violation rendered the alien liable to the penalties decreed by the law of December 3, 1849, made far more severe by the decree of May 2, 1938.

was a police measure involving public order whose advisability and reasons the courts had no power to inquire into.⁹

The prefects and the Minister of the Interior proceeded with particular severity in this regard in the years 1934-1935 and 1937, which preceded and followed the establishment of the Popular Front. Now, for a political refugee, refoulement or expulsion was tantamount to the creation of a permanent state of illegal existence. The alien would be taken to the border, generally the Belgian border. The authorities of the latter country would conduct him back to France or force him to return by himself. This operation was sometimes repeated again and again. Finally, the person in question, being found in France in violation of the order banishing him from the country, would be arrested and sentenced to imprisonment. After serving his sentence, but having no place to go to, he would automatically become a recidivist and be haled to court again.¹⁰

It was in order to remedy this situation to some extent that the decree of May 2, 1938 was issued by the Daladier government. The decree introduced two extremely important innovations: a kind of administrative appeal from an order of expulsion and the codification of the "right of asylum" in the sense that it forbade the execution of an expulsion measure against a refugee who had no place to go to. However, notwithstanding these innovations, and although it proclaimed in its preamble that "it does not seek in any way to impair the traditional rules of French hospitality and the spirit of liberalism and humanity which is one of the traits of our national genius," the decree of May 2, 1938, constitutes the harshest measure ever taken in France in regard to aliens.

First of all, it raised to the rank of criminal offenses quite a

⁹*Cass. Crim.*, November 15, 1934, *Gaz. Pal.*, 1934.2.911.

¹⁰Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 254, cites the case of an Italian who had been convicted 29 times and spent 9 years, 8 months, and 21 days in jail, which cost the State 28,368 francs.

number of acts and deeds which previously had not come within the provisions of the penal law. In particular, it declared an alien liable to a fine of 100 to 1,000 francs and to imprisonment of one month to one year if he entered France irregularly, by stealth, or without the required papers and visas, or if he was found on French territory after having been refused or deprived of an identity card (Art. 2). The same penalty was provided for an alien who, without a valid excuse, failed to apply for an identity card within the prescribed time (Art. 3), and for any individual who, directly or indirectly, facilitated the irregular entry, movement, or stay of an alien in France (Art. 4). The penalty for violating an expulsion order issued by the Minister of the Interior was sextupled: imprisonment for six months to three years (Art. 9) instead of the one to six months prescribed by the law of December 3, 1849. The maximum punishment was declared automatically applicable to a foreigner who made a false statement about his civil status or made use of false identity papers (Art. 12).

Finally, the benefit of extenuating circumstances was denied in the case of the infractions enumerated above (Art. 13).

The two liberal measures mitigating these Draconian provisions were contained in Arts. 10 and 11 of the decree. Art. 10 inaugurated an administrative appeal by providing that a foreigner able to prove that he had entered France legally, that he had not incurred a correctional or criminal conviction under the common law, and that he already possessed an identity card of normal validity, was to be granted a delay of eight days from the time of his notification of the administrative measure contemplated against him in order to file a kind of courtesy appeal. The appeal consisted of a request by the refugee concerned to be given a personal hearing by a representative of the prefect. A report containing the explanations and proofs offered by the person in question was to be drawn up and forwarded to the Minister

of the Interior for his decision. The expulsion was to be suspended pending the scrutiny of the record by the Minister. But even this frail recourse was denied if the measure of banishment had been prompted by considerations of public order or national security, of which the Minister of the Interior and the prefects were the sole judges. The really important innovation was Art. 11, which, as a result of many a resolution and recommendation by the League of Nations, sanctioned the plea of "impossibility" of leaving France till then rejected by the French courts. This article provided that, if it was established that an alien could not leave French territory, he should not be subjected to the severe penalties prescribed by the decree for non-compliance with an expulsion order. The Minister of the Interior might assign the refugee concerned a place of residence, where he was to report to the police or gendarmerie at fixed intervals.

The Draconian provisions of the decree of May 2, 1938, were prompted, among other things, by "concern for the national security." They aimed to eliminate suspect elements who had managed to steal into France masquerading as political refugees. It may be said that, in reality, the decree hit only unfortunate and honest refugees. Hitlerite agents, members of the Fifth Column, had their papers in order.¹¹ The decree was severely criticized in Left circles who nicknamed it the "super-murderous" (*super-scélérat*) decree.

Yet it must be admitted that, while its harsh provisions unquestionably increased the sufferings of many refugees, the sanctioning of the political refugee's right of asylum saved a far greater number from the infinitely more tragic consequences of expulsion

¹¹On April 12, 1939, the Government issued a decree further increasing the rigor of alien regulations. Organizations consisting mainly of foreigners were ordered to submit their by-laws and membership lists to the prefectures. Such supervision could easily be explained to the public as a safeguard against foreign agents, but in practice it usually hit the friends of France.

or refoulement. However disheartening the prospect of being sent to forced residence in some remote nook of the provinces, under the watchful eyes of the police, and where the chances of getting any remunerative employment was virtually nil, that condition was incomparably milder than that of a refugee conducted to the border and transformed into a kind of human football to be kicked back and forth by the frontier police of the two countries concerned.

Moreover, it cannot be stressed too much that, despite these severe regulations, the French Government was exceedingly liberal in the application of measures recommended by the international Geneva Conventions in favor of refugees (e.g., relief, social security, education, etc.).¹²

It was again the French Government which made the greatest demand upon the cooperation of refugees, notably in the matter of determining the qualifications of a German political refugee.

Indeed, on the basis of the League of Nations Provisional Arrangement of 1936 concerning the status of refugees from Germany, and at the recommendation of the first Blum government, a presidential decree of September, 1936, prescribed that persons who were refugees as defined in the Provisional Arrangement were to receive a special identification paper called *certificat d'identité et de voyage pour les réfugiés provenant d'Allemagne*. This document was to entitle refugees who had arrived in France between January 30, 1933 and August 5, 1936, to freedom of movement in those states which had signed and ratified the Provisional Arrangement. The decree covered persons who, under the German law of July 14, 1933,¹³ had lost their German citizenship through cancellation of their naturalization, or through denationalization for political reasons, as well as persons who,

¹²Sir John Hope Simpson, *Refugees—Preliminary Report of a Survey*, p. 115.

¹³*Reichsgesetzblatt*, Part I, No. 81, July 15, 1933, p. 480.

though formally still German citizens, could not longer expect the protection of German consulates, *de jure* or *de facto*.

A Consultative Committee composed half of Frenchmen and half of German refugees was formed to help determine who was a *bona fide* refugee entitled to receive that document. After careful examination, 6,522 applicants were confirmed as refugees. This was the first time that any country employed the services of German refugees for so vital a task, involving the security of the State. It should be added that even subsequent governments, with a more conservative orientation, made use of the Committee and never had any complaints to make about its work.

As a result, the confidence reposed in the refugees by the French Government, as well as the assistance given them in all cases by large French political and humanitarian organizations, among which the League for the Rights of Man assuredly occupied the place of honor, created, despite all the severity of the police measures, a sentiment of gratitude, one might say of attachment, to France on the part of the refugees.

This sentiment did not fail to manifest itself fully in the memorable days of September, 1939, when the fate of France hung in the balance.

(c) *Refugees in French Military Formations and Defense Services*

Stateless youths residing in France had been liable for regular military service ever since the enactment of the law of March 31, 1928, providing that "stateless young men living in France are called up with their age class and enrolled in the foreign regiments in order to fulfill the term of service prescribed by the law" (Art. 3).

However, the enforcement of this measure had been deferred for nine years. It was not until 1937 that a census was taken of

the youths concerned. An important communiqué from the Minister of National Defense dated February 24, 1937,¹⁴ explained at one and the same time the reasons which had led the French parliament to require of stateless young refugees the military service not demanded of other aliens, and the ways in which the law was to be applied.

The calling to the colors of young refugees was explained as a "fair and honorable return" for the rights and benefits accorded to refugees (relief, social security, education, work, etc.) without reciprocity to Frenchmen, and which placed the refugees in a position "more like that of citizens than that of aliens." By a liberal construction of the terms of the law, the French Government had decided not to regard as "resident in France" those youths concerned who should declare their intention of settling outside of France. Beginning with October, 1937, the youths to be drafted for two years were to serve in the same units as young Frenchmen,¹⁵ and only those expressing a desire for it were to be assigned to regiments composed of foreigners. The young refugees drafted were to be put on an equal footing with Frenchmen in regard to the privileges accorded Frenchmen, such as enlistment in advance of the call to the colors, choice of the place of service, promotion, eligibility to the ranks of non-commissioned officers in the reserves, allowance to their families during their period of service, and a career in the army. Without obliging them to become naturalized, young refugees who had performed their military service were to be accorded considerable privileges in the matter of acquiring French citizenship, everything being done to expedite action on their applications from the moment the term of their active military service was over. Finally, those preferring to re-

¹⁴*Journal Officiel*, June 10, 1937.

¹⁵This important modification of the law of March 31, 1928, had been brought about by the protests and representations of leading Russian refugee circles.

tain their alien status were to receive, on being discharged from the army, a special identity card permitting them not to be classed as aliens under the laws relating to employment.

By a decree of April 12, 1939 (Art. 4), the obligation imposed on French citizens by the general regulations concerning military service were extended to all aliens benefiting by the right of asylum; all stateless men from 20 to 40 years of age were put at the disposal of the military authorities; and foreigners desiring to enlist were no longer restricted to service in the notorious Foreign Legion, volunteers from 18 to 40 years of age being permitted to sign up for regular army corps.¹⁶ These provisions were implemented by Decree No. 171 of June 22, 1939, ordering the registration for military service of all stateless aliens and foreign nationals enjoying the right of asylum in France between the ages of 20 and 48 who had not yet registered under earlier laws. Such aliens (Art. 4) could thereafter be called up on twenty days' notice by posting public notice to appear at the local commissariat or mayor's office. Foreigners who stated during registration that they did not consider themselves refugees or who did not enjoy the right of asylum could not appeal from orders to leave the area at a later date.¹⁷ Subsequent measures taken during the war laid down rules for the functioning of the so-called *formations de prestataires* (construction battalions).¹⁸

After Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia, when war appeared inevitable, a movement sprang up among the refugees to enlist for the defense of France. On April 15, 1939, *L'Oeuvre*, influential Paris organ of the Radicals and Radical Socialists, reported this movement under the heading "*Les étrangers de France à leur deuxième patrie.*" Thousands of refugees gathered

¹⁶*Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg*, May 23, 1939.

¹⁷*Pariser Tageszeitung*, July 23-24, 1939.

¹⁸Decrees of January 13, February 3, and April 9, 1940.

at the offices of new organizations of friends of France to enroll as members. One such organization, the *Association des Amis de la République Française*, founded by men like Robert Lange, former vice president of the Radical Socialist Party, former Premier Paul Painlevé and former Foreign Minister Paul Boncour, the deputies Louis Jaquinot and Leo Lagrange, Henri Torres and General Weiller, held a large demonstration at the *Mutualité*, one of the largest auditoriums in Paris.¹⁹ On July 19, 1939, *Le Temps*, noting the extraordinary movement among aliens in France who were volunteering to defend their new homeland, suggested that those who entered the military service of France should be granted citizenship.

Three days before the outbreak of war, the Federation of Associations of Jewish War Veterans also set up a recruiting office. Six thousand men volunteered during the first week. The beginning of the war witnessed mass internments of alien Jews in France. Despite this harsh new policy, 9,000 Jewish aliens had joined the French army by October 8, 1939. Eight thousand Jews enrolled in the Polish Legion and 1,000 in the Czech Legion—all of them refugees who had come to France either from Germany or Czechoslovakia.²⁰ On January 28, 1940, it was announced that up to that date 60,000 Jews—half of them refugees—had joined the French army.²¹

The saga of the "indeterminates," the stateless refugees, has been recounted by Hans Habe in his book, *A Thousand Shall Fall*. They were assigned to the twenty-first *Régiment de Marche des volontaires étrangers*, made up of 58 nationalities. The losses of this regiment in the decisive battles of May and June, 1940, were appalling. Refugees who succeeded in escaping to the United

¹⁹*Rundschreiben No. 2 der Zentral-Vereinigung der oesterreichischen Emigranten*, July, 1939.

²⁰*Contemporary Jewish Record*, Vol. 2, 1939, p. 65.

²¹*Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 1940, p. 175.

States reported that 80 percent of the regiment had been declared missing in action. The "indeterminates" fought valiantly, for well they knew what was at stake.

In addition, refugees were employed quite early in some services of French national defense. Since 1936, the radio broadcasts from Strasbourg had been conducted with the collaboration of refugees. After the start of hostilities, the propaganda campaign was considerably expanded, and other refugees were assigned to compose leaflets and brochures to be dropped over Germany from the air.

2. OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

(a) *Mass Internments of German and Austrian Refugees; Liberation Efforts; Results*

Soon after the outbreak of war, the French Government interned nearly all male enemy aliens in order to prevent possible danger to the national security.

Already on August 26, 1939, a few days before the actual commencement of hostilities, it was decided not to exempt refugees from internment because there might be suspicious persons among them.²² In September posters appeared in all French cities ordering all German and Austrian men from 17 to 65 years of age to assemble at certain designated places and bring with them food rations for two days and blankets. Fifteen thousand aliens were confined in 60 reception camps (the so-called *centres de rassemblement*, or assembly points).

Besides the refugees ordered to report for internment, there were also lists of persons to be arrested because they were considered dangerous. However, the persons on these rolls, who were subjected to the worst humiliations, included Left-Wing writers

²²Maximilian Koessler, "Enemy Alien Internment: with Special Reference to Great Britain and France," *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1942, p. 114.

like Arthur Koestler, persons whose nationality and right of residence were not clear, and similar cases, mostly of persons awaiting decision on their appeals from refoulement orders issued by prefects. The percentage of real Nazi and Hitlerite agents was slight.²³

Conditions in the reception camps, as well as in the internment camps to which these aliens were later transferred, were exceedingly primitive. There was a lack of water, and sanitary facilities were either absent altogether or so crude as not to deserve the name. From all camps there came complaints about the lack of beds and bedding, even about insufficient straw and food:

No means to wash myself, no canteen was ready, and I am no longer a youngster to lie on straw and hard stone floors. . . . Assuredly many have fared worse in life . . . but I want to impress something on you: it is incomprehensible that these measures, although fully justified as compared to Nazi pranks, were used indiscriminately in the cases of declared friends of France.²⁴

Now, previous registrations of aliens, particularly the military registration of July 22, 1939, could easily have served as a basis for distinguishing genuine refugees from possible Nazi sympathizers among the German aliens, but the authorities were slow to separate the sheep from the goats.

Both the refugees themselves and the French public, including French officials, believed that the internment of hostile and friendly aliens together was a temporary measure intended to facilitate their classification. However, on arriving at the reception camps, the refugees found that their documents were of little

²³Arthur Koestler, *Scum of the Earth*, pp. 57-80.

²⁴Robert M. W. Kempner. "The Enemy Alien Problem in the Present War," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 34, 1940, p. 450.

value in procuring their release. According to Heinz Pol, "their official French certificates, testifying to the fact that they were loyal, recognized refugees, were mere scraps of paper, the butt of jokes by the very officials who had issued them."²⁵

In the reception camps there were men who had already volunteered for military service. As one of them put it, "When they are fighting for this country, I can't stand aside."²⁶

Special military commissions (*commissions de criblage*) were set up in order to separate the "reliable" internees from the others, and to decide who should remain interned or be released. The administrative procedure, however, was slow and defective. As a rule, persons suspected of sympathizing with Hitler or Stalin were not released.

Helpful in gaining release were sponsorship letters (*lettres de garantie*) from prominent French citizens and favorable reports from the police. Another condition favorable to release was the fact that the internee's wife or children were French by birth. Austrians, and also Saarlanders, were judged more leniently than German refugees. Those who had been honored by Hitler with denationalization could also cite this fact to the commissions as a ground for release. Certain noted writers like Konrad Heiden and others were set free in a relatively short time.²⁷ But as a rule, the only refugees who were released after a few days' detention were those whose nationality was officially designated as indeterminate.

Now it may be remarked that this designation, which virtually spelled the difference between liberty and the internment camp, could have been applied to the great majority of the approximately 15,000 Germans and Austrians about to be interned.²⁸

²⁵Heinz Pol, *Suicide of a Democracy*, p. 230.

²⁶Leo Lania, *The Darkest Hour*, p. 33.

²⁷Lion Fecuhntwanger, *The Devil in France*, p. 173.

²⁸Kempner, *loc. cit.*, p. 450.

Special privilege in the matter of release was accorded to the infirm internees, called "incapables;" and, after a time, the legal and physical possibility of emigrating overseas was likewise recognized as a ground for liberation, or at least for removal to a *camp d'émigration* where the individual was detained until his actual embarkation.

An important rôle in the granting of release was played by "voluntary" enlistment for military service. Those former Germans and Austrians, as well as other aliens, who, in the sense of Arts. 2 and 6 of the decree of July 22, 1939, had claimed the right of asylum, were, in case of physical fitness, released if they enlisted in the Foreign Legion. Although such enlistment normally entailed service for a period of five years, the refugees were permitted to enlist for the duration of hostilities only. Again, men under 20 and over 48 years of age were recruited for service as *prestataires*,—a uniformed auxiliary construction or labor corps, organized and disciplined by the military authorities. In a majority of cases, moreover, those enlisting in the Foreign Legion were promised, and in certain cases actually given, a furlough of several weeks, so that they had an opportunity to visit their families, many of which had been deprived of their means of support by the sudden internment of their menfolk.²⁹

Gradually it began to dawn upon the French public that, by interning avowed enemies of Hitler, France was helping him win a cheap victory during the period of the "Phony War." Many Frenchmen who had expressed their misgivings about previous indiscriminate restrictions upon aliens now began to voice their protests at the protracted and misguided internments.³⁰

²⁹Koessler, *loc. cit.*, pp. 115-116; Michael Schapiro, "German Refugees in France," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, Vol. 3, 1940, p. 139.

³⁰Wladimir d'Ormesson in *Figaro*, Dec. 21, 1939; Marius Moutet in *La Lumière*, Nov. and Dec., 1939; *Le Petit Parisien* and *Justice*, Nov., 1939.

Finally, on December 6, 1939, there was a full-dress debate on the situation in the Chamber of Deputies. Marius Moutet, a member of the central committee of the French League for the Rights of Man, who for years had taken a keen interest in the alien problem in France, proposing many bills, often criticizing the French Government's policy concerning aliens, and, as Minister in the Popular Front government, introducing reform measures, delivered that day one of his most eloquent speeches. He declared it an irresponsible act to intern the enemies of one's own enemies, and said that such internments should as a rule be resorted to only in cases where the national security demanded it. The Alsatian Socialist deputy, Samuel Grumbach, seconded Moutet. Albert Sarraut, who, as Minister of the Interior, bore the responsibility for those measures, made a statement in the Chamber, which he repeated on December 26 in the Senate, to the effect that at the beginning of the war it had been impossible to distinguish the really dangerous aliens from the others. He admitted that the *commissions de criblage* had not always understood the instructions given them, and promised to try, together with the Minister of War, to bring about a more rapid and efficient functioning of those commissions. At the same time he confirmed that the number of Germans and Austrians originally interned was 15,000, of whom 7,000 had been released in the first three months of the war.³¹

After the debates in the Chamber and the Senate, releases were expedited. By the middle of January, 1940, most of the interned refugees were again at liberty, but physically fit men up to 48 years of age were obliged immediately after to enter the ranks of the Foreign Legion or of the *formations de prestataires*. Nine thousand joined the former and about 5,000 the latter.

In this connection mention should be made of the services

³¹Kempner, *loc. cit.*, p. 451.

which the various advisory committees set up by the refugee organizations rendered in the first months of the war. When all male enemy aliens were interned, thousands of families were suddenly left without livelihoods. The Committee for Assistance to Refugees, which, as the largest Jewish committee, handled the great majority of emigrant relief cases, was faced with an almost insoluble problem. It was able to meet the situation only because the refugees themselves took an active part in extending aid and were in a position to handle individual cases far better than were the French themselves.

Institutions like the French League for the Rights of Man, through its *Service Juridique* (Legal Board), advised thousands of women in all matters pertaining to release, drew up petitions, ascertained whether the Interministerial Commission created in the meantime would consider a case favorably or unfavorably, obtained sponsorship letters, etc.

(b) *The Blitzkrieg in the West; Second Wave of Internments*

By the end of the winter, 1940, the majority of the internment camps had been transformed into labor camps, and the *presta-taires* (labor soldiers) not only wore uniforms, but received pay while their families were given aid.

Those who had enlisted in the Foreign Legion had been transported to North Africa. There they underwent intensive training at Sidi bel Abbes (Algeria) or at Marrakesch (Morocco).

Nevertheless, the situation of the other German and Austrian refugees was very precarious. Their economic condition steadily deteriorated, hundreds of business enterprises having been placed under compulsory State control and their bank accounts in many cases tied up.³² The unleashing of the *blitzkrieg* in the West on May 10, 1940, gave a catastrophic turn to this situation.

³²*Aufbau*, September 27, 1940.

On May 13, three days after Hitler's armies had simultaneously invaded Belgium and Holland, the French Government ordered the internment of all persons hailing from Greater Germany, both men and women, between the ages of 17 and 55. On May 13 and 14 this order was made public throughout France, and only women who had to take care of children under 17 years of age were exempted. During the second half of May, men and women over 55 and up to 65 years were also interned.

As a rule, women had not been interned until then. However, at the beginning of September, 1939, female "undesirables" had been apprehended and brought to Camp Rieucros, previously occupied by Spanish refugees. There the women remained for more than a year, and those unable to leave the country were later transferred to other camps. The accommodations were exceedingly crude (straw ticks for beds), and the food very poor.

In the Paris area, the new internment order often forced women and their daughters to move to the *Vélodrome d'Hiver* (Winter Velodrome), which served as the Paris reception camp, from which they were removed to ultimate camps in the provinces.

Thousands of families were thus torn asunder, and it was by no means certain that they would ever be reunited. The fact that, in most cases, they were reunited is one of the few inspiring events of those sad days of France.

At first the treatment in these camps did not differ from that already described. However, the *blitzkrieg* aggravated the confusion generally prevalent because of French unpreparedness. There were days of waiting, transportation to points where the refugees were not supposed to be brought, or else shunting trains carrying refugees to sidings where they were laid up for days. The camp commandants had no instruction as to the steps to be taken in the face of the threatening advance of the Germans.

The farther south the refugees were transported, the better was

their situation, because the danger of being captured by the Germans was thereby diminished.

The story of the second internment, the story first of the flight from camp to camp, then the release of the refugees at the discretion of camp commandants, has been recounted in a number of books written by prominent refugees from personal experience.³³ Under the pressure of events, many camp commandants, clearly recognizing that they could not assume the responsibility for letting the refugees fall into the hands of the Nazi hordes, threw open the camp gates and gave the internees certificates of release. Apparently, this action of the camp commandants was later approved by the French Government.

In those days of her supreme trial, millions of men, women, and children fleeing before the Nazi invaders were jamming the roads of France. First came the flight to Paris of refugees from Belgium, Holland, and the North of France. Those with means were allowed to remain there for a short time; the others were ordered to move on. Then came the frightful stampede from Paris. This increased to tremendous proportions the wave of refugees streaming southward and the indescribable chaos on the roads. "Military authorities continually pressed them to move south because they obstructed troop operations. After a few days, tales of horror and bombardments so terrified some Belgian men that they left without their families, thinking their wives and children would suffer less if captured in villages than if bombed or machine-gunned on the road."³⁴

The terror was deliberately fostered by the Germans. The radio blared out threats to apply "German justice" to the refugees, and to "annihilate" any Jews who might fall into German hands.³⁵

³³See Koestler, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-217; Lania, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-143; Feuchtwanger, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-156.

³⁴*Life*, June 10, 1940.

³⁵*Contemporary Jewish Record*, Vol. 3, 1940, p. 417.

Plans of the relief organizations, which reopened their offices in Bordeaux on June 4, to organize some kind of relief work from there, had to be abandoned because of these threats.

Prompted by panicky rumors—partly true and partly false, and spread by German propaganda—of camouflaged parachutists being dropped everywhere in France to commit acts of sabotage, arrests of individual refugees, even though they no longer were German nationals, were still being made at the beginning of June. Supposedly only particularly suspicious persons were being arrested, but in those days one could find at the provisional Roland Garros camp “avowed anti-Hitlerians, for the most part emigrants who had left Germany for political, religious, or racial reasons.”³⁶

(c) *French Collapse; Suicides; Flight to Spain and Portugal*

Amidst the chaos of those days in France, where five million people—Belgians, Netherlanders, North Frenchmen, Parisians, and refugees of all nations—were in flight,³⁷ word came of the signing of the Armistice with its Article 19. “The French Government is to deliver up all German subjects designated by the Reich Government who are in France or in her overseas possessions,” the article stipulated.

Art. 19 filled the refugees in France with consternation. Many outstanding anti-Nazi refugees, in their despair, committed suicide. Others cabled frantic appeals to their friends in America to save them. Indeed, Art. 19 set in motion a great work of rescue, conducted from the United States, which will form a glorious page in the annals of American democracy.

After the armistice went into effect, the bulk of the refugees

³⁶Bruno Weil, *Baracke 17 Stillgestanden*, p. 30.

³⁷*Life*, “Refugees from France,” June 10, 1940; *New York Times*, June 13, 17, and 22, 1940.

crowded into unoccupied France, but many remained in the occupied part.³⁸ Possibilities of employment in the unoccupied zone were just as scant as the possibilities of succor. The refugees, trudging from village to village and from town to town, were dependent upon the solidarity of the French population. Eyewitness accounts tell of the great sympathy displayed by the French people, who saw in the refugees flesh of their flesh, real companions in misfortune.

The few refugees who possessed ready money found it their sole means of survival. Sending aid from abroad was at first quite difficult. (Subsequently the Quakers undertook such transmissions.) Even inside France mail deliveries were not quite regular. In many cases money orders were delivered, but in many others they were not. When mail finally did arrive from abroad, it was delivered to the addressee, but the censor would remove the enclosed foreign paper money against receipt. Often private aid was arranged, wealthy emigrants donating money for distribution among the needy, "but this is only a drop in the bucket."³⁹

The plight of the refugees in France caused alarm in England also, although the latter had her own refugee problem.⁴⁰ The need of launching relief work was recognized in American circles. Jewish organizations already in possession of well-tried relief machinery now set it in motion in order to remove the refugees, insofar as this was possible, and to institute relief measures.

Many of the German and Austrian refugees who were still at large tried to leave France by means of irregular visas which merely served the purpose of obtaining transit visas for Spain and Portugal. A vivid picture of the situation at that time is given in the following excerpts from the first of a series of articles by

³⁸Cf. Lania, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

³⁹Carl Misch, "Schicksal der Réfugiés in Frankreich," *Aufbau*, Sept. 27, 1940.

⁴⁰*Manchester Guardian*, June 28, 1940.

Varian Fry, who was the delegate of the Emergency Rescue Committee and of the International Relief Association and, in that capacity, managed the American Center in Marseilles:

Caught in the concentration camps of southern France, or congregated in the larger cities, Pau, Montaubon, Toulouse, Nice and, above all, Marseilles, the refugees lived in an agony of fear and apprehension. For weeks and months they believed that every ringing of the doorbell, every step on the stair, every knock on the door might be the police come to get them and take them to the Gestapo. They sought hysterically for some means of escape from the net which had suddenly been dropped over their heads. They were the prey of every sort of swindler and blackmailer. Their already badly frayed nerves sometimes gave way altogether under the incessant pounding of fantastic horror-stories and wild rumors. . . .

Under the strain of these alarms, many refugees committed suicide. The roll of those who took their own lives includes such men as Carl Einstein, Walter Benjamin and Walter Hasenclever, all German anti-Nazi writers.⁴¹ Some weeks after the armistice the body of Willi Muenzenberg, the eloquent German Communist publisher, was found, in a state of partial decomposition, hanging from a tree near Grenoble. Many less known men, and some women, died in concentration camps, cheap hotel bedrooms, and dark, narrow streets, preferring escape through death to the unbearable strain of the terror which the defeat of France seemed likely to unleash upon them at any moment.

Fortunately, the terror did not begin immediately, and it is a sad reflection that many of those who committed suicide might

⁴¹Erich Kaiser, well-known democratic newspaper editor, Gert Reisner, press photographer, and many others also committed suicide. Cf. "Abschiedsbrief an Erich Kaiser," *Aufbau*, Oct. 11, 1940.

have been saved if they had only waited. In the first weeks after the armistice, escape was easy. France, under orders from Berlin, granted no exit visas to refugees, but the United States gave entry visas freely, and the Portuguese and Spanish consulates issued transit visas to all comers who had any overseas visas whatever. Once they had the Spanish and Portuguese transit visas, the refugees had only to go down to the French frontier and cross over—often with the help and guidance of the local French authorities, who had not yet been replaced by men obedient to Vichy's orders. Hundreds left in this way. . . .

. . . In October, 1940, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, visited Madrid. His visit was followed by a radical change in Spanish transit visa policy. At first no transit visas were issued to Poles, or to Germans and Austrians without valid Reich passports. American "affidavits in lieu of passport," issued by the American consulates to visa applicants without other travel documents, were declared to be invalid in Spain (they had been one of the most common travel documents of the political refugees). At about the same time the French, doubtless under German pressure, tightened up their border control.⁴²

This marked the end of "illegal" emigration on a large scale, which was often possible by crossing the Pyrenees, a perilous feat attempted by a number of refugees.

3. THE GERMAN OCCUPATION AND THE VICHY REGIME

The setting forth by the Nazis and the acceptance by the Petain government of Art. 19 of the Armistice agreement was a clear hint of what the Nazis and Vichy had in store for the refugees.

⁴²*The New Leader*, April 25, 1942.

The reality surpassed the worst expectations.

I. *The Occupied Zone*.—The creation of a line of demarcation between occupied and unoccupied France, and the German decree of September 27, 1940, prohibiting all travel by Jews from one zone to the other, practically trapped those refugees who still remained in that greater part of France which was under direct German administration. Individual roundups of refugees started as soon as the Gestapo began to function in Paris. Mass internments were to come a few months later. In March, 1941, all Jews in the northern coastal districts were expelled from their homes and removed to two camps in the departments of Yonne and Aube (occupied zone). A few weeks later nearly 5,000 Parisian Jews, mainly Czechoslovakian, Austrian, and Polish nationals between the ages of 18 and 40, were sent to a concentration camp near Orleans.⁴³ The deportation for internment of these unfortunates took place under the most revolting circumstances. Unsuspectingly these Jews were told to appear with their wives and children at the prefecture, whence the women or children were sent home to fetch the most necessary belongings, while the men were detained and the most tragic scenes were enacted.⁴⁴

The opening of Hitler's attack upon Russia on June 22, 1941, marked, in both zones, the start of a roundup of Russian refugees, mostly Jews, many of whom had lived in France for twenty years or even longer. They were sent to the concentration camps of Compiègne and Drancy. In August of that year 6,000 more foreign Jews were arrested. The raids were continued sporadically. By the middle of 1942, about 25,000 Jews, mainly aliens and including a large proportion of refugees and stateless persons, had been interned in the following German-administered concentration camps: Compiègne, Pithiviers, Beaune-la-Rollande, and Drancy.

⁴³Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews*, p. 267.

⁴⁴*New York Times*, May 17, 1941.

The most dreaded of these camps was Drancy, in the neighborhood of Paris. Run by a Nazi officer named Danneker, with the assistance of a French follower of Jacques Doriot, the French quisling, Drancy soon "earned the ill-famed title of the Dachau of France."⁴⁵ The internees of these camps were the first to be deported to "unknown destinations" when the Nazis, in the summer of 1942, inaugurated mass deportations from France to the extermination camps of Eastern Europe.

No wonder, then, that the line of demarcation between occupied and unoccupied France had such a powerful fascination for the people of the occupied zone, especially for alien Jews. Despite the constant reinforcement of the Nazi guards at the boundary line and the use, at some "weak" spots, of specially trained bloodhounds, many tried, at the risk of their lives, to cross into the so-called "free" zone. Cases of disinterested help given these fugitives by Frenchmen living near the boundary line, and particularly by the French Underground, were not rare. Generally speaking, however, the smuggling of people across the line of demarcation developed into a source of profit for a number of unscrupulous persons, and Jews escaping from Paris had in some instances to pay a stiff price for the use of the "underground railroad."⁴⁶

Moreover, many of the foreign and stateless Jews who succeeded in crossing the line soon discovered that they had merely jumped from the frying pan into the fire. For ordeals similar to those they had fled from awaited them in Vichy jails, concentration camps, or small localities to which they were assigned for forced residence under control of the gendarmerie.

II. *Vichy France*.—As stated above, the bulk of the refugees had crowded into the southern part of France which became the

⁴⁵Institute of Jewish Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁴⁶Eyewitness account.

so-called "free" zone under Vichy rule.

Not only did not the quisling government of Petain-Laval try to disband the labor and concentration camps, but it instituted a policy which was bound to fill the existing camps, to multiply their number, and to increase their inmates. As a matter of fact, foreign Jews, and particularly German and Austrian refugees, had been subjected to a regime of concentration camps and forced labor in Vichy France some eight months before the German occupation authorities in Paris filled their first concentration camp.⁴⁷ On July 7, 1940, as soon as it assumed power, the Vichy Government ordered the internment of Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria. In August of the same year, all aliens living on relief given by welfare agencies, were ordered interned. On September 27, it was decreed that all aliens *en surnombre* ("superfluous") to the national economy be put in labor camps, while a further decree on October 4, published simultaneously with the first Jewish statute, empowered the prefects to confine alien Jews in camps or to designate compulsory residence for them. Thus, those Jews who had been released from, or who had left, the camps during the confusion of June, July, and August of that year, were again interned if they were in no position to leave the country or did not possess sufficient means. The number of internees increased further after June 22, 1941, when aliens and refugees of Russian origin were rounded up.⁴⁸

The ranks of these unfortunates, interned by the direct action of the Vichy Government, grew considerably as a result of the deportation to the unoccupied zone of all Jews, whether infants or hoary old men, from Baden and the Palatinate. This deportation was carried out by the Nazis, without previous warning, in

⁴⁷Institute of Jewish Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

⁴⁸Most of the Russian refugees who could prove that they were against the Soviets, and that they possessed means of subsistence, were released in the following months.

October, 1940. The influx of 10,000 German Jews into a region unable even in normal times to feed its own population, and deprived by the German-Italian Armistice Commission functioning in Marseilles of most of the food coming in from North Africa and other French colonial possessions (from 60 to 80 percent), could not but aggravate the material and moral situation in the camps.⁴⁹

Most of these 10,000 Jews went to Camp Gurs (in Basses Pyrénées). Included among them were 2,000 whose ages ran from 60 to 104 years. For the first time, children were also interned in the camps. When subsequently it was ordered that the concentration camps be transformed into assembly camps, the number of those interned in them, including the Jews from Baden and the Rhineland, was estimated at 25,000.

(c) *The Situation in the Camps*

The most important camps in the unoccupied zone were Gurs, Le Vernet, Rieucros (the women's camp), and St. Cyprien. They had sprung up after the collapse of the Spanish Republic. France had admitted 453,000 Spanish refugees, but it had interned them in camps built in part by the Spaniards themselves. These camps were thus able to shelter the great mass of refugees. When in May, 1940, it was decided to intern women, too, 8,000 of them were sent to Camp Gurs. It could easily have accommodated 20,000.

During the first four months following the signing of the armistice, the situation was well-nigh unendurable. Owing to epidemics like dysentery, encephalitis epidemica, etc., which spread because

⁴⁹An explanation of this ruthless deportation was attempted by the Transocean Correspondence, which alleged that France, in a secret clause of the armistice agreement, had pledged herself to take over a large number of German Jews. Another version said that the measure was intended to exert pressure upon the United States to admit more Jews. Cf. *Aufbau*, Nov. 8, 1940.

of the absence of sanitary conveniences, and to undernourishment (950-1,200 calories per day instead of the minimum requirement of 1,800 to 2,000), the death rate at Camp Gurs was very high.

In the first four months which these homeless people and their fellow sufferers, who had already emigrated to Belgium, Holland, and France and had now been brought to Gurs, had to pass in the damp, cold, drafty, and gloomy barracks, without light and air, with insufficient clothing and without any comforts, no fewer than 1,055 died out of an average camp population of 13,500. This is roughly 77 per mille for the total number of internees, or, if we take a three-month period, 57.75 per mille. Compared with the official mortality figures for New York, showing a death rate of 2.5 per mille in the same three months, the mortality at Gurs was more than 20 times higher.⁵⁰

Conditions at the camps of St. Cyprien and Le Vernet were no better. There is a report on St. Cyprien which, after describing the arrival at the camp, goes on to recount in part:

Driven by thirst, we collected the rainwater which dripped from the cover of the wagon, and took turns at drinking it. . . . The Spaniards called this camp the hell of Perpignan. About 80 percent of them died here. . . .

The sanitary conditions defy description . . . dysentery and diarrhoea, etc. are the results. . . . All kinds of diseases and death. . . . Typhus broke out in consequence of the contaminated water. Despite prophylactic inoculations by emigrant physicians, the mortality continues. . . . Food: in the morning, two cups of coffee; at noon, soup which sometimes contains scraps of meat, and in the evening soup again; also, half a liter of red wine a day, and about 300 grams (less than 11 ounces) of

⁵⁰Excerpt from a report by Dr. Alfred Wolff, former camp physician at Gurs, in *Tätigkeitsbericht der Baden-Pfalzhilfe*, June-November, 1941.

bread. Those who cannot afford to buy additional food starve by degrees. . . . Very few have money. . . . Just to give you an idea: at first a bar of chocolate weighing 200 grams (a little over 7 ounces) sold at 120 francs, and cigarettes at 25 francs apiece; but gradually, through the understanding shown by the guards, it became possible to procure something. Today (Oct. 16, 1940), a loaf of bread may be purchased for 18-20 francs, a bar of chocolate for 15-20 francs, and a pack of cigarettes at the canteen for 5 francs.⁵¹

This account was corroborated by Gustav Ferl, a former Reichstag member, who later came to the United States and reported that the typhus epidemic had carried off thirty young men in two months. The food situation, however, he characterized as tolerable. "Aside from bread and meat in insufficient amounts, there was plenty of fruit, that is, peaches, tomatoes, and grapes."⁵²

As for Le Vernet, the following abridged version of a report published in the *New Republic* of November 11, 1940, gives a graphic account of the terrible conditions which prevailed there:

You know that I have been through four concentration camps. The three others were nothing compared to the fourth, Camp Le Vernet (Ariège), which is between Toulouse and the Spanish frontier. That is where I was interned for 16 months, from October, 1939 to January, 1941. Among ourselves we called this camp the French Dachau.

Lack of food, the horrible misery, the cold, the lack of clothing and medical supplies, the complete absence of hygiene, and the restrictions, prohibitions and punishments. . . . There were the persecutions, the physical punishments and the shootings. Inmates were constantly hit and beaten by the guards

⁵¹*Neue Volkszeitung*, Nov. 16, 1940.

⁵²*Ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1941.

of the gardes mobiles. Treatment was given in waves, e.g. as soon as news of these beatings reached the outside, they would go easy on them, but two or three weeks later it would begin again. Lieutenant Combs, commander of Quartier C from October, 1939 to August, 1940, and his men would always go around with bamboo sticks in addition to their revolvers and muskets. Combs, who was nicknamed "Schweinbacke" (Hog Face), let his subordinates beat us on the slightest provocation.

End of October, 1939, I saw the guard Balandoni, a Corsican, strike a Russian émigré with his bamboo stick in the face several times. He had refused to work because he was sick. One hour later, the military physician at the camp confirmed the fact that he was sick. February, 1940: I saw Balandoni hit a Chinese in the face with a stick because he was too weak to carry the heavy buckets of excrement.

November, 1939, Leon S., from Barrack 33, a Jew from Palestine (British subject), was called to Lieutenant Combs' office. He came back a half hour later, his face covered with bruises and welts. Hog Face had received him with the words, "You swine, you filthy swine, you didn't do a lick of work today," and had struck him in the face with a piece of iron.

January, 1940, I and 400 others saw the internee Werner S. hit in the face. His face was covered with blood.

Dead: Lack of care, hunger and cold:

Willi Weber, Barrack 33, October, 1939.

Paul Dreyfus, Barrack 32, October, 1939.

Weil, Barrack 33.

Jules P., a Pole, July, 1940.

Pitschowa, after operation.

Shootings: The regulations were:

Between nightfall and dawn, if an internee comes within ten feet of the barbwire on the inside of the camp, the sentinels

are to shoot immediately without a warning. This regulation was literally applied in the following cases: On November 11, 1940, a young German refugee from Mannheim, Leo Dollinger, who had fought for republican Spain, said to his friends: "I can't stand this life any more. I am going to run away now." At 7 o'clock, when the lights were still on, he suddenly rushed up in the direction of the big hedge of the barbed wire. The sentinel immediately shot him. He fell on the barbed wire and began to scream. The others wanted to take him off, but the guards refused to permit this; a half hour later—he was dead. A month later a similar incident took place: a Spaniard was shot. September, 1940, a young Pole from Quartier A was shot by the guards. When the refugees came to complain, the garde-mobile said: "I advise you to keep quiet. We have 50,000 bullets here to keep you that way."

The intercession of various organizations concerned with helping the internees caused the Vichy Government to undertake certain reform measures. In the middle of November, 1940, it was ordered that the concentration camps be closed and replaced with assembly camps.⁵³ The concentration camps had been under military control, which meant that all refugees interned in such camps were under military jurisdiction. Under the new dispensation, the camps were placed under civil administration. Two categories of refugees were to be detained in the assembly camps: (1) those without means, and (2) those whom the authorities wished to keep out of the cities and towns, where they might engage in undesirable political activities. The majority of those affected by the new order were Jews. However, the Vichy Government declared that it had no desire to keep in these camps foreign Jews who were in a position to emigrate to other countries; those obtaining overseas visas would immediately be trans-

⁵³*New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1940; *Aufbau*, Nov. 22, 1940.

ferred to Camp Les Milles in the vicinity of Aix-en-Provence, and the prefect of that district had been authorized to grant exit permits without further ado.

However, an eyewitness account given at a meeting of the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia in January, 1941, or two months after the reorganization undertaken by the Vichy Government, showed that, as regards living conditions in the camps, this change was a rather superficial one.⁵⁴

The report stated that starvation had been the cause of a number of deaths in the French camps. Gurs was described as particularly bad: "an unbearable atmosphere of human helplessness, an intense desire to die" prevailed there. The refugees had given up the fight, lying listlessly on their straw ticks, often refusing food, and waiting for their end. Camp Gurs, according to the report, then harbored the entire former Jewish population of Baden and some 3,000 men from St. Cyprien, "already accustomed to the life of camp, but nevertheless enfeebled by long privations." The report confirmed all that the refugees themselves had written. This, for example, is what it had to say about the barracks: "There are no glass windows, only skylights in plain wood, which opened give only a poor light and which must be closed during rain. Even with all the skylights raised it is impossible to read in the interior of the barracks. Air space for each person is notoriously insufficient." (It is interesting to note that the refugees themselves made little mention of this, being no longer conscious of such inconveniences.) The Quakers' investigator reported similarly about other camps, for example, Argelès.

A more optimistic note was sounded by the official report of the Portuguese Red Cross released in January, 1941, and given wide publicity in the American press. A delegate of the Portuguese Red Cross had been permitted to inspect the camps. Accord-

⁵⁴*New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1941.

ing to his account, the Commandant of Gurs, Major Davergne, was "animated by the best intentions," and had introduced some improvements in the camp (such as wooden floors, a stove in every barrack, and the distribution of firewood). However, in view of the low temperature prevalent, "the commandant would greatly welcome the sending of any kind of warm clothing . . . as well as blankets." And because of the strict rationing of food throughout France, he "would be grateful if condensed milk, chocolate, and sugar were sent for the aged and the children." (There were 500 children in the camp.) It was suggested that 5-kilogram parcels consisting mainly of canned foods preserved in oil, as well as coffee, butter, chocolate, and oil, be sent. (However, the sending of such parcels had to be abandoned in September, 1941, because Portugal permitted only the sending of chocolate, chocolate powder, and rice. Food parcels could no longer be shipped directly from overseas on account of the war.)

The report stated further that the treatment of the camp inmates was decent, charges of corporal punishment having been found untrue, and that the authorities were doing everything possible to facilitate the departure of the internees from France provided they possessed the necessary travel documents. "Applications for release must be addressed to the managing director of the camp (*commissaire directeur du camp*). He summons the applicant and then submits a report to the prefect, who thereupon tries to obtain not only the release from camp, but also an exit permit (*visa de sortie*)."⁵⁵

There is no doubt, however, that the winter of 1940-1941 brought great suffering to the interned refugees.⁵⁶

⁵⁵*Aufbau*, Jan. 10, 1941.

⁵⁶*New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1941; *Rapport sur l'activité de l'Union OSE* (1941); *Activité de l'OSE dans les Centres de Rassemblement* (1940); report of Ellen Bonnell, of the American Friends Service Committee, Jan. 7, 1941.

In Camp Rivesaltes there were in May, 1941, more than 6,000 children, among them many who had lost their parents, or such as had been lost without ever finding their parents again. According to the report of the OSE (Organization for Protection of the Health of the Jews) of January-February, 1942, there were 2,000 Jewish and Spanish children in the camp. Rivesaltes became the assembly center of all refugee children. The picture drawn in this report is still far from bright. "They wander around half-starved in cold, filthy, dark barracks or lie prostrate on the bare sand. During last winter they suffered all sorts of illnesses and expired from cold and hunger; in summer dysentery took a terrible toll among them. Only very slowly, the OSE, together with the Quakers and the Secours Suisse, was allowed to bring medical aid, distribute supplementary food and organize some sort of schooling for the children."

The OSE took over the care of 5,000 children in France who, owing to the war, were dependent upon the organization for support. Twelve hundred of them were under the direct supervision of the OSE and sheltered in its children's homes.⁵⁷

At the end of April, 1942, 2,500 children were still at Rivesaltes. Notwithstanding the consent given by the Vichy Government, it was not possible to get the children out of the camp, for difficulties arose in connection with finding adequate shelter for the children. The quarters offered by the various Departments were unsatisfactory. It was deemed preferable to leave the children in the camps.⁵⁸

Under pressure from the relief organizations active in France, the Vichy Government in March, 1941, granted permission for

⁵⁷*American OSE Review*, Jan.-Feb., 1942. See also the report of the Secours Suisse of the Red Cross, which provided for the feeding of 150 children in Camp Gurs. Most of the children in Gurs were transferred to Rivesaltes.

⁵⁸American Friends Service Committee, *Bulletin on Relief in France*, May 18, 1942.

American journalists to visit the camps.⁵⁹ Their reports confirmed the statements made by the relief organizations and individual refugees. The inspection of Camp Le Vernet was for some obscure reason halted by the French authorities. Lansing Warren of the *New York Times* summed up his general impression thus: "The trip's strongest impression is of the hopeless situation of these people confined in internment or refugee camps. Nobody in them is happy except some of the children and even they are an exception." Warren described the problem of food and lodging as grave, to which he attributed the low morale of the internees.

The main trouble in the camps was disease, mostly due to undernourishment. Vichy allotted 11.5 francs a day for each camp inmate. This amount would have sufficed to feed one person if the necessary provisions could have been procured, or if the provisions procured had been used for the internees only.⁶⁰ The bad food situation was attributed to the fact that part of the provisions were sold in the black market by the guards.⁶¹ The abuses were such that even *Guinguette*, the most rabidly antisemitic and anti-alien of Vichy organs, protested in its issue of August 15, 1941, against the illicit traffic in camp provisions at the camp of Argelès-sur-Mer.⁶² The situation in that camp was described in the following terms by Lansing Warren, who visited Argelès-sur-Mer in March, 1941: "Nearly all the persons visible were dressed in filthy ragged garments. . . . The inmates slept on the sand, which was infested with vermin. There is an absolute dearth of linen or cotton rags and underclothing. The food situation is acknowledged to be inadequate."

⁵⁹*New York Times*, March 28-29, 1941. See also previous reports in the *New York Times*, Feb. 23 and Mar. 7, 1941, and in the *New York Post*, Feb. 28, 1941.

⁶⁰*New York Times*, April 11, 1941.

⁶¹Howard L. Brooks, *Prisoners of Hope*, p. 149.

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 166-168.

Was Vichy to blame for these conditions? When the American clergyman, Howard L. Brooks, who spent several months in France, visited the assembly camps, he put this question to one of his French confidants. He received the following answer:

Wouldn't you welcome every opportunity to publicize the misery of those refugees? Wouldn't you appeal to the conscience of the world? Wouldn't such description in the press of the United States and other countries be your best and only way to bring about a change? But Vichy doesn't want anything to change. It is no more concerned with bettering the life of the refugees than the Nazis themselves. Vichy shares in the responsibility and that is why the government doesn't want any publicity.⁶³

The organizations engaged in administering relief bent every effort to supply additional victuals. However, for reasons already explained, their efforts were frustrated, with grave consequences to the camp inmates' health. The official statistics on health conditions in the camps "were outright lies."⁶⁴ The mortality figures given out did not accord with the actual number of deaths.

There is an illuminating report on these health conditions by Dr. I. Chomsky. From June, 1940 to June, 1941, Dr. Chomsky worked in three hospitals in Southern France, where he treated hundreds of refugees, the large refugee camps being located in the vicinity of the hospitals. In his report he notes:

1. The "almost complete disappearance of births among the Jewish population, though young families predominated among Jewish refugees." From October, 1940 to the end of January, 1941, in one of the large maternity hospitals of Southern France, Dr. Chomsky observed only one confinement of a Jewish woman

⁶³Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

(brought from an internment camp), who gave birth to stillborn twins.

2. Many young women did not menstruate for 2, 3, and 4 months. This was attributed to great exhaustion and anxiety during the flight as well as to a radical change in living conditions.

3. All children showed marked emaciation with sharply protruding vertebrae and ribs, hollow chests and protruding joints. The muscular tonus was invariably weak, weight and height below normal.

4. Many infants showed the first signs of rickets.

5. The average loss of weight among Jewish adults during four months of wandering came to from 20 to 25 pounds.

6. It was difficult to help Jewish diabetics, because one could not obtain insulin.⁶⁵

At the beginning of February, 1941, it became known, through a letter which the French Ambassador to the United States, Gaston Henry-Haye, sent in reply to one from Dr. Smith Leiper, that refugees could be released from the camps if 1,200 francs a month were guaranteed for the maintenance of each person concerned.⁶⁶

This letter was written at the very time that Vichy had to admit that the situation in the camps was not of the best and decided to avail itself of the moral and material aid of the 21 foreign welfare organizations operating in France. The latter, on their part, set up a coordinating committee which met at regular intervals in Nîmes. The chairman was Pastor Toureille, whom Howard L. Brooks described as a particularly capable and understanding

⁶⁵Dr. I. Chomsky, "Among Refugees: Some Medical Observations," *American OSE Review*, March-April, 1942.

⁶⁶*Aufbau*, Feb. 7, 1941.

man. Among the constituent organizations were the American Friends Service Committee, the International Young Men's Christian Association, the OSE, the Unitarian Service Committee of Boston, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the American Friends of Czechoslovakia, the International Migration Service, the Mennonites, the French Red Cross, the Belgian Red Cross, the American Red Cross, the Centre Américain de Secours, HICEM (abbreviated name of a worldwide Jewish emigrant aid organization whose principal sponsors and backers are the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and the Jewish Colonization Association), and Russian and Czech relief organizations.⁶⁷

As a result of this cooperation, an effort was made to improve in especial the health of the camp inmates and to utilize the services of more than 300 refugee physicians resident in Southern France at the beginning of 1941.⁶⁸ Indeed, there was a gradual improvement in the general conditions of life in the camps.

A refugee who left Camp Gurs in March, 1942, after having spent nearly two years there, has written an interesting account of life in that camp. It is reproduced below because the picture it draws may be regarded as more or less representative of the other camps (except Le Vernet). We quote:

There are still about 4,500 people in Gurs; 4 blocks of buildings are unoccupied. The external condition of the camp has remained essentially the same. True, an attempt was made to improve the roads, but without success. In rainy weather one still sinks in the mud. The women's blocks are now the worst. Equally futile were the repairs to the barracks: the rain still comes in.

⁶⁷*New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1941; Brooks, op. cit., p. 134 ff.

⁶⁸*New York Times*, March 8, 1941; American Committee of OSE, *News Bulletin*, June, 1941.

Two important improvements were effected: each one has his own bed. Tables and benches have not yet been installed in the barracks, but each block now has its cultural barrack, well lit, which is heated on winter evenings. As the blocks are occupied on the average by 450 persons, they are naturally far too small.

The food regulations are those prevalent in unoccupied France. There are the same rations of bread, fats (no butter), dried vegetables, meat, noodles, sugar, potatoes, tobacco, and soap. The last two items are supplied irregularly. The coffee ration, allowing for ersatz products, is 2 grams per person daily. In the case of some of these foodstuffs, a certain percentage is deducted in advance; in the case of bread, for example, for "desiccation," so that the rations generally weigh 240 gr. instead of 250, and, in the case of workers, 320 instead of 350 gr. Moreover, additional deductions are made by the camp commissary in the actual distribution. The meat rations for 100 patients in the maternity hospital were 2 kilograms short; in the case of the internees living in the blocks the shortages were correspondingly greater. The "savings" thus effected flow mainly into the vast black market. With the help of cigarettes and tobacco these deductions may be reduced; they cannot be prevented altogether.

In the fall the food consisted mainly of pumpkins, in the winter of turnips. In both cases it was a question of cattle fodder of the poorest quality. The pumpkins were stored without straw in a barrack in a vacant block. Fourteen days after storage the pumpkins were either gnawed by rats or decayed. It was even worse with the turnips. The latter were delivered in a period of rain and, in their moist condition, were partly stored in barracks and partly in the open on the muddy ground and in puddles of rain. When the first frosty nights came, the turnips

froze. While, in the case of the pumpkins, the worst parts were cut away, the turnips were distributed as they were. They also had to be consumed that way, for they constituted the basic part of the nourishment, and it was almost out of the question to throw away any part of them.

All who subsist on such food alone are so emaciated that they look like skeletons. Already towards the end of the winter of 1940-41, a disease made its appearance whose causes are to be sought in the food consumed, although its real nature is not definitely known. The joints of the arms and legs become swollen and cause acute pain. So far more than 70 such cases have become known. They are lodged in a separate barrack and given a certain diet. Rummaging in the garbage pails has become a common sight: discarded heads of sardines, potato and orange peel are picked up from the refuse cans and consumed by these poor wretches either cooked or raw. Often these refuse cans contain rat poison, and so cases of poisoning are relatively frequent.

For those with some money there is the possibility of procuring additional food in the camp's black market. Generally the "supply" is plentiful. Naturally, the prices are very high. A kilogram (ca. 2.2 lbs.) of bread costs about 60 francs; a kilogram of dried beans, 60 francs; a kilogram of oat flakes, 60 to 70 francs; a kilogram of meat, 150 to 180 francs; a box of sardines, 35 to 40 francs; a liter of oil, 200 to 250 francs; one egg, 8 francs; carrots, 6 to 8 francs a kilogram; a package of cigarettes or tobacco, 40 to 45 francs shortly after the replenishment of tobacco stocks. On the other hand, shortly before the replenishment of tobacco stocks, which takes place every four weeks, a package costs up to 90 francs. These things are, as a rule, always available. Occasionally there are also available chocolate, for which as much as 100 francs is paid, depending on the

size and quality, biscuits (2 to 3 francs apiece), potatoes, flour, groats, and condensed milk.

Supplies reach the internees in three ways: (1) Through the camp commissary. Sometimes the French personnel and sometimes camp inmates employed there traffic illicitly in provisions, especially in fats, oil, and meat. (2) Through purchases in the vicinity of the camp, made through the keepers, the French nurses employed in the camp, and the members of labor companies. (3) Through the parcels post. Theoretically, it is forbidden to send rationed food. But if the censor is given a cigarette, he closes one eye and—confiscates only one half of the contents; if he is given two cigarettes, he shuts both eyes; given still more cigarettes, he does not even trouble to open the parcel.

Now and then the *Sûreté* makes arrests. The persons apprehended are handled roughly, and if a confession is extorted, they are turned over to the courts. But, naturally, it cannot and does not want to arrest the real profiteers and organizers of the black market, for they are members of the camp administration, or else are so closely connected with it through business deals that they have become immune to attack.

In addition, there is a canteen in almost every block. Among the "necessaries" available are date bread, powdered ersatz soup, powdered ersatz pudding, Bouillon D, and, occasionally, peppermints. Twice a week a market is held in the camp. The French employees have priority in the making of purchases. When they have bought all they want, the canteens are permitted to purchase. In this way one procures paprica pods, lettuce, and turnips of every variety. Individual canteens are plentifully supplied with articles of use, stationery, galoshes, and toilet articles.

The radio service is well organized. One internee is allowed to listen to all broadcasting stations and to report the news to the camp inmates, on condition that he first submit his report to the censor, and that the news about France be gathered only from the official Vichy Radio. The broadcasts of the British and Russian stations are reported in great detail. I know of no case where the censor ever deleted anything. The news is reported twice a day and, in addition, summary reviews of it are given once a week.

The camp contains a very good orchestra (Kurt Laval, conductor), a theatrical troupe, and a players' group (directed by Nathan). The last-named enjoys a certain freedom of criticism. In its last revue, *Heaven and Hell*, there was a number entitled "Wotan's Song," which dealt with Hitler's failure in Russia. It was prohibited, but not until after the whole camp had seen it. The final scene, showing that it is not the Nazis' New Order that will save Europe, was not suppressed.

A few words about the social arrangements in the camp. For each parcel received a franc must be paid, from each money order one percent of the incoming amount is deducted. The money goes partly to the CCA, partly to the block treasury. With this money the CCA buys vegetables (*i.e.*, turnips), occasionally fruit or delicatessen. These supplementary provisions are given to the blocks either gratis or at a reduced price. The blocks, for their part, pay with money derived from surpluses at the canteens, the revenue from incoming parcels and money orders, and the food assessment. The food assessment in individual blocks amounts to 5 francs per capita a week, which everyone must pay. Most of the internees manage to pay the assessment by selling part of their tobacco rations.^{68a}

^{68a}The author of the foregoing report on Camp Gurs was Henry Behrendt, a German refugee. Following his release from Gurs, he made his way to the United States, arriv-

In March, 1942, that is, after many thousand overseas visas had been put at the disposal of the refugees in the camps, and another part had managed to obtain release by having their maintenance provided for, while a third part had passed away, there were 16,401 persons left in the French camps, according to a list compiled by the American Friends Service Committee.⁶⁹ They were distributed as follows:

Vernet	1,900
Rieucros	327
Gurs	4,500
Recebedou	1,217
Noe	1,200
Les Milles	1,250
Septfonds	100
Rivesaltes	4,487
St. Louis Hosp.	200
Bombard	190
Terminus	105
Levant	400
Barcares	300
Laguiche	225
<hr/>	
Total	16,401

(b) *Forced Residence*

The lot of the uninterned refugees was scarcely more enviable. To be sure, they retained their personal freedom; but what precarious freedom that was! They were forbidden to engage in any remunerative work, forbidden to move from one locality to another without a special permit which the police granted only in

ing early in 1943. In August of the same year he entered the U. S. Army, was sent to the Pacific theatre of war in January, 1944, and was killed in action on Biak Island, June 18, 1944.

⁶⁹*Aufbau*, April 24, 1942.

very exceptional cases.⁷⁰ Hence in many cases this freedom amounted at bottom to a kind of forced residence under constant police surveillance. Yet even this relative freedom, for a great many refugees, changed overnight into formal assignment to a place of forced residence or, worse yet, into assignment to a labor camp, at a prefectorial order issued under the decree of October 4, 1940, mentioned above.

Forced residence, it will be remembered, was not an innovation. This measure was first introduced in French legislation and administrative practice by the Daladier decree of May 2, 1938. As a rule, assignment to forced residence affected the refugees—Germans, Belgians, Netherlanders, etc.—and the stateless. But a great many Frenchmen, too, who were hostile to the Petain regime, were thus placed where “they could do no harm.” And it is certainly not the least of the curious lessons of history to point out that the severest critics of the 1938 decree predicted at the time the exact use a future Fascist dictator of France would make of the decree.⁷¹ As regards the refugees, those among them were subjected to forced residence who had, or were supposed to have, means, and whose presence in an urban center was deemed undesirable in the opinion, or whim, of the prefects. The “regional prefects” (another innovation of Petain’s, who aped the monarchy in everything) of Haute-Garonne (Toulouse), Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseilles), and Alpes-Maritimes (Nice), who had under their police jurisdiction the largest masses of refugees of every variety, had a grand time of it. Those of the Rhône (Lyons) and of Isère (Grenoble) seemed to be more liberal, at any rate less indoctri-

⁷⁰This was a war regulation dating from 1939 which was aimed at all foreigners. In the hands of Vichy it became an instrument of oppression directed primarily against the refugees and the stateless.

⁷¹Said André Ferrat: “The future Fascist dictator will only have to extend the existing powers of the police over aliens to all French citizens and French political liberties will be no more than a memory.” Quoted by Millet, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

nated with the spirit of the "New Order" propagated by Vichy.

The place of residence assigned was a "hole" in the country or in the mountains. The refugee, provided with a special pass, had to go there with his family and, immediately upon arrival, to report to gendarmerie headquarters or town hall for registration. Save for one or two localities in the high mountains of the Pyrenees, which originally served as summer resorts, housing conditions were nearly always deplorable. And this for the simple reason that the villages, tucked away in the country or in the mountains, had just about enough accommodations for their normal population. As against this, the food situation of the refugee in forced residence was in most cases changed for the better owing to the fact that the country suffered much less from the food shortage than the large urban centers. But this advantage was largely offset by the complete spiritual isolation. The attitude of the local population was generally correct. However, there were cases of hostility in small communes contaminated by the corrosive propaganda of Vichy, or whose new mayor was an ardent adherent of Doriot's party or of the French Legion of Former Combatants created by Petain. The surveillance on the spot exercised either by the gendarmerie or by the mobile guards was rather mild in the sense that no unusual vexations were inflicted. Nevertheless, the confinement within the limits of a small commune was complete and Vichy's orders were carried out to the letter. Even a pass to go to a nearby city to consult a doctor could be obtained only with the greatest difficulty.

Persons with particularly well-lined pockets managed to "procure" the lifting of the order of forced residence and obtained permission, either from the prefect's office or from Vichy, to return to the cities. That did not protect them, after a while, from becoming once more the object of the same measure, the most arbitrary practice being the rule in this matter.

(c) *Labor Battalions*

From the standpoint of security, the situation of the refugees sent to labor battalions was the most stable, at least until the occupation of the whole of metropolitan France by the Nazis in November, 1942.

These labor formations represented the transformed *compagnies des prestataires* (construction battalions) created by various laws and decrees of 1939 and 1940, prior to the French collapse, as regular military units operating under military leadership and discipline. In consequence of the demobilization of the French army, these units were rechristened *Groupements de Travailleurs Etrangers* (Groupings of Foreign Workers)—T.E., for short. The supreme central authority over them belonged to the *Commissariat à la lutte contre le chômage (formations de travailleurs étrangers)*. A *groupement* extended over several departments and was divided into several groups. The cadre (supervisory personnel) of a group generally consisted of a former non-commissioned officer and from 5 to 6 guards (*surveillants*). The average number of men composing a group was 300. The head of a group received a salary of 4,500 francs a month, and the supervisory personnel free board and a monthly salary of 1,000 to 2,000 francs.

The Vichy decree of October, 1940, whereby aliens in the ages of 18 to 55 who were unemployed and without means of support were liable to compulsory labor if they could not return to their countries of origin, caused the ranks of the labor formations to fill quickly.

The following information on living and working conditions in the groups is drawn from an original report made by a refugee who for a long period of time had been a member of the group T.E. 313 based on Bellac, which is situated in a farming region in the Department of Haute-Vienne (Central France). Although

accommodations, food, and the attitude of the group administration varied from place to place, this information may be regarded as affording a true picture of the main features of life in all groups.

T.E. 313 belonged to *Groupelement* I comprising 32 groups, of which only one consisted of Germans, five of Poles, and the rest of Spanish Loyalists. In July and August, 1940, the Jews of *Groupelement* I were segregated in two special non-Aryan groups, thus two years in advance of a formal Vichy decree to that effect issued in January, 1943. It is worth noting that the Jews transferred from T.E. 313 to the new special Jewish groups were partly replaced with German deserters from units of the Reichswehr stationed in the occupied zone.

The group at Bellac was until November, 1941, quartered in sheds and stables of a nearby village. Afterwards a large wooden barrack was erected. Married T.E. men whose families had obtained permission to reside at Bellac were allowed to live with their families. The clothing was multiform. The outfit of members of the old *compagnies de prestataires* consisted of a brown or light gray shooting jacket and knickers, brown cape, brown cap, and leggins. *Prestataires* continued to wear this outfit on being transferred to the T.E. formations; others, who were transferred to the T.E. from ordinary military units, wore the army uniform and could not be distinguished from a regular French soldier. Later recruits of the T.E. were issued large light checkered jackets, long brown Manchester trousers with bright yellow stripes, and other articles of apparel no longer usable otherwise. Footwear grew ever more scarce, and many T.E. members were provided with *sabots* (wooden peasant shoes) both for work and for ordinary wear.

Each T.E. member was given a worker's food card granting increased rations of fats (550 grams instead of 450 a month),

bread (300 grams instead of 275 a day), and meat (260 grams instead of 180 a week). However, the food actually distributed fell considerably short of these rations, because a part of the provisions, as well as of the issues of tobacco and cigarettes, was often held back illegally by the head of the group and members of the supervisory personnel. Thanks to these abuses, which prevailed in many camps, the entire nutritional level was far below the official allowance.⁷²

Besides camp duties (cleaning, helping in the kitchen, etc.), the T.E. men were employed at various reclamation works. Gradually, most of the groups shifted to farm and forest work. T.E. men were either assigned to farms by the office of the group or, which was most frequently the case, themselves arranged to be hired by a farmer, mainly for the sake of getting better nourishment.

A contract would be made by the farmer with the office of the group. Of the daily wage of ten francs (then officially worth 20 cents) paid directly to the office of the group, the latter would retain 6 francs and allow 4 francs a day to the T.E. man concerned. Forest work, consisting of cutting and piling up logs, was usually undertaken for the benefit of a contractor under a similar agreement with the office of the group. The price paid by the contractor was 12 francs per cubic meter of timber cut, piled up, and properly prepared.⁷³ The office withheld a weekly sum of 93.10 francs for maintenance expenses for each T.E. man concerned, so that the latter could hardly count on an income of more than 50.90 francs (about one dollar)—and that, too, provided there was no interruption of the work on account of inclement weather. Despite

⁷²For weeks during the winter of 1940-1941, the food consisted only of carrots or turnips or Jerusalem artichokes, served mostly hot but not infrequently as salads. During the following summer the fare improved somewhat through the addition of greens and potatoes, but in November, 1941, turnips and Jerusalem artichokes became once more the regular diet.

⁷³The normal price paid to a French lumberjack was 30 francs per cubic meter.

constant threats of punishment, the daily output of the work was in many cases below the minimum standard.

Specially skilled T.E. men (engineers, architects, printers, etc.) could obtain permission to go to work for a private employer, even at a great distance from the camp. On approval by the Labor Inspector, a contract would be entered into by the prospective employer and the T.E. man in question, which, to become binding, needed the approval of the general administration of the *groupe-ment*. A precondition to such approval was agreement by the parties concerned that a portion of the agreed salary or wages (from 5 to 20 percent) be paid over to the *groupe-ment*. The term of the contract would be three months, renewable for the same period of time, but with the reservation that the T.E. man could be called back to his group at any moment on 24 hours notice. Such contracts became an abundant source of extra "profits" to the administration of the *groupe-ment*. Thus, when Vichy extended the obligation of compulsory labor to more and more classes of aliens (Poles, Belgians, Netherlands, etc.), wealthy persons affected by a call to a labor or forest camp could manage, at a high cost, to escape forced labor, at least for a time. They could do this by paying a complacent employer, who in turn would repay part of the money he received to the administration of the *groupe-ment* as a supposed percentage of the salary supposedly paid by him to the T.E. man involved.

Besides these casual earnings, each T.E. man was paid by the State 50 centimes a day (a little over one cent in American money: the usual pay of a French soldier). A married T.E. was entitled to receive an *allocation militaire* (soldier's allowance), later called *secours social* (social aid)—i.e., a daily allowance of 7 francs for his wife and 4.50 francs for each child. Beginning with January, 1942, there was attached to each group a Social Service office which made these payments. Members of the men's families could

claim reimbursement of expenses incurred for necessary medical and dental treatment and for medicine.

According to the regulations, every T.E. man was entitled to a 10-day furlough (*permission de détente*) every six months, for which he was paid 13.50 francs a day if he spent his holiday away from camp. The one-time reduction in train fare for members of the T.E. was later abolished.

Release from T.E. labor service could be obtained only (1) on reaching the age of 55 years; (2) in case of physical incapacity; (3) by producing evidence of emigration prospects.

If a T.E. worker was released by reason of physical incapacity, he naturally had to prove that adequate means were available for his maintenance or, what amounted to the same thing, that one of the prefects had granted him permission to settle in some community; otherwise he was transferred to a camp for people unfit for work, which was nothing but a concentration camp. It was exceedingly difficult to obtain a residence permit from a prefect. Only if the possession of adequate means of support was proven (in the department of Haute-Vienne, for example, 20,000 francs for each member of the family; in the Department of Alpes-Maritimes, 50,000 francs) could one hope to settle down with comparative freedom from molestation. And that, too, only before August, 1942.

As for the discipline in the T.E. camps, the head of a group might mete out the following penalties: curtailment of the furlough by as many as three days, withdrawal of the residence permit from the offender's family, and assignment to disagreeable chores. Furthermore, at the request of the group head, the director of the *groupement* might sentence an offender up to three months confinement in a disciplinary camp. At the disciplinary camp at Brives (Corrèze) it was forbidden to smoke or talk, the ban being lifted only on holidays. The T.E. inmates had to toil at

difficult road construction work while receiving the worst board imaginable. The supervisory personnel was antisemitic.

The following special information is available concerning the Jewish T.E. group at Mauriac (Cantal): Those fit for work were employed at all kinds of labor on the construction of a large dam near Mauriac, where a large number of free French workers were also employed. They were paid the same wages as the French workers, and were quartered in barracks. Those unfit for work remained at Mauriac, receiving meager board and absolutely no clothing.

The organization of T.E. groups constantly expanded, since, at least until the beginning of the deportations to the East, this was regarded by Vichy as the only solution of the problem of refugees, and even of all aliens, without special means of support.

Additional T.E. workers were obtained by means of roundups carried out by the French police, gendarmes, and mobile guards in Marseilles, Toulouse, Montaubon, and other refugee centers.

Moreover, other large strata of refugees and Jews who had come to France since January 1, 1936, even if they had acquired French citizenship since their arrival, were affected by Vichy orders providing either for their incorporation in the T.E. formations or for their assignment to special centers (official statement by Admiral Francois Darlan dated December 10, 1941, and circular letter of Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior, dated January 2, 1942).

To the refugee or alien, especially if he was Jewish, who was without means or who had lost, through the Vichy racial laws, the right to engage in remunerative work, the labor camp ultimately appeared to be the only protection from internment in a concentration camp.

To be sure, the labor camp was nothing but a modern version of the slave trade. However, the T.E.'s finally came to regard them-

selves as privileged, so to speak, in comparison with the refugees and aliens enduring the moral and physical degradations of an internment camp. In the end the T.E.'s ceased to be a financial burden to Vichy; they managed to support themselves by the fruit of their labor and, at the same time, afforded Vichy the means and the excuse for keeping in service a large number of demobilized officers. The T.E.'s nursed the hope that they, at least, would succeed in surmounting the post-armistice hardships and witness the coming of peace.

The servile policy of Laval and the occupation of the free zone by the Germans in November, 1942, must have been a terrible disappointment to them.

4. DEPORTATIONS TO "UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS"

Internment camps, compulsory residence, forced labor—these were but the curtain-raisers. The real tragedy of the Jewish refugees and aliens in France began in the summer of 1942.

Until Pierre Laval was restored to power for the second time by Petain, the lot of the refugees in France had been slowly improving. To be sure, the health and food situation remained critical all the time. When, for example, 50 refugee children from the French children's camp Riversaltes arrived in the United States in July, 1942, the reporters stated that these children "presented a pitiful sight." "Their clothing is shabby and inadequate, instead of shoes they have rags wound about their feet; they walk with a stoop, their emaciated little bodies are without strength, and they have deep rings under the eyes. But all this is not so depressing as the expression on their starved faces, the deadly seriousness with which they wait to be handed their portions, and the greediness with which they pounce upon the food."⁷⁴

⁷⁴*Aufbau*, July 17, 1942.

However, the various organizations engaged in bringing relief to France had been able to keep their offices in Marseilles open. There had been cooperation between many communal authorities and these organizations. Little by little OSE had succeeded in ameliorating to some extent the hygienic and moral conditions in the camps. In the unoccupied zone ORT had set up workshops and technical courses to train refugees, prospective emigrants, for a new life in overseas countries. And thanks to the untiring efforts of HICEM, Jewish and non-Jewish refugees about to obtain overseas visas had been either released from internment and labor camps or transferred to the transient camp at Les Milles, near Aix-en-Provence, where conditions were much better than in the other camps. The steadily declining numbers in the concentration camps indicated a certain degree of stabilization in the relief work and in the problem of removal to other countries. On May 1, 1942, according to figures made public by the American Friends Service Committee, no more than 14,630 refugees were still held in twelve different camps.

Then came Hitler's decision to deport the Jews of occupied West European countries, in the first instance refugees from lands overrun by the Nazis, for slave labor or for slaughter in the German-operated extermination centers in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

In the occupied zone of France the deportations started in the middle of July, 1942. Here is a sober account, taken from a Swiss newspaper,⁷⁵ of the incredible scenes enacted on what the caption over the story described as "A Modern St. Bartholomew's Night in Paris":

On the night of July 15-16 the French police carried out wholesale arrests of alien and recently naturalized Jews. The

⁷⁵*La Sentinelle*, La Chaux-de-Fonds, August 13, 1942.

arrests affected 28,000 persons whose names appeared on a list compiled several months before.

Many persons had been forewarned either by strangers or by the police agents themselves, some of whom have been discharged for this reason. 6,000 Jews had thus been able to hide in the Eighteenth Ward (a workingmen's district), and the actual number of persons arrested did not exceed 12,000-14,000. So the arrests are continuing, although at a slower tempo.

Men and women were apprehended, their money was seized, and they were taken separately to the Vélodrome d'Hiver or to the Parc des Princes. Neither the sick nor even those operated on as recently as the day before, were spared. Thus the surgical ward of the Rothschild Hospital, which was reserved for surgical cases from the Drancy camp, was emptied at one stroke and all the patients were taken back to the camp, regardless of the gravity of their condition.

Children from three years up were taken away from their mothers. Merciful police agents entrusted them to neighbors, while others—and they were in the majority—shut up the apartments, leaving the children in the street, or piling them into trucks packed with hundreds of tiny tots. Their pitiful cries, their desperate calling of "mother," resounded through the dark and deserted streets. About 5,000 children were lodged in three school buildings. The Welfare Department and the General Union of French Jews were charged with the care of some of them. There were numerous cases of measles and scarlet fever among the children. Four of them died twelve hours after their arrest.

The poor state of health of the adults frequently required attention. Ten physicians were authorized by the occupation authorities to give medical care to the sick. The French Com-

missariat for Jewish Affairs allotted only three. The delivery of national relief rushed by the Government was forbidden by the German authorities. The Quakers, the Salvation Army, and the General Union of French Jews tried to feed this starving crowd. Their situation in the camps—devoid of the most elementary provisions for shelter and sanitation, without dressings for wounds, without cooking facilities—is even worse than in the Parc des Princes.

A large number of children have lost their identification tags and cannot for the present be identified.

There has been practically no news of those detained since their arrest.

The number of suicides is estimated at 300 to 400. Some women threw their children out of the window and then jumped after them.

In many cases women were believed to be exempt from these measures. Accordingly, the men alone evaded arrest by means of flight, leaving their fortunes, their jewels with their wives, mothers, daughters. The valuables were confiscated and the women arrested. . . .

In Paris the great majority of those arrested were aliens; in the provinces, both French and foreign Jews, men and women, were seized, this time by the German police. Surrounded by soldiers with fixed bayonets, they were hustled into trucks, men and women separately, and provisionally interned, many of them at the camp of Pithiviers. The children were left in the streets, the apartments sealed up, and the neighbors forbidden to take care of the children. Even in the most isolated localities, where only a single Jew was living, the police came to make arrests.

Thanks to the active solidarity of the non-Jewish population, a large number of persons were able to escape arrest; many

children were given shelter, or taken to the unoccupied zone, despite the danger involved in such action.

A large number of Jews in danger of arrest succeeded in escaping to the free zone. Men, women, and children crossed the boundary line at various points, after walking many miles and paying large sums of money (from 5,000 to 10,000 francs per person) to agents (*passeurs*) who smuggled them across.

At first the local authorities were kindly disposed to the alien fugitives. Then their attitude changed, apparently on orders from Vichy. Some foreign Jews were arrested and sentenced for having traveled without a pass; others were sent to forced residence; still others were interned.

And it soon transpired that Pierre Laval, who just could not say no to the Germans, had agreed to deliver to them a first contingent of 10,000 refugees and foreign Jews from the unoccupied zone. Lists of internees to be deported were drawn up in the camps of Southern France. The prefects were ordered to compile identical lists of foreign Jews who had arrived in France since 1936.

Neither the indignation aroused throughout the world nor the interventions of the authorized representatives of French Jewry, of international relief organizations, of high dignitaries of the Catholic and Protestant Churches, and of the Papal Nuncio could move the Vichy Government. Petain took refuge behind his helplessness. Laval was brutal and cynical.

During the first fifteen days of August the internment camps and the large cities of the free zone—Marseilles, Nice, Toulouse, Lyons, etc.—witnessed the same heart-rending and inhuman scenes which had taken place in Paris.

Nothing can describe with more moving simplicity the anguish, the despair, and then—when their fate seemed to be sealed—the dignity, the courage, the solidarity, and the love the internees

showed one another than was done in the diary of a certain Protestant clergyman. He had made futile efforts to save some of his co-religionists from deportation and had thus been able to witness the Calvary of those doomed to deportation.⁷⁶

We quote:

Friday: I call on the camp director. Sadly and politely he tells me that he is unable to give me access. I insist on it, he persists in his refusal. I stress the point that, for the first time in my ministry, I am being forbidden to dispense spiritual consolation to persons in distress. I was a prison chaplain and minister of an insane asylum under the old regime; never did I meet with the slightest hindrance. Today I have to defend my calling as a servant of God and of the Church. The director takes refuge behind instructions from above. I refuse to go on and sympathize with the director's embarrassment. Finally we agree to call up police headquarters. Same prohibition, same argument, same refusal. Promise to refer the matter to a higher quarter and to let me know the decision by telephone tomorrow.

Today it is too late anyway.

I leave the office and come into the camp. I find F. again. He quickly gives me information about this one and that one, speaks of the depressing atmosphere, the severance of all contact with the outside world, the strong police guard, the anxious waiting of everyone. I read this anxiety in every face I see.

Saturday: I have been in the camp since eight o'clock. I gather my flock. From the very start I gain a strong impression which in the course of this terrible day is confirmed not only in regard to my own congregation, but in regard to all the inter-

⁷⁶This document reached one of the co-authors through underground channels, and he had it published in the *Aufbau* of Dec. 18, 1942, where it appeared under the heading "I Saw It."

nees. At first it is the frantic fear in the face of the specter of deportation; but then it is the courage with which, in spite of all, everybody looks his fate in the face; and finally, it is the love they untiringly manifest toward one another. Everyone tries to lighten his brother's cross, to help save a comrade.

Hearts open up to me in their sorrow. In all this misery there is never a trace of baseness, never a trace of meanness. This is true of all the internees with whom I have spent this week of nightmares. Everywhere dignity, kindness, nobility. Have a talk with the camp director; it is still unknown who is on the list.

Monday: The anxiety exceeds all bounds. Unforgettable parting of the children under 18, who are to go to America. Terrible separation! A tall and handsome fellow, 17 or 18 years old, has his arms around his father and mother. He does not cry, but bends down now to the one, now to the other, and strokes their cheeks with his, slowly and gently, with all the tenderness imaginable. Not a word is spoken. Father and mother weep incessantly, anxiously. This goes on and on. No one speaks. Finally the trucks arrive. Old and young burst into tears. Not a shriek, not a move. But faces are tense, as if they wished to behold eternity in the next moment. The policemen about me are pale as ashes. One of them said to me the other day, "I have been to the colonies, to China; I have seen massacres, war, and famine, but never did I see anything so horrible as this." At the moment no one can speak or move. The truck has disappeared. Finally a mother collapses and rolls on the ground in convulsions. All day long the Rabbi, two French Jews, and I are at police headquarters, pleading the cause of the unfortunates, for whom, it seems to me, departure is like a death sentence.

Here are a few Protestant cases: A., an old sea captain, has been in the service of the Allies, his father and two brothers shot

as enemies of the Third Reich; he can be under no illusions. His pardon is refused to me. He is already lined up with those about to leave when I must tell him that my efforts have been unsuccessful. He looks at me courageously and thanks me.—X., former state's attorney in a large city. He proceeded vigorously against the Nazis in the first trials and is under sentence of death in Germany. A fine personality. His wife radiates love and cheerfulness in this gloom. She was free, but hastened to her husband in the camp and reported herself a prisoner in order to share even the hardest lot with him. Their son is a French soldier serving in the Foreign Legion; I receive one of my first refusals in their behalf. She bears the blow wonderfully, finds strength to comfort her husband, and asks me if I could administer the sacrament to them before their departure. I hasten once more to police headquarters and renew my request, pointing out that the son of this couple is a French soldier. Despite my remonstrances, the X.'s are taken to the train at 4 P.M. Wednesday. In passing, he says to me under his breath, "This is the end." "No," I answer. He gets into the cattle car. There are 42 men and women to each car, with a single bucket for answering nature's call. The doors are locked and bolted with an iron bar. And still no reply to our telegram. An hour later I prevail upon the superintendent of police to order their release. It then takes nearly an hour before the car is opened so that they may be taken back to the camp.

Wednesday: Ten suicides signalize this ghastly day. From ten o'clock in the morning the internees have been standing in the courtyard under a pitiless sun. During the afternoon a policeman crosses the courtyard with a pitcher of water for his comrades in the service. He passes a group of internees. One of the unfortunates holds out his drinking cup in silent entreaty. The policeman walks past and reviles him. Afterwards the

policemen conveying the first batch to the train make sure that there is no lack of brutality. The Chief Rabbi and I protest to the superintendent of police. There is no recurrence of such cases in our presence.

Here is something I myself have witnessed: Mrs. L., previously at liberty, petitioned that she be deported together with her son. Meanwhile, however, he ran away. In spite of our efforts, Mrs. L. is carried off, the victim of her mother love.

Night has fallen. It is incomprehensible, yet I know it for a fact: today the fate of a human being was decided in 30 seconds. Misery, humiliation, disgust, indignation, heartache, immeasurable grief, trampled lives, indelible stains, inexpiable crimes. The witness of Israel: God made it noble and moving. This whole nation has borne its sufferings with dignity, truthfulness, humility, and grandeur. Glorious example of women who voluntarily joined their husbands in captivity. Everywhere a spirit of brotherhood and helpfulness. My relations with the Rabbi were intimate and steadfast. I must acknowledge that I saw how these unfortunate brethren were as attentive to the needs of others as to their own. How they rejoiced at the deliverance of their friends and sympathized with their distress. But I never saw them try to hurt one another. There was nothing odious and repugnant about them.

We know what the reaction of the French people was: their indignation, their protests, their acts of solidarity toward the unfortunates, notably in hiding, both in town and in country, the children threatened with deportation, wherein they were stimulated by the example and words of the clergy who braved the reprisals of Pierre Laval.⁷⁷

At first the fate of the children remained uncertain. But later reports showed that even children who had been torn from their

⁷⁷See Institute of Jewish Affairs, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-280.

parents were being deported. The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, warned Vichy: "The details of the measures taken are so revolting and so fiendish in their nature that they defy adequate description. Naturally this Government has been observing with special interest reports of the plans of the French Government at Vichy . . ." ⁷⁸

The American Government, prompted by all the relief organizations, offered asylum to 5,000 children. Laval finally agreed to let the children go. Unfortunately, delays in obtaining the necessary authorizations did not permit the carrying out of this rescue work before the occupation of the whole of France by the Germans on November 11, 1942, which put an end to the project.

Following the total occupation of France, the drive to liquidate all foreign Jews in that country who were former nationals of Nazi-dominated countries was intensified. Jews from satellite countries (*e.g.*, Rumania), and even old French Jewish families who had lived in France for centuries, were hunted down throughout 1943, arrested, and transferred to Camp Drancy, which served as an assembly point for those who were to be deported to "unknown destinations." Wholesale roundups took place in March and April, 1943, in Marseilles, Toulouse, Perpignan, Arles, Aix-en-Provence, and Limoges. The entire Jewish population of Clermont Ferrand was deported. ⁷⁹

A decree by Laval which was to go into effect on June 27, 1943, whereby all naturalizations granted to Jews after August 10, 1927, were revoked, was expected by the Nazis to result, as a German news agency put it, in a "mass exodus" of Jews from France.

The tragic meaning of this "mass exodus" was made clear in one of the last eyewitness accounts from Drancy, which reached

⁷⁸*New York Times*, Sept. 16, 1942.

⁷⁹*News Digest*, No. 1255, Oct. 4, 1943, F. 22.

London in May, 1943, and from which we extract a few significant passages.⁸⁰

This is an excerpt from one of the last eyewitness accounts to reach England early in May from the Drancy concentration camp. These reports are scarce. Their data are generally incomplete, and it is impossible to gain from them an accurate . . . picture of conditions prevailing in the concentration camps of France. One fact, however, is evident throughout: the systematic annihilation of the Jews, French as well as foreign, commenced ten months ago, has neither ceased nor abated. Day by day, concentration camps serving as reception and classification centers have to comply with "requisitions" from the SS Elite Guards and supply specified numbers of Jews. If there is no "supply" at hand, it has to be procured. The security organs of the Laval government and the armed followers of Doriot are engaged in this procurement. . . .

Several days ago, the commanding officer of the Drancy concentration camp received instructions to "supply" three thousand Jews to Germany. At the time, only two thousand Jews were at the camp. Subsequently the Paris police arrested an additional two thousand five hundred and promptly turned them over. Those arrested spent the night in the open air, under the glaring beam of a searchlight, closely pressed against one another so as to keep warm, in constant prayer and singing the Marseillaise. At fifteen-minute intervals, lists of those to be deported to the East were issued and posted. When the trains, composed of cattle cars, left, thousands of voices started singing the Marseillaise anew. The French policemen who had been

⁸⁰This report appeared on May 29, 1943, in *Die Zeitung* of London, weekly organ of the German refugees in England. A mimeographed English version was published the following month in New York by the Advisory Council on Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress.

forced to carry out the arrests stood about on the platform and cried. . . .

Orgies of sadism reach their height during the preparations for the deportations. Those selected for deportation are herded into barbed-wire enclosures. Men get their hair shaved off. The condemned are subjected to a minute physical inspection. Young Doriotists and Pilorists perform this task in the case of women. After a night under the sky, the SS Camp Commander, Danecker, appears at 6 A.M. and orders the waiting crowd driven into the trucks to the tune of nightsticks. In the trucks family members are separated from one another. The seriously ill, the very old, the paralyzed, and the insane are all dragged along. And nothing is ever heard again of any of them.

A young woman succeeded in throwing a letter out of her sealed cattle car at Epernay on July 27, 1942. It fell upon the station tracks and miraculously reached the addressee, a superintendent, in whose care the sender had left her two small children. The letter said that the train had been en route for three days. There was no bread, only a few drops of water. Men and women went about their physical needs on the spot without shame.

"We carry with us," she wrote, "the body of a woman who died in our midst and for whom there was no help, since the cars are sealed. We cannot get rid of the corpse. Whenever somebody thrusts his hand out of the car, there is a burst of rifle fire. . . ."

The deportation of women to the East, in groups of one thousand each, is proceeding systematically. Children of thirteen years or over are squeezed into sealed cattle cars together with their mothers. Children under thirteen, and as young as two years, are left behind without supervision. They are given numbers by which they are called rather than by their own

names. They are half starved and are dying like flies. At the end of last year (1942), there were about five thousand of these children at Beaune. . . .

The children left behind at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande, augmented by thousands of new ones, were sent to Drancy in transports of one thousand each. At Pithiviers the children of one transport were awakened at midnight and kept waiting in the open air for two hours. At Drancy these unfortunates of tender age were faced with even worse conditions. They were forbidden to go outside, had neither sun nor fresh air, slept on the bare floor, completely alone, without any supervision and care by adults, hungry, vermin-ridden, and afflicted with a hundred diseases and infections.

But even for these children, Drancy was merely a way station on the road to Calvary. After a while, they, too, were transported eastward in groups of one thousand. Their hair, too, was shaved off. Everything was taken away from them which could have betrayed their identity. Thus they left. Nobody ever heard of them again. At Châlons-sur-Marne, witnesses saw children's hands reaching out from between the boards of the cattle cars, holding empty bottles. German soldiers patrolling the train used their rifle butts against any one trying to approach the train and fill the bottles with water. . . .

Naturally, it is impossible to present a statistical survey of the man-hunt now proceeding in France, especially as the "Jew-hunt" coincides with the "labor-hunt," Laval's so-called *relève*. (Not a few cases . . . are known in which able-bodied Jews were removed from deportation transports and shifted to labor gangs.) But though these are separate activities, the methods employed are the same. . . .

It is equally impossible to give a survey of the number and names of the camps. A total of more than fifty camps are known

to exist. Some of them have been disbanded; others are being established. The internees are constantly being shifted from one camp to another until, finally, all trace of them is lost somewhere on the journey eastward to Poland or occupied Russia. The scope of the original orders to deport German, Austrian, Czechoslovakian, Polish, Baltic, and Russian Jews has now been extended to all others, including the French Jews. The annihilation of the Jews of France has been proceeding relentlessly for the last ten months.

How many refugees and Jews have been deported from France? Henri Frenay, Commissar for Repatriation of War Prisoners and Deportees in the Provisional Government of the French Republic in Algiers speaks of 60,000.⁸¹ An Associated Press dispatch from Bern, Switzerland, dated April 7, 1943, quoted a refugee member of the official French Jewish Committee as stating that the number of Jews deported from France amounted at that time to 53,000. Thereafter the systematic campaign of deportation was continued. Roundups and internment of Jews were conducted relentlessly, especially after August, 1943. Convoys of 1,000 to 3,000 interned Jews left Gurs and Drancy regularly for the East. Thus the number of Jews deported from France may at present be estimated at not less than 75,000.

The only avenue of escape open to the refugees and Jews was flight to Switzerland and to Spain. After November 11, 1942, the Germans, now masters of the whole of France, practically closed the two frontiers. Nevertheless, making use of the dangerous passes of the Jura range or the Pyrenees, refugees managed at great risk to reach these two countries.⁸²

⁸¹*Journal Officiel de la République Française* (Algiers), Supplement, No. 21, March 9, 1944, "Debate of the Consultative Assembly on the Repatriation of Prisoners and Deportees in France."

⁸²"After many days in hiding, a Polish Jew, Frederick Halbreich, aged 53, his wife and an unidentified companion set out with a French guide Saturday from Chamonix

The number of those who succeeded in escaping to Switzerland is estimated at 10,000, and of those who crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, at 12,000. These figures refer to the end of 1943. It is certain that, despite the growing danger, refugees continued to escape daily from France to Switzerland and Spain; in the case of the former country, an average of at least 30 refugees a day.⁸³ The Italian occupation authorities having proven less rigorous in the enforcement of racial measures, a stream of fugitives flowed from the zone under German domination to the cities and towns of the Riviera. With the collapse of Italy at the end of the summer of 1943, a large number of refugees crossed into Italy, only to fall again into the clutches of the Nazis when the latter extended their domination over Northern Italy. A small number of refugees succeeded in reaching the coast of North Africa in small boats sailing from various localities on the Riviera.

Finally, several thousand refugees went into hiding or joined the French resistance forces. The active part they took in the armed struggle with the German occupants was pointed out both by Vichy and by Underground sources.⁸⁴

As for the relief activities in France after its total occupation by the Germans, the international relief organizations operating there were obliged to abandon their activities following the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States. The Quakers turned their remaining funds, clothing, and provisions over to a

by the high mountain route to flee France. Sunday night the couple collapsed in the snow and died before their companion brought aid."—News item in the *New York Times*, Oct. 3, 1942.

⁸³Letter of Charles Bergmann, Swiss Minister to the United States, to the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, reproduced in the *New York Post*, June 22, 1944.

⁸⁴*Congress Weekly*, March 24, 1944; *Pour la Victoire*, March 25, 1944; Statement made by Joseph Darnand, the Vichy Himmler, to Radio Paris.

French committee, but these means must long since have been exhausted.

5. THE WAY OUT OF FRANCE

Besides those who left "illegally," thousands of other refugees managed to get out of France between July, 1940, and July, 1942, by means of Vichy exit permits. For the most part these were men under 18 or over 45 years of age, as well as women and children.⁸⁵ There is not the slightest doubt that thousands more could have been saved from death if Vichy had displayed more good will in the granting of exit permits.

In the report of the delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross to which reference has already been made,⁸⁶ special Vichy statements were quoted to the effect that the issuance of exit permits was a mere formality and that the Vichy authorities made no special difficulties in granting such permits. This assertion runs counter to the actual facts.

In reality, Vichy, either of its own accord or under German pressure, did make great difficulties in authorizing the departure from France of refugees and certain categories of aliens. The permit was obtained only after long months of petitioning. The regulations in regard to it changed constantly, denying permission to leave the country now to one category of persons now to another. Beginning with 1942, proof was required that the applicant had obtained not only a visa from the country of final destination, but also a Spanish or Portuguese transit visa. Now, Spain did not grant transit visas to refugees of military age, and Portugal refused them to refugees of Russian origin. This often created a vicious circle for the refugee applying for an exit permit. It would

⁸⁵A gripping account of a voyage of 111 refugee children from Marseilles to Lisbon in the spring of 1941 is given by Dr. Isaac Chomski in his article "Children in Exile," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, October, 1941, p. 522.

⁸⁶See pp. 166-167 above.

have been easy to grant exit permits with transit through Algeria or Morocco and embarkation at Casablanca, where ships sailing from Lisbon made a stop. Indeed, this practice was inaugurated in 1942. However, even then Vichy granted such permits only very sparingly.⁸⁷

At the beginning of July, 1942, in order to bar every avenue of escape to those threatened with deportation, Pierre Laval ordered the cancellation of exit permits granted months before to refugees, stateless persons, and foreign Jews hailing from countries occupied by the Nazis and already in possession of visas from the countries of immigration and of Spanish or Portuguese transit visas. Worse yet, he ordered the frontier posts along the Spanish border to tighten their control and to strengthen the mobile guard border patrols.

This dubious attitude on the part of Vichy was officially stressed toward the close of 1940 in the note handed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Gaston Henry-Haye, the then Vichy Ambassador to the United States. The Vichy Government had presented a note to the United States Government calling upon the latter to intercede with the governments of the Western Hemisphere with a view to having them admit to their respective countries 300,000 refugees, in the first instance those of German nationality and the Jewish religion. Vichy referred to the work of the Intergovernmental Committee.

Secretary Hull's note in reply pointed out, first of all that . . . The basic principles enumerated at that time and which were accepted as fundamental by the Intergovernmental Committee throughout its sessions and are controlling in the relations between this government and other American govern-

⁸⁷It should be added that, in order not to fall into the hands of the Nazis, a number of prominent refugees never took a chance of dealing with the Vichy bureaucracy. See the *New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1941; also the volume entitled *We Escaped*, edited with an introduction by William Allen Neilson.

ments are (a) that no distinction shall be made between refugees on grounds of race, nationality or religion; (b) that no country shall be asked or expected to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by prevailing practices and existing laws;

that, therefore, the American Government

would not wish to suggest or be party to any international action which might be interpreted as placing pressure on any government or governments to take action in the field of migration contrary to or irreconcilable with their practices and laws.

The American Government recalled, in the second place, the effort made by the United States, Canada, and other American countries to receive the largest number of refugees possible, compatible with their prevailing immigration laws. At the same time it put special emphasis upon the double-faced game played by Vichy, which, on the one hand, asked for the mass immigration of 300,000 refugees to overseas countries and, on the other, refused exit permits to those refugees on its territory who were already in possession of entry visas for an overseas country.

Apropos of this Secretary Hull's note said:

10. It is noted in this connection that many persons who have fulfilled the requirements for admission to the United States and have received many visas have not been able to leave French territory owing to the fact that the French Government has been unwilling or has failed to grant the required exit permits, with the consequence that these persons have not been able to proceed to the United States and remain on French territory where they must be cared for and fed.

11. It is the impression of this government, moreover, that the other American governments are likewise receiving persons in substantial numbers who can qualify for admission to their

respective territories under their laws and practices and that persons qualifying for admission to these other American countries have, too, encountered difficulties and, as a consequence, remain to be cared for and fed on French territory.

Finally, reference should be made to the fact that in addition to the persons who are being received in various American countries by infiltration, settlers who can fulfill certain specified requirements are being admitted in increasing numbers to the settlement established upon the invitation of the Dominican Government, under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Committee and at the direction of an American Association at Sosua in the Dominican Republic. These persons who are carefully selected in Europe by an agent of the Dominican Republic Settlement Association have also in many instances failed to receive the necessary permission of the French authorities to leave and remain to be supported in France.⁸⁸

Indeed, at that very time Vichy was delaying the issuance of exit permits to 3,000 refugees in possession of American visas. The Vichy request could not but be regarded as a political maneuver instigated or desired by the Nazis. The more so as Vichy was perfectly aware that, even if the American Government had complied with its request, the existing shipping shortage would have constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the carrying out of such an enormous project as the transporting of 300,000 emigrants to the Western Hemisphere, at least in the foreseeable future.

As a matter of fact, transportation had been a serious problem ever since the outbreak of the war. And the problem assumed tremendous proportions after the collapse of France, when the exodus from Germany again increased greatly, and thousands of

⁸⁸*New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1941, where the full text of Secretary Hull's note will be found. See also *Interpreter Release*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Series E., "Interpreter Report No. 2," Jan. 23, 1941.

passage bookings could not be effectuated. Lisbon was the main European port from which refugees could sail for overseas countries. Plying between Lisbon and America were the American Export Line ships *Excambion*, *Excalibur*, *Exeter*, and *Siboney*, with a total carrying capacity of 1,200 passengers; also the Portuguese vessels, *Nyassa*, *Serpa Pinto*, and *Guinee*, with an aggregate capacity of 2,300 persons. From the ports of Bilbao and Vigo, Spain, sailed the Spanish liners *Magallanes* and *Marquis de Comillac*, with a capacity of 1,600 passengers. In addition, there were the chartered steamers, *Ciudad Sevilla*, *Villa Madrid*, and *Navemare*, sailing from Spain, and the *Muzinjho* and other small freighters, sailing from Lisbon.

Passengers desiring to go to the United States had to furnish proof to the respective American consul that ship reservations had been made for them, generally through relatives in this country. The American Export Line accepted 10,000 bookings—i.e., it allocated passengers for the trips scheduled to be made by its boats up to the end of 1941. However, all attempts to charter larger vessels failed owing to the attitude of the Maritime Commission in Washington, and, accordingly, the American Export Line on March 14, 1941, suspended all further bookings.

The transportation problem was eased somewhat when Vichy decided to admit refugees aboard ships plying between Martinique and the mother country. These boats could also carry refugees who were unable to obtain Spanish transit visas on account of their age (18 to 49). The S.S. *Winnipeg*, *Wyoming*, *Monte Viso*, and others transported several hundred refugees via Oran and Casablanca to Fort de France (Martinique), whence they were able to reach the mainland of the United States either directly or by way of St. Thomas and Puerto Rico.

With the capture of the *Winnipeg* by the British on May 10, 1941, shortly before her arrival at Fort de France, this route

ceased to be available and one was again dependent on Lisbon only. As the S.S. *Siboney* of the American Export Line was taken over by the U. S. Government, the transportation problem became still more acute. The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the entrance of the United States into the war put an end to the activities of the American Export Line.

However, the new American immigration rules which went into effect on July 1, 1941, restricting the issuance of visas; the ban on all departures from Germany after November 3, 1941; the closing of her doors by Cuba (Presidential decree of April 22, 1942); the cancellation of the exit permits already in possession of Jewish refugees, stateless persons, and aliens generally by Pierre Laval in July, 1942; finally, the occupation of the whole of France by the Germans in November of the same year—all this combined to solve the transportation crisis in a negative way. Since July, 1942, only two Portuguese steamers, the *Nyassa* and the *Sérpa Pinto* have continued to carry refugees, at long intervals, from Lisbon to the United States and Canada.

But great as the transportation difficulties may have been, they hardly played any rôle in the Vichy policy concerning the issuance of exit permits and in its order of July, 1942, canceling those already issued. The whole system of alien regulations and the treatment of refugees and foreigners, primarily Jews, which was inaugurated by Laval and his aides—Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior; Joseph Barthelemy, Minister of Justice; Xavier Vallat and Darquier de Pellepoix, successive Commissars for Jewish questions, to single out a few—offers convincing evidence of a concerted plan and inflexible determination to facilitate the ruthless elimination of Jewish refugees and aliens from France, decreed by Hitler and all too eagerly accepted and abetted by the men of Vichy.

6. NORTH AFRICA

(a) *The "Trans-Saharan" and the "Camps of Death"*

After the armistice of June, 1940, thousands of Spanish, German, Austrian, Czech, and Polish refugees who had enlisted in the Foreign Legion to "fight Hitler" were, by order of Vichy, herded into North African internment and labor camps. Situated as they were on the rim or in the depths of the Sahara Desert, these camps became symbols of unequaled human misery. Compared to the conditions of life, work, and discipline prevailing in these camps, existence in the T.E. formations of metropolitan France could almost have been called happy.

Following is a description of the camp of Djelfa (Algeria) by a refugee who was interned there until October, 1941:

... This camp, one of the worst, is on the edge of the Sahara Desert, surrounded by three walls of barbed wire and guarded by machine-gun posts. In it are 600 Spanish Republicans, about 300 members of the International Brigade which fought in Spain, and 30 or 40 refugees from Germany and Austria. The camp commander is a French officer who is a drunkard and a drug addict. He practices cruelty out of perversion. Daily men are put into a cement cell and beaten. Once a group of 12 members of the International Brigade were kept in the cell 30 days for building a camp fire to make coffee from toasted date pits.

Lingering starvation is the lot of all the men, who have lost on the average 30 pounds in weight, and succumb readily to disease. In 1941—I was in Djelfa till October, 1941—there were 18 cases of tuberculosis. A typhoid epidemic took 16 lives. For a time the only nourishment for the sick was potatoes cooked without salt. We never received medicines from the French authorities, and only occasionally from private relief organizations.

The men in Djelfa have to make sandals of alfalfa do for shoes. These wound their feet, and the wounds heal slowly and become easily infected in the Sahara. In the winter there is about three feet of snow in the camp, for the site is in the Middle Atlas Mountains. . . .⁸⁹

The inmates of the labor camps were assigned to work mostly in coal mines and on the construction of the Mediterranean-Nigeria Railroad, the so-called "Trans-Saharan," which was to link Dakar with Algeria. The project of building this railroad stemmed from prewar days. One of the causes which had delayed the commencement of the construction of the section stretching across the Sahara was the virtual inability of white men to labor under the murderous climatic conditions of the Sahara Desert.

Each kilometer of the advancing track was to cost the lives of enslaved refugees. But what did so small a detail matter in the calculations of the men of Vichy bent on promoting the military plans of the Nazis and their postwar economic ambitions and dreams? It should be added that among the refugees assigned to that work there were a considerable number of intellectuals totally unfit for such hard work even under less cruel conditions of life, discipline, and climate.

The number of refugees employed on the construction of this railroad was estimated at 5,000 or 6,000.⁹⁰ A large percentage of them were Jews. Several hundred died while working in the desert.⁹¹ With the mortality so high, it became necessary to fill the gaps. Mass roundups were accordingly staged by Vichy in the streets of Marseilles at the beginning of May, 1941. Over 1,500 persons were herded aboard the S.S. *Massilia*. They were given

⁸⁹Martin Stone, "New France is Hope of 'Forgotten Men' in North-African Prisons," *New York Post*, June 12, 1943.

⁹⁰*New York Times*, July 25, 1941; eyewitness accounts in *Aufbau*, July-August, 1941.

⁹¹*Jewish Journal and Daily News*, Jan. 12, 1943 (Yiddish).

their release only after "volunteering" for labor service in the Sahara. Yet Vichy and its Governor General of Algeria did not hesitate to assert in official reports that the treatment of the "volunteer railroad workers" was no worse than that of soldiers, and that the punishment inflicted for breach of discipline was even milder. These allegedly moderate punishments were meted out in disciplinary or penal camps. Two of them—the Hadjerat M'Guil camp and the Ain-el-Ourak camp, both in the vicinity of Colomb-Béchar — acquired the macabre fame of "Camps of Death." This was particularly true of the former, "a camp whose name is spoken with dread in all North African camps."⁹² Refined methods of starvation, torture, and flogging to death were employed daily at these camps, where unfortunate slave workers were sent for the purpose of extinguishing their last flicker of human dignity. The commanding staffs (officers, non-coms, and guards) of the disciplinary camps consisted of ruthless and sadistic Germans, devotees of Hitler's New Order, White Russians who had served in the Foreign Legion, and equally heartless Frenchmen whose whole career had been spent in the Foreign Legion, or in the Colonial Army. The trial of the entire commanding staff of the Hadjerat M'Guil camp in February, 1944 (see below), was a shocking revelation of the disciplinary methods held in high esteem at this camp. Those employed at the disciplinary camp of Ain-el-Ourak were no less inhuman, as may be seen from the following report forwarded to the authors by a former inmate:

Ain-el-Ourak now holds about 90 men. Most of them are Spanish refugees who have spent the last three years in various labor camps throughout France and Morocco, but there are also a number of former members of the Foreign Legion accused of robbery and other offenses, and some foreign army volunteers. The grounds on which these men have been sent to the disci-

⁹²Kenneth C. Crawford in *PM*, April 13, 1943.

plinary camp of Ain-el-Ourak vary with the individual cases. M.'s crime, for instance, consisted in going, without leave, from Mengoub, his labor camp, to Bou-Arfa on a Sunday. N. was caught attempting to reach England via Spain. R. has now been in the camp for nine months because he once slapped a sergeant who was torturing him. K. was interned for an indefinite period because he complained about the injustice done to him in a letter intended for a person living in a free country. B., who has worked with an Austrian committee in France, is considered guilty for political reasons; the duration of his term is not yet fixed. Four men of the working group of Mengoub refused on religious grounds to work on Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year's Day. They were sent to the disciplinary camp in order to be made an example of. Here they were immediately put into the *tombeau* ("tomb"), which means that for eight days and eight nights they remained in a pit, each by himself, buried alive with water and bread.

The *tombeau* is an invention of the Foreign Legion, but its application in the disciplinary camp is more rigorous. . . . Sometimes a man may have to stay for fifteen consecutive days in the *tombeau*, which is a shallow pit, about 15 inches deep, and a little wider and longer than a coffin. Over this pit a cover is spread and held in place by heavy stones. In this grave for the living the punished "offenders" lie all day long, exposed to the unbearable heat of the African sun. In the morning, at noon, and in the evening, the water pitcher is refilled and the men leave their pits for a few minutes. All the rest of the time they must stay in the *tombeau* under all circumstances and are not allowed to raise their heads unless they want to expose themselves to a stone thrown by the Arab guard. Two men attempted to evade this rule; they were sent to the hospital with fractured skulls. It also happens that those who lie in the

tombeau come to feel upon their bodies the gun-buttocks of the Goumiers (native Arab troops). At night, one stays in the pit and may use the cover as a protection against the cold. The food consists of 200 grams of bread per day. If there is heavy rain, the men are allowed to leave the *tombeau* only when the water reaches the brim of the pit. . . .

Often enough, the Arab Goumiers prod the men to speed up their work by pushing them with the butt-ends of their guns. Those who complain are sent to the *tombeau* for eight days.

Once every two or three months a few men with good records in the camp are released and sent to other labor groups, where they crush all ideas of revolt or protest by telling their new comrades about life in the disciplinary camp of Ain-el-Ourak.

That is what Vichy officially termed "moderate punishment."

(b) *Allied Landings; Disbandment of the Camps*

On November 8, 1942, when American troops landed in Morocco and Algiers, there were 15,000 Spanish and 11,000 or 12,000 Jewish refugees in North Africa. Of these refugees, according to an incomplete survey, the following categories were to be found in the camps:⁹³

Morocco

Camp	Number of Internees or Laboring Refugees
Berguent	400
Mengoub	400 (road building)
Bou-Arfa	200 (only a small staff of workers)
Ain-el-Ourak	150 (disciplinary camp)
Infout	500 (construction of dam)
Oued Akresh	200 (invalids)
Sidi-el-Ayashi	450 (aliens camp)

⁹³*Aufbau*, Nov. 15, 1942.

Algeria

Camp	Number of Internees or Laboring Refugees
Saida	400 (railroad construction)
Colomb-Béchar	400
Depot No. 5 (near Colomb-Béchar)	200 (Polish refugees exclusively)
Hadjerat M'Guil	200 (disciplinary camp)
Berroughia	200 (prisoners' camp)
Djelfa	600 (Spanish Loyalists)

Their immediate liberation was taken for granted. This belief was strengthened by President Roosevelt's statement of November 17, 1942 (nine days after the landing) on the "Darlan Deal," in the course of which he declared:

I have requested the liberation of all persons in North Africa who had been imprisoned because they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate the world and I have asked for the abrogation of all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi governments or Nazi ideologists.

Yet, despite Admiral Darlan's declaration of December 16, 1942, that he "already had granted full and complete amnesty to all against whom any action had been taken because of sympathy to the Allies," and despite the communiqué of General Giraud (Darlan's successor) on the eve of New Years, 1943, to the effect that a certain number of persons detained because of certain political tendencies would be liberated on the occasion of the New Year and coincident with his taking command as High Commissioner of France, resident in North Africa—despite all these statements, the release of the refugees was very slow in coming.

The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, which had meanwhile been set up under the direction of ex-Governor Herbert H. Lehman, informed the German Labor Delegation of New York in a letter at the end of January, 1943, as follows: "I am glad to advise you that this Government is using every effort to

bring about as prompt release of the prisoners and refugees as the military situation will permit. A commission consisting of British, American and French members has been constituted in Algiers to consider and deal with the entire prisoner and refugee problem. Also, representatives of this office are proceeding to North Africa and will be able to examine the entire situation and make prompt and effective recommendations."

This joint commission, headed by J. E. M. Carwell and Samuel H. Wiley, respectively the British and the American Consul General in Algiers, visited various concentration camps and investigated individual cases.

Finally, and not without pressure of American public opinion, the freeing of the interned refugees became an accomplished fact seven months after the landing of the Allied forces in North Africa. On June 23, 1943, the Associated Press reported that "the Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees announced the liberation of all persons 'who were interned in concentration camps, incorporated in labor companies, or confined in special residential areas prior to the landing of the Allied military forces on November 8, 1942.' " Those released were "provided with useful occupations of their own choice," the commission reported. A large number of them signed contracts as civilian employees of the American armed forces; they were paid the current prevailing wages and were not organized in military formations. Others joined the British pioneer battalions, receiving the same pay, rations, and quarters as British soldiers. As for the internees and members of labor companies who had been employed on the construction of the Trans-Sahara Railroad and in the Kenadza coal mines, they were said to have been given their complete freedom and to have left the region except for "a few who of their own free will signed contracts to remain."⁹⁴

⁹⁴*New York Post*, June 23, 1943.

Many Jewish refugees, who had never confused Vichy with the real France, enlisted anew in French military formations. And the "forgotten ally" soon gave proof of his mettle, as witness the following news dispatches:

The enemy launched a counter-attack yesterday at a road junction north of Garaet Achkel and ten miles from Bizerte, but this quickly petered out under the fire of Allied machine guns and artillery. The French African Corps, *including many Jewish refugees serving as volunteers**—some of them equipped with material captured from the Germans—were clearing the western slope of Djebel Cheniti, flanking the road running along the north shore of Garaet Achkel to Bizerte.

—Frank L. Kluckhohn in the *New York Times*, May 6, 1943.

On April 22 the French forces in the north of Tunis, *composed of refugees from concentration camps, including Jews, Spaniards, Poles, and Americans, attacked.**

—*New York Times*, May 11, 1943.

(c) *The Hand of Nemesis*

With the constitution of the Committee of National Liberation in Algiers, the hour of reckoning struck.

The first judicial application of the policy of purging Vichyites and collaborationists was the trial of the torturers of the inmates of the disciplinary camp of Hadjerat M'Guil.

Hadjerat M'Guil specialized in the "re-education" of anti-Fascist intellectuals. The victims, systematically starved, overworked, and beaten and tortured to death, were mostly Spanish Loyalists and German Jews.

Eleven men, comprising the members of the commanding and supervisory staff of the camp and the Inspector General of the

**Italics ours.*

Vichy labor camps in North Africa, were charged with murder, complicity in murder, manslaughter, and criminal assault. Three were Corsicans: Lieutenant Xavier Santucci, Sergeant Major Jean Baptiste Finidori, and Sergeant Antoine Mosca. Four were metropolitan and Algerian Frenchmen: Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Viciot, camp commander, charged with having personally inflicted blows and wounds upon internees; Colonel Félicien Lupi, Inspector General of Vichy labor camps in North Africa, charged with dereliction in his duties and with manslaughter; Sergeant Major Raphael Dauphin, and André Cellier. Two were Germans: Otto Riepp, who seems to have done most of the torturing, and Johann Trees. The last two were Ansen Dourmenoff, a Russian, and Arturo Dotti, an Italian.

The personality of one of the defendants charged with murder, Sgt.-Maj. Finidori, was colorfully described by two Jewish refugees, former enlisted men in the Foreign Legion, who were subject to his orders and supervision when they were interned, after the Petain armistice, in the camps of Fhounassa and Kenadza, near Colomb Béchar. They wrote:

... We knew well Sergeant Major Finidori, that heavy-built and fat man with the shaven head and short neck, a great glutton for skylarks, which he had his pet legionaries kill by the hundreds on the Fhounassa oasis. Every morning we saw him descend from the camp to the trail, followed by his funny little mongrel dog (which he called Blum), in order to speed up our work under the cruel sun that scorched our bare torsos. He so distinguished himself by his brutality that his superiors found him worthy to take charge of a disciplinary company specially created in 1941 for the purpose of crushing and destroying our anti-Fascist élite. . . .⁹⁵

⁹⁵Armand N. Drucker and Guy G. Rothenstein, "La Parole est aux victimes," *France-Amérique*, March 26, 1944.

The trial opened at Algiers on February 17, 1944, before a special army tribunal composed of three military and two civil judges, and presided over by Chief Justice Louis Ohlmann of the Algiers Court of Appeals. The two weeks of the trial were filled with recitals of horrors not only by the witnesses for the prosecution, but also by those called by the defense. One of the accused admitted having kicked and beaten with iron-tipped sticks two prisoners who lay naked and already unconscious on the blood-stained floor.⁹⁶ The main defense of the accused was that they had merely obeyed orders from above—from Vichy. Each was defended by counsel. After defense pleas lasting no less than 48 hours, the court handed down its verdict. Four of the convicted men (Santucci, Finidori, Dauphin, and Riepp) were sentenced to death, two (Viciot and Dourmenoff) to life imprisonment at hard labor, two (Mosca and Trees) to 20 years imprisonment at hard labor, and two (Cellier and Dotti) to 10 years imprisonment at hard labor. The eleventh man (Col. Lupi) was acquitted.

The death sentences of Finidori and Dauphin were commuted by General de Gaulle to life and 20 years imprisonment at hard labor, respectively.⁹⁷ Those of Santucci and Riepp were carried out by a firing squad at Algiers on April 12, 1944.

Thus the hand of Nemesis descended upon the first of the Vichyite war criminals.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, March 12, 1944.

⁹⁷Announcement by the Algiers Information Commissariat, *Christian Science Monitor*, April 13, 1944.

CHAPTER VII

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT

D. GREAT BRITAIN

Prewar Period—Outbreak of War; Registration and Classification of Aliens—Restrictions—Reaction of Public Opinion—Legal Basis and Motives of the Government's Policy—Easement of the Alien Regulations—Financial Aid to Refugees by the Government—Participation in the War Effort

1. PREWAR PERIOD

One of the largest aggregations of Jewish refugees in Europe, over 60,000, is found in Great Britain.¹ The development of the refugee problem there was quite different from that in France. There were no economic reasons for admitting or encouraging immigration to Great Britain. Long before the First World War a restrictive policy had been inaugurated in that country; and after the war, when hundreds of thousands of refugees or alien workers streamed into France, where they were admitted without any difficulties, England, faced with a grave problem of unemployment, closed her gates completely and continued this policy until, and for some time after, the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany in 1933. From the previous stream of refugees, particularly that of Russian refugees, hardly a trickle reached Great Britain. The modification of this policy in the years immediately preceding the present war was, therefore, based primarily upon motives of humanity. Theoretically, Reich Germans, Austrians, and Czechoslovaks possessing a valid passport could enter the country; but thanks to her geographical position England could always

¹"Refugees in Britain," *Planning*, No. 216, Jan. 14, 1944, pp. 2 and 10; 389 Commons 1158; 389 Commons 1188.

control immigration. For years the British immigration authorities made no distinction between refugees and other aliens, the same guarantees of financial, moral, and physical fitness being required of all who sought entry. The provisions of Article 1 of the Aliens Order 1920, Statutory Rules & Orders 1920, No. 448, according to which "no alien may land in the United Kingdom without permission of the appointed officers," were also applicable to refugees. Until 1938 only those refugees could enter England who either possessed sufficient means or had an invitation from a prominent Briton, or else who came on a so-called domestic service permit.

Kurt Zielenziger puts the number of refugees from Germany in Great Britain on December 31, 1937, at 4,500, while Sir John Hope Simpson says that it is impossible to obtain accurate figures of German refugees. One thing is certain, namely, that the number of refugees swelled in 1938, although the Government gradually introduced compulsory visas, first for Germans, then for Austrians, and later also for Czechoslovaks. On November 21, 1938, the then Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain stated that about 11,000 refugees (men, women, and children) had been allowed to land in Great Britain, apart from 4,000 or 5,000 others who subsequently migrated overseas.²

In Great Britain, Nansen refugees, that is, those who were under the protection of the Nansen International Office set up by the League of Nations (cf. its Refugee Convention of October 28, 1933), as well as refugees from Germany, Austria, and later from Czechoslovakia, had to apply for a visa to the local British consular representative, who referred the application to the Foreign Office for action. However, even if the visa was granted, the immigration officer at the port of debarkation could deny the refugee entry under Art. 1 of the Aliens Order. "Immigration

²Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 340.

officers [at the ports] are given full powers to refuse admission if, for example, there is absence of means of support. The administrative practice of 'conditional landing' assists in regularizing immigration."³

Section 3 of the British Aliens Act of 1905 contains a provision permitting the admission of political refugees. It states:

But in the case of an immigrant who proves that he is seeking admission to this country solely to avoid prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds or for an offense of a political character, or prosecution involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or limb on account of religious belief, leave to land shall not be refused on the ground merely of want of means or the probability of his becoming a charge on the rates.

However, the administration in power in 1933 was reluctant to make an extensive application of this provision; years had to pass before refugees were admitted without adequate economic guarantees.

Great Britain had ratified the provisional refugee agreement of July 4, 1936, as well as the final one of February 10, 1938, but a wider admission of refugees first became noticeable during 1938. In that year several thousand Jewish men, women, and children from Germany and Czechoslovakia were granted entry. Since then Great Britain has been one of the few countries where the difference between ordinary aliens and refugees is recognized not only in everyday practice, but also from the legal point of view. Whereas immigration into Great Britain remains extremely difficult under the existing regulations and each case is carefully studied both by the Ministry of Labor and by the Home Office, the admission of refugees is handled solely by the Home Office,

³*Ibid.*, p. 337.

which acts in close cooperation with a special coordinating committee composed of representatives of private refugee-aid organizations. The Government authorized several Jewish organizations to bring into the country refugees for retraining purposes without any limit as to their number, provided their maintenance and subsequent emigration were guaranteed.

On July 19, 1939, at a meeting of the permanent Intergovernmental Committee created by the Evian Conference, the British Government expressed the view that the refugee problem was insoluble if the financing of the project was left to private initiative. It declared itself ready to discuss with other democratic governments a plan for granting governmental financial assistance toward a solution of the refugee problem.⁴

Sir John Hope Simpson observes that the admission of Jews from Germany "is a result of the extraordinary effort and generosity of the Jewish Community in Great Britain in undertaking unconditional responsibility for their support."⁵ A strong fight was waged against those who tried to restrict or exclude the admission of refugees for fear that it might aggravate the unemployment situation. It was proved that such an assumption was erroneous and that, besides, Great Britain had to share responsibility for the conditions which had given rise to the Nazi regime in Germany, and so was under moral obligation to offer hospitality to the victims of that regime.⁶

A special committee (British Inter-Aid Committee of the World Movement for the Care of Children Coming from Germany) was formed to deal with all children under 17 years of age who were brought to Great Britain unaccompanied by their parents. Up to the outbreak of the present war, 9,354 such

⁴Nathan Caro Belth, "The Refugee Problem," *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 41 (1939-1940), p. 375.

⁵Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

⁶See especially Norman Angell, *We and the Refugees*, pp. 11-47 and 221-279.

children, 6,690 of them Jewish, had been brought to Great Britain—the largest number of refugee children admitted by any country; a legal loophole was found for admitting an additional 10,000 on condition that they leave England after reaching their majority. The children thus admitted were divided into two categories: the so-called guaranteed cases, where relatives or friends assumed full responsibility for the maintenance and education of the children up to the age of 18, and the non-guaranteed cases, where children arrived without such assurances, and had to be housed, maintained, and educated in camps until homes could be found for them. Local guardian committees were set up in most districts to look after these children. The entry of the guaranteed children was requested by their guarantors, while the selection of the non-guaranteed was left to the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland in Berlin, and the Jewish community of Vienna.⁷

Nor was it only children who found a haven in England. Quietly, without display or publicity, the British authorities admitted thousands of refugees year after year, relatively more than the United States.⁸ A special camp for refugees was established at Richborough at a cost of £20,000, where 3,000 refugees were lodged and their maintenance provided at an average weekly expense of 10 sh. per capita. The inmates of the camp were trained for manual trades, but had freedom of movement and were treated with cordial hospitality both by the authorities and the local population.⁹

The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, in close cooperation with the Emergency Committee for German

⁷Stephen K. Schimanski, "Refugee Children in England," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, July-August, 1939, pp. 22-30.

⁸See ~~page 200 above~~ Table XII, p. 354 below.

⁹Margaret Goldsmith, "The Refugee Transient Camp at Richborough," *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September, 1939, pp. 315-321.

Scientists, had, by the end of 1938, found permanent positions for 524 scholars, placed 378 in academic institutions, and 146 in industry or general research. By April 1940, the Society had obtained posts for 380 college professors and research workers. In addition, the Society arranged lecture courses and tours by German savants. The International Student Service, which had collected £450,000 in 1919 for needy students in Central Europe, was instrumental in procuring, besides financial aid, scholarships in English universities and technical institutes for 1,000 students, 75% of whom were Jews.

Early in 1938 the British Coordinating Committee for Refugees was founded. Its main task was to serve as liaison with the Home Office, which instead of dealing with many different committees and individual cases, preferred to deal with one central body which took charge of the negotiations and settlement of individual cases on behalf of the various committees. The function of the British Coordinating Committee for Refugees may thus be compared with that of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees in New York.

The Coordinating Committee also acted as a clearing house for all applications to the Domestic Bureau, which succeeded in bringing over 14,000 women, accompanied by nearly 1,000 children.

The considerable sums necessary to organize relief work on such a large scale were raised by the Lord Baldwin Fund and, in the case of Czech refugees, by the Lord Mayor's Fund for Refugees from Czechoslovakia, both of which put about £900,000 at the disposal of various refugee-aid activities.¹⁰

¹⁰Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 338; F. Lafitte, *The Internment of Aliens*, p. 45 ff.

2. OUTBREAK OF WAR; REGISTRATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF ALIENS

Upon the outbreak of war, the first government measure concerning aliens was their compulsory registration. Under Art. 6, as amended, of the Aliens Order of 1920, every alien over 16 who was not an enemy alien had to report to the registration officer any change of residence, or an absence from home of more than two weeks. He had to obtain and carry with him a registration certificate.

As to the registration of enemy aliens (an enemy alien being defined as "a person who possesses the nationality of a state at war with this nation"¹¹), they were required to furnish to the registration officer all the particulars concerning their status; they could not change their residence without the approval of the registration officer of the new place of residence; they had to report every absence of more than 24 hours; they had to obtain registration certificates and could not travel more than five miles from the place of their residence without a travel permit (Art. 6A of the Aliens Order).

The British Government did not undertake a wholesale internment of enemy aliens. As early as September, 1939, the British Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson, declared that the Government would draw a clear distinction between enemy aliens in the ordinary sense—that is, subjects of the enemy state who were resident for business or other reasons in Great Britain—and the refugees from the Greater Reich who were enemy subjects but were resident or sojourning in England as a country or refuge.¹²

The Government appointed over a hundred special Aliens Tribunals composed of judges and leaders of the Bar, sitting

¹¹Art. 20 (2) of Aliens Order.

¹²Norman Bentwich, "Wartime Britain's Alien Policy," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, February, 1942, p. 46.

with a police officer, to examine the case of every refugee over the age of 16, and to classify these cases in three categories, viz.: Class A, comprising persons who were to be interned as not being absolutely reliable; Class B, composed of persons who were to be left at liberty but subject to certain restrictions applicable to enemy aliens under the Aliens Order of 1920; Class C, including persons who were to be free from all restrictions except those applying to friendly aliens. Such facts as the political past of the individual, the eventual loss of his German nationality, or the fact that he had been confined in a German concentration camp or an Italian prison during Hitler's visit in Italy in 1938, were taken into consideration by the tribunal. Representatives of the refugee relief committees were present at all the hearings and submitted recommendations in each case. As a result of the examinations, 568 refugees were placed in Category A and interned; about 6800 were classified as B; while the overwhelming majority—over 64,000—were classified as C.¹³

The stress of the national crisis and the fear of Fifth Columnists after the fall of France in June, 1940, caused a temporary abandonment of this liberal policy by the British Government. Mass internments of refugees of enemy nationality followed. In the end, however, the inherent liberalism of the British people triumphed and, at the close of 1940, the restrictions were eased.

3. RESTRICTIONS

The period of restrictions began on May 12, 1940 when the battle for Belgium and Holland was raging on the Continent. Announcement thereof had already been made on April 23, when the Undersecretary for the Home Department, Mr. Peake, declared in the House of Commons:

¹³Lafitte, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63; Maximilian Koessler, "Enemy Alien Internment: With Special Reference to Great Britain and France," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LVII, March, 1942, pp. 102-103.

... The case of every German and Austrian in this country has been reviewed by the local tribunals, and a further review of certain categories of aliens is at present being undertaken by Advisory Committees appointed for each Civil Defense Region. The onus is on every person of German or Austrian nationality to show cause why he should not be interned, and the policy is to intern any German or Austrian if there is doubt as to his attitude and disposition towards the Allied cause.¹⁴

On May 12, using the power given to him by Art. 9 of the Aliens Order "to declare an area protected and to prohibit any alien, or any class of alien, to enter it, or to remain in the area," the Secretary of State declared as protected area a wide coastal belt stretching from Inverness to the Eastern edge of Dorset.

The Alien (Protected Areas) Order of April 15, 1940 (S.R.&O. 1940, No. 468), provides that "alien residents of protected areas shall not remain without permission of the registration officer or of the Secretary of State. If the registration officer refuses the alien permission to reside in a protected area, the case will be referred to an advisory committee which will report to the Secretary of State." Other prescriptions refer to the possession of cameras or photographic apparatus, telescopes, nautical charts, etc.

According to these regulations, alien women and children were ordered to leave their homes and find new places of residence, while the males, between the ages of 16 and 60, living in these areas, were interned. Some of them, however, were permitted to remain in the coastal belt on the following conditions: they had to report daily in person to the police, they had to observe a curfew between 8 P.M. and 6 A.M., and they could use no motor vehicle (other than a public conveyance) or bicycle for travel. The first of these conditions was repealed on May 28, 1940.

¹⁴360 Commons 32.

Both the University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics (then located in Cambridge) lost prominent members of their faculties because Cambridge fell within the coastal belt. Many Austrians and Germans who were spending the weekend in the coastal zone, were likewise seized and interned.

Simultaneously, the British Government issued a series of Internment Orders.^{14a} On May 16 and 17, these orders were followed by the roundup of all male Germans and Austrians of Class B, between the ages of 16 and 60; 2,200 of these refugees were seized and interned.¹⁵

These measures—the forerunners of mass internments—caused apprehension, not only among the refugees but among the public, so that the Home Office was impelled to issue the following statement:

These measures are to be considered as measures of urgency applied to areas where for military reasons special precautions are required for the time being.

It is recognized and much regretted that these necessary measures will involve for a period great hardship in individual cases. Those persons, however, who are affected by them and who are in fact faithful to the vital interests of this country will give the best proof of their attitude by submitting freely and uncomplainingly to the restrictions which the exigencies of the situation for the moment require.

It is intended that the rigor of these measures should be mitigated as soon as circumstances permit.¹⁶

It is important to note that it was just these “midnight arrests” and internments which produced a certain anti-alien feeling, against which the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany

^{14a}There were altogether four internment orders: May 13, May 16, May 27, and June 10, 1940.

¹⁵*The Times* (London), May 17, 1940.

and Central Europe warned in a letter to all clergymen, signed by the Bishop of Chichester and the Auxiliary Bishop of Westminster. The letter pointed out that, with the intensification of hostilities, public antipathy might be aroused towards all people of German origin, and that as a result the refugees—themselves victims of the most ruthless oppression by the Nazi Party—might suffer. "May we therefore appeal," it went on to say, "for your help in averting such a tragedy by keeping your people well informed as to the facts of this rapidly changing situation?"¹⁷

On May 20, the newly created Aliens Advisory Committees began the re-examination of the cases of all female Germans and Austrians belonging to Class B. However, on May 27, these re-examinations were suspended and 3,000 Class B women aged 16-60 were interned. The Home Office, in answer to criticism, stressed that this internment, too, was temporary. Beginning with June 3, after the surrender of King Leopold of Belgium, all aliens over the age of 16 (except the French) were subject to a curfew from 10:30 P.M. to 6 A.M. The "protected areas" were further extended, and aliens had to leave these districts as soon as possible. Sometimes they were given only a few hours, and sometimes up to three days, in which to remove from these areas. During the same week, 300 Class B Germans and Austrians aged 69-70 were interned, and by the middle of June 7,000 men and 3,800 women were stated to be in internment camps.

In the second half of June, the internment of male Germans and Austrians became general. This was announced by Sir John Anderson in Parliament as follows:

I have authorized chief constables to arrest for internment any German or Austrian in Category C about whose reliability

¹⁶Lafitte, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

the chief constable feels doubt from the point of view of national security.¹⁸

According to Maximilian Koessler, it was on June 21, the day of France's collapse, that general internment was decided upon, but Lafitte gives June 25 as the date on which the order was issued to intern all Class C men under 70.¹⁹ Concerning the power granted to the chief constables in connection with this internment, Sir John declared on July 11:

The discretion given to the chief constables is not a discretion to exempt enemy aliens from internment, but a discretion to intern individuals falling within the exempted categories if as regards a particular individual the police have special information showing that his immediate internment is necessary on security grounds.²⁰

By the middle of July 13,000 more Class C men had been rounded up, making a total of 20,000 men interned, or two-thirds of all the male Germans and Austrians in the country.²¹

4. REACTION OF PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion in Great Britain or, at least, a considerable part of it was aroused by the internment measures, and there was general indignation following the disclosure of the hardships and tragedies accompanying the enforcement of the internment and deportation policy, especially the sinking, on July 2, 1940, of the ship *Arandora Star* on its voyage to Canada with interned enemy aliens, and the acts of robbery committed against other internees aboard the vessel *Dunnera* en route to Australia.

The *Manchester Guardian*, the *News Chronicle*, *The New Statesman*, *The Spectator*, Lord Cecil, H. C. Wells, Sir Andrew

¹⁸361 Commons 634.

¹⁹Koessler, *loc. cit.*, p. 106; Lafitte, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

²⁰362 Commons 1318-20.

²¹Bentwich, *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

McFadyean, the Bishop of Chichester, Justice Asquith, Lord Lytton, the leaders of the Trade Unions, and outstanding members of the Labor Party took the Government severely to task for its internment policy. The critics reminded the authorities that, at the outset of the war, England had issued a White Book on the Nazi Terror, and that she was now making war upon her "sincerest friends."

The fact that Nazis and non-Nazis, friends and foes of the British, had to live together in the camps, that the arrests had been carried out under the most degrading circumstances, and that conditions in part of the internment camps were exceedingly bad, led to a debate in the House of Commons on July 10, in the course of which Members of all parties demanded a sensible attitude on the part of the Government. These demands were renewed during a second debate on August 22.²²

The Lord Bishop of Chichester remarked on August 6, 1940, in the House of Lords:

I would ask noble Lords who are judges and lawyers to note this point, that principles have been laid down in the past for the treatment and for the internment of enemy aliens—that is, "passport nationals" of enemy countries. Those principles are not applicable to refugees and a belligerent nation adhering to such obsolete methods toward refugees brands material friends as formal enemies. Wholesale internment or deportation of refugees as if they were enemy aliens is therefore an arbitrary act. . . .²³

And the Nestor of contemporary British statesmen, Lord Cecil, declared:

I feel most strongly that the history of what has taken place with regard to these unhappy people is one of the most discred-

²²Lafitte, *op. cit.*, p. 75; *Aufbau*, July 19, 1940.

²³117 Lords 125.

itable incidents in the whole history of this country. . . . The grossest injustice has been committed under the influence of an unreasonable and unreasoning terror, aroused not by this kind of people at all but people who were called the Fifth Column. People forget that the original Fifth Column consisted of the nationals of the country concerned, who were traitors. . . . Unhappily there came one of those waves of panic which do occur in war-time, and it was said, "Oh, we cannot wait for any of these elaborate measures for inquiring into the guilt or innocence of individuals; we must intern the lot"; and that became what I believe is called a slogan. Well, that was the most ridiculous nonsense ever devised to take in a people in a moment of great excitement.²⁴

Mr. Wedgwood observed on August 22, 1940, during the debate in the House of Commons:

Every nation is divided into two different schools of thought, one school on our side and the other school on the Nazi side. It is out of date to talk of enemy aliens. . . . If I was asked from where the danger will come if the Germans invade this country, I would not say from the German Jews. . . . The danger would come from the Fascist party, from people who were defeatists, and from people who have nothing to lose if Hitler comes. . . .²⁵

There are no official statistics regarding the composition of the interned, but Lafitte cites interesting figures based on a census taken by statisticians interned in a camp where there were 1,500 men. Two-thirds of the men came from Germany and over one-tenth from Austria; 17 percent were stateless, and 82 percent were Jewish. Fifty-eight percent were over 40 years of age, and 27 percent over 55 years old. About three-quarters were married

²⁴117 Lords 133.

²⁵363 Commons 1386.

men, and 5 percent were engaged. Half of the wives of these men were of German, 20 percent of Austrian, and 13 percent of British origin. The wives or fiancées of over 33 percent of these men were also interned. More than one-third of the married men had children under 16; of the fathers of children under 16, four-fifths had British-born children, while one-third had children under 16 who were likewise interned. Ninety percent of the men had been examined by one tribunal and 5 percent by two. Eighty-four percent claimed to be refugees, and 70 percent had actually been classed as "refugees from Nazi oppression" by the tribunals; 30 percent stated that they had been in Nazi prisons or concentration camps. Fully 87 percent of the men were ready to volunteer for some form of National Service; that is, nearly everyone except the seriously sick and the real Nazis, which last were naturally very few in number, such enemy aliens having already been interned on the basis of the security lists.²⁶

Lafitte publishes a number of complaints about the treatment during arrests and in the camps, but the chief grievance was to the effect that the internments ushered in a campaign against the wrong people.²⁷

"The main fault of the war prisoners' camps was that anti-Nazis, usually in a minority, were put together with Nazi sympathisers. Mr. H. N. Brailsford, who visited one camp (a converted holiday camp in Devon) to see his friend H. N., an Austrian member of the International Brigade, gives a description of conditions there (*Reynolds News*, July 14, 1940) which tallies with all other reports we have received:

"The camp was cold, damp and water-logged, but the atmosphere was kindly. The guards were obviously friendly and considerate. The prisoners were allowed to run the camp them-

²⁶Lafitte, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

²⁷*Aufbau*, August 8, 1941.

selves, and had set up a school and a theatre. H. N. edited its wall-newspaper, and made a little pocket money by weaving fishing-nets. I found three other [International] Brigaders, two of them Germans, in the camp.

“They had one complaint, which they repeated as time went on, in letters, week after week. In this camp about half the men were Nazis, the rest decided friends of our cause. The Nazis were organized by a Gestapo man, and behaved with deliberate arrogance and brutality. They went about singing their blood-thirsty Nazi songs, and occasionally they even beat up Jewish internees.

“Our friends were equally well organized, according to the Trade Unions to which they belonged. Life in these conditions was scarcely endurable: there was daily civil war in the camp. To separate the two would have been easy; they had already sorted themselves out.’ ”²⁸

Following is a more detailed account by a Jewish refugee interned in the same camp:

We belonged to Category C of the German refugees in England. Category A consisted of known or suspected sympathisers with Nazi Germany; these had been in custody since the outbreak of war. Category B comprised refugees whose behavior did not give evidence of anti-Nazi activity. However, among them were many young men whom the authorities wished to keep under closer surveillance after the outbreak of hostilities and to deny them certain privileges, such as the right to travel freely in the country, etc. Category C was composed of persons who were manifestly anti-Nazis and victims of the Nazi dictatorship. The classification, in especial the assignment to Category B, was made at the discretion of the judge, and in case of

²⁸Lafitte, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

doubt the person concerned was put in Category B rather than C. We lived in the coastal region, which was declared a Protected Area at the start of the war, and until Whitsunday we were under no restrictions whatever. On that day we were informed that we would have to part from our wives and report to the police within six hours for the purpose of deportation and internment. It took us nearly a week to reach our destination: the internment camp at Huyton near Liverpool.

The deportation was carried out under guard. The object of this measure was to segregate us from the civilian population. The behavior of the guards, as of all British soldiers who kept watch over us, was correct. The camp consisted of a settlement colony recently completed and cleared in haste. One- and two-story houses, 120-150 in number, with one or two rooms on each floor. In each house, depending on its size, between 11 and 16 persons were lodged. The entire colony was cut off from the outside world by barbed wire. There were no beds, but three blankets for each person. About 2,000 German refugees were quartered in this camp. At first there was a lack of preparation and organization on the part of the British. A particular hardship was the absence of newspapers and radios. Also, the postal communications with our wives and others were most irregular. Naturally, we always bore in mind that England was at war and never regarded these measures as arbitrary. But many of us had emigration prospects which could only be followed up by contact with the outside world, and they suffered greatly under the handicap mentioned. Also, there was lack of occupation, although we began to establish ourselves in the camp as in a small town.

We had a kind of self-administration which cooperated with the British camp commandant. In keeping with the character of a settlement colony, the houses we lived in were arranged

in streets and squares. We did the cooking, conducted classes and religious services, and provided medical care, insofar as this was possible with the initial shortage of medicaments. A further great handicap was the fact that many of us had no money, which had been taken away by the authorities for safe-keeping during our transportation and only returned later, when things had been put somewhat in order. We helped one another, the more wealthy sharing with the others, although one could not buy much with the money except postage stamps and a few things on sale at the canteen, such as cigarettes and fruit. All in all, there were 2,000 persons in our camp, at first all of them from the Protected Areas, since London was just beginning to undertake such internment measures at the time of my departure from England at the end of June. As far as I know, there were altogether about nine such camps in Great Britain. The food was fair, and health conditions satisfactory. We tried to do something to keep up the morale, and the few books at our disposal were arranged in a library. Once we also had an entertainment with the participation of sundry interned artists. For spiritual edification we held divine services; in particular, Laemmle, the religious instructor of the young, and Cohn, the Conservative rabbi, did everything during the holidays to elevate the spirit of hundreds of persons who attended the Jewish religious services. I cannot give the exact number of the Jewish internees. It is my guess, however, that three-fourths of the inmates of our camp were Jews.

I estimate, further, that the refugees in the camp consisted of the following age-groups: one-third of persons between the ages of 16 and 26, another third of those between the ages of 27 and 45, and the rest of older persons. A few days before I left the camp to sail for the United States, Italians were interned in the camp, but segregated from us. They were mostly

from the crews of captured or stranded vessels. During the last days of my stay in the camp, it became known that the wives of refugees were also interned on the Isle of Man. A number of such refugees in our camp were transferred there, having applied for such transfer in the hope of being interned near their families. When I left the camp on June 30, the majority were still at Camp H. On the whole, the atmosphere was bearable, and all were inclined to resign themselves to necessity. We should have been only too glad to take an active part in the British anti-Hitler cause instead of remaining inactive behind barbed wires and a burden to the British Government, especially as many of us had offered England our loyal and expert services in many vital war undertakings and even in the Air Force. This view was expressed, with a discretion becoming our situation, in a collective petition to the British authorities, who received it in a most tactful and kindly manner.²⁹

The complaints of the interned may be summed up as follows:

1. They regarded their internment as a moral degradation. To intern them, who considered and had proved themselves pioneers in the fight against Hitler, as potentially dangerous elements in the struggle against their mortal enemy Hitler, was something none of them could understand. However much one might plead with them to realize that presumably considerations of security alone had led the British Government to decide upon this internment, the refugees agreed with the following argument which K. W. M. Pickthorn ironically advanced during the debate in the House of Commons on August 22, 1940, in defense of the contention that possibly there were a few traitors among the refugees and so all had to be interned:

... If an archangel appeared before all the members of the

²⁹*Aufbau*, July 19, 1940.

War Cabinet at once and said, "There is one red-headed man in England who, unless care is taken, will do something to injure the State," I think it would be the duty of the War Cabinet to see that all red-headed men were interned. . . .³⁰

This war is Hitler's war, "which means that we are faced with a foe who recognizes none of the old standards."³¹ In this crusade for freedom the refugees could have made a substantial contribution to the war effort; they were ready to sacrifice everything in the common endeavor to defeat Hitler, whether as scientists, researchers, stretcher bearers, or in any other capacity in which they could give proof of their loyalty. "Not a single case has become known of a man or a woman of the C-Category who has been found wanting in loyalty."³² One can therefore realize what a psychological shock the refugees received when agents of Scotland Yard appeared in order to transport them to internment camps.

2. The conditions in the camps were partly primitive and partly bad, particularly as regards the sanitary arrangements and sleeping accommodations.

3. Families were torn asunder. The internees did not know whether or not their wives were also interned and where they were. For weeks the refugees waited for a sign of life from them. Letters and postcards were not delivered because, in one place, the censorship did not yet function properly. On the other hand, their families did not know the whereabouts of their menfolk. The committees, which did their best, were able only after weeks of searching to bring some measure of reassurance to both sides.

4. In the camps themselves there were many sick people, due to the fact that a number of the internees were past the age of 58

³⁰363 Commons 591.

³¹Argus, "Friendly Enemy Aliens," *Contemporary Review*, January, 1941.

³²*Ibid.*

and by no means equal to the Spartan rigors of camp life. The medical care was inadequate.

5. Some of the guards did not treat the refugees well and looked upon the internees as "captured enemies." They regarded the refugees as Nazis who had brought so much misery to the world.

6. In some of the camps anti-Nazis were placed together with real Nazis. To be sure, on June 21, 1940, Sir John Anderson, forced to admit his policy of "interning the lot," stated that these internees would be kept apart from regular prisoners of war; but in practice this meant that Nazis arrested in England came in contact with anti-Nazis and partly terrorized them, while Jewish civilian prisoners were physically assaulted by these antisemitic rowdies under the very noses of the British guards.

In July it became known that male internees were being deported to Canada and Australia. At first it was believed that only Category A and Category B aliens were involved, but later the Government admitted that it had also deported Category C aliens, that is, those officially classed as "refugees from Nazi oppression."

Below we reproduce two reports on the lot of the deported refugees, one from Australia and the other from Canada, both written at about the same time.

Australia, November, 1940

The internees arrived here from England after a two-month voyage alike adventurous and difficult. About 1,000 men were quartered in a camp which, by four weeks of work, they made as comfortable as possible.

The food is good and plentiful. The internees have nothing to complain about their treatment by the camp commandants; but here, too, there are many things which do not belong with the amenities of life.

First of all, there are frequent frictions inside the camp itself, which is not surprising, since the most varied temperaments, age-groups, and professions are thrown together. However, this is relatively unimportant. It is more difficult to overcome the fact that the internees, situated in a very warm region, are not dressed according to the climate and have to wear the clothes they had on when put aboard ship. A further hardship is that those interned in Australia, mostly married men, hardly ever hear from their families. It takes months for mail to reach England, and no one can afford to send letters by air mail. There is also a scarcity of cigarettes, tooth brushes, paper, and books.³³

Ottawa, November, 1940

In a comparatively short time the refugee-internees brought here from England changed quarters three times. Now they have been transferred from "wild" regions to civilized ones and accommodated in barracks. Strange to say, however, not only are Nazis now being segregated from Jewish internees, but also non-Jews, so that there are now exclusively Jewish and non-Jewish camps.

The internees have certain opportunities for work, among which they are free to choose. In their spare time they try to study, so as not to lose touch with their past and to believe in a better future. In Camp A there is a high school, as well as a number of artistic groups, which, although composed exclusively of Germans, arranged a celebration on October 27 in honor of the 22nd anniversary of the birth of Czechoslovakia.

The cases of the refugee-internees deported to Canada are not being reviewed by the Canadian authorities. In individual cases the refugees have been advised that "theoretically they are free," but that they will have to remain in camp until there

³³*Aufbau*, January 3, 1941.

is a boat available to take them back to England. The Canadian Government takes the stand that it had an agreement with the British Government to take over dangerous enemy aliens, and not friendly ones, and refuses so far to grant asylum in Canada to those "released." Opinion among the refugees as to a possible return to England is quite divided.³⁴

5. LEGAL BASIS AND MOTIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

The power under which the orders of internment was issued, derived from the general prerogative right of the Crown to arrest subjects of enemy states in time of war, and not from any specific provision in the Aliens Order of 1920.³⁵ At the outset of World War I, enemy aliens were left free and wholesale internments began only after the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915. At that time various internees applied to the courts for a writ of habeas corpus, but the courts held that the writ did not lie in favor of enemy aliens, and that the Royal Prerogative could be applied to them without restrictions. Nevertheless, the legal status of the refugees appeared to be different. By her ratification of the Provisional Arrangement of July 4, 1936, and the Geneva Convention of February 10, 1938, England had recognized the exceptional position of refugees. Art. 2 of the Convention of February 10, 1938, states expressly that "a refugee shall be entitled to move about freely, to sojourn or reside in the territory to which the present Convention applies." However, this right is limited by the preceding phrase, "without prejudice to the power of any contracting party to regulate the right of sojourn and residence." No attempt was made to test in the courts the effect of the Convention on the Royal Prerogative.³⁶

³⁴*Aufbau*, January 3, 1941.

³⁵Bentwich, *loc. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁶*Ibid.*; Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 571.

As may be gathered from the statements already quoted, the Government's policy to "intern the lot" was dictated by the desire to meet the supposedly strong public clamor for such internment, and to obviate the dangers which had arisen from the activities of Germans in Holland, Belgium and France. In the House of Commons debate of August 22, Mr. Osbert Peake for the Home Office and Sir Edward Grigg for the War Office defended the Government's policy. Previously it had been explained that internment was necessary "for paramount reasons of military security." But now Mr. Peake advanced other reasons. He said:

The invasion and overrunning of Holland and Belgium, which was attributed in the public mind so largely to Fifth Column activities, made a radical change in the situation. The people of this country were not able to realize the great distinction between our position and the position of Holland and Belgium. Holland, for example, had a treaty with Germany, whereby they could not refuse the admission of any German, and I am told that something like 300,000 Germans had come into Holland shortly before the act of aggression. Moreover, the public did not realize that those countries were at peace with Germany, and were only too anxious to appease Germany at the time that these disasters took place.

The military reasons were described as follows:

For the first time we were faced with an enemy in possession of ports very close to this country. It was represented to us by the military authorities, on military grounds, that the whole of the coastal belt on the East and South-East coasts of England must be made into a protected area. Not only did they press upon us that enemy aliens, about whom we know so much, should be turned out, but they pressed upon us also that neutral aliens, about whom we know much less, should be removed. It was, in

my view, quite impossible when a policy of this kind was put forward by those responsible for the defense of the country against invasion to refuse to accept it under those circumstances.

As a result of this situation, Mr. Peake stated, it became necessary to intern all alien males. When asked why the internments were later extended, he gave four reasons:

1. The fact that a majority of the refugees were unemployed.
2. In case of serious air raids, many of these people would be in personal danger of anti-alien feeling.
3. Many of the refugees were so alarmed by hostility and suspicion shown toward them that they themselves asked to be interned.
4. The policy of internment was strongly advocated by military authorities.³⁷

6. EASEMENT OF ALIEN REGULATIONS

The period of releases from August, 1940 until the summer of 1941, was the practical result of the criticism leveled at the governmental measures by public opinion. The White Paper (Cmd. 6217) issued by the Government on July 13, 1940, in reference to Germans and Austrians belonging to Class C, enumerates 18 categories of refugees who are entitled to submit applications to the Under-Secretary of State, Aliens Department, for release from internment. The White Paper specifies that the release of a person, although falling within one of these categories, may nevertheless be refused on security grounds. The categories were as follows:

Persons under 16 years and over 65 years of age; the invalid or infirm; young persons under the age of 18 who, at the time of

³⁷Lafitte, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-163.

their internment, were resident with British families or in educational establishments; persons who, at the date of their internment, held an employment permit issued by the Aliens War-Service Department; persons who, at the time of their internment, had permission from the proper authorities to remain in an Aliens Protected Area; persons who occupied key positions in industries engaged in work of national importance; skilled workers engaged in agriculture, commercial food-growing, or forestry; scientists, research workers, and persons of academic distinction for whom work in their special field was available; doctors of medicine and dentists authorized by the Secretary of State to exercise their professions in England; doctors and dentists who had permission to study in England for British degrees and who were pursuing their studies to that end; persons who were honorably discharged from the service in His Majesty's Forces; persons engaged in refugee-aid organizations, which were still functioning, whose absence might hinder the work of these organizations; persons who were employers of at least 12 British employees in works or factories engaged in work officially certified to be of value to the community, if it could be shown that the business would have to close down unless the alien was released from internment; parents of a British-born or naturalized son serving in the British armed forces; ministers of religion, if holding a spiritual charge, except ministers of a German church; persons about to embark for emigration overseas; and special cases of extreme hardship, *e.g.*, where a parent, wife, or child was dangerously ill.

In August, 1940, eligibility for release was extended to certain Class B aliens; furthermore, a 19th category was created referring to "any person as to whom a Tribunal, appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose, reports that enough is known of his history to show that by his writings or speeches or political or official activity he has consistently, over a period of

years, taken a public and prominent part in opposition to the Nazi system and is actively friendly to the Allied cause."³⁸

On October 21, 1940, when Herbert Morrison had succeeded Sir John Anderson as Home Secretary, three more categories (20-22) were added, to wit: "persons of eminent distinction" in the field of art, science, learning or letters; students qualified in a specified way; and "any person as to whom a Tribunal, appointed by the Secretary for the purpose, reports that he has, since his early childhood, or for at least 20 years, lived continuously, or almost continuously, in the United Kingdom; that he has long severed connection with his country of nationality; that his interests and associations are British; and that he is friendly toward this country."

An Advisory Committee was set up for the purpose of advising the Home Secretary on questions of internment policy, especially the creation of new categories eligible for release. The chairman of this committee was Sir Cyril Asquith, an eminent judge, and its members were Sir Herbert Emerson and Sir Neill Malcolm (respectively the last and the next to the last League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). At the recommendation of this committee, a new category was added on November 26, 1941, "providing for the release of men who, by reason of age or physical unfitness ineligible for the Pioneer Corps, can satisfy a tribunal that they are opposed to the Nazi or Fascist systems, that they are positively friendly toward the Allied cause, and that they will remain steadfast toward that cause in all circumstances."³⁹

Besides the committee, there was set up an Advisory Council which was attached to the Refugee Department of the Foreign Office. It consisted of Lord Lytton, chairman; Sir H. Emerson,

³⁸See revised White Paper, Cmd. 6321 and Cmd. 6223.

³⁹Koessler, *loc. cit.*, p. 108 ff.; *Sozialistische Mitteilungen*, August 15, 1940; Bentwich, *loc. cit.*, pp. 45-46; Lafitte, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

vice-chairman; Mr. H. W. Butcher, M.P.; Lord Cranborne, M.P.; Mr. P. J. Noel-Baker, M.P.; Mr. Neil MacLean, M.P.; Sir Neill Malcolm; Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P.; the Marchioness of Reading; Mr. H. U. Willinck, M.P.; Lord Winterton, M.P.; and Lord Wolmer, M.P.

The functions of the Advisory Council, as stated by the Foreign Office, were:

(a) To suggest measures for maintaining the morale of aliens in this country so as to bind them more closely to our common cause;

(b) To revise and if necessary to suggest measures for the coordination to that end of the work of the various refugee committees and other voluntary organizations concerned with aliens in this country;

(c) To maintain contact with the various Government departments having responsibilities in connection with refugees and other classes of aliens and with foreign Governments or National Committees established in this country;

(d) To advise and assist the Home Office in the arrangements made for the welfare of enemy aliens in internment camps;

(e) To study and make recommendations upon the problem of finding occupations for enemy aliens in internment camps.⁴⁰

Following the appearance of the first White Paper, Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P., who for years has taken great interest in the refugees, sharply criticized it in a letter to the Editor of the *Manchester Guardian*. In view of the fact that this criticism is of extraordinary importance on moral grounds, we give the letter in full, especially as its strictures coincide with those of many other "Letters to the Editor:"

⁴⁰*Manchester Guardian*, September 8, 1940; Lafitte, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

Sir,—The White Paper on internees issued on Thursday in effect assumes the policy of “intern the lot” and adds to it “and release as few as possible.” It achieves this, not so much by the rigid terms of its categories, as these may be extended later by the Advisory Committee which has been set up, but by laying down a procedure calculated to secure that only a few of the few nominally entitled to release will actually achieve it. This is so because the initiative has to be taken and the matter pushed through by those who, either from lack of power or from lack of time and energy, are not likely—save exceptionally—to push it through effectively.

All the natural friends of the internees—the refugee organizations which brought them to this country and maintained them here, the committees and individuals who in Parliament and the press have interested themselves in the problem, even their wives and hostesses and medical attendants, are not merely ignored but implicitly barred out from intervention. Hence one may infer that if they do make appeals, these will be pigeonholed and ignored, as, indeed, has happened, except in a few cases of successful “gate-crashing,” during the past months since the internment camps were set up. If so the only course left open to these people will be to make their own pleas known by the methods of press publicity and Parliamentary questioning. Is this really desired or desirable? This criticism applies especially to the two most important groups—namely, category 3, “the invalid and infirm,” and categories 4, 5, 6, and 7, applying to those whose claims are based on the value of their work to the national effort. Consider how the procedure laid down will work out for these.

In the case of the invalid and infirm “no application for release is required.” The matter is left to the medical officer of the camp, who, if he thinks release necessary, will certify ac-

cordingly, and release will follow "provided that arrangements have been made for his (the internee's) accommodation and treatment elsewhere. (How the Home Office will satisfy itself on this latter point is not specified.) But who is to be the medical officer entrusted with this responsibility? Is it to be the same man, usually an R.A.M.C. officer, often of junior rank, who may for many weeks have had in his care numerous men suffering from the worst diseases (angina pectoris, diabetes, cancer, tuberculosis, acute arthritis) in a camp unequipped with the most elementary provisions necessary for the treatment of such diseases yet apparently has been unable to secure either the necessary equipment or the release? What assurance have we that it will be different in the future?

If such internees instead of being released are (as usually hitherto) sent to hospitals within or connected with the camp, what sort of hospitals? Will the man's relatives be able to visit him there, and under what conditions? Hitherto, the camp medical officer has often been aided by highly qualified medical internees. But many of these come themselves within a category entitled to release. And the extent to which they are used depends on the goodwill of the commandant and the M.O. himself.

In the case of internees entitled to release on the grounds of their employment the initiative is left to the internee's previous employer. But these, being in every case firms or individuals engaged in work of great importance to the war effort, are obviously exceedingly busy men. In many cases the internee has been lost to them for many weeks. Probably his place has been filled somehow, though perhaps less satisfactorily. Will the employer, unless stimulated from outside, take the necessary steps to apply to the authority stipulated, which may be, according to the category, the Home Office, the Divisional Con-

troller of the Ministry of Labor, the Government department concerned with the firm's work, the War Agricultural Executive Committee, or the Forestry Commission? And if he does apply, how much delay will there be before these overburdened bodies deal with the application?

Suppose the employer does fail to take action, either from lack of energy or because the internee's job has been filled; is his skill to be lost to the nation although other employers may be urgently in need of such men? Against this waste of talent the White Paper makes no provision whatever. The application must come from the previous employer. Or suppose the employer does want the man, but for work in a specially protected area from which all aliens are normally excluded. Will the internee be permitted to enter it?

This last point applies to category 9 (doctors and dentists permitted to practise in the United Kingdom). If their practices or hospital appointments are in protected areas, will they be released either to resume them or be helped to practise elsewhere? The long delays may have already resulted in ruining the hard-won opportunities of these men and women.

Except in the case of "scientists, research workers, and persons of academic distinction for whom work of national importance in their special fields is available" (category 8), and "employers of British employees numbering at least 12 persons" (category 14), no provision is made for men who are themselves employers or single-handed workers. Yet may there not be internees outside these two categories whose work is worth preserving?

The last paragraph of the White Paper reads:

"Except where otherwise stated, application for release should be made by the internee, and every facility will be given by the authorities for this purpose."

Yet "no special form of application is provided." Why not? Why should not the internee, in his own interest and that of overpressed departments, be supplied with a questionnaire on which every necessary particular can be entered in the most concise yet complete form? And if the case is one where application should come from some person other than the internee—that is to say, from the employer—will the internee be allowed and helped to communicate quickly with that person, asking him to take the necessary steps?

ELEANOR RATHBONE.⁴¹

A certain balance for the past period of internments and the work of the Advisory Committee is struck by Sir Neill Malcolm in the periodical *Britain Today*, published by the British Library of Information in New York, wherein he admits the mistakes made and dwells upon the refugees deported to the Dominions. We quote:

By far the most intricate complication is, however, that which has arisen in consequence of the hasty transportation of some 7,000 enemy aliens, most of whom are again refugees, to the Dominions. Other mistakes, those made in this country, are comparatively easy to rectify, but not those which involved a voyage of thousands of miles without records and even without any sort of identification papers. As Sir John Anderson said, mistakes were made, but all were the result not of ill will, but of haste. Families were often broken up, one member being sent to Australia, another to Canada, and a third left in this country. In any circumstances the difficulty of reunion would have been very great. Now it is rendered still greater by lack of shipping. But I must make it quite clear that nowhere is there any lack of good will.

⁴¹*Manchester Guardian*, August 9, 1940.

Yes, it is true that there have been grave mistakes, but in all fairness I would ask whether there is any other country which in time of war would allow thousands of enemy (even if only technically enemy) aliens to remain at large within its borders. Not only are they at large, but many of them, as well as the internees, are cared for at the public expense, at a cost which, even in these days of astronomical budgets, amounts to no mean figure.

We have made mistakes, of that there can be no doubt. We are fighting for our lives under incredibly difficult conditions, and calm consideration by fair-minded judges must show that we have, on the whole, acted with generosity, and without vindictiveness.⁴²

The release of the refugees transported to Canada and Australia met with difficulties, since the Dominion Governments, except in a few cases, were unwilling to let them stay in their country as free men. As late as the summer of 1941, only 1,500 had been returned; and although many thousands were to be released under the new British regulations, they were still awaiting transportation back to England.⁴³

On November 26, 1941, Home Secretary Herbert Morrison stated in the House of Commons that Class B women were about to be released, and that a committee was conducting an investigation on the Isle of Man where the women were interned. According to Morrison, it was the men who were friendly to the Allied cause, but who did not come under any of the categories established by the White Paper, who constituted the main problem. The Asquith Committee (as the Advisory Committee was commonly known)

⁴²Excerpt from an article, "The Alien Problem," by Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm in *Britain Today*, December 13, 1940.

⁴³Bentwich, *loc. cit.*, p. 47.

estimated that it would take ten tribunals, working for almost a year, to ascertain the loyalty of these persons.

According to Morrison, many people had already been released, while the release of others was imminent. "Among those not accepted for enlistment in the Pioneer Corps there may be men whose hearts are on our side, and yet they cannot prove their loyalty. I can only say that it is humanly impossible to find a completely satisfactory method of searching human hearts. If these people must remain in the internment camps, it is not due to lack of sympathy for their predicament, but to the urgent necessity in time of war to regard the question of security as paramount."⁴⁴

The following illustrates the progress of the releases:

Date	Released
By Sept. 17, 1940.....	2,516
By Oct. 5, 1940.....	4,603
By Oct. 15, 1940.....	5,200
By Dec. 5, 1940.....	7,800
By Jan. 22, 1941.....	10,130
By Feb. 13, 1941.....	11,113
By June 26, 1941.....	16,694

By July 23, 1942, the total number of aliens of enemy nationality interned, including those interned in Canada and Australia, was 7,849. The release of 402 Germans and Italians was authorized during the first six months of 1943. During the preceding six months, the number of releases amounted to 615.⁴⁵

7. FINANCIAL AID TO REFUGEES BY THE GOVERNMENT

Following the outbreak of the war, the British Government began to extend financial help to refugees, realizing that private relief organizations could not carry the burden alone.

⁴⁴*Sozialistische Mitteilungen*, No. 20, December, 1940.

⁴⁵Statement by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons, on Oct. 27, 1943, *Official Report*, Col. 202.

At the end of 1939, the Government, anxious that the refugees should not become a charge on the local assistance funds and thus arouse public resentment, granted subsidies to the refugee-aid bodies to cover an important part of the cost of maintaining the refugees in the country.

The policy of general internment aggravated the burden, assistance having to be extended to families of arrested male "breadwinners." At the end of 1940, the British Government undertook to make a financial contribution during the war equal to the entire amount required for the maintenance of the refugees, at the rate paid to British unemployed, and three quarters of the expenditure on administration, welfare work, and emigration. Up to June, 1941, the total sum granted by the Government was £770,000, more than double the amount raised by the refugee bodies.⁴⁶

It is important to note that, commencing January, 1941, the monthly average of the Government's contributions started to decline, owing to the steady increase in the number of employment permits granted to German and Austrian refugees and to the absorption of refugees into various phases of the national war effort.

8. PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFFORT

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the British Government undertook to use alien manpower for the war effort. Public opinion, as reflected in the leading newspapers, was all in favor of it. Thus, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "But one thing is certain, almost without exception these refugees are anxious to do all they can to help the country which has given them shelter. Many of them are eager to fight and have the qualifications which make the offer of their services more than simply a gesture of gratitude.

⁴⁶Bentwich, *loc. cit.*, p. 48.

Others have special knowledge—industrial or medical—which they have so far been unable to make use of, owing to the conditions under which they were granted asylum. To waste so much talent and eagerness would be folly.”⁴⁷

In many “Letters to the Editor” attention was called to the scientific attainments of the refugees and it was increasingly urged that the services of 50,000 people be not permitted to remain unused.⁴⁸

Regulation 58A of the Defence,⁴⁹ gave to the Minister of Labor the power to “direct into suitable employment persons of any foreign nationality in the same way as he can direct British subjects.”

Although the majority of refugees had been admitted to Great Britain on condition that they would not engage in any kind of gainful work without special permission, over 10,000 labor permits were issued to persons of German and Austrian nationality (65% to women, 25% to men, and 10% to youths) during the first few months of 1940.

On August 1, 1940, Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labor, announced:

I have decided, with a view to organizing the man-power of the Allied nations and of other well-disposed persons of foreign nationality in this country to set up an International Labor Branch, as part of the Employment Department of my Ministry. This branch will have its headquarters at a separate office in London. The staff will include persons able to speak the languages of the countries concerned, and I am confidently expecting to secure the cooperation of representatives of the

⁴⁷*Manchester Guardian*, September 1, 1939.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, “Alien Scientists in Britain,” Sept. 5, 1939; “German Refugees, Should We Not Make Use of Them?”, June 14, 1940.

⁴⁹General Regulations, 1939, S. R. & O., 1939, No. 927.

different nations in making a success of this new organization. In particular, I hope to have the advice and assistance of an advisory committee, including trade union representatives from foreign countries. It is my hope that we shall thus get valuable assistance in establishing the *bona fides* of well-disposed foreigners and in bringing sympathetic consideration to bear on individual cases. It will be part of the functions of the new International Labor Branch to obtain full knowledge of the persons available for employment and to seek suitable openings for them in industrial or other work. . . .

I am extremely short of skilled men at present, and in utilizing the skill and ability of a number of these men, I shall actually be putting Britishers to work.

I shall have nothing to do with the people who are interned. The question of release is one for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. My duty will begin when he has completed his, and has passed them on to me to utilize their services. . . . I do not propose to use the term "aliens" or "refugees." As far as this part of the work is concerned, it is my intention to call them, once they are passed on to me from the Security Department, the International Labor Force, and neither aliens nor refugees.⁵⁰

The total mobilization of manpower took a great stride forward with the compulsory registration of aliens for industrial service carried out in August, 1941.

A review of those registered under the International Labor Force Registration Orders, 1941, taken shortly after registration, showed that 82.5% of the men and 60% of the women were then employed, the majority in work of general utility, and a considerable number in the production of munitions and military sup-

⁵⁰364 Commons 379.

plies. The incorporation of aliens into the country's industries was thus inaugurated. The *New York Times* carried this report about it:

All foreign civilians in Britain—something like a quarter of a million—friendly and enemy-country aliens who have not been interned, have been called upon by Ernest Bevin, Minister of Home Security, to “do their bit in the war for the country whose hospitality they enjoy.”

German, Italian, French, Belgian, Dutch, Czecho-Slovakian, Norwegian, Polish and Austrian nationals have been compelled to register for industrial service. Men between 16 and 65 years of age, and women between 16 and 50, will have to work either in munition factories or on the land. Germans, Austrians and Italians number about 60,000.

Many were already engaged in essential work. The rest are being combed out and trained for war work.

As far as possible, aliens will work in nationals groups, and they will receive the same wages and work under the same conditions as British subjects.⁵¹

The more refugees were released, the more labor permits were issued. Despite the policy of internment, 2,000 labor permits were issued monthly in 1940, and 3,300 in the first half of 1941.

Since 1941, the British Government has found it possible to increase the opportunities open to aliens to engage in war work, and the number of those still unemployed is negligible. It includes mostly persons who, by reason of health, inability to speak English or unadaptability by reason of previous occupation, are well-nigh unemployable.⁵² An interesting picture of this period is given by Norman Bentwich, who writes:

⁵¹*New York Times*, July 13, 1941.

⁵²*Butterworth's Emergency Legislation Service*, (2) “Aliens: Preliminary Note.”

In August, 1941, the Government instituted a general registration of adult aliens with a view to their employment in the war effort. Soon afterwards, the procedure for obtaining permits for the employment of friendly aliens in war industries was greatly simplified and the absorption of skilled men and women in these industries has gone on steadily. The young persons, and the old persons also, amongst the refugees were admitted freely into the government training schemes. Professional men, lawyers, journalists, artists and the like were trained in these centers to be workers in skilled and semi-skilled mechanical employments. At the same time, the engagement of the refugee medical doctors and dentists, who numbered altogether 1,300, was facilitated. An administrative order, issued early in 1941, allowed their employment in hospitals and clinics, although they had not obtained an English medical qualification. It took some time before the order became effective for the large majority. But as more of the English medical profession were called up for the armed forces and for service in the civil defense, openings for the alien doctors were created. By the end of 1941 at least two-thirds of the 1,300 will be in employment.⁵³

The result of the new policy toward aliens may best be seen from the following item printed in the *Bulletin from Britain*:

When Hitler made war on all those who disagreed with his regime, he drove out of Germany to refuge in Britain a high percentage of men capable of hitting back by giving aid to the Allied cause.

These friendly "enemies," for whom an Allied victory means the recovery of all they cherish most, are to be found in every branch of the nation's war machine. Their service for

⁵³Bentwich, *loc. cit.*, pp. 49-50; see also *Sozialistische Mitteilungen*, No. 22, February, 1942.

democracy is varied, but most important of all is that done by those who hold key positions in Britain's secret war laboratories. For many months now their special skill has been used to devise new and terrible weapons for the fights against the men who robbed them of all they had.

It is, indeed, a strange sidelight on this war that British science, medicine (nearly 600 "enemy" doctors are now working in the army and navy, Government services and private practice), literature, art and music have all been enriched by new blood which has come from the European part of the Axis.

Britain's Ministry of Labor has completed an official industrial checkup of all the well-disposed "enemy" aliens—Italians, Germans and Austrians—in every part of the country.

The high percentage of these 70,000 "enemies," who are engaged in front-line war work in British factories, and in the services, may have surprised even the authorities; for this was the first occasion on which the Government had conducted an official quiz into the professional activities of these men and women.

It was found that less than five percent of the refugees under the age of 40 were out of work.

Alien women are wearing the khaki of Britain's "women's soldiers"—the Auxiliary Territorial Service; the Air Force blue of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force; and the dark blue of the Women's Royal Naval Service. A number already hold the King's Commission.

Other non-British women are taking their turn at the wheels of the ambulance fleets, while many more are serving with the largest feminine war corps in the world—composed chiefly of housewives—the million strong Women's Voluntary Services.

There are friendly "enemy" girls and women who, after spending their preliminary period of intensive instruction at

one of the Government's engineering training centers, have been drafted into tank factories, aircraft plants and munition works.

They can be found at work on the production benches side by side with the broad-vowelled Lancashire lasses, spritly London Cockneys and the Midland wives whose men for generations have served Britain's heavy industries in the glare of the blast furnaces and the white heat of molten steel.

It is equally strange that much of the havoc caused in London has been cleaned up by hundreds of Hitler's fellow countrymen wearing the battle dress of the Pioneer Corps, which does much of the Army's spade work. Many of the members of the Corps, who were loaned by the Army to clean up London's bomb damage, were Iron Cross veterans of the last Great War who fought Britain and her Allies on the battlefields of France and Flanders.

As the war progresses, these 70,000 men and women in the van of the battle are daily proving how great was the mistake Hitler made when he drove them into the arms of Britain.⁵⁴

The British Broadcasting Company makes use of German refugees in the extremely important war of propaganda against Germany. Others are doing research work in the libraries, gathering material to be used on the radio or in leaflets. Propaganda is rightly regarded in England as vital for the war strategy. Such propaganda can be successfully carried on only if experts are available who know the nations this propaganda seeks to influence. It was suggested that a research department be set up, since "such a research could enable British propaganda to become what it should be, the newspaper of the secret army of the illegal fighters against nazism and fascism."⁵⁵

⁵⁴*Bulletin from Britain*, No. 89, May 13, 1942, p. 11.

⁵⁵An Englishman, *How to Win the War*, p. 99.

The trend indicated in the foregoing quotations has continued ever since. The number of interned aliens has steadily declined and, as of May 1943, did not exceed 300. Thus the tragic situation of June, 1940, has changed completely. The staunchest foes of Adolf Hitler and all he stands for are the recognized allies of England, their efforts no longer hampered by any formalities of citizenship or other red tape.

The same policy has been applied in regard to the incorporation of the refugees in the military effort of Great Britain.

The refugee-aid organization of the German Social Democrats in Great Britain, in its news bulletin of February 16, 1940, called upon the refugees to enroll in the Pioneer Corps. "Hundreds of German, Austrian, and Czechoslovakian refugees have already joined the British Pioneer Corps," it was stated in this fiery appeal. No opportunity was overlooked, both at meetings of refugees and in their publications, to have the refugees enlist in the military bodies into which the British admitted them.

In a radio talk, the commanding officer of the Pioneer Corps of the British Army, which consists mainly of former inmates of Austrian and German concentration camps, gave the following account of the conduct of the Pioneer Corps companies:

There are no finer workers in the Pioneer Corps of the British Army today than our alien companies. They are ranked among the happiest and the best disciplined men in the service.

The reason for this is as interesting as it is true. All these men have come through the hell of concentration camps. They have undergone incredible tortures individually, they have suffered indignities too appalling to mention here.

In the Pioneer Corps these fellows have not only regained their freedom, but what is of far greater importance to them, their self-respect. The manner in which they carry out their army duties proves their gratitude to this country.

I served with this company in France, and I was more than very proud of it. Its reputation out there was second to none, and in rejoining it as I have done recently, I am glad to know that its reputation overseas has been fully maintained since it returned to this country.⁵⁶

Alfred Werner, who was at Kitchener Camp in Kent when the refugee Pioneer Corps companies were formed, reports to the same effect. Dr. Cosmo Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Lieutenant Colonel Marquess of Reading, a Jew, visited Kitchener Camp in order to invite the refugees to join the Pioneer Corps. Said the Archbishop: "It will be a great thing when we in this country can look upon you not only as refugees whom we have been glad to welcome but also as fellow workers in a common cause in which we all share."⁵⁷ Mr. Werner gives the following instructive picture of the part played by the refugees:

Some of us, of course, did not feel that we should join the army, since our relatives, still living under Nazi rule, would certainly suffer as a result. Others wanted to join their families in the United States, and still others were physically unfit. But many enthusiastically answered Lord Reading's appeal, especially those who had been prisoners at the concentration camps at Dachau, Sachsenhausen or Buchenwalde.

I thus witnessed the gradual transformation of our civilian camp into a military post, with English and refugee sergeants drilling the men. In January, 1940, the first company left for "somewhere in France," and we saw them off at tiny Sandwich Railway Station. When I left England, shortly before the "Blitzkrieg" began, five AMPC companies had already arrived in France. . . .

⁵⁶*Aufbau*, January 10, 1941.

⁵⁷Alfred Werner, "Refugees Fight for Allies," *The National Jewish Monthly*, April, 1942, p. 246.

Through a friend newly arrived from England, I learned the inside story of the Jewish legion's narrow escape. At the very last minute, when the Belgian army surrendered, rifles and pistols were distributed among the Jewish pioneers. But there was no time to teach them to shoot, for when the Nazi pincers closed, the triangle around Dunkirk shrank from hour to hour.

If ever a retreat can be called "glorious," it was this withdrawal of 350,000 Tommies and thousands of Poles, Belgians, Czechs, Jews—who were shipped to England despite incessant attacks from land and air. Marching on the flanks, the Jewish pioneers engaged in hand-to-hand fights with the German outposts several times. But they defeated the Nazis in all skirmishes, making use of two or three light machine guns they had captured. They were praised by the Tommies, and of course some of them lost their lives on the blood-soaked soil of Belgium.

. . . In November, 1940, some 4,200 German and Austrian refugees, most of them Jewish, were in the Military Auxiliary Pioneer Corps. . . . At present, most of the pioneers are busy clearing up the debris left in London and other cities by German bombing. The British military authorities are so grateful for the high quality of their "alien" soldiers, that recently, for the first time in all of English history, the King's Commission was granted to a refugee—a man who had taken part in the evacuation from Dunkirk was accorded the rank of second lieutenant after having undergone British officer training.⁵⁸

On July 10, 1940, Col. Arthur Evans (M.P. for Cardiff South) described in Parliament what the refugees under his command did when the *Blitzkrieg* swept over Northern France:

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

It happened not many weeks ago that I had the honor to command a force of some 6,000 men, known as the Defence Brigade, and I had in the force two such companies [of refugees] each 281 strong, roughly 600 men. When we were ordered to take a position in the line these men were not armed. They were composed largely of professional men . . . and there was a certain percentage of technical and experienced artisans. We were very hard up for men at the time, and I decided to arm those men 100 percent on the spot. I issued them with 50 rounds of ammunition per man. I am pleased to say that they conducted themselves in a manner worthy of the best traditions of the British Army. Within a few hours, and certainly in less than two days, not only did they learn to load their rifles and handle them, but they were manning machine-guns and anti-tank rifles at the side of the road and at points, and were prepared to meet and to deal with any armored vehicle column that came along in their vicinity.⁵⁹

It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Peake, Under-Secretary for the Home Department, declared in Parliament on the same day: "*I should like to pay my tribute to the behavior of these refugees in that they have shown themselves worthy of the confidence which we placed in them.*"⁶⁰

It is significant that, by a regulation dated July 3, 1942, aliens, members of His Majesty's Forces (or those who have been honorably discharged) were declared "not deemed to be aliens for the purpose of the Aliens Order."⁶¹ By order of January 18, 1943, "Any alien member of His Majesty's Forces, released from active military duty," was declared "exempt from the provisions of any order, not relating solely to an individual alien, . . . other than

⁵⁹Lafitte, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁶¹Article 22 (2), Aliens Order, (S. R. & O. 42, No. 1367).

those requiring him to obtain permission from the Minister of Labor and National Service before taking an employment."⁶²

Many hundreds of refugees from Germany and Austria have joined fighting units of the British Army. Many of them were members of the Pioneer Corps until, in the middle of 1943, a new policy was adopted by the War Office as a result of which refugees eager to serve in *combatant units* could be transferred or enlist directly. Several Pioneer companies have consequently been disbanded.

The units in which the refugees are now serving include the Royal Tank Corps, the Royal Engineers, and the Infantry. Quite a number of Germans and Austrians have received commissions; there are even two lieutenant colonels.⁶³

Great Britain has continued to receive alien refugees after the outbreak of the war. Speaking in the House of Commons on May 19, 1943, Mr. Peake, the Undersecretary of State for the Home Department, declared that, during 1941 and 1942, some 63,000 refugees had been admitted to Great Britain. This figure did not include the large number of British refugees from the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, and elsewhere. He further reported that, in the first four months of 1943, 4,000 refugees had arrived in England, of whom 129 were Jews.⁶⁴

⁶²S. R. & O. 43, No. 94.

⁶³*News from Hitler's Europe*, November 23, 1943.

⁶⁴389 Commons 1123/4.

CHAPTER VIII

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT

E. U.S.S.R.

Introductory—Influx of Polish War Refugees—Numbers, Distribution, and Categories of Polish Jewish Refugees—Controversy Over Citizenship of Jewish Refugees—Refugee-Aid Activities of the Polish Embassy in U.S.S.R.—Russo-Polish Diplomatic Break and End of Polish Government's Relief Work in Soviet Union

1. INTRODUCTORY

The third great European country, after France and Great Britain, which has played a most important part as a haven for refugees is the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It differs from the other two in the order of its appearance in the rôle of host to those seeking refuge.

While both France and England admitted rather considerable numbers of refugees immediately after the advent of the Nazi regime in Germany and continued to do so until the outbreak of the war and even afterwards, the Soviet Union was practically without any importance in this respect before the war.

In justification of this policy of virtual exclusion, spokesmen for Soviet Russia cited the unfavorable occupational makeup of the German refugees and their capitalistic education which might complicate their absorption into the economy of the country. Besides, the Russian Government regarded the refugee problem as a result of the present social order, for which the capitalistic governments ought to assume full responsibility. The fact that Russia had not been invited to the Evian Conference, and that the leaders

of the Jewish people had never approached the Soviet authorities about admitting Jewish refugees into Russia, was advanced as another reason for her not taking any interest in the problem.¹ The Soviet Government declared that, inasmuch as it had not taken part in the negotiation of the international agreements concerning the refugees, it felt obliged to make a general reservation in regard to them.²

2. INFLUX OF POLISH REFUGEES

The situation changed radically during the war. As soon as the western provinces of Poland were overrun by the Germans and hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees began to stream from there to the Russian-occupied eastern part of the country, they were all admitted without any difficulty by the Russian authorities. It was not until a few weeks later that the border was closed, but in the meantime some three hundred thousand refugees had gained entrance, a figure surpassing considerably the number of refugees admitted by any other country. The Soviet authorities not only admitted those refugees, but sought to help them by providing them with food and sending many of them as workers to the interior of the country. In general the refugees were not hampered in their movements; they were allowed to settle wherever they chose in the newly-occupied territories.

As related in Chapter III of this book, a sudden reversal of this policy occurred in 1940. Tens of thousands of refugees were arrested and deported for forced labor in remote parts of the Soviet Union. This move was of a transitory character, however. As a result of the Sikorski-Molotov agreement concluded in July,

¹Theodore Bayer, "The Jewish Refugee Problem," *Soviet Russia Today*, January 1939, p. 24. See also the spirited reply of Leon Baratz, "Le problème des réfugiés juifs en l'U.S.S.R.," in *La Juste Parole*, July 5, 1939, pp. 16-19.

²League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted by the Sixth Committee to the Assembly, October 9, 1936*.

1941, shortly after the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities, nearly all the deportees who were Polish nationals were released. In the meantime, however, there began a new influx of refugees into Soviet territory, first from Rumania into the newly-occupied province of Bessarabia, and then from the German-occupied territories of the Soviet Union (including the new Soviet republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), as well as from the regions occupied by the Rumanians. Tens of thousands of Polish Jewish refugees had to flee now for the second time, being accompanied by the Jewish inhabitants of the former eastern provinces of Poland and the Baltic countries, as well as by Soviet citizens, who fled from the occupied areas to the interior of their own country. It is impossible to state the exact size of this mass flight. In general it is assumed that the number of Polish refugees evacuated to the interior of the Soviet Union was between 350,000 to 500,000; the number of evacuated Jews from the Baltic States is estimated at 100,000 to 125,000, while the number of Soviet citizens proper evacuated to the interior of their country may have been close to 1,200,000 men, women, and children. Altogether, then, a refugee population ranging from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000.

3. NUMBER, DISTRIBUTION, AND CATEGORIES OF POLISH JEWISH REFUGEES

No official documents concerning Polish refugees in the Soviet Union have so far been published either by the Polish or by the Soviet Government. The Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev succeeded in registering over 270,000 refugees assisted by it; but this number cannot be taken as representing the total number of Polish refugees on Soviet territory, who were probably far more numerous than those who received refugee aid from the Polish Embassy. Of those registered by the latter, almost 40 percent (to be exact, 39.3%) were Jews, but all figures relating to Jewish fugitives

from Poland should be taken as only approximately true. There was practically no possibility of compiling exact statistical data concerning the Polish Jewish refugees. It happened very often that the Soviet authorities demanded of the representatives of the Polish Embassy that they furnish them with data specifying the nationality and creed of the registered Polish citizens. In view of the acute controversy over the citizenship of Poland's national minorities, however, any statement as to nationality and religion might have meant for the people concerned having their Polish citizenship challenged by the Russian authorities, and being prevented from benefiting by the help extended by the Polish Embassy. Accordingly, the representatives of the Embassy throughout the Soviet Union were generally instructed not to register such data at all. That is why the figures concerning Jewish refugees are based mostly on superficial observations (such as surnames and even first names). In some districts, however, statistics were compiled notwithstanding the aforesaid precautions.

With due allowance for the situation just described, the following figures on registered Polish Jewish refugees in the U.S.S.R. are worth quoting:

Region	Total Number of Polish refugees	Number of Jews	Percentage of Jews
South*	90,249	69,289	76.7
Kazakhstan	56,991	7,606	13.3
Siberia	71,444	12,187	17.2
European Russia	46,817	15,520	33.4
	<hr/> 265,501	<hr/> 104,602	<hr/> 39.4

*The term "South" used in this table refers to the region covered by the Usbek, Tadjik, Turkmen and Kirghiz Republics and the southern areas of the Kazakh Republic; i.e., Alma-Ata, Djambul, Southern Kazakhstan, and Kzyl-Orda Districts.

It may be advisable to add more detailed figures concerning the South where the number of Polish Jewish refugees, as well as their percentage when compared with the total number of Polish refugees, was largest.

Area, country or Republic	No. of Dis- tricts	Total Polish citizens	No. & % of Jews	Men	Women	Children	Unfit for work
Kzyl-Orda	3	2759	2370—86%	1329	1030	400	308
S. Kazakhstan.....	16	11315	6450—57	4370	4342	2603	1738
Djambul	7	15817	11090—70	7315	5430	3072	1916
Dzhalal-Abad ..	6	3667	2899—79	2074	1047	546	449
Osh	10	4778	3640—76	2105	1655	1018	482
Frunze	11	4910	3585—73	2505	1326	1079	371
Alma-Ata	9	5450	4360—80	2736	1899	788	615
Mari	1	1180	708—60	900	200	80	90
Chardzhou	9	520	416—80	203	257	60	12
Karakalpak	9	1396	488—35	597	397	420	193
Khorezm	8	1765	617—35	653	690	422	78
Bukhara	22	8029	7200—90	3722	2717	1590	1190
Samarkand	18	11512	10350—90	5977	3370	2265	851
Tashkent	9	3991	3592—90	1746	1337	908	340
Sukhandariisk ..	3	396	218—55	183	154	59	20
Stalinabad	13	897	744—83	415	281	201	907
Leninabad	6	2013	1693—85	1053	635	325	259
Ferghana	14	5601	5041—90	3170	1609	822	590
Namangan	10	1931	1738—90	886	584	481	300
Andizhan	13	2322	2090—90	1074	888	560	276
Total	194	90249	69289—77%	43013	29848	17699	10985
<i>Percentages:</i>				49.4	3.28	18.5	12.1

Very characteristic is the disproportion between the number of men and women, as well as children, shown in the foregoing table. Women are not much more than half and children much less than half when compared with the number of men. Whether this was because more men than women or children succeeded in escaping from Nazi-occupied territories, or whether men managed to survive in greater numbers under the extremely difficult conditions of life in the U.S.S.R. in those years, is a problem still to be investigated. The possibility is not excluded that more men than women and children were concentrated in the South because of the

fact that the Polish Army was mobilized in the southern districts of Russia and many men rushed there from the northern provinces in the hope of being admitted into the Polish Army and getting evacuated from Russia.

As stated before, this registration by the Polish Embassy cannot be considered complete; but it is almost impossible to find other more reliable sources. According to a report submitted to the Jewish Agency for Palestine and to the World Jewish Congress in September, 1942, by a competent investigator who spent five weeks in Iran, studying from that vantage point the situation of the refugees in Russia, there are, besides people registered by the Polish authorities, "anywhere from two to three hundred and fifty thousand Jewish refugees scattered throughout the length and breadth of Russia; the exact number cannot be established." The report states:

These Jewish refugees fall into three categories, viz:

1. Those who were deported to outposts so remote from any community or center that they do not even bear place names but are simply designated as Labor Station No. So-and-So. Some of these are located in the tundras of Northeastern Siberia, where the refugees are employed at woodcutting. The approach to these places is a several months' journey from the nearest railroad station. Mail is delivered at irregular intervals by plane. Those of the refugees who have come to Teheran led such an isolated life that they can report only about their own labor stations, having no information whatever about any of the other stations, even those which were only a few score kilometers away. Under such conditions, it is obviously impossible to ascertain the exact number of refugees in these stations. Some put the number at 50,000; others believe it is twice and even thrice that figure. There are also large numbers of refugees at work in those areas of Asiatic and European Russia which are

closed to outsiders as a wartime precaution. These labor stations are, for the most part, concentrated in the Ural districts and only stray bits of information have leaked out about the situation of the refugees there. It is rumored that more than half of them have perished.

2. It is impossible to estimate the number of those who joined the Red Army upon the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. After a few months of service, these mobilized men were removed from the army and placed in semi-military labor divisions. It is believed that the majority of refugees in these militarized labor divisions are Ukrainian and Polish Jews, as the Gentile Polish refugees were not mobilized at all. . . .

3. The third category comprises those Polish Jews who adopted Soviet citizenship right after the annexation of the eastern half of Poland by Russia and of their own accord proceeded far into the interior of the Soviet Union. Since they had enrolled in the labor divisions voluntarily, the decree releasing the Poles (following the Soviet-Polish agreement) did not apply to them.

The reasons for the catastrophic condition of the refugees in Russia are summed up in the report as follows:

1. The industries of the republics in the Turkestan area are essentially of a peace-time character, with the result that war conditions have played havoc with them. Transportation facilities have deteriorated from day to day and raw materials cannot be imported. The resultant shortage of necessities hits all the local inhabitants, but is particularly hard on the refugees in that area.

2. Non-citizens are barred from the better-paying positions, such as officials, executives of industrial establishments, etc. In the matter of employment, the Polish refugees are regarded as aliens.

3. The lot of the Jewish refugees is aggravated by the fact that they do not enter the collective farms, since they are not physically fit for such work nor can their bodies stand the poor food. While the majority of non-Jewish Polish refugees went to work on the farms, the Jews, with the exception of a few hundred Chalutzim, remained in the towns. There they could find no employment owing to the influx of millions of refugees who had arrived from Russia's own occupied regions. It is also natural that, in those fields which were still open in Turkestan, priority was given to Soviet citizens.

4. Conditions in Russia are such that no man can get along on his regular income, but must supplement it with earnings on the side in fields open to citizens but barred to aliens.

At first the Jewish refugees lived largely on the proceeds from the sale of their personal effects, but this source of income has since been exhausted. These people have been accused of living by speculating in their personal effects. They have even been charged with selling the shoes and clothing distributed to them by the relief agencies. I have heard many reports about the famine and terrible housing conditions in Russia. Human beings are living in filth in stables and at the wayside. Abdominal and spotted typhus, as well as scurvy, have taken a heavy toll of the refugees. Every train, every boat which makes the two-day trip across the Caspian Sea, brings a number of corpses. I have visited the camps of the refugees who are now in Teheran, numbering about 12,000, of whom 600 are Jews. They have been here for three months now, but despite the good treatment accorded them, their faces still bear the scars of the illnesses they have undergone. Nearly all the women have shaved heads as a result of an attack of typhus. There is a good deal of dental work to be done on the refugees, as scurvy has a weakening effect on the teeth. I saw emaciated

children of 13 and 14 who looked like ten-year-olds. A large number of these children are termed "orphans." The truth of the matter is that the parents of many of these children are still alive, but have sent them to Teheran in the hope that their children, at least, will be spared starvation. After these children had been assembled in the orphanages and sent abroad, the parents who remained behind wrote pathetic letters pleading that their children be looked after and that reports of their welfare be sent back to them.

Practically all of these refugees, insofar as they are still alive (it is estimated that about 25% died in the first year of the war owing to lack of food and the extreme hardship of their life), still remain on Soviet territory. Only a few thousand, mostly soldiers, women, and children, succeeded in getting evacuated to Iran and from there to Palestine and some other countries during the first and second evacuation of Polish soldiers and their families. The Polish authorities attributed this insignificant proportion of Jews among the almost one hundred and forty thousand evacuated Poles to the attitude of the Russian authorities, who, regarding all Polish Jews on Soviet territory as Soviet nationals, allegedly had refused to have any of them evacuated from Russia. This statement, however, is disputed in the aforesaid report, as also in a second report by another reliable observer. In both reports the accusation is made that the Polish military authorities deliberately tried to prevent the departure of Jews, whereas the Russian authorities really did not interfere with the process of evacuation, approving whatever lists were submitted to them. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the number of Polish Jewish refugees who have left the Soviet Union is insignificant, and that no material change can be expected in this respect before the end of the war. As for the other Jewish refugees on Soviet territory, the possibility of their emigration

does not exist even theoretically.

4. CONTROVERSY OVER CITIZENSHIP OF POLISH JEWISH REFUGEES

The problem of the citizenship of Polish Jewish refugees in Russia, to which passing reference was made above, has to be explained at some length, as it proved to be one of the most complicated in the life of the refugees, decisively affecting both their status as well as the possibilities of organizing relief work for them. In discussing this problem, as well as the activities in aid of the refugees on Soviet territory, our remarks will be based on information contained in a report by the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev, a copy of which was forwarded to the World Jewish Congress.

Briefly, the Polish contention was that all persons who were Polish citizens in September, 1939, retained that status wherever they were and regardless of their race, nationality, origin, or creed. The Soviet attitude, on the other hand, underwent several modifications resulting from the claim of the Soviets to the eastern Polish territories occupied by them from September, 1939 until the summer of 1941. At the time of the signing of the Sikorski-Molotov agreement of July 30, 1941, and of the issuing of the amnesty decree of August 12, 1941, as well as during the first few months that followed, the Russian view seemed to coincide with the Polish standpoint. At any rate, no discrimination on the ground of nationality, creed, or race was made when the Soviet authorities first began to release Polish citizens from their various places of detention. However, on December 1, 1941, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Polish Embassy that in the future the Soviet Government would recognize as Polish citizens only persons of Polish nationality. This meant that thenceforth the Soviet Government would regard

Polish citizens of Jewish, Ukrainian, or White Russian nationality who were present in "Western Ukraine" and in "Western White Russia" (i.e., the Soviet-occupied parts of prewar Poland) on November 1 and 2, 1939, as Soviet nationals. As a result, whenever the Embassy intervened with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in behalf of Polish Jewish refugees, or whenever it wished to appoint Jews or even persons with Jewish-sounding names as its local representatives, the Soviet authorities nearly always refused to discuss the matter, maintaining that the persons in question were Soviet citizens. As a rule, they also declined to grant exit permits to any such persons even though they possessed visas for foreign countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Palestine, or India.

It should be noted that in all Soviet notes concerning this problem, the Soviet authorities included among "persons present in Western Ukraine and Western Russia on November 1 and 2, 1939" also those Poles and Jews who fled to Eastern Poland to find refuge from the horrors of the German-Polish war, but who were in fact residents of Central and Western Poland which had been occupied by Germany.

As a result of lengthy negotiations between the Polish Embassy and the Soviet Government, initiated in February, 1943, the latter finally agreed to recognize as Polish citizens all those who were not permanent residents of Eastern Poland and whose presence there was accidental. The practical consequences of this new Soviet attitude, however, never became effective for, on April 25, 1943, the U.S.S.R. severed its diplomatic relations with Poland.

These differences of opinion concerning the citizenship of Polish refugees in the U.S.S.R. strongly influenced the relief activities carried on for them, especially by the Polish Government. The official Polish relief machinery was established on the terri-

tory of the Soviet Union at the end of 1941, after an exchange of notes on December 23 and 24, 1941, between the Polish Embassy and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which finally established the "rules regulating the scope of the activities of the delegates of the Polish Embassy." In conformity with this agreement, 19 regional delegates were appointed by the Polish Embassy, each with an appropriate staff to supervise and organize the distribution of the relief goods and to exercise legal protection over Polish citizens in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. The delegates were directly responsible to the Embassy. Apart from them, local representatives were appointed from among Polish citizens in the provinces to act as intermediaries between the delegates and the individual centers with a larger Polish population.

On December 31, 1941, the Soviet Government granted the Polish Government a loan of one hundred million rubles for relief for Polish civilians. From then on it was possible to conduct the relief work with relative efficiency and the machinery built up by the Embassy for this purpose was set in motion.

However, as early as March and April, 1942, the Soviet authorities informed the Polish Embassy that it must cease intervening on behalf of Polish citizens of Jewish, Ukrainian, and White Russian nationality, as the Government of the U.S.S.R. considered these people to be Soviet citizens. Furthermore, the latter took steps to prevent such persons from occupying positions in the relief organization established by the Polish Embassy.

The number of Jews engaged in this relief work varied. While local representatives could only be appointed with the approval of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, this did not apply to the personnel of relief institutions which, therefore, included a considerable number of Jews. There were at first very few Jews among the local representatives, since the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs declined to approve their appointment. In the autumn of 1942, however, a certain change became evident in the Soviet attitude and the practical possibility arose of including a number of Jewish local representatives, especially in centers where Jews formed the majority of Polish citizens.

On April 25, 1943, out of a total of 3,847 persons serving in the Embassy's relief machinery, 1,828, or 47.5%, were Jews.

Toward the end of June, 1942, the Soviet authorities proceeded to arrest the delegates of the Embassy, although some of them possessed diplomatic status, and a certain number of local representatives. By July 20, not one delegate remained free, and the Soviet Government declared that it no longer agreed to the continuance of the Polish relief organization based on a network of delegates. This attitude on the part of the Soviet authorities seriously impaired the working of the system, which thereafter had to rely solely on the local representations of the Polish population. Most of the arrested delegates and local representatives were set free after a time, but were compelled to leave the territory of the Soviet Union. The Embassy, wishing at all costs to maintain the help accorded to Polish citizens, undertook itself to distribute the relief among the more than 400 local representatives. Though various suggestions for a new type of organization were formulated until the very last moment, conditions for bringing assistance to Polish citizens continued progressively to deteriorate and when, on April 25, 1943, the Soviet Union severed relations with Poland, all action in this sphere had to be abandoned.

5. THE REFUGEE-AID ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH EMBASSY IN U.S.S.R.

As long as the relief machinery of the Polish Embassy con-

tinued to exist, relief was administered by it in the following four ways:

- (a) Financial relief through regional networks of committees;
- (b) Direct individual relief from the Embassy;
- (c) Relief in kind;
- (d) Institutional relief (orphanages, homes for disabled persons, medical centers, kindergartens, schools, etc.)

Financial relief through regional networks of committees was the most common form employed in Russia both because it was the easiest to organize and because it was the most rapid way. It was distributed through the medium of the Embassy delegates' offices and through local representatives. These received remittances from the Embassy through the post offices or through the Russian State Bank in proportion to the number of Polish citizens in a given area and to their immediate needs. Beginning with 1942 it became the practice for delegates or local representatives to supply the Embassy with preliminary budgets which were checked by the Embassy in order to ascertain whether they complied with the general financial policy of the Embassy. Priority was always given to the needs of children with no one to care for them, to the disabled, the sick, those unfit for work, and to persons with large families. Considerable means were also granted to various relief institutions.

The value of this form of relief depended on the time when it was accorded and upon the conditions prevailing in the place to which it was sent. In some districts it was impossible to keep alive without financial assistance; in others, the absence of food on the markets rendered money worthless. But on the whole, money was indispensable for buying bread, setting up institu-

tions, obtaining medical supplies, paying for living quarters, railway fares, etc., and even for warm meals in certain industrial plants where canteens could be established.

The following was the disbursement for these relief activities during the period from August, 1941 until severance of the diplomatic relations between the Polish and the Russian Government in the month of April, 1943:

August 1, 1941—December 1941	1,527,292 rubles
Total expenditure in 1942	88,265,565 “
Total expenditure in 1943	19,019,008 “
Cost of evacuation	2,717,917 “
Cost of transfer depots	170,711 “
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Total	111,700,493 rubles

This means an average of 263 rubles per Polish citizen included in the relief.

This expenditure of 111,700,493 rubles may be broken down thus:

Financial assistance	57,794,744 rubles
Relief institutions	26,330,047 “
Food purchases	8,615,708 “
Transportation of goods	6,765,546 “
Administration costs	9,746,329 “
Evacuation of civilians	2,448,119 “
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Total	111,700,493 rubles

The following table, showing the regional distribution of financial relief during the period extending from October 1942, to March 1943, is provided for clearer illustration:

Region	Total Polish ref. population	Number of Jews among the former	Amounts remitted	Average per person
Eur. Russia	46,817	15,520	13,147,449	279
Siberia	71,444	12,187	12,721,125	178
Kazakhstan	56,991	7,606	11,102,005	195
South	90,240	69,289	32,933,909	365
Total	265,492	104,602	69,904,488	263

The South, which contained 34.8% of the Polish refugees, absorbed as much as 46% of the total disbursement. This is explained by the large number of relief institutions set up in this region by the Polish Army and the Embassy during and after the southward drift of the Polish refugees. These consumed 56% of the 32,939,909 rubles. These institutions had been created primarily for the purpose of combating epidemics and the appalling rise in the death rate which accompanied the arrival of the migrants from the North. After these calamities had been prevented from spreading, and even after the evacuation in the summer of 1942 of the Polish Army and a number of civilian citizens, the institutions continued to be maintained by the Embassy and contributed very substantially to alleviating the lot of the remaining Polish citizens in the South, a very large proportion of whom were Jews.

Financial relief was distributed by the Embassy not only through delegates and local representatives, but also directly to individuals. A great number of individual applications for assistance made the creation of a special department for this purpose necessary. Applications for assistance from persons of special value to the nation and in very difficult circumstances, were generally dealt with favorably. The number of applications received by the Embassy increased daily and a considerable percentage of the applicants were Jews.

From the middle of August, 1941 until the end of that year, the Embassy distributed in this way the sum of 272,257.30 rubles. In 1942, 1,504 remittances were made for a total amount of 798,271 rubles, or an average of 530 rubles per head. In the first four months of 1943 until the break of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, 1,939 remittances were made by the Embassy for a total of 942,100 rubles, or an average of 486 rubles per capita.

Special conditions in 1943 resulting from the deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations prompted the Embassy to intensify relief in all forms, so that the amount of cash distributed among individuals increased substantially.

Excluded from the figures given above were the remittances made under special instructions to various prominent citizens including Jewish social workers, politicians, and rabbis, as well as subsidies given to Polish citizens who passed Kuibyshev on their way to other parts of Russia.

The third form of relief granted by the Embassy was relief in kind. It was not only the most desired form of assistance, but also the most effective. The goods distributed among Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. were not only used for immediate consumption but were also bartered for produce which could be obtained in Russia, or were sold. In Siberia, for example, a family of four could live for a month on what it could get in exchange for a pair of boots or one blanket.

Great difficulties, however, had to be overcome before the goods could reach their destination. In many cases railway cars loaded with relief parcels traveled for months before they arrived at the office of a delegate or local representative. In the more remote regions, the representative had to secure all kinds of transportation including the most primitive means such as donkeys, camels, etc., to get goods from the railway station to

the place of distribution. Goods had often to be taken across thousands of miles of frozen rivers, wastelands, and steppes.

The relief goods were distributed throughout the Soviet Union from central depots in ports and in one or two places inland. The depot in Kuibyshev served, besides the refugees in the neighborhood, travelers passing through the city.

Between September 1, 1941 and May 5, 1943, 101,759 parcels aggregating 4,048 tons of clothing, food, and medical supplies were distributed from an available total of 157,925 parcels, representing 6,176 tons of goods. 56,166 parcels representing a total weight of 2,128 tons were confiscated together with the stores and depots by the Soviet authorities when they severed diplomatic relations with Poland.

The following table shows the percentage of distribution and average per head (in kilograms) in the four great regions:

Region Percentage of total	Polish population served by relief organization	Percentage of relief in kind in total relief	Average per head in kg.
South	34.0	34.0	20.1
Kazakhstan	21.5	13.6	12.8
Siberia	27.0	30.4	19.3
Eur. Russia	17.5	22.9	19.5

While it is impossible to calculate how much of the relief in kind went to Polish citizens of Jewish nationality, the above table shows that the South, where the percentage of Jews was 76.7, received 34 percent of all goods distributed, and that the average per head there was 20.1 kg., while the average for the whole Soviet Union was 15.2 kg. This was made possible by the transport facilities and a well developed network of local representatives in the South. The small average per head in Kazakhstan was due to the very poor transport system in that Republic.

The bulk of relief in kind was supplied by the Polish Government, but a number of foreign charitable institutions also con-

tributed goods for distribution among Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. Among these, the American Red Cross and Polish organizations in America gave most. Of the American Jewish organizations, the greatest quantity of relief goods was contributed by the Jewish Labor Committee and by the Joint Distribution Committee.

A few remarks about the relief activities carried on for Polish refugees in the field of education. As a result of lengthy negotiations, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs consented on December 23, 1941 to the organization of Polish orphanages and kindergartens, and on February 12, 1942, agreed to grant special food quotas to these institutions. On March 1, 1943, there were 807 institutions of all types (orphanages, kindergartens, schools, laboratories, courses, workshops, etc.) for the use of 31,465 Polish citizens, among them 15,335 Jews, or nearly 11% of the aggregate number of 140,602 Polish citizens of Jewish nationality benefited by the relief organizations. The institutions employed 2,639 persons, 1,366 of whom, or 52.8%, were Jews. All these institutions cared for over 22,500 children, of whom almost 45% were Jewish.

The smallest number of institutions—only 77—was in European Russia, where only 5.4% of all Poles and 5.3% of all Jews were included in this form of relief. In the South, on the other hand, the network of institutions was quite ample, due to the favorable conditions prevailing there for the organization of this work, the relatively friendly attitude of the local authorities, and the help received in this particular field from the Polish army.

Practically all institutions were financed and supplied by the Polish Embassy, which expended 26,330,047 rubles for this purpose.

The following table shows the number of Polish schools in

the Soviet Union, their types, the number of Polish and Jewish children attending them, and the number of the Polish and Jewish personnel:

Type of	Number of Schools	Total Number of Students	Number of Jewish Students	Total Personnel	Jewish Personnel
Kindergarten	175	5,685	1,518	404	96
Schools	43	2,999	2,055	165	89
Courses	68	1,466	741	124	53
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Total	286	10,150	4,314	693	238

The percentage of Jewish children in relation to the total number of children attending the schools ran as follows:

Jewish children in kindergartens	27
Jewish personnel in kindergartens	24
Jewish children in schools	68.5
Jewish personnel in schools	54
Jewish students in courses	51
Jewish personnel in courses	43
Total percentage of Jewish children in educational establishments	43
Total percentage of Jewish personnel in educational establishments	34

The schools, kindergartens, etc. served not only educational purposes but also as feeding centers. Some were boarding schools, while many were attached to orphanages. This was by no means the least important part played by them for the welfare of the children.

6. RUSSO-POLISH DIPLOMATIC BREAK AND END OF POLISH GOVERNMENT'S RELIEF WORK IN SOVIET UNION

On January 15, 1943, however, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs issued a decree whereby all the relief institutions of the Polish Embassy were to be taken over by Soviet management and administration. This was to affect all orphanages, homes for the infirm, kindergartens, hospitals, medical bases, etc. This action did not begin everywhere at the same time, but gradually and in different regions. Its tempo varied in accordance with the arrangements agreed on in Moscow between the Polish Ambassador and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It actually began in February, 1943, and the first institutions to be taken over were in the Kuibyshev area, not far from the seat of the Embassy; while it was not until the end of March that action on a larger scale was taken, when all the 800 establishments were either put under Soviet administration or abolished. In this way the relief work done so far by the Polish authorities came to an end. At present, relief can be extended only by private organizations. But even this private relief work is greatly curtailed because of the policy of the Soviet Government which does not permit foreign relief organizations to operate in the country, nor does it allow any relief activities on a sectarian basis. Accordingly, there are at present only two ways of extending relief to the Jewish refugees in Russia: one is by transmitting funds and supplies to be used for general relief work; the other, by sending parcels of food and clothing to individual refugees whose addresses have been learned. Both things are being done now by several Jewish organizations, especially by the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency, and the World Jewish Congress. At the same time efforts are being made to obtain more names and addresses of refugees in the Soviet Union and to establish contact

between them and their relatives in other countries. However, all these activities, whose scope increased greatly in 1943, are even now far from adequate to the existing need; and it remains to be seen whether and in what degree they will succeed in saving the refugees from the imminent danger of starvation, until the time when their repatriation, or the establishment of a normal life for them in Russia or in some other country, becomes possible.

CHAPTER IX
COUNTRIES OF REFUGEES AND SETTLEMENT
F. SWITZERLAND

*Introductory—The Prewar Situation—Developments during
the War—Attitude of Swiss Public Opinion—The Refugee
Camps and Homes—Who Supports the Refugees—Conclusion*

1. INTRODUCTORY

Switzerland has long been a haven of refuge for political and religious refugees. This is partly due to the fact that she is the classic country of freedom and tolerance in Europe, and partly to her geographical position, bordering as she does on Germany, Austria, France, and Italy. Even during the present war, notwithstanding her difficult economic situation and the vital necessity of doing nothing that might provoke Hitlerite Germany, she has continued to accept refugees, both civilian and military, in large numbers. At the end of 1943, according to the official figures of the Swiss Government, she harbored 70,494 refugees.¹ Of this number it is estimated that about 25,000 were Jewish refugees.² This is an exceptionally high figure for a country with a total population of little more than four million, and is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that, at the beginning of the war, the Swiss Federal authorities figured on a maximum absorptive capacity of 6,000 refugees.

¹*Israelitisches Wochenblatt* (Zurich), March 24 and April 21, 1944.

²This is the estimate of Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz, European Chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee. See his "Report from the Battlefield," in *The Rescue of Stricken Jews in a World at War: Report on the Work and Plans of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, as contained in Addresses delivered at its Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting, December 4th and 5th, 1943*, p. 14.

Indeed, at this writing (latter part of 1944), Switzerland is perhaps the most important reception country for refugees in Europe.

2. THE PREWAR SITUATION

Curiously, it was not until the later years of World War II that Switzerland began to play an important part as a country of refuge for present-day refugees. In the years preceding the war, owing to the economic depression, and also for diplomatic reasons, Switzerland was reluctant to admit refugees from Germany and, later, from Austria. Nevertheless, the Federal Council of the Swiss Republic decided in April, 1933, to leave the German frontier open and to give temporary refuge to fugitives from Germany, that is, to those for whom Switzerland was merely a wayside station. Thus, between April and September, 1933, 10,000 Jewish refugees passed one frontier post alone, that on the railway station at Basel.³

The regulations under which refugees were allowed to enter the country were very strict. According to the Federal Law *Sur le séjour et l'établissement des étrangers* of March 26, 1936, three kinds of residence permits were issued to aliens in Switzerland: (a) *Permis de séjour*. These permits were issued for a limited period not exceeding nine months to persons coming to Switzerland for a definite period; e.g., seasonal laborers, and students. (b) *Tolérance*. These permits were not limited, but they had to be renewed from year to year. Refugees who had been resident in Switzerland for ten or fifteen years were granted this permit. New refugees did not obtain it, and had to leave the country after the expiration of their visas. (c) *Permis d'établissement*. These permits were unlimited and unconditional, but were not

³Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 397.

granted to stateless refugees who had come to Switzerland after World War I.⁴

These regulations, which were repeatedly attacked by the progressive elements of the Swiss people, who favored liberal treatment of refugees, were defended by the members of the Federal Council. Thus Federal Councilor Johannes Baumann declared at the National Assembly session of July 3, 1936: "Real political refugees who report in time to the proper authorities are treated as such. Refugees without the necessary documents we grant a certain period of time to stay in Switzerland, but we cannot keep them indefinitely."

At the Conference on the Right of Asylum which took place in Paris in June, 1936, the head of the Swiss delegation said: "Switzerland has a proud tradition in the matter of the right of asylum, but of late, taking the country as a whole, the situation has changed for the worse." This allegation is borne out by the following excerpt from a report made public by the Federal Alien Police (*Eidgenössische Fremdenpolizei*) in April, 1934:

From the very first the cantons were informed by the Federal Department of Justice that temporary residence without the pursuit of a gainful occupation should not be denied, but that, owing to the excess of aliens and the prevailing unemployment, it was impossible to grant aliens permanent residence. The cantonal authorities were called upon to take the necessary steps to make these foreigners report at once to the local police. Those desiring to stay only a few weeks or months at a hotel, or with private persons, should not be molested; on the other hand, those intending to stay permanently in Switzerland should be required to apply immediately for a residence permit. During the year 1933, 400 such cases, involving a total

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 269.

of 600 persons, were referred to the Federal Alien Police. The latter were impelled in most cases to grant permission for a stay of a few months, at the expiration of which the foreigner was required to leave Switzerland.⁵

The German annexation of Austria in March, 1938, caused an influx of Jewish refugees from that country into Switzerland. At the Evian Conference in July of that year, Dr. Heinrich Rothmund, Chief of the Swiss Federal Police, stated that some 3,000 to 4,000 refugees from Austria had crossed into Switzerland at that time. Other countries bordering on Austria closed their frontiers, and Switzerland was compelled to reintroduce the visa on Austrian passports in order to control the refugee movement. In October of that year, following the annexation of the Sudetenland by the Reich and the consequent swelling of the refugee tide, the Swiss Government went so far as to introduce visas for non-Aryan German citizens, many of whom were now entering the country surreptitiously.⁶

The wave of anti-Jewish excesses which swept over Germany in November, 1938, produced a new exodus of Jews from that country. The Government of the Netherlands asked Switzerland whether she would be willing to assist these unfortunate victims of Nazi persecution. The Political Department of the Swiss Government replied as follows to the Dutch Government:

In view of her geographical position, the excess of aliens, and the widespread unemployment which has prevailed for years now, Switzerland can only serve as a transit country for the refugees from Germany. For this reason she cannot receive an influx of refugees on her territory without control of individual cases. However, the frontiers are not completely closed. All applications for entry, which are very numerous,

⁵*Neue Züricher Zeitung*, April 17, 1934.

⁶Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

are carefully studied, and permits are granted in individual cases within the limits of feasibility. Obviously, these limits depend upon the possibilities of these refugees from Germany being finally admitted into other countries and may be widened in accordance with them.⁷

In December, 1938, Johannes Baumann, President of the Federal Council of the Swiss Republic, stated that Switzerland could not tolerate the illegal crossings of her frontiers, as favored by the German Government. Investigation had disclosed that the refugees arriving at the Swiss border had literally been driven out of Germany. The Federal Alien Police did not prevent these illegal entries; however, as time went on, the directors of the cantonal police took the position that Switzerland was no longer able to take in additional refugees. France, too, closed her frontiers to aliens passing through Switzerland. The Federal Department of Justice and Police was forced to take action against illegal entries. This became all the more necessary as the number of refugees constantly grew. President Baumann declared on December 6, 1938:

At present the number of Jewish refugees in Switzerland may be put at 10 to 12 thousand. Events in Germany have swelled the tide of immigration still further. In these circumstances Switzerland is compelled to enforce the existing regulations.⁸

However, under the stress of the tragic events of 1938, as well as under pressure of Swiss public opinion (of which more will be said further on), the following categories of refugees were made eligible for admission into Switzerland:

⁷*Basler National Zeitung*, Dec. 3, 1938.

⁸*Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Dec. 7, 1938.

1. Persons who have obtained a visa for another country as well as the necessary Swiss or other transit visas entered on a valid passport.
2. Persons who are not in possession of such visas but who can prove that they will be able to obtain them within a short period, and have relatives in Switzerland.
3. Persons over sixty who can furnish the necessary guarantee through Swiss relatives.⁹

Later these regulations were modified as follows:

1. Immigrants will be admitted to the territory of the Swiss Republic provided they are over 65 years of age.
 - (a) Immigrants desiring to reside in Switzerland permanently must furnish a cash guarantee of 2,000 Swiss francs per person per annum for the rest of their lifetime. The exact amount will be fixed by the Swiss authorities in accordance with actuarial principles.
 - (b) Those who have a valid immigration permit or visa from an overseas country (Cuba, for instance), but who owing to transportation or other difficulties are unable to proceed to such country, may obtain residence for one year provided an amount equal to 2,000 Swiss francs per person is deposited at the Swiss National Bank.
2. Immigrants of any age will be admitted into Switzerland, provided they have relatives who are established in the country. It is not necessary that these relatives be Swiss citizens. The relatives will be required to guarantee the maintenance of the immigrant to the authorities in the manner prescribed in Par. 1(a).

Such, then, was the refugee situation in Switzerland in the 6

⁹*Bulletin of the Coordinating Committee for Refugees*, May, 1939, pp. 23-24.

years immediately preceding World War II. It is estimated that from 1933 to 1939 about 7,100 refugees, among them 5,000 Jews, found asylum on Swiss soil.¹⁰

3. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WAR

With the outbreak of war in Europe, Switzerland, by virtue of her geographical position, was bound to attract fresh refugees. And this at a time when the Swiss Government was endeavoring to repatriate 300,000 Swiss nationals who were abroad, and so was anxious to reduce the number of refugees in order to avoid congestion in the country. Accordingly, on October 8, 1939, an order was issued by the head of the Federal Police directing the deportation of all who had entered the country after September 6, while another order, issued on October 17, provided that all foreigners entering the country secretly (*i.e., illegally*) should be expelled at once.

In part these and subsequent anti-refugee measures were adopted under pressure from the Nazis. The latter denounced, and even threatened, the Swiss for harboring Axis enemies, who, the Nazis charged, were using Switzerland as a "mouthpiece" for insults and for "espionage." Another reason for these measures was the acute economic situation and food shortage. Yet the Swiss did not allow themselves to be intimidated by the German threats, and, despite the international and economic difficulties, the country's frontiers were never completely closed to those fleeing from Nazi persecution.

At first the refugees arrived in dribblets. But beginning with the spring of 1940 their influx grew steadily if at first slowly, rising to a furious crescendo in the last third of 1943. Four distinct refugee movements into Switzerland may be distinguished.

¹⁰Figures cited by Dr. Eduard von Steiger, Federal Councilor and Chief of the Department of Justice and Police, in his statement before the Swiss National Council in September, 1942.

(a) In June, 1940, after the collapse of France, about 80,000 French soldiers, of every branch of the service, fled to Switzerland, where they were disarmed and interned. With the exception of those among them who were of Polish origin, most of these soldiers were eventually released and repatriated to France.

(b) The mass deportations of Jews from France to the German murder factories in Eastern Europe which the Nazis—and also Vichy—instituted in August, 1942, produced a second stampede of refugees into Switzerland. Because of the difficulty of Switzerland's position vis-à-vis Germany, the Federal authorities thought of applying the decree of October 17, 1939, to 300 Jewish refugees, of Dutch and Belgian origin, who presented themselves at the Swiss border in August. Indeed, the Federal Council was torn between sympathy for these unfortunates and anxiety not to aggravate a diplomatic situation already grave. Refoulement measures were contemplated. Finally, under the pressure of Swiss public opinion, which was almost unanimously opposed to any impairment of the right of asylum, these measures were not put into effect. Although the provisions of the decree of October 17, 1939, were not eased, and the watch on the border was strengthened, fugitives from the Nazi terror continued to cross the Franco-Swiss frontier. Some idea of this stampede may be gained from the fact that within ten days—between September 23 and October 3, 1942—no less than 2,207 refugees, the majority of them Jews, slipped into the country.

(c) A third flight into Switzerland commenced in November, 1942, following the occupation of the whole of France by the Germans. About 2,000 refugees, most of them of Polish, Czechoslovak, and Austrian nationality, crossed into Switzerland, where they were interned.

(d) Finally, a fourth influx began at the end of the summer of 1943, after Italy's capitulation to the United Nations and the

military occupation of Northern Italy by the Nazis. Contingents of Italian soldiers fled to Switzerland, as did many civilians. Among the latter were about 1,800 Jews. In addition, the influx from France continued. The number of emigrants and refugees, both civil and military, in Switzerland now grew by leaps and bounds, and by October 12, 1943, according to official figures made public at a conference of cantonal police heads, amounted to 61,461.¹¹ By the end of 1943, as stated earlier in this chapter, their number had risen to 70,494. At the same time the Jewish refugees in the country numbered 25,000, as against 6,000 in the middle of 1942,¹²—a more than fourfold increase in one year and a half.

During the first eight months of 1944, the influx of Jewish refugees, particularly from France, Northern Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary continued.

In order to cope with the problem of housing and feeding the refugees, the Federal Department of Justice and Police, on October 2, 1942, appointed a special commissioner to handle refugee questions.¹³ And in the spring of 1944, the Swiss Government set up a Special Commission for the Study of the Refugee Situation, under the chairmanship of Federal Councilor von Steiger, to deal, among other things, with the problem of repatriating the refugees to their countries of origin immediately after the end of the war.¹⁴

4. ATTITUDE OF ~~THE~~ SWISS PUBLIC OPINION

The reaction of the Swiss people, when confronted with the refugee problem in all its magnitude, was worthy of the finest tra-

¹¹*Tribune de Genève*, October 20, 1943.

¹²Cf. *Aiding Jews Overseas: A Report for 1942 by the Chairman of the National Council of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee*, p. 14.

¹³*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 45 (1943-1944), p. 286.

¹⁴*La Colonia Svizzera*, May 26, 1944.

ditions of their free country. Clergy, press, and democratic bodies aroused public opinion, creating an almost unanimous sentiment in favor of admitting the refugees from Nazi cruelty who were besieging the Swiss frontiers.

Thus the Council of the Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches appealed to the Federal authorities in August, 1942, urging that the right of asylum be not denied to "non-Aryan refugees who recently arrived in Switzerland, and that liberal methods be applied to those who may yet come." Again, in September of that year, when the wave of deportations of Jews from France, Belgium, and Holland reached its crest, the Swiss National Protestant Church, in a pastoral letter concerning a nationwide fast which was read from every pulpit, declared:

. . . We forsake our first love if we forget that our country must remain, as far as possible, a haven of refuge for the persecuted and refugees. To abandon this rôle is to betray our spiritual heritage, is "to lose our soul in order to gain the world." In particular, we cannot remain indifferent to the lot of the people of Israel, in whose midst our Saviour was born and who are today the object of measures whose cruelty and iniquity are the shame of our age. . . .

The Swiss Federation of Labor and other liberal bodies repeatedly demanded better treatment for the interned Jewish refugees and a more sympathetic understanding of their individual needs. And during the debates in the National Council in September, 1943, the representatives of various political factions exhorted the Federal authorities to exercise the largest measure of tolerance toward refugees.

In the forefront of these journalistic champions of the refugees stood the *Basler National Zeitung*. From among many relevant passages from its columns, we select one. In the course of an

article entitled "The Emigrant's Fate as Reflected in Police Reports," which appeared in this paper on September 3, 1938, J. B. Rusch allegorically depicts the tragedy of the refugee who arrives at the Swiss frontier in search of a haven of refuge, only to be turned back by the border patrol.

Were the following to happen, he writes, would it not come under the heading "Accidents and Crimes?" Raging torrents rush into a valley and sweep away many houses. Panic-stricken people float in the muddy waters, threatened by drifting wreckage, and with death and destruction all around them. Desperately they clutch at broken beams, floating boards, and with their last ounce of strength manage to reach a safe bank. There people have been standing all the time watching this struggle for life. They have long poles in their hands. Perchance to hold them out to those approaching in order to draw them ashore and help in their rescue? Oh, no, they use these poles to push the swimmers back into the raging waves, and with sad and tear-dimmed eyes the people thus pushed back must go under.

Another pleader of the refugee cause was the *Neue Argauer Zeitung*, which in August, 1942, wrote: "The right of asylum is a sacred Swiss institution. We cannot shirk our duty. If the authorities forget that to renounce the right of asylum may weaken our will to resistance, it behooves us to remind them."

And when Adolf Hitler's mouthpiece, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, attempted in November, 1942, to frighten Switzerland into refusing entry to Jews by accusing her of harboring Axis enemies and "spies" and warning that her neighbors would not tolerate this, another Swiss newspaper, *Volksrecht*, manfully asserted the Swiss people's indomitable spirit of independence and devotion to the right of asylum. As disclosed by the Office of War Information on December 2, 1942, this paper declared:

So long as Switzerland is an independent state—and we are determined to maintain our independence with all our means and energy—no other power on earth shall order us or tell us what laws we must make or how we must treat our citizens. It isn't our fault but our honor that we have become the refuge for some thousands of persecuted. There must be one little spot of ground in "new Europe" where humanity finds a home. We only regret that the force of circumstances makes fulfillment of our task so modest. If "new Europe" finds few supporters in Switzerland, it isn't the Jews who are responsible therefor, but those Aryans who understand "new Europe" as the suppression of small peoples.

It should be added that the most important Swiss newspapers helped to raise funds for the refugee-aid organizations.¹⁵ They also took severely to task those few papers which remained silent about the tragic occurrences at the frontier (where 6,082 refugees were denied entry into Switzerland in 1943 alone¹⁶), and which branded all pleas in behalf of refugees as *Humanitaetsduselei* ("humanitarian twaddle").¹⁷

These repeated appeals to the conscience and humanitarian traditions of the Swiss people had their effect. Public opinion was aroused, with the result that thousands of refugees were able to find asylum on Swiss soil, especially in the latter part of 1943.

The sympathy of the Swiss people for the refugees also found expression in thousands of letters from non-Jews to the Jewish communities. Many of the letters were accompanied by contributions in money and in kind.

The following paragraph from the *Israelitisches Wochenblatt*

¹⁵*Israelitisches Wochenblatt*, December 24, 1943.

¹⁶Official report of the Federal Alien Police quoted in *Aufbau*, August 18, 1944.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, June 23, 1944.

of October 15, 1943, is typical of the attitude of the Swiss people to the refugees:

Refugee Camp HEMBERG (St. Galle). This camp was established three weeks ago. It shelters close to 240 refugees, among them 70 women and 90 children. The Commandant and the authorities are doing everything they can to mitigate the lot of these unfortunates. In this they have the active cooperation of the local population. Upon the arrival of the interneees, the townspeople arranged a sumptuous supper for them in the best restaurant in the place, thus spontaneously manifesting their sympathy with the persecuted. . . .

5. THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND HOMES

Even before the war, about 900 refugees were installed in 15 camps in Northern and Eastern Switzerland.¹⁸ After the outbreak of hostilities, especially after the fall of France, when it became increasingly difficult for the refugees to emigrate to other countries, labor camps were established for those among them who were fit for manual work. There they were employed at the construction of new roads, building drainage systems, and similar public works, for which they received one franc a day pocket money. (Under pressure of public opinion, the pay was increased to 1.50 francs a day.)¹⁹ The purpose of these camps was twofold: to keep the refugees usefully employed, and at the same time to prevent them from depressing the Swiss labor market by competing with native workers.

As time went on, and the ranks of the refugees grew, the refugee camps increased in number and a variety. As of November 30, 1943, there were 38 labor camps (including one for

¹⁸*Bulletin of the Coordinating Committee for Refugees*, May, 1939, p. 25.

¹⁹*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 43 (1941-1942), p. 186; Vol. 44 (1942-1943), p. 226.

vocational retraining) and 3 labor detachments with an aggregate population of 4,032. Another 3,998 were located in 6 homes for families, 13 homes for women and girls, 4 homes for men, 1 for convalescents, and 1 station for tuberculous cases. Finally, about 6,000 refugees were held in temporary quarantine and reception camps under the control of the Swiss army.²⁰ And as of October 15, 1943, another 1,244 were to be found in agricultural enterprises (individual assignments of men and women); 49 in certain specified occupations; 250 in university towns, with permission to study; 466 in free places obtained for them by the Swiss central relief organization for refugees; 11 in various penal institutions, and 2,100 in forced residence, under military control, and with restricted freedom of movement.²¹ In addition, the Swiss organization for refugee children placed 1,143 children in foster homes, 679 in children's homes, and 179 with private families paid by the organization.²²

In its report of April, 1943, the American Friends Service Committee had this to say about the Swiss camps for refugees:

... What we have seen so far of the Swiss handling of the refugee problem, the first group of approximately 4,000 rather than the more recent arrivals, is splendidly organized and functions excellently. ... Until a few months ago, the average Swiss working company for foreign refugees numbered a maximum of 100 men. In contrast, one thinks of the camps in France with 8,000 to 10,000 people rounded up into enormous barbed-wire enclosures. ...

To be sure, the internees do not possess freedom of movement. The men, in the labor camps, have to do hard work, such as ex-

²⁰Files of the World Jewish Congress. Cf. *Israelitische Wochenblatt*, March 10, 1944, p. 10. A list of these camps and homes will be found in Appendix V.

²¹*Israelitisches Wochenblatt*, October 1, 8, and 15, 1943.

²²*Ibid.*, May 28, 1944.

cavating, road-construction, land-clearance, stone-quarrying, tree-felling, etc., while the women, who are interned in special homes, are employed at washing, ironing, mending, knitting, etc. (Men receive 1.50 francs a day; women, 40 centimes; in either case, one half is retained by the camp administration and credited to the internee's saving account.)²³ However, the attitude of the camp commandants is humane and sympathetic, like that of the general population. A certain amount of cultural activity is permitted and even encouraged. Lectures and artistic entertainments are given with the cooperation of the internees and outside talent. There is freedom of worship. On major Jewish holidays religious services are held in certain camps. Those interned in camps near the large cities (Zurich, Geneva, etc.) receive permission to go to town in order to attend the services at the local synagogues.²⁴ In short, the internee, treated like a human being, gradually regains his human dignity.

6. WHO SUPPORTS THE REFUGEES?

The Swiss Government pays the expenses of refugees living in camps and homes (where they receive the same food rations as Swiss citizens²⁵) who are without means of their own and without support from any other source.²⁶ Some idea of the magnitude of this financial burden may be had from the fact that in 1940 the Swiss Government spent a million and a half francs for the

²³There are special homes for refugees unfit for heavy labor. The latter do light indoor work and receive 20 centimes a day.

²⁴About the religious and cultural activities in the refugee camps and homes, see the *Israelitisches Wochenblatt*, April 9, 1943, p. 22; April 16, 1943, p. 23; April 23, 1943; April 30, 1943, p. 17; May 6, 1943, p. 20; May 21, 1943, p. 15; June 4, 1944; June 11, 1943; June 18, 1943.

²⁵*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 45 (1943-1944), p. 286.

²⁶Files of the World Jewish Congress.

maintenance of the refugees in the camps,²⁷ and that on October 2, 1942, it appropriated the sum of 3,500,000 francs for the same purpose.²⁸ Nor is this all. On March 25, 1941, in order to encourage the emigration of as many refugees as possible, the Swiss Government decided to contribute 400 Swiss francs (about \$100) towards defraying the transportation costs of each departing refugee.²⁹

Persons with means of their own pay 3.50 francs a day. The Dutch have a camp of their own, administered by themselves, and the Dutch Government pays 5.50 francs a day per person. Refugees who still have a consulate to apply to, such as the Poles and the Czechs, receive from their consulate 15 francs a month pocket money. The others receive a monthly allowance of 6 francs from the various refugee relief organizations, which are constituted along denominational lines. Non-interned refugees who have no private means receive, in the case of Poles and Czechs, 160 francs monthly, 40 percent of which is paid by the respective consulate and 60 percent by the respective refugee relief organization. In the case of non-interned refugees who no longer have a consulate to turn to, the respective refugee relief organization pays part of the cost of maintenance and the remainder is collected privately.³⁰

A ruling of the Swiss Federal Council on March 21, 1941 provided that well-to-do refugees must contribute to the maintenance of needy ones.³¹

As for the Jewish refugees, the Swiss Jewish community covers a substantial part of the cost of their maintenance. In this it is

²⁷League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees*, 1941, p. 4.

²⁸*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 45 (1943-1944), p. 286.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. 43 (1941-1942), p. 186.

³⁰Files of the World Jewish Congress.

³¹*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 43 (1941-1942), p. 186.

assisted by the great overseas Jewish relief organizations, notably the Joint Distribution Committee.³² In the last ten years, the Union of Swiss Refugee Relief Organizations has raised 16,000,000 Swiss francs, most of which came from voluntary contributions by individual Swiss Jews and relief societies.³³ This is a remarkable record, considering that there are only 18,000 Jews in Switzerland, 5,000 of whom are scarcely in a position to contribute anything to the relief funds.

7. CONCLUSION

While, owing to extremely urgent considerations of a political and economic nature, the Swiss Government could not open the doors of its country more widely to the thousands of unfortunates knocking for admittance, Switzerland has certainly made a considerable contribution to the refugee problem.

Certain it is that, without the sympathetic understanding of the tragic plight of the refugees manifested by the Swiss people, tens of thousands of these fugitives would have been doomed to extermination at the hands of the modern barbarians.

In view of her fulfillment of the duty of human solidarity toward the victims of Nazi barbarity, Switzerland, small in area but rich in humanitarian traditions, may well serve as an example to larger and more powerful countries.

³²*Ibid.*, Vol. 45 (1943-1944), p. 288.

³³*Israelitisches Wochenblatt*, May 26, 1944.

CHAPTER X

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT

G. MINOR REFUGEE CENTERS

*Other European Countries—Latin America—The Far East—
British Dominions and Possessions—Miscellaneous*

1. OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Of the minor European countries which have played a considerable rôle as centers of reception for refugees, Czechoslovakia deserves first mention. That free and democratic country, the only free and democratic land in all of Central and Eastern Europe, tried successfully to remain true to its ideals in the field of refugee aid also. Several thousand political refugees, both Jewish and non-Jewish, found asylum in Czechoslovakia, being treated there with cordial hospitality. However, the critical economic situation did not allow of granting work permits to the refugees generally, and they were maintained by relief organizations which also helped them to emigrate to overseas countries.

In contrast to most of the reception countries in Europe, no visa was necessary to enter Czechoslovakia if one had a German passport. Naturally, many refugees did not possess such a passport and so crossed the border illegally, which was facilitated by the fact that the boundary between Czechoslovakia and the German Reich was about 1,100 miles long. The illegal crossing could easily be effected in the region of the Bavarian Forest and the Giant Mountains. If such refugees were recognized by one of the refugee committees approved of by the Czechoslovak Government, they could, under Par. 5 of the Passport Law of 1928, not

only be granted asylum, but also obtain a stateless passport. This provision proved very helpful, especially after Munich, and thousands of refugees received the famous "pink passport."

The number of German and Austrian refugees in Czechoslovakia before the annexation of the Sudetenland was estimated at 5,000.¹ From 1933 to 1935, the police regulations for the registration of refugees were exceedingly lenient. The refugee committees operating in Prague were entrusted by the police with the task of registering all refugees, who thereupon received residence permits without further delay if they were vouched for by one of the accredited refugee committees.²

In the province of Moravia the authorities were not always so accommodating. In Bruenn, the Moravian capital, attempts were made, especially after the events of March, 1938, in Austria, to enforce strictly the police regulations regarding aliens. In the years when a considerable number of German and Austrian emigres were living in Czechoslovakia, many arrests took place. Also, a number of expulsions were ordered. Nevertheless, it must be said that Czechoslovakia remained faithful to the sentiment which Dr. Eduard Benes, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed in a message to an American committee aiding German refugees: "It is our pride to offer to German refugees a refuge, just as once America, England, and France could pride themselves on offering asylum to the persecuted."³

While, prior to September 30, 1938, the refugees had found a new home in Czechoslovakia which they were all loath to leave,⁴ the situation changed completely after Czechoslovakia was de-

¹Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 395.

²Cf. *Fuenf Jahre Flucht, Not und Rettung. Bericht der Demokratischen Fluechtlingsfuersorge*, March, 1938.

³*New York Times*, March 19, 1934, p. 11, col. 7.

⁴Rudolf Olden, "Kleiner Abschied von Prag," *Das Neue Tagebuch*, Herbst, 1939.

livered into Hitler's hands. Suddenly that country was faced with a refugee problem of its own. In the days between September 20 and 30, 1938, when it was believed in Czechoslovakia that war with Hitlerite Germany was imminent, both the authorities and the people were anxious to enlist the first victims of the Nazi regime—the German refugees—as natural allies in the defense of the country. With the approval of the authorities, the refugee committees issued certificates (with photographs), stating that the bearer of such a certificate was a German refugee willing to fight together with the Czechoslovak people against Hitler and therefore entitled to protection and assistance.

After the "peace" of Munich, however, this attitude changed. The Czechs now had to take care of their own refugees (the number of Czechoslovak refugees from the areas ceded to Germany was estimated at 131,000), and so an attempt was made to transport back to German-annexed Sudetenland those who had been evacuated for military reasons.

Expulsions from the Czechoslovak area ensued. The attitude of the Second Republic toward refugees was unfriendly. It was not until November and December, 1938, that there was a certain improvement.

The breathing spell between Munich and Hitler's march into Czechoslovakia made it possible to bring part of the imperiled political and Jewish refugees to other countries. In those five and a half months, all the refugee committees in Prague strove in common to remove their clients. The committees, which had begun to busy themselves with emigration before this, enjoyed the advantage not only that there were fewer refugees to remove, but that they now had refugees in Prague with overseas visas for whom means could now be provided out of a large fund. The Democratic Refugee Relief Committee, for instance, had evacu-

ated 70 percent of its clients to other countries by March 15, 1939.⁵

At the time Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia (March 15, 1939), the following categories of refugees were to be found there:⁶

Political émigrés from Austria and Germany.....	600
Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany.....	5,000
Sudeten-German political refugees	12,000
Jews from the Sudetenland	14,000
Total	32,600

Besides these 32,600 extremely imperiled refugees, there were hundreds of thousands of Jews, Czechs, and Slovaks in Bohemia and Moravia who had fought Hitlerism and Fascism at home and abroad and therefore were likewise in danger. There were two ways of getting out of the country:

- (a) Legal departure with the Gestapo's permission;
- (b) Illegal departure via Poland.

For the majority there was only the illegal way through Poland. From the refugee centers which sprang up in Poland, most of the refugees were sent to England and some to France, Sweden, and Norway. Katowice and Cracow received most of the refugees, only a small part going to Warsaw.⁷

When the war between Germany and Poland broke out on September 1, 1939, the removal of the refugees from Katowice and Cracow had not yet been completed. The Home Office in London was reproached by the British refugee-aid organizations for having jeopardized the lives of thousands of refugees through bureaucratic red tape. Six hundred refugees fled from Cracow

⁵*Jahresbericht der Demokratischen Fluechtlingsfuersorge*, March, 1939.

⁶Kurt Grossmann, "Refugees in Peril," *Manchester Guardian*, March 28, 1939.

⁷*The Tragedy of the Exodus from Czechoslovakia*, a hitherto unpublished report which deals with the various phases of the flight from that country after March 15, 1939, and reproduces many records and letters.

alone. "Marched through the war zone without food, pursued by German planes and caught in the vortex of the retreating Polish army. Many were killed or died of starvation and were left lying in the ditches. Only a few succeeded in crossing the Rumanian border."⁸

In the puppet state of Slovakia, created in March, 1939, simultaneously with the occupation and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, there lived some 6,000 German and Austrian refugees, to which must be added several hundred "No Man's Land" victims who were trapped at the Hungaro-Slovakian border in the winter of 1938-39 and finally readmitted into Slovakia and confined in camps. During the first months of the war, some 2,000 refugees from Poland swelled the refugee ranks. Nearly all these refugees had to be supported by the Jewish community of Bratislava with the help of the Joint Distribution Committee.⁹ With the growing wave of anti-Jewish persecutions, the plight of the refugees became more and more intolerable.

Considerable numbers of refugees were also admitted into Belgium and Holland. Despite many differences between these two countries, there were a number of common features in their policies toward refugees. In both countries these policies were based on liberal principles similar to those of France and Great Britain; in both countries the refugees were admitted with the understanding that they would leave as soon as possible, since there was no possibility of absorbing them, and in both countries efforts were made to close the borders when new refugees continued to arrive while the old ones did not depart as soon as expected. Special camps were established for the refugees, where they were maintained at the expense of the Jewish communities

⁸*Self-Help in Action: Report on the Activities of the Self-Help of Emigrés from Central Europe, 1938-1939.*

⁹*American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Aid to Jews Overseas: Report for 1939, p. 24.*

of the respective countries, or at the expense of large international organizations, as well as of the State, in order to keep them from competing with the native population.

In Holland, where the number of refugees was estimated at 30,000 before the outbreak of the war, the Government sheltered a great many of them in settlements scattered all over the country, in buildings belonging to it or to other public agencies. Such adult camps, whose commandants were appointed by the Government, were in most cases used as retraining centers for the refugees in order to prepare them for further emigration. Special training centers were also established for the Jewish youth, the most famous of them being the agricultural training farm at Wieringen, on reclaimed Zuider Zee land, where over 100 young people were prepared for emigration to Palestine or South America.¹⁰ This farm settlement was most successful. The total number of refugee children in Holland was estimated at 1,500.

The Dutch Government, although careful not to assume any legal or financial responsibilities toward the refugees, did much to help them. A Ministerial Instruction of 1934 recognized refugees as a category of aliens deserving special and sympathetic treatment. The Geneva Convention of 1938 concerning the status of German refugees was signed (but not ratified) by Holland. Although, after the annexation of Austria by Germany, only transients possessing visas and steamship tickets for an overseas country were legally admitted, cases of deportation of refugees who entered the country illegally were quite rare.¹¹ The Government also defrayed part of the expenses of the refugee camps established in the country during 1939.

On the other hand, economic enterprises were launched by the refugees, especially in Amsterdam, where a new center for the

¹⁰Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 345-350.

manufacture of women's wearing apparel was brought into being. The exports of this industry, which had amounted to 400,000 Dutch guilders in 1936, rose to 1,300,000 in 1938 and to 3,100,000 in 1939.¹²

The number of refugees in Belgium was less than in Holland. Although some 40,000 were admitted during the years 1933-1939,¹³ no more than 25,000 remained on the eve of the present war.

The Belgian alien legislation and the liberal attitude of the Belgian Government toward German refugees came about only after a number of the latter had been forcibly put back over the frontier by the authorities in the years 1933-35.¹⁴

By a Royal Decree of February 20, 1936, an Interdepartmental Commission was created to which the Minister of Justice might refer any proposal for the expulsion of a refugee made by the police authorities. The function of this laudable commission was to distinguish between ordinary and refugee aliens and to enable the refugee to present his case against the administrative measure contemplated against him. The commission was made up of representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Labor, and Social Services, as well as a representative of one of the refugee-aid organizations chosen by the refugee concerned. Its president was a member of the Court of Appeal.¹⁵ Although its duties were purely advisory, the findings of the commission helped shape the decision of the Minister of Justice, and no alien was deported if the commission declared in his favor.

Most of the refugees were concentrated in Brussels and Ant-

¹²*World Jewish Congress, Beitrage zum Studium der wirtschaftlichen Leistungen juedischer Emigranten in den Jahren 1933-1939*, p. 19 ff.

¹³Joseph Glatt, "Jews in Belgium," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, July-August, 1940, p. 400.

¹⁴Kurt Grossmann, *Menschen zwischen den Grenzen* (unpublished).

¹⁵*Moniteur Belge*, February 22, 1936.

werp. Among them, especially in the first years of the Nazi regime in Germany, were many wealthy persons. One hundred and five factories, employing 2,740 persons, had been established by them by the end of 1938.¹⁶ A special refugee settlement was founded at Merxplas near Brussels on the principle of self-rule under governmental supervision. The buildings of the settlement were placed at the disposal of private organizations by the Government, which also provided the furniture, beds, and bedding and paid the cost of electricity. The settlement was very successful, especially as a retraining center.¹⁷ Some 600 refugee children were placed in Belgium, partly in private homes (Jewish and non-Jewish) and partly in hostels. The Government did not make any difficulties in admitting refugee children, provided their maintenance was guaranteed by private assistance organizations.

Besides approximately two thousand political refugees, between two and three thousand Jewish refugees were admitted to Denmark, where they were treated with understanding and sympathy and helped to establish themselves. Denmark was the only Nazi-occupied country where Jewish refugees, together with the entire indigenous Jewish population (some 6,000 souls), were not persecuted, apparently because of the well-known attitude of the Danish people and Government. A change for the worse took place in October, 1943, when the Germans stripped Denmark's constitutional Government of its powers and interned the King. Soon the Jews were threatened with deportation. But now there occurred one of the most daring and inspiring acts of rescue: in defiance of Hitler, Danes and Swedes united to save Danish Jewry, the great majority of whom was brought to safety in Sweden. Of the remainder, some perished when the boats in which they were fleeing to Sweden were sunk by the Germans,

¹⁶World Jewish Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁷*Bulletin of the Coordinating Committee for Refugees*, April, 1939, p. 19 ff.

while others were deported, mostly to Terezin, in the Protectorate, despite the protests of the Danish Foreign Office and many youth and professional organizations.¹⁸

The number of Jewish refugees admitted to Norway and Sweden was 2,000 and 3,200 respectively. To the latter figure must be added the approximately 7,000 Jewish refugees from Denmark. A considerable number of them were placed in camps until employment and housing accommodations could be provided for them. Special camps were established for orthodox Jews, where the dietary laws are observed. The financial responsibility for the maintenance of these camps was at first borne by the Swedish Government, but after a time it was transferred to the *Danske Flyktingkontoret*, a royal Danish refugee office, which received a credit of 5,000,000 Swedish crowns from the Swedish Government, as well as funds raised by many Swedish organizations. The number of Danish Jewish refugees dependent on subsidies granted by this and other relief bodies declined after the first few months as a result of new regulations whereby people of Scandinavian nationality might be employed in Sweden without special work permits. Today only the aged and children remain in the camps.¹⁹

Italy pursued a liberal policy in the admission and treatment of German and other refugees until 1938. Self-supporting refugees could live unmolested in Italy, and in many cases were even encouraged to settle permanently. In June, 1935, there were said to be over 1,000 German refugees in that country. The more the pressure in Germany, in Austria, and then in Czechoslovakia increased, the more refugees tried to reach Italy.²⁰ In particular, refugees from Czechoslovakia used Italy as a transit country be-

¹⁸Based in part on oral information supplied by the Danish Information Office of New York. Cf. "The Danish Case: A Summary," *Congress Weekly*, Jan. 14, 1944.

¹⁹Based on a recent report to the World Jewish Congress from its affiliate in Sweden.

²⁰Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

cause of a clearing arrangement between the two countries allowing prospective emigrants to take a certain amount of money out of Czechoslovakia on which they could live up to six months.

Italy also served as an important transit country from 1933 to 1939 for another reason, namely, that many relief committees sent their clients to Genoa, where they embarked for South American countries, taking advantage of the lower rates offered by the Italian shipping lines in competition with the French and other lines.

On September 1, 1938, the Italian Government, acting under pressure from Nazi Germany, decreed a number of antisemitic measures aimed at foreign Jews. As a result, nearly 14,000 people, comprising 5,000 refugees from Germany and 9,000 Jews from Eastern Europe, were threatened with expulsion. Some 9,000 left before the date on which the decrees were to go into effect, while others made frantic efforts to be able to immigrate to some overseas country.²¹

Some 3,500 refugees remained in Italy despite the expulsions, and more refugees came to Italy after the outbreak of World War II. These were interned, but their treatment was incomparably less harsh and brutal than that of the Jews thrown into concentration camps by the German Nazis.

Naturally, the longer the war lasted, the more precarious became the position of the refugees. In June, 1943, it was reported from reliable sources that many Jewish refugees interned in Italy were faced with starvation. On the other hand, Italy admitted Jewish refugees who managed to steal across the frontier from the Italian-occupied part of Yugoslavia. As against this, many Jews were interned in the south of Italy and threatened with deportation or with being drafted for forced labor.²²

²¹Sir John Hope Simpson, *Refugees: A Review of the Situation since September, 1938*, p. 41.

²²*Independent Jewish Press Service*, July 23, 1943.

Following the Allied invasion of Italy and the downfall of Mussolini, about 2,000 Jewish refugees in the German-occupied part of the country succeeded in escaping to Switzerland, while others were arrested and put into a concentration camp.²³ Refugees interned in Southern Italy, such as the nearly 2,000 held at the internment camp at Ferramonte di Tarsio, in the province of Cosenza, were set free by the Allied invasion forces.

According to a report to the World Jewish Congress, a majority of the inmates of Camp Ferramonte were Jews, among them 350 refugees from Yugoslavia. The internees were quoted as saying that the Italian camp administration, with the exception of the Fascist militia on guard outside the barbed-wire enclosure, had been decent and humane throughout.

Of the Balkan countries, mention must be made of Yugoslavia, where the number of Jewish refugees before the Nazi occupation was about 7,000, including a group of over 1,000 stranded on the way to Palestine. In Hungary there are said to be approximately 6,000 Jewish refugees, half of them from Germany and the rest from Poland. Nearly all of them are interned, and the recent domination of the country by Nazi Germany has rendered the plight of these unfortunates desperate in the extreme. Among the Baltic States, only Lithuania played some part as a haven of refuge by admitting a very limited number of German refugees and, during the early days of the present war, of Polish Jewish refugees, especially in the annexed Vilna region.

Of the remaining European countries, Portugal and Spain deserve special mention. A stream of 15,000 Jewish refugees poured into Portugal after the collapse of France, being at first admitted without any difficulty, but with the understanding that

²³The New York *World-Telegram* of January 6, 1944, reported the arrest of 25,000 Jews in the Nazi-held section of Italy, but did not say how many refugees were among those seized.

they would proceed to other countries as soon as possible. This was actually done and, despite the constant arrival of fresh refugees, their number dropped to less than 2,000 in the first months of 1942. In addition, great numbers of refugees from Germany, Austria, the Protectorate, and Italy passed through Lisbon on their way to American countries. From June, 1940 to the end of May, 1941, their number was estimated at 30,000 to 40,000.²⁴ Afterwards the policy of the Portuguese Government became more strict and the authorities proceeded to arrest refugees who did not leave the country within a specified time. Although the rigor of this policy was later relaxed, the 700 refugees still in Portugal early in 1943 had to live in restricted areas. About 180 left for Palestine early in 1944. In June of that year the number of refugees remaining in Portugal was estimated at 400.

In the first years of the present refugee movement, a very limited number of Jewish refugees (some 2,000 to 3,000) found asylum in Spain, where they were supported by two special committees in Barcelona and Madrid.²⁵ Spain's policy was changed with the overthrow of the republican government in the terrible civil war of 1936-1938, no Jews being admitted thereafter. Nearly 1,000 refugees who entered Spain during the early part of World War II without Spanish transit visas were confined under the worst conditions in prisons or concentration camps.

After the occupation of the whole of France by the Germans in November, 1942, about 12,000 refugees escaped to Spain. All of them were admitted regardless of whether they had Spanish visas or not. A considerable part of those who possessed no visas were arrested and held in prison for a time, but all of them were later released. The material aid of Allied nationals was

²⁴Max Gottschalk, "The Refugee Problem," *The American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 43 (1941-1942), p. 329.

²⁵Norman Bentwich, *The Refugees from Germany*, p. 118 f.

for the most part provided by the respective governments, while German or stateless refugees were succored by Jewish private assistance organizations operating through the American Friends Service Committee. In the course of time most of these refugees were removed from Spain, mainly to French North Africa but also to Palestine, the United States, and a few other countries. However, the places of those who left were soon filled by others who crossed the Franco-Spanish border illegally, wherein they were helped by the French Underground and by several Jewish organizations. The attitude of the Spanish authorities has been very correct of late and no difficulties whatever are made by them. As a result of this continuous flow of refugees through Spain, a few thousand of them are always to be found on Spanish territory.

2. LATIN AMERICA

The Latin American countries have absorbed a rather considerable number of refugees, ranking immediately after the United States and ahead of Palestine. However, they differ greatly from one another both in the number of refugees admitted and in the attitude toward them. As against Argentina and Uruguay, whose policy, at least in the early years of the present refugee movement, was relatively liberal, there are other countries where the number of refugees admitted was, if anything, insignificant. And as against such countries as Uruguay and Ecuador, where the refugees are treated in a friendly way, there are others where the propaganda against them, aided and abetted by Axis agents and pro-Axis native elements, is being carried on vehemently and has succeeded in poisoning the atmosphere. But there are some features common to the refugee problem in all these countries and thus justifying their joint description.

To begin with, all these countries are united by their common Iberian (*i.e.*, Spanish or Portuguese) origin. As against the

liberal Anglo-Saxon tradition so strongly felt in the United States and in the British Empire, these countries were, in past centuries, educated in a spirit of religious intolerance whose influence is still manifest. There is also lacking in them the factor of steady progress which is a characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon countries and which has enabled them to accomplish their magnificent work of colonization. Riots, wars, and revolutions follow one another in most of these Latin American countries, retarding their development.²⁶ Both factors—the frequent manifestations of the spirit of intolerance and the frequent disorders—must naturally have an unfavorable effect upon immigration into these countries and the influx of refugees.

There are other factors tending in the same direction. Both the tempo of economic development and the material and cultural standards of living are mostly backward. There are thus problems not only of overcoming the psychological difficulties, as in all other countries, but of finding ways and means to secure the existence of the immigrant. With the exception of Argentina, which offers some opportunities—not to be compared with those in the United States, of course—for industrial activities, especially in the small and medium industries, all other Latin American countries are primarily agricultural lands, eagerly waiting for the arrival of farm elements, but opposed to all other kinds of immigration and especially that of middlemen and members of the liberal professions. And since the Jewish refugees consist largely of middlemen and professionals, practically all Latin American countries are reluctant to admit them. The deeply-rooted feelings of religious intolerance mentioned before are so strongly interwoven with economic motives and with the special problem of antisemitism referred to in our first chapter,²⁷ that

²⁶Samuel Gay Iman, "Refugee Settlement in America," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 183.

²⁷See pp. 9-10.

it is virtually impossible to separate them. The general atmosphere thus engendered is very inhospitable.

Periods of severely limiting the admission of immigrants or excluding them altogether are more typical than somewhat liberal periods. Argentina, which in 1935, according to a declaration by its representative at the Evian Conference in July, 1938, admitted 32 Jewish immigrants for every 48 who entered the United States,²⁸ issued a decree in 1938 providing that applications for immigrant visas to that country must be referred by consuls abroad to an interministerial immigration board in Buenos Aires. (In general, immigrants who left their country of origin not for economic but for political, racial, or religious reasons were considered undesirable in Argentina.) Today that country is practically closed to immigration. A similar development took place in Brazil, where the liberal policy at first pursued toward refugees (at the end of 1937 there were said to be 8,000 German Jewish refugees in that country²⁹) was reversed in 1937, and thereafter only capitalists and visitors were admitted and that, too, under very rigorous conditions. Capitalist visas were granted until 1941. In order to obtain such a visa, 250 contos (1 conto equals \$50) per family had to be deposited in a Brazilian bank. In a number of cases tourist visas, good for six months, were issued—and quite a few people found ways and means to stay in the country permanently. Early in 1941 the Brazilian Government issued a decree enabling visitors to apply for permanent residence. Chile, Peru, and Ecuador were virtually closed to Jewish immigration in 1937 and, with the exception of Ecuador, have remained so to this day. (According to a United Press dispatch of September 30, 1944, Ecuadorian consuls in Europe have been instructed to issue visas to all Jews desiring to settle in that country.) In Chile, a campaign

²⁸Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 480.

²⁹Kurt Zielenziger, "Die Auswanderung der deutschen Juden seit dem Jahre 1933," *Population*, December, 1937, p. 95.

of hatred was launched early in 1940 in connection with charges of illegal entry of refugees, and none have been admitted since then, although the country derives many economic benefits from the refugees, who have established numerous factories employing more than 5,000 workers.³⁰ In 1938, the Colombian Government turned down the applications of nearly 10,000 German refugees, mostly Jews, although about half of the applicants had relatives or friends in Colombia.³¹ A most unfriendly policy toward would-be Jewish immigrants is also pursued by Paraguay and Bolivia. The Bolivian Immigration Commission, by an order of May 3, 1940, indefinitely suspended the immigration of Jews without exception. Nevertheless, some 7,000 Jews had immigrated into Bolivia by the end of 1942. Of this number, 2,200 left later for other South and North American countries. At present the numbers of European Jews in the country is said to be 4,800. Of these, 85% are engaged in commerce, 5% in the skilled trades, 5% in farming, and 5% in the liberal professions. La Paz, the capital city, contains about 2,800 immigrants and Cochabamba 1,000. The rest are scattered throughout the country. One fifth of the refugees in Bolivia are on relief. The SOPRA of La Paz, which is the leading Jewish relief organization of the country, disbursed the sum of \$160,000 for relief purposes from January, 1939 to the end of December, 1942.^{31a}

If, nevertheless, tens of thousand of Jewish refugees have found new homes in South American countries, this may be due to the great efforts of the old-established Jewish communities,

³⁰L. Liberson, "German Jewish Refugees in Chile," *Der Weg*, March 7, 1942 (Yiddish).

³¹E. W. H. Lumsden, "Immigration and Politics in Latin America," *The Interamerican Quarterly*, October, 1940, p. 68. However, early in 1944 Colombia liberalized its immigration policy. See *News from Hitler Europe* (London), March 8, 1944.

^{31a}See the SOPRA's report, "Juden in Bolivien," in the volume *Zehn Jahre Aufbauarbeit in Südamerika, 1933-1943*, published on the tenth anniversary of the Jewish Philanthropic Association of Buenos Aires, p. 104.

which strove incessantly to influence the policies of the respective Governments. Many positions have thus been gained in South America since 1933 whose stabilization remains the task of the future.

Of the other Latin American republics, Mexico, Santo Domingo, and Cuba deserve mention. The first has absorbed—albeit with great difficulty and rather reluctantly—a few thousand refugees. Santo Domingo has become famous because of an experiment in Jewish colonization which was undertaken there on the basis of an agreement reached in 1940 by the Government of that country and the Dominican Republic Settlement Association (abbreviated to DORSA), an American corporation. The willingness of the Dominican Government to admit one hundred thousand immigrants for gradual settlement had been made known in 1938 at the Evian Conference. An investigation by President Roosevelt's Refugee Advisory Committee revealed an absorptive capacity of 29,000 families and recommended a trial settlement of 200 families.³² As a result of this investigation, the aforesaid agreement was concluded on January 30, 1940, and was unanimously ratified by the Dominican Congress on February 21 of that year. In this agreement the Dominican Government granted the settlers and their descendants full equality of civil, legal, economic, religious, and human rights, exemption from entry taxes and duty, and free import of their furniture, personal effects, tools, and materials. Considerable rights were also granted to the association, among them exemption from taxes and full freedom of economic activity. As the first contingent, 500 families of settlers were to be admitted, and the number was to be gradually augmented by the admission of additional settlers up to 100,000.³³

³²Concerning this investigation and the first preparations for colonization in Santo Domingo, see *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, June, 1940, p. 361 ff.

³³The full text of the agreement was published in the *Contemporary Jewish Rec-*

Nearly 400 refugees were brought over and settled on a tract of land at Sosua granted by the President of the Dominican Republic, General Rafael Trujillo.

The number of persons living at the Sosua refugee colony on June 30, 1942—the last date for which figures are available—was exactly 472,—a far cry from the 100,000 settlers contemplated. Moreover, a year after the founding of the Sosua settlement, the Brookings Institution of Washington, D.C., perhaps the foremost research organization in the United States, sent a group of agricultural and economic experts to the Dominican Republic to study the economic problems involved in settling refugees there under the agreement mentioned above. After several months of studying conditions on the spot, they reached the conclusion that, under the best circumstances, the Caribbean republic could at most accommodate 3,000 to 5,000 immigrants; that its rôle in solving the refugee problem as a whole is negligible except for the good example it sets for other countries.³⁴

Cuba, the largest of the Caribbean islands, with a population of 4,227,587, has a Jewish community of 7,800 souls. She has always been a member of the League of Nations and, as such, has participated in the various international conferences on the refugee problem.

When, on July 28, 1936, Dr. William I. Sirovich, member of the United States House of Representatives, conferred with President Miguel Gomez regarding a project to admit 100,000 or more Jewish refugees, it aroused so much anti-alien and anti-

ord, March-April, 1940, pp. 195-199. See also Dominican Republic Settlement Association, *Concerning Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic*.

³⁴The results of this study are embodied in a 400-page volume, *Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic*, published by the Brookings Institution in 1942. For a succinct summary of this report, see Murray Frank's article, "The Refugee Problem," in *The Workmen's Circle Call*, July, 1943, pp. 5-7.

Jewish agitation in Cuba that even the revised plan to admit only 25,000 refugees was shelved.^{34a}

However, Cuba granted, under her normal rules for the admission of foreigners, so-called tourist visas, for which the applicants or their relatives had to pay fees ranging from \$150 in 1938 and 1939 to \$250 or more in 1941. In addition, certain deposits had to be arranged for. These consisted of the following: (a) a letter of credit amounting to \$2,000, of which \$333.33 a month might be withdrawn for six consecutive months; (b) \$500, as a guarantee that the "tourist" would leave the country, and to be forfeited in case he was unable to leave at the specified time; (c) \$150, as security for the fare from Cuba to the final destination. Since the Cuban tourist visas in 1940-1941 offered one of the few means of rescuing Jews from Germany and other Nazi-held parts of Europe, and many relatives were unable to raise the considerable sum of \$2,650 for each adult, certain not very reliable banking institutions in Havana issued *pro-forma* letters of credit for a fee of \$150.

On May 15, 1939, the Hamburg-American liner *St. Louis* sailed for Havana with 907 refugees on board, although a decree had been promulgated by the Cuban Government voiding all landing permits previously issued by the Cuban Commissioner of Immigration. The passengers were not admitted although great Jewish organizations were ready to provide guarantees in the form of deposits of \$500 for each refugee permitted to land. On June 2, 1939, the ship sailed back to Europe, and one of the greatest refugee tragedies was averted only because England, France, Belgium and Holland agreed to admit these refugees after the Joint Distribution Committee had given financial guar-

^{34a}*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 39 (1937-1938), p. 490.

antees that these refugees would not become public charges and that they would eventually reemigrate.^{34b}

In May, 1940, when there were 3,000 Jewish refugees in Cuba, the Government announced that it would no longer admit political or religious refugees.^{34c}

In the latter part of 1940 and the first half of 1941, a more liberal policy was pursued in the application of the rules regarding the required deposits of money. However, on August 24, 1941, the issuance of tourist and transit visas to European nationals was suspended until late in September. During the succeeding months, most tragic for the Jews in Germany because of the closing of all United States consulates, nearly 35,000 visas were issued by the Cuban authorities. However, in view of the fact that the German Government on November 3, 1941, suspended all railway traffic to Lisbon, only 1,500 German Jews were able to reach Cuba.

After Cuba's entrance into the war against the Axis, a Presidential decree of April 19, 1942, made the issuance of further tourist visas impossible. But the refugees already in Cuba were allowed to remain there for the duration, and also to engage in some gainful activities.

3. THE FAR EAST

The rather interesting part which the Far Eastern countries played as centers of reception for Jewish refugees until the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and the events it set in train, derived from two facts: first, from the desperate efforts made by the refugees themselves, who did not encounter the same difficulties in those lands as elsewhere; second, from a certain amount of experience gained previously when the Far East had absorbed—

^{34b}*Ibid.*, Vol. 41 (1939-1940), p. 387 ff.

^{34c}*Ibid.*, Vol. 42 (1940-1941), p. 456.

at least temporarily—a number of Jewish refugees during World War I and in the years immediately after that war. Many Jewish communities had been founded in that period. Accordingly, a stream of German Jewish refugees turned to China, trying to find new livelihoods there. In this they were not hampered by the Chinese authorities, since there was no danger of their competing with the native population, concentrated, as the latter was, mainly in agriculture and the lowest grades of industrial labor. Even the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan did not affect this movement, which tended mostly to Shanghai as the only semi-European city one could enter without a visa.³⁵ Thus a community of 20,000 Jewish refugees, mainly from Germany but in the first years of the present war also from Poland, arose in Shanghai. Already in 1939, every third European in Shanghai was a German Jewish refugee. Most of the newcomers settled in the suburb of Hongkew because of the cheap lodgings and food to be had there. Many streets in Hongkew took on the appearance of a ghetto.³⁶ The majority of the refugees, unable to find suitable employment in the overcrowded city, had to be supported, and led a precarious existence. In 1941, nearly 15,000 were receiving aid from the Committee for the Assistance of European Jews, 3,700 were living in camps maintained with the financial aid of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, while 6,500 were being fed at soup kitchens.³⁷ The growing tension in the Far East complicated the situation still more, and it was evident even before the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States that the only solution was the removal of the refugees to other countries. A plan drawn up in consultation with the National Gov-

³⁵About the importance of Shanghai as a refugee center, see Albert Jovishoff, "A City of Refugees," *The Menorah Journal*, Spring, 1939, p. 209 ff.

³⁶Julius Rudolph, "The Jewish Refugee Tide," *China Weekly Review*, August 19, 1939.

³⁷"Jews in the Far East," *Jewish Affairs*, Vol. I, No. 6, January, 1942, p. 4.

ernment of China to colonize German Jews in the province of Yunnan did not materialize.³⁸ The outbreak of hostilities in December, 1941, and the subsequent occupation of Shanghai by the Japanese, made all escape of the refugees from there impossible; it also precluded the possibility of sending help to them from America. That many of the over twenty thousand refugees there did not perish of starvation was due to the Joint Distribution Committee, which, foreseeing the possibility of war, had empowered its two representatives in Shanghai to borrow money locally against the J.D.C.'s postwar credit if war should come and communications be severed. These representatives, who were unable to leave Shanghai after the commence of Japanese-American hostilities, succeeded, prior to their internment by the Japanese in February, 1943, in borrowing \$500,000 from neutrals in that city, with which they were able to serve 5,000 meals a day to the neediest among the refugees—the children, the aged, and the sick.³⁹

There is but little to relate about the Jewish refugees in Japan proper. In World War II, as in World War I, that country served as a transit place for several thousand refugees proceeding from Germany and Lithuania across Russia to American countries and to Palestine.⁴⁰ But while, in the earlier war, the refugees had to

³⁸Concerning this plan, see "China's Offer to Provide Home for Jews in Yunnan," *China Weekly Review*, June 24, 1939, p. 9.

³⁹A very interesting and moving account of conditions in Shanghai after the city's occupation by the Japanese was given by Laura L. Margolis, one of the J.D.C.'s representatives in Shanghai, upon her return to the United States on December 2, 1943, aboard the Swedish exchange liner *Gripsholm*. See Laura L. Margolis, "Refugees in the Far East," in *The Rescue of Stricken Jews in a World at War: A Report on the Work and Plans of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee as contained in Address delivered at its Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting, December 4th and 5th, 1934*, pp. 17-18.

⁴⁰The Joint Distribution Committee estimated that this route was used by more than 7,000, of whom 5,000 were emigrants from German lands and over 2,000 Polish refugees from Lithuania. (See *Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1940 and the First 5 Months of 1941*, p. 16.)

stay in Japan for only a few weeks until transportation was secured, the problem now grew enormously difficult because of the new American visa regulations, with the result that many refugees had to remain in Japan for months until emigration possibilities were found. The Japanese authorities, whose attitude toward the refugees had been very friendly in the first period, and who had granted transit visas through their country even when the final visas were of doubtful validity or were merely expected, grew impatient in the course of time and insisted on having the refugees removed from the country. With the mounting tension between Japan and the United States, further complications arose leading finally to the deportation of nearly all the refugees from Japan to Shanghai in October, 1941.⁴¹

Of the other countries in the Far East, mention must be made of the Philippine Islands, where by the end of 1939 seven hundred refugees had found asylum in and about the city of Manila. The Philippine Commonwealth agreed to admit 10,000 refugees over a period of years for settlement in Mindanao,⁴² but the outbreak of war put an end to this agricultural colonization project.

4. BRITISH DOMINIONS AND POSSESSIONS

The insignificant part played by the British Dominions as countries of reception for Jewish refugees can scarcely be explained on economic grounds. Nearly all the British Dominions, being linked with one another and incorporated in the gigantic body of the British Empire, have enormous possibilities of economic development, and the admission of a few tens or even

However, several hundred refugees from other parts of Russia must be added. Between July, 1940 and May, 1941, 4,664 Jewish refugees found temporary asylum in Japan. Of these, 2,496 came from Germany and 1,962 from Poland. (Cf. "Jews in the Far East," *loc. cit.*, p. 5.)

⁴¹"Jews in the Far East," *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴²American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, *Aid to Jews Overseas: Report for 1939*, p. 42.

hundreds of thousands of immigrants would not constitute a difficult problem for them. Nearly all the British Dominions are no less interested in the industrial than in the agricultural development of their respective territories. Their reluctance to admit Jewish refugees cannot therefore be wholly or mainly prompted by economic motives.

The truth is that both in South Africa and in Australia, and to a certain extent also in Canada, political considerations weigh more heavily than economic. In South Africa, where hostile relations between the white population and the Negroes have always caused unrest, and where another sharp antagonism exists between the British and the Boers, very little survives of the former liberal British policy. The proximity of Tanganyika Territory, former German East Africa, where Nazi propaganda soon began to spread, has served as a further complicating factor. Consequently, as soon as the number of German refugees grew from a few hundred in the first year of the Hitler regime to 7,000 in the following years, the anti-alien and, later, clearly anti-Jewish agitation in that country assumed such proportions that the authorities saw—rightly or wrongly—no alternative but to close the doors altogether to Jewish refugees.⁴³ The Board of Deputies of South African Jewry was obliged, in a statement of December 16, 1936, to protest against anti-Jewish discrimination in immigration matters and against arguments as to the alleged unasimilability of the Jews which were employed in the propaganda campaign. The Board also denied the accusation that the Jewish immigration into South Africa had been organized by it.⁴⁴

A similar policy, although not so clearly directed against Jewish refugees, was followed by Australia. Unlike South Africa,

⁴³For details of this agitation and the reaction to it, see *Report of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, 1933-1935*, and the pamphlet, *The Immigration of the Jews into the Union, 1926-1936*, published by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies.

⁴⁴*The Immigration of the Jews into the Union, 1926-1936*, pp. 15-17.

the population of this Dominion is British in its overwhelming majority and is determined to preserve its British character. The immigration of non-British elements is therefore considered undesirable. This is the reason why that country was closed altogether to Japanese settlers and why the immigration of even white people, especially of Italians and Jews (who furnished the largest number of immigrants in recent years), was severely restricted, although Australia is greatly underpopulated, having, on a territory almost as large as Europe, no more than 7 million inhabitants (as against Europe's 460 millions), and although, according to its own leaders, its population will have to be increased to at least three or four times its present size after the war.⁴⁵ Another half-economic, half political motive is the desire of Australians to preserve their unusually high standard of living and not to permit the immigration of elements who might affect this standard unfavorably. The problem of immigration, and also the problem of refugees, is therefore one of the most delicate in the life of the country, and any agitation in favor of admitting refugees is most unpopular.

Altogether, the number of Jewish refugees admitted into Australia up to the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific is estimated at 8,500.⁴⁶ In many cases the Government made entry conditional upon the possession of at least £200 landing money, and sometimes much larger sums were required.⁴⁷ In 1938, the Australian Government decided, after long hesitation, to admit 5,000 refugees annually for the next three years. Only persons who would not disturb the existing labor conditions were to be admitted,

⁴⁵Dr. George M. Berger, *Report on the Jewish Immigration to Australia, with Special Consideration of the Australian Immigration Policy, 1933-1941, Submitted to the World Jewish Congress*, p. 2 (hereafter cited as *Berger, Report*).

⁴⁶Dr. George M. Berger, "Australia and the Refugees," *The Australian Quarterly*, December, 1941, p. 52.

⁴⁷R. Lemberg, "The Problem of Refugee Immigration," *The Australian Quarterly*, September, 1939, p. 20.

with special consideration for individuals with capital and experience necessary to launch and develop industries not already developed. At the same time, the Government announced its willingness to grant some financial assistance to refugee-aid organizations as an indispensable factor in the assimilation of the refugees.⁴⁸ However, owing to the subsequent outbreak of war, this authorization could not be fully utilized; of the quota of 15,000 entry permits to which the Australian Government agreed, at least 11,000 are still available.⁴⁹ A few hundred Polish Jewish refugees have been admitted to Australia during the war on the strength of a guarantee for their maintenance given by Jewish organizations.

The situation in Canada is somewhat different. This Dominion has always had the internal problem of relations between the British and the French populations, and it has also had a strong antisemitic movement. But the general reluctance of that country to admit refugees is certainly due more to economic than to psychological reasons. Canada is primarily an agricultural country and apparently will remain such for a long time to come. As an essentially agricultural country with a vast area, it is capable of absorbing hundreds of thousands and even millions of farm settlers, but its absorptive capacity for industrial workers is much smaller, and it is insignificant as regards merchants and professional men. This is the reason why Canada's doors have been virtually closed to immigration since the last great depression. Very few exceptions have been made for refugees, although in the not so distant past there were many cases where refugees were not only admitted but assisted after their arrival in the country (among others, several thousand Russian Jewish refugees

⁴⁸C. Hartley Grattan, "Refugees and an Undeveloped Economy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 181.

⁴⁹Berger, *Report*, p. 6.

were admitted). A very small number of German refugees were admitted into Canada until the start of the present war, despite the vigorous campaign waged by the progressive elements of the country.⁵⁰ The refugees admitted belonged mostly to the wealthier classes among German Jewry, and they invested considerable sums in Canadian industry. A Canadian writer has estimated at twenty million dollars the amount of capital which refugees invested in their own manufacturing enterprises up to the end of 1940.⁵¹ The total number of German refugees admitted to Canada is estimated at 6,000.⁵² A limited number of Polish Jewish refugees were admitted only for the duration of the war under a special agreement concluded between the Polish and the Canadian Governments, the principal object of which was to create a Polish army in Canada.

At the end of 1943 the Canadian Government agreed to issue visas to refugee families stranded in Portugal or Spain. Single persons were to be considered later. Meanwhile the Canadian National Committee on Refugees and Victims of Political Persecution conducted a campaign, under the leadership of Senator Cairine Wilson, to obtain 500,000 signatures to a petition urging the Government

to offer the sanctuary of Canada to refugees from political or religious persecution without regard to race, creed or financial condition:

to take immediate steps to facilitate the entry into Canada of refugees—especially those stranded in Portugal—whom it is still possible to rescue:

⁵⁰See especially Canadian National Committee on Refugees and Victims of Political Oppression, *Should Canada Admit Refugees?*

⁵¹Bruno Lasker, "Elsewhere: An Atlas of Hope," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1940, p. 586 ff.

⁵²Francis Kalmay, *The New Americans*, p. 33.

to make any change in the Immigration Act, regulations or administration thereof necessary to admit such refugees to Canada.⁵³

On December 17, 1943, the Canadian press reported that restrictions on the employment of interned refugees who had been released were being lifted.⁵⁴

All the other British Dominions, Colonies, and Possessions (New Zealand, India, Kenya, etc.) pursue the same restrictive policy as the foregoing three Dominions, and the number of refugees admitted by them is negligible.

A certain number of Polish refugees, among them several hundred Jewish families, have been admitted to Rhodesia, Kenya, Tanganyika, and other British colonies in Africa for the duration by virtue of an agreement between the Polish Government-in-Exile and Great Britain. Other Jewish refugees have found a refugee—though not of their own choosing—in the British Colony of Mauritius, an island in the Indian Ocean, off the coast of Madagascar. Mauritius became a haven for Jewish refugees in January, 1941, when more than 1,500 Jews, mainly from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig, who had come to Palestine without immigration visas, were reported by the British authorities to Mauritius and detained chiefly in a camp at Port Louis, the island capital. At the end of September, 1943, there were 1,422 refugees at the Port Louis detainment camp, of whom all but a few were Jews. The camp contains two synagogues, workshops, schools for the young (kindergartens, primary and second-

⁵³Senator Cairine Wilson, "The People on Canada's Conscience," *Modern Digest*, December, 1943. This campaign, it should be added, has borne fruit. According to press reports of August and September, 1944, several hundred Jewish refugees stranded in Spain and Portugal arrived in Canada, where they were given assistance by the Canadian Jewish Congress.

⁵⁴Jewish Telegraphic Agency, *Daily News Bulletin*, December 19, 1943.

ary schools), libraries, playgrounds, hospitals, etc.⁵⁵

The various schemes for colonizing Jewish refugees in certain parts of the British Empire have not advanced beyond the theoretical stage.

The project to colonize Jewish refugees on the land in the East Kimberley district of Western Australia was launched in 1937 by the Jewish Freeland League, whose headquarters, now in New York, were then in London. The area selected for settlement consists of over 7,000,000 acres. Opinion regarding the climate and the soil of that region is divided. Enlightened public opinion in Australia was very favorable to the project, but so far the Dominion Government has not accepted it and the matter is still under negotiation.⁵⁶

The plan for Jewish refugee colonization in Kenya was first suggested by Lord Winterton, the British representative at the Evian Conference, and was favorably received in both Jewish and non-Jewish circles, but soon opposition developed, especially among the Hindu inhabitants of the colony. A statement by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on November 21, 1938, reduced the whole scheme to the settlement of a few young men who had undergone agricultural training under the auspices of Jewish organizations in Germany, and that, too, on farms to be purchased by Jewish organizations. But even on this modest scale nothing was done.⁵⁷ The idea of refugee colonization in British Guiana was also first propounded by the British Govern-

⁵⁵See *Colony of Mauritius: Interim Report on the Detainment Camp for the period 1st Oct., 1942, to Sept., 1943*, by H. J. Armitage, Commandant of the Detainment Camp. See also the annual reports of the Joint Distribution Committee for 1941, 1942, and 1943.

⁵⁶For details of this plan, see J. Steinberg, "The Jewish Colonization in Kimberley," *The Australian Quarterly*, March, 1940, and "Projects for Jewish Mass Colonization," *Jewish Affairs*, Vol. I, No. 4, November, 1941, p. 10 ff.

⁵⁷"Projects for Jewish Mass Colonization," *loc. cit.*, p. 11 f.

ment in a statement in the House of Commons on November 21, 1938, and an Anglo-American commission of experts was sent there to study the existing possibilities. The report of this commission suggested a trial settlement of 3,000 to 5,000 carefully selected young men and women at an approximate outlay of \$3,000,000.⁵⁸ No concrete action followed, either by the British Government or by some private corporation.

In short, the rôle which the British Dominions and Possessions have played in the effort to solve the Jewish refugee problem cannot be compared with that of Britain itself.

5. MISCELLANEOUS

To enumerate all the countries where Jewish refugees have found, or at least have sought to find, new homes after being driven out of Germany and other European countries would sound like reciting a lesson in world geography, for the Jewish refugee movement has been truly global in extent. But there remain a few countries which deserve passing mention.

The French colonies and dependencies in Africa became of some importance to Jewish refugees only during the present war, when several thousand of them sought refuge in French Morocco after the collapse of France. At first they were treated with cordial hospitality, but later they had to suffer in the same manner as the Jewish refugees in metropolitan France because of the anti-Jewish policy of the Vichy Government. A great number left the country; of the remainder, many were put in internment camps or condemned to forced labor in the Sahara Desert, and were only liberated after the reconquest of North Africa by the Allies, as related in Chapter VI.

⁵⁸For details, read Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the British Guiana Commission to the Advisory Committee on Political Refugees appointed by the President of the United States*, p. 17; Appendix to the Report, p. 106.

Small numbers of Jewish refugees—mostly scholars and experts—have been admitted into Turkey, Iran, and Egypt. The Arab countries have played no part whatever in the absorption of Jewish refugees, although plans for admitting them have been discussed on several occasions in connection with the political and economic situation in the Near East.

CHAPTER XI

THE REFUGEE IN FIGURES

*Introductory—Distribution According to Country of Origin
—Countries of Immigration—Age Distribution and Sex
Ratio—Marital Status—Occupational Distribution—Import
of Capital by Refugees*

1. INTRODUCTORY

For several years following the advent of the Hitler regime the ranks of the Jewish refugees were made up entirely of persons leaving Germany. Beginning in 1938 these ranks were swelled by émigrés from Austria, and at the present time the refugee groups comprise nationals of nearly all European countries. The spread of the Nazi rule over the Continent made the refugee problem one of far greater magnitude than it had been previously. Before any steps toward postwar planning can be taken, it is essential to have as accurate a picture as the situation permits of the geographic distribution of the refugees, their age grouping and occupational adjustment. It is the purpose of the present chapter to review the basic facts regarding the refugee situation so far as the available scattered statistics make this possible.

For a number of reason it has been necessary to be content to a certain degree with approximate rather than exact figures. In the first place, reliable official figures regarding Jewish immigrants are available only for the United States and to a lesser extent for Palestine. Such data cannot be secured for other countries because in varying degree the movement of refugees out of and into certain lands is of an illegal character and cannot be reflected in official figures. In most countries, moreover, the

official statistics do not include the category of race or religion and it is therefore impossible to obtain figures regarding Jewish immigrants or Jewish inhabitants in general. Furthermore, the official machinery for collecting statistics is in many states far too inefficient to provide reliable figures. Finally, so far as the departure of refugees during the present war is concerned, this took place in many cases under conditions of general chaos which made it impossible even to record the number of persons involved. The sources upon which the present investigation is based are of three kinds: (a) official figures taken from the reports of governments or governmental agencies in charge of immigration; (b) reports of reliable semi-public Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, including the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, HICEM, Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland, the Red Cross, and the American Friends Service Committee; (c) articles in various periodicals describing the situation of refugees in individual countries, and a selected number of other publications.

2. DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

One fundamental remark must be made before the first table, showing the approximate figures for Jewish refugees according to their countries of origin, is presented. We may be tempted to include there only refugees in the narrow sense of the word, namely, those who left their homelands either of their own free will, fleeing from persecutions, or who were evacuated by their own governments in order to save them from falling into the hands of the enemy. However, this category, which before the war and even in the first three years of the war constituted the majority of the uprooted Jewish elements, has lost its numerical preponderance as a result of the mass deportations, begun shortly

after the outbreak of hostilities and carried on in proportions almost unexampled in the history of mankind, especially since the middle of 1942. Not to take into account this mass movement of deported people, numerically several times greater than the category of free refugees, would be a grave error likely to produce a distorted picture of the existing situation.

But even the category of deported persons must be subdivided. Not all persons expelled from their homes by the Germans or their satellites were deported to other countries; a very considerable part remained in their own country, being merely removed from one locality to another or even—in cases where ghettos were established—from one section of the town to another. The difference between these two cases is not merely one of distance. Whereas deportation from one country to another has meant loss of liberty coupled usually with forced labor, in the case of deportation within the limits of the same country the deportees often retain their freedom, and there may even exist a possibility for them to continue—at least, in some measure—their former economic activities.

Hence it is advisable to include in the following table all uprooted Jewish elements, divided into the three categories of refugees in the narrow sense of the word, deportees from one country to another, and deportees within the limits of the same country.¹

¹Besides the sources mentioned above, the following two books were used in compiling this table: *Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews*, pp. 299-311, and Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, pp. 95-113. Both books, published in 1943, contain the latest figures available.

TABLE I

JEWISH REFUGEES AND DEPORTEES, 1933-1943, CLASSIFIED
BY CATEGORY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Country	Refugees (including evacuees)	Deportees from one country to another	Deportees within the limits of the same country	Total
All countries.....	2,391,000	665,000	2,205,000	5,261,000
Poland	525,000		2,000,000	2,525,000
U.S.S.R.	1,200,000			1,200,000
Germany	285,000	160,000		445,000
Austria	100,000	20,000		120,000
Rumania	100,000	185,000		285,000
France	30,000	70,000	100,000	200,000
Protectorate	25,000	30,000	40,000	95,000
Slovakia	10,000	60,000	20,000	90,000
Lithuania	10,000		30,000	40,000
Latvia	15,000		15,000	30,000
Belgium	25,000	50,000		75,000
Holland	25,000	80,000		105,000
Yugoslavia	8,000	25,000		33,000
Greece	3,000	10,000		13,000
Bulgaria		10,000		10,000
Other European countries	30,000	5,000		35,000

The figure for the refugees from Poland, it should be remarked, includes both persons who at the outbreak of war, or later, succeeded in escaping to neighboring countries and then emigrated further, mostly to Palestine and the United States, and the second category of refugees now living on Soviet territory. The number of the first group is rather limited, being estimated at 30 to 50 thousand. The second category is quite numerous; it may be not much under half a million. In 1940, a great many of these latter

were deported from the Russian-occupied part of Poland to the interior provinces of the Soviet Union, but they were released after the commencement of Russo-German hostilities and so can scarcely be regarded as deportees at the present moment. Again, the 1,200,000 refugees of the U.S.S.R. have all been evacuated by the Russian authorities to the interior of the Soviet Union. There are no Russian refugees outside the country's borders.

Altogether it appears that close to two and a half million European Jews have fled of their own accord since 1933, or have been evacuated; almost three quarters of a million have been deported from one country to another, and over two million have been displaced within the confines of their country. In relation to the Jewish population of the world, now estimated at some sixteen million, the uprooted Jews form almost exactly one third; in relation to European Jewry as it was before the Nazi regime in Germany (about nine and a half million) they constitute much more than one half. Thus every third Jew in the world and every second Jew in Europe may be included today in the category of uprooted people, a ratio scarcely equaled in the annals of any other nation.

It should be mentioned, by the way, that not all the Jews whose numbers are given in Table I are alive today. This is particularly true of the deportees, a large proportion of whom died either in the course of deportation or shortly afterwards. Altogether the number of those who died during deportation is estimated at 350,000, while of the Polish Jews who were left on the territory of their country, more than one half—two million men, women, and children—have been exterminated by the Germans.

Not all who have been uprooted from their homes have lost all their sources of income and must be supported in one form or another. The refugees, particularly those who left Germany

in the early years of the Nazi regime, have been able in some measure to reestablish themselves in other countries, especially in Palestine and the United States. At least 100,000 German Jews may be put in this category. Then, too, many of the refugees from West European countries succeeded in saving a considerable part of their fortunes. However, in comparison with the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, who have been ousted from their economic positions and deprived of all their property, such limited numbers hardly count and they cannot alter materially the magnitude of the Jewish refugee problem.

3. COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION

Just as in the case of countries of origin we had to divide the vast stream of refugees into the three categories of refugees, deported persons, and those displaced within the limits of their own country, in order to make the table more intelligible to the reader, so in the present case a rather fundamental distinction must be made between countries of reception, where the refugees went on their own initiative and in the hope of finding new homes there, and the countries to which they were evacuated or deported. The term "country of refuge" may be used only in regard to the first category of countries and to a certain extent also in reference to countries to which people were evacuated; it is certainly inapplicable to countries to which people were deported.

This distinction is, of course, not of sentimental value only; it is of decisive importance as far as the present situation and the future of the refugees are concerned. In the countries of reception, the situation of the refugees is as a rule tolerable, not infrequently even better than that. In many cases there may exist the will to remain there and establish a new home; where this will is not manifest, the cause generally is sentimental attachment to the old country rather than dissatisfaction with the new. Quite

different is the case of the deportees, who have no reason whatever to be satisfied with their new places, where their situation is at best precarious and may only too often become unbearable. Here the desire to leave these places and return home or emigrate elsewhere may be considered the rule. Midway between these two extremes is the situation of the evacuees, which as a rule is also very difficult, but incomparably better (especially as regards morale) than that of the deportees; nor is the possibility of finding permanent homes in the new places altogether excluded here.

In the light of these observations, let us look at the table of the immigration countries. (Table II, p. 340)

A few explanatory remarks are in order.

The figure for Poland comprises two million Polish Jews displaced within the confines of their own country, as well as six hundred thousand Jews who have been deported to Poland from other countries. It is based, so far as the deported elements are concerned, on an official estimate by the Polish Government, which, however, is regarded by some scholars as exaggerated. A reduction of this figure must automatically result in a corresponding increase of the figure for Russia, since, as is well known, people from Central and Western Europe have been deported to either one or the other of these two countries.

The figure for Russia comprises the Soviet Jewish citizens evacuated to the interior provinces of that country; the Polish Jews now residing on the territory of the Soviet Union whose number is estimated at half a million (but there are more modest estimates ranging from as low as 250,000 to 350,000); the Jewish refugees from Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (in all perhaps about 100,000), and the deportees to the German-occupied territories of Russia, whose exact number can hardly be established.

TABLE II

JEWISH REFUGEES AND DEPORTEES, 1933-1943, CLASSIFIED BY
COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION (INCLUDING PEOPLE DISPLACED
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY)

Country	Number Admitted (in thousands)
All countries	5,261
Poland	2,600
U.S.S.R.	1,850
United States	190
Palestine	120
England	65
France	55
Belgium	30
Holland	35
Switzerland	16
Spain	12
Other European countries	70
Argentina	50
Brazil	25
Uruguay	7
Bolivia	12
Chile	14
Other Latin American countries	20
China	25
South Africa	8
Australia	9
Canada	8
Other Countries	40

The estimated number of refugees admitted to the United States during the period 1933-40 was calculated by two alternative methods which give essentially the same result: (a) The official figure regarding Jewish immigration from Germany (75,048) was increased by about 50 percent to allow for those

who entered from other countries (England, France, and Belgium); it was further estimated that among the 36,435 Jews admitted as visitors about 25,000 were refugees. (b) Alternatively, the whole number of Jewish immigrants (129,078) was reduced by the number of those coming from Canada, Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, and Hungary (19,624), and the remainder (109,454) assumed to consist of refugees; this figure was then increased by 25,000 to allow for those admitted as visitors. By either method a total of 134,000 was obtained and to this was added the whole number of Jewish immigrants admitted during the last three fiscal years and half the number of Jewish visitors, a considerable number of whom held "emergency visas" which are granted to political refugees for the duration of the war. On the basis of this rather conservative calculation an estimate of 190,000 was accepted.

The figure for Palestine was arrived at by adding to the official figure regarding Jewish immigrants from Germany in the years 1933-1939 (49,551) the entire Jewish immigration to Palestine since the start of the war (some thirty-two thousand), as well as an estimated forty thousand covering people who entered Palestine before the war without immigration certificates and German Jews who arrived from countries other than Germany.

As for the figure given in Table II for "other European countries," it is known that, prior to the outbreak of the present war, there were 6,000 Jewish refugees in Hungary, 7,000 in Yugoslavia, 6,000 in Slovakia, 3,500 in Italy, 2,000 in Norway, and 1,000 in Turkey. How many of them are still left in these countries, it is impossible to tell. In many cases, especially in the territories occupied by the Germans, the figures were drastically reduced during the war. On the other hand, a considerable number of refugees from Poland were admitted to Hungary before the recent German occupation of that country.

As is evident from this table, the great majority of the Jewish refugees and deportees—more than four fifths—are concentrated in Poland and in the Soviet Union. Besides these two countries, there are a few others which appear in both Table I and Table II, notably France, Belgium, and Holland. These three countries, which before the war had admitted rather considerable numbers of refugees, have themselves been turned by the war developments into territories from which Jews have had to flee or have been deported.

It may be instructive to compare the various countries of immigration in respect to their relative importance for the uprooted Jewish elements. But for this purpose Poland and the Soviet Union must be omitted since, as indicated above, they can hardly be called countries of refuge. The corrected table, listing only refugees who fled of their own accord, will appear as follows (Table III, p. 343):

Table III shows that over one fifth of the refugees went to the United States and over one seventh to Palestine; while the greater part arrived before the war began, the stream continued to pour in after its outbreak. Among the other countries an important part was played by England and France which (before the war) absorbed approximately one eleventh and one fourteenth, respectively, of the total. Of the American countries, outside of the United States, only Argentina admitted a substantial number of refugees, but still less than England or France. Altogether, however, the Latin American countries absorbed about one sixth of the total.

It will be of interest to compare the number of refugees admitted into each country with the number of Jews resident there before Hitler's rise to power. (Table IV, p. 344)

A rather different light on the admission of refugees is thrown by Table IV. Despite the fact that the United States admitted the

TABLE III
COUNTRIES OF RECEPTION FOR JEWISH REFUGEES
1933-1943

Country	Number admitted (in thousands)	Percent
All countries	811	100.0
United States	190	23.5
Palestine	120	14.8
England	65	8.1
France	55	6.8
Belgium	30	3.7
Holland	35	4.3
Switzerland	16	1.9
Spain	12	1.4
Other European countries	70	8.8
Argentina	50	6.2
Brazil	25	3.1
Uruguay	7	0.8
Bolivia	12	1.4
Chile	14	1.7
Other Latin American countries ..	20	2.4
China	25	3.1
South Africa	8	1.0
Australia	9	1.1
Canada	8	1.0
Other countries	40	4.9

largest number of refugees, it falls far behind all other countries in respect to the ratio of this group to the size of the Jewish community in the country. It is the West European countries which admitted relatively large numbers of Jewish refugees while high ratios are likewise shown by the South American countries as well as by Australia.

The tremendous contribution of Palestine, which absorbed refugees to the extent of over two thirds of its previous Jewish

population, stands out. Disregarding Spain, Switzerland, and certain Latin American countries, whose high relative figures are obviously due to the fact that they had so few Jews until 1933, Palestine leads all the other countries under consideration by a wide margin. The relative importance of German-Jewish immigration into Palestine during the years of Nazi domination is also evident from the official figures submitted to the League of Nations by the British Government.²

TABLE IV
JEWISH REFUGEES CLASSIFIED BY COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION AND
RATIO TO JEWISH POPULATION

Country	Jewish population*	Year of census or estimate	Estimated number of refugees	Ratio of refugees to the Jewish population in percentage
Palestine	175,000	1932	120,000	68.1
United States ...	4,500,000	1933	190,000	4.2
England	300,000	1931	65,000	21.7
France	220,000	1933	55,000	25.0
Belgium	60,000	1934	30,000	50.0
Holland	150,000	1933	35,000	23.2
Switzerland	17,973	1930	16,000	84.6
Spain	4,000	1930	12,000	300.0
Argentina	215,000	1933	50,000	23.2
Brazil	40,000	1934	25,000	62.5
Uruguay	12,000	1933	7,000	58.3
Bolivia	2,000	1933	12,000	600.0
Chile	2,200	1933	14,000	672.2
South Africa	90,000	1936	8,000	8.8
Australia	24,000	1933	9,000	37.5
Canada	155,000	1931	8,000	5.2

*While census figures are available for five of the countries listed, round numbers have been substituted for the sake of uniformity.

²Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1936, p. 72; Report for the Year 1938, p. 70.

TABLE V
JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO PALESTINE CLASSIFIED BY
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, IN PERCENT

Country of origin	1922-29	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Poland	46	43	49	41	35	25
Germany	—	16	11	27	34	52*
Other countries	54	41	40	32	31	23

*Including Austria.

Prior to 1934 there was practically no German Jewish immigration into Palestine, but this situation changed rapidly. (Table V.) The percentage of refugees, already considerable in 1934, grew steadily, except for a short interruption in 1935; in 1938, on the eve of the war, immigration from Germany amounted to more than half the annual total. Conversely, the preponderance of Polish Jews decreased until they amounted to only one fourth of all Jewish immigrants admitted in 1938.

A year-by-year description of the shifts and changes in the rate of immigration of Jewish refugees to the various countries cannot be compiled from the available statistical data. Only for the war years 1939-1942 can such an account be attempted on the basis of the official reports of the respective governments as well as the reports and estimates of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, HICEM, and the Jewish immigrant aid societies in the respective countries. Table VI covers all Jewish immigrants during those years, but the overwhelming majority of them, especially 1940-1942, were undoubtedly refugees.

Although a number of refugees went to certain Central American and Far Eastern areas during 1939-1940, those countries are

TABLE VI
JEWISH IMMIGRATION, 1939 - 1942

Country of immigration	1939	1940	1941	1942	Total	Percent
All countries	103,501	57,015	34,994	18,235	213,745	100.0
United States	43,450	36,945	23,737	10,608	114,740	53.6
Palestine	35,061	10,247	5,447	5,000	55,755	26.1
Canada	890	1,623	600	76	3,189	1.4
Argentina	4,300	1,850	1,460	1,318	8,928	4.2
Brazil	4,600	2,416	1,600	108	8,724	4.1
Uruguay	2,200	500	300	138	3,138	1.5
Chile	5,200	1,137	500	250	7,087	3.3
Bolivia	5,000	1,223	200	—	6,423	3.1
Ecuador	1,300	300	400	167	2,167	1.0
Colombia	500	300	300	170	1,270	0.6
Others	1,000	474	450	400	2,324	1.1

omitted from Table VI because the refugees simply journeyed through them *en route* to the United States and Palestine; Jewish immigration to the overseas countries not included above was insignificant. The following conclusions may be drawn from Table VI: (a) The relative importance of the United States and Palestine grew to even greater heights than in the prewar years. Almost four fifths of all wartime refugees were received by these two countries. Every other refugee was admitted to the United States and every fourth to Palestine. (b) The number of refugees admitted annually has been decreasing because of war conditions which make escape from European countries practically impossible. In 1940, 1941, and 1942 totals dropped to one half, one third, and one fifth, respectively, of the 1939 figure. (c) Nevertheless, the figures are quite considerable and they bear witness to the desperate efforts of the refugees themselves as well as

of the Jewish organizations concerned to save whatever could be saved from the European inferno. The fact that over 110,000 Jewish refugees could be brought from Europe to overseas countries during three years of war (1940-1942), can scarcely be overestimated.

Official statistics for tracing the trend of refugee migration from its inception are available only for Palestine and the United States. Tables VII and VIII³ below show this trend with respect to these principal countries year by year since 1933.

It is obvious that the figures in Tables VII and VIII cover only part of the refugees, since they are limited to those who came directly from Germany, and it is known that a very considerable number sojourned in other countries before their arrival in the United States or Palestine. However, even in this limited form the steady increase in the number of refugees is evident, especially in the case of the United States. A sharp rise in the number of refugees from Greater Germany was registered after 1938, because the refugees from Austria were added to the totals in that year and the pressure of persecution in all German territories became much more severe than in former years. The sudden decrease in the figure for 1940-41 is, of course, due to the war, which reduced the flow of immigration to overseas countries. Certain extrinsic factors also affected the development: the transitory decrease of the figures for Palestine in the years 1937-38 was due to the disorders prevailing there and the subsequent restriction of immigration by the Mandatory Government. In the case of the United States the heavy increase starting with 1937 may be connected with a change in policy which opened the gates to a larger number of refugees within the limits of the quota.

³*Report to the XXI Zionist Congress and to the Council of the Jewish Agency, Submitted by the Central Bureau for Settlement of German Jews, 1939, App. I, p. 68, with additions for the later years.*

THE JEWISH REFUGEE

TABLE VII

JEWISH REFUGEES FROM GERMANY ADMITTED TO THE
UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1932 TO JUNE 30, 1941

Fiscal year	Number	Percent
Total	79,261	100.0
1932-33	72	0.1
1933-34	1,786	2.2
1934-35	1,683	2.1
1935-36	3,284	4.2
1936-37	6,750	8.5
1937-38	11,917	15.0
1938-39*	30,096	37.9
1939-40*	19,880	25.1
1940-41*	3,793	4.9

*Including Austria

TABLE VIII

JEWISH REFUGEES FROM GERMANY ADMITTED TO
PALESTINE, 1933-1940

Year	Number	Percent
Total	7,447	14.8
1933	7,896	15.7
1934	3,280	6.5
1935	6,138	12.2
1936	9,490	18.8
1937	791	1.6
1938*	50,342	100.0
1939*	6,803	13.5
1940*	8,497	16.9

*Including Austria.

Interesting figures concerning the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine during the three years 1939-1941 and their distribution according to the "legal" or "illegal" character of the immigration, have been published by the General Federation of Jewish Labor in Palestine. This immigration may virtually be regarded as a refugee immigration, for, even in the eight months of 1939 preceding the outbreak of the war, German Jewish refugees constituted the overwhelming majority of all immigrants.

TABLE IX
JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE, 1939-1941

Type of immigrant	1939	1940	1941	Total	Percent
All immigrants	35,061 (68.1%)	10,247 (21.2%)	5,447 (10.7%)	50,755 (100.0%)	100.0
Legal immigrants (registered by the Palestine Govern- ment)	16,405	4,547	3,647	24,594	48.4
Illegal immigrants (detained by the authorities)	11,156	5,450	800	17,406	34.3
Other immigrants	7,500	250	1,000	8,750	17.3

The rather substantial number of immigrants in 1939 dropped to less than a third in 1940 and to a sixth in 1941 under the impact of the war developments. Although exact figures for 1942 are unavailable at this writing, in all probability they are virtually the same as for 1941.

The considerable rôle played by the so-called illegal immigration is quite evident from this table, which shows that over 34% of all Jewish immigrants arriving during those three years came without authorization from the Palestine Government.

4. AGE DISTRIBUTION AND SEX RATIO

In this section as well as in Section 6, which deals with the occupational distribution of the refugees, we must again rely

mainly on data concerning the refugees who migrated to Palestine and the United States. Our sources in the first instance are the reports of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and of the Palestine Government, and in the second, the figures published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States.

TABLE X

REFUGEES ADMITTED TO PALESTINE PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 1939,
CLASSIFIED BY AGE-GROUP

Age-group	Number	Percent
All ages	44,517	100.0
1- 9	4,337	9.7
10-20	10,181	22.8
21-30	11,241	25.3
31-40	7,502	16.9
41-50	4,502	10.1
51-60	3,723	8.4
61-70	2,018	4.5
71 and over	619	1.4
Unspecified	394	0.9

As against this picture offered by Table X⁴ compare the age composition of the Jewish population in Germany in 1933, shown in Table XI.⁵

⁴Based on *Report of the Central Bureau*, Table VII, p. 79; see also Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany during 1933-1937*, Table VII, p. 8 (mimeographed).

⁵*Statistik des deutschen Reiches*, vol. cccclv., *Volkszählung. Die Bevölkerung des deutschen Reiches nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung 1933*. Heft 5: *Die Glaubensjuden im deutschen Reich*, p. 17.

TABLE XI

JEWISH POPULATION, GERMANY, 1933, CLASSIFIED BY AGE-GROUP

Age-group	Number	Percent
All ages	499,679	100.0
Under 6	24,318	4.9
7-20	82,648	16.6
21-30	71,052	14.2
31-40	82,978	16.6
41-50	80,710	16.1
51-60	76,529	15.3
61-65	28,797	5.8
Over 65	52,647	10.5

The contrast is clear. Children and young people under 21, who comprised no more than one fifth of all Jews in Germany, formed more than one third of the refugees. It ought also to be pointed out that the third group, namely, those between 21 and 30 years of age, constituted more than one fourth of the entire number of refugees, so that more than half of the refugees who entered Palestine were young people. Conversely, the older age-groups were about twice as numerous relatively in the German Jewish community as among the refugees. The older groups, who bulked larger in the German-Jewish community than in Eastern European countries (especially Poland), because of the earlier and greater decline in birth rates, were less exposed to persecution than the young. Thus, they often preferred to remain in Germany, living on such income or property as they had or support they could get, to the trials and risks of migration. Consequently the age distribution of the refugees was strongly weighted by young people who, either independently or by the will of parents who sometimes remained in Germany, fled from

Nazi oppression. This age distribution was also strongly influenced by the movement of the *chalutzim* (the Zionist "pioneers") who represent a considerable part of the refugees; these "pioneers" range from 18 to 35 years of age.

The departure of so large a part of the younger generation naturally had the effect of raising still higher the ratio of the older age-groups among the remaining Jewish population in Germany. According to a report submitted to the Evian Conference by the Central Organization of German Jewry, the situation on January 1, 1938 was roughly as follows:

Age-group	Number	Percent
All ages	350,000	100.0
Under 20	54,300	16.0
20-44	106,700	30.0
45-50	37,100	11.0
Over 50	151,900	43.0

The decline in the relative number of young people after less than five years of Hitler's rule is striking. The group aged 51 and over, which constituted less than one sixth of the refugees who settled in Palestine, formed a ratio almost three times as great within the population which remained at home.

So far as the age distribution of the refugees arriving in the United States is concerned, it will be best to concentrate on the four fiscal years beginning July 1, 1939. (Table XII, p. 354) During this period the entire Jewish immigration into the United States consisted of refugees.

The age distribution for each of the four years is very similar but it differs widely from that of the refugees admitted to Pales-

tine. (Table X) The youngest group, under 21, which constituted one third of those migrating to Palestine, comprised not much more than one fifth of the refugees entering the United States. On the other hand, the group over 50, which formed less than a sixth of those who went to Palestine, formed over a fifth of the refugees admitted to the United States, and in the last two years even more than a fourth. Whereas in Palestine the largest group was between 21 and 30 years of age, that is, persons in the physical prime of life, in the United States first place was occupied by the 31-40 age-group. It is clear that the *chalutz* ideal was largely responsible for the age distribution of the refugees entering Palestine while no comparable influence is evident in the United States figures.

It may be added, incidentally, that even during this relatively short period of four years a few significant changes occurred in the age structure of the refugees arriving in the United States. The percentage of children under 11 and of the next age-group, 11-20, declined, while the percentage of people over 60 rose rather considerably. This development may simply reflect the prevailing trends in the natural increase of the Jewish population, but in some measure it is also due to the horrors of the war years, which affected the children more than the older generation.

Another comparison may be made with the age distribution of the non-Jewish immigration to the United States. (Table XIII, p. 355)

TABLE XII

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1939 TO
JUNE 30, 1943, CLASSIFIED BY AGE-GROUP

Age-group	Number				Ratio in percentage			
	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
All ages	36,945	23,737	10,608	4,705	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 11	3,058	2,142	851	300	8.3	9.1	8.0	6.4
11-20	5,681	3,210	1,270	592	15.2	13.5	11.9	12.6
21-30	5,491	3,163	1,282	744	14.8	13.3	12.1	15.8
31-40	7,925	4,977	2,088	1,040	21.5	20.9	19.6	22.2
41-50	7,004	4,644	1,939	813	18.9	19.6	18.2	17.3
51-60	4,667	3,424	1,643	546	12.8	14.4	15.8	11.5
Over 60	3,119	2,177	1,935	670	8.5	9.2	14.4	14.2

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TABLE XIII

NON-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1939 TO
JUNE 30, 1942, CLASSIFIED BY AGE GROUP

Age-group	Number			Ratio in percentage		
	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1939-40	1941-41	1941-42
All ages	33,811	28,039	18,173	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 11	2,398	2,802	1,448	7.1	9.8	8.1
11-20	5,605	3,948	2,745	16.6	16.5	15.1
21-30	9,640	7,206	5,303	28.4	24.6	29.2
31-40	8,799	6,663	3,900	26.1	22.7	21.5
41-50	3,785	3,653	2,277	11.2	13.0	12.5
51-60	1,954	2,051	1,251	5.8	7.3	6.8
Over 60	1,630	1,716	1,249	4.8	6.1	6.8

The difference is quite evident. The proportion of children shown in Table XIII is somewhat greater than among the Jewish refugees. More significantly, whereas among the Jews the group between 31 and 40 years was far greater than the 21-30 age-group, the contrary was true for the non-Jews. Furthermore, the ratio of persons 51 years of age and over among the latter was much less than among the Jews. The age composition of the non-Jewish immigrants may thus be considered more favorable than that of the Jewish refugees.

In spite of the differences indicated, the non-Jews who entered the United States during the years 1939-41 consisted largely of refugees. It is therefore of interest to compare Jewish refugees not only with the contemporaneous non-Jewish immigrants in respect to age distribution but with the "normal" immigrant groups prior to the outbreak of the war. Unfortunately, the age-groups of the official statistics for the earlier period do not coin-

cide with those shown in Tables XII and XIII. Nevertheless, a rough comparison may be ventured. (Table XIV)

TABLE XIV

IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1930 TO
JUNE 30, 1942, CLASSIFIED BY AGE-GROUP

Age-group	Number	Percent
All ages	457,675	100.0
Under 16	78,150	16.9
16-21	71,788	15.8
22-29	112,323	23.4
30-37	80,043	18.6
38-44	41,029	8.9
45 and over	74,342	16.4

The two youngest groups, which formed not much more than one fifth of the Jewish refugees admitted into the country, comprised almost one third of the immigrants during the eight preceding years. The predominance of the age-group 22 to 29, in contrast with the situation among the refugees, is striking. Finally, the ratio of the oldest age-group during the "normal" years was lower than it was among the refugees in 1939-43; whereas the group represented more than 20 per cent of the refugees, it comprised no more than one sixth of the earlier immigrants, even including those from 45 to 50 years of age who cannot be considered elderly.

A final comparison between the age distribution of the refugees entering the United States and that of the Jewish immigrants into this country before the first World War should be suggestive. During the years 1899-1914 the percentage of children under 14 among Jewish immigrants was 24.37 and of persons 14-44 years

old, 69.80, whereas persons over 44 years formed 5.83 percent.⁶ The contrast is striking. There are relatively fewer children and many times more older persons among the refugees today. However, the ratio of older immigrants had begun to increase after 1918, long before the exodus of German Jews began. In the years 1915-1924 the group over 44 years of age included 11.74 percent of all Jewish immigrants and twice as great a proportion (23.49 percent) during the ensuing three years. The ratio of children under 16, on the other hand, 29.21 and 22.71 percent, respectively, during the two periods in question, shows no comparable trend. Nevertheless, even the lower ratio is still high as compared with the corresponding figures among the refugees admitted in 1939-43. (Table XII)

In sum, the age distribution of Jewish refugees in the United States differs greatly from that of the other groups, viz., the refugees admitted to Palestine, the contemporaneous non-Jewish refugees admitted to the United States, immigrants entering the country from 1931 to 1939 and the Jewish immigrants who arrived here before the First World War. There were relatively few children and a larger ratio of older persons among the first group; even within the middle-aged group the older men and women were more strongly represented. Coming after the younger ranks of German Jewry had been seriously depleted, the age distribution of Jewish refugees admitted to the United States in 1939-43 closely approached the age composition of German Jewry as shown by the 1933 census. The refugees from Poland and other countries, included in Table XII, did not tend to alter this distribution greatly since, in the majority of cases, these came from the upper class of European Jewry, whose age composition resembled that of the

⁶Michael Traub, *Juedische Wanderbewegungen vor und nach dem Kriege*, Table XIX, p. 118.

German Jews more than that of the Jewish masses in their own country.

The predominance of German Jews among the refugees in the United States is also evident in the sex ratio of the group.

TABLE XV

SEX RATIO OF JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES,
JULY 1, 1939 TO JUNE 30, 1943

Sex	Number				Percentage			
	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
Total	36,945	23,737	10,608	4,705	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	18,482	11,925	5,041	2,181	50.0	50.2	47.5	46.3
Female	18,463	11,812	5,567	2,524	50.0	49.8	52.5	53.7

The sexes were about equally represented (Table XV), whereas among the non-Jewish immigrants females were in the majority. (Table XVI)

TABLE XVI

SEX RATIO OF NON-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES,
JULY 1, 1939 TO JUNE 30, 1942

Sex	Number			Percentage		
	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42
Total	33,811	28,039	18,173	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	14,978	11,594	6,967	44.3	42.1	38.3
Female	18,833	16,445	11,206	55.7	57.9	61.7

A similar difference appears when a comparison is made with the sex ratio of immigrants admitted to the country prior to the present war.

TABLE XVII

SEX RATIO OF IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES
JULY 1, 1931 TO JUNE 30, 1939

Sex	Number	Percent
Total	457,675	100.0
Male	195,690	42.7
Female	261,985	57.3

Women were less strongly represented among the Jewish refugees arriving in 1939-43 than among immigrants in general. Whereas among the latter the ratio of women rose from 35 percent in 1914 to 56 in 1938⁷ (because of conditions favorable to the immigration of relatives with no occupation), the situation among refugees was quite different. Despite the changes brought about in recent years, domestic servants are still less likely to be found among Jewish than non-Jewish immigrants and this appears to be the explanation of the difference in the sex ratios of the two groups. Further corroboration of this point is afforded by the fact that the ratio of single persons among Jewish refugees admitted during 1939-43 was lower than among other immigrants. (Tables XVIII-XX)

⁷M. Schibsy, "Who is the New Immigrant?," *Social Work Today*, December, 1939, p. 14.

5. MARITAL STATUS

TABLE XVIII

ALL IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1931 TO
JUNE 30, 1939, CLASSIFIED BY MARITAL STATUS

Status	Number	Percent
Total	457,675	100.0
Single	228,705	49.8
Married	202,711	44.5
Others	26,259	5.7

TABLE XIX

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1939 TO
JUNE 30, 1941, CLASSIFIED BY MARITAL STATUS

Status	Number				Percentage			
	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
Total	36,945	23,737	10,608	4,705	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	14,252	8,622	3,634	1,674	38.6	36.4	34.2	35.5
Married	20,381	13,351	5,844	2,508	55.1	56.2	55.2	53.4
Others	2,312	1,764	1,130	523	6.3	7.4	10.6	11.1

TABLE XX

NON-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1939 TO
JUNE 30, 1942, CLASSIFIED BY MARITAL STATUS

Status	Number			Percentage		
	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42
Total	33,811	28,039	18,173	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	14,830	12,045	7,645	43.8	43.7	42.1
Married	17,227	14,335	9,229	51.0	50.5	50.8
Others	1,754	1,659	1,299	5.2	5.8	7.1

In the years before the present war, when the immigration of young laborers and domestic servants was still possible, immigrants included a higher ratio of single than of married persons. (Table XVIII) Following the outbreak of hostilities the immigration consisted entirely of refugees (both Jewish and non-Jewish), among whom the married element was more strongly represented, comprising somewhat more than half the non-Jewish total. (Table XX) Among the Jewish refugees, however, the percentage was still higher. (Table XIX)

A similar situation appears among the refugees who immigrated to Palestine, a majority of whom were males. (Table XXI)⁸

⁸*Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany during 1933-1937*, p. 7.

TABLE XXI

SEX RATIO OF GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO PALESTINE,
1933-1937

Sex	Number	Percent
Total	33,923	100.0
Male	17,693	52.2
Female	15,946	47.0
Not recorded	284	0.8

This majority of male immigrants, as against the balanced ratio among those admitted to the United States during 1939-43, must again be attributed to the influence of the *chalutzim* movement; among these "pioneers" the percentage of men has always been much higher than that of women. Similarly the percentage of married persons, high as it was among Jewish refugees arriving in the United States, was still higher among those admitted to Palestine.

TABLE XXII

GERMAN JEWISH REFUGEES OVER 17 YEARS OF AGE ENTERING
PALESTINE, 1933-1937, CLASSIFIED BY MARITAL STATUS

Marital status	Number	Percent
Total	26,434	100.0
Single	9,254	35.0
Married	17,180	65.0

The proportion of married persons among the refugees, about 50 per cent higher than that of single persons in the case of those admitted to the United States (1939-41), was almost 100 percent higher in Palestine. (Table XXII) The preponderance of married persons was particularly marked among the women. As against 3,468 unmarried women among the German Jews who settled in Palestine during this five-year period, there were 9,082 married women, a ratio of over two and a half to one.

The preponderance of males noted for refugees admitted to the two principal countries was equally characteristic of those arriving in other countries. From figures available for about four fifths of the refugees in Australia it appear that there were 2,825 female to 3,789 males, a ratio of about 100 to 135.⁹ The explanation in such cases may be that the husband goes ahead to distant countries, whereas the wife follows him after a certain lapse of time. It may therefore be stated that in general the ratio of women among refugees is low, while that of married persons is higher than the corresponding ratios among other immigrant groups. Whether this is only a transitory phenomenon which will disappear after a time, remains to be seen.

6. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Among the refugees who arrived in Palestine during the period from the beginning of 1933 to March 31, 1939, less than a third specified a particular occupation. (Table XXIII)¹⁰

⁹George M. Berger, "Australia and the Refugees," *The Australian Quarterly*, December, 1941, p. 59.

¹⁰Report of the Central Bureau, pp. 76-77, Table VI.

TABLE XXIII

REFUGEES ADMITTED TO PALESTINE, JANUARY 1, 1933
TO MARCH 31, 1939

	Number	Percent
All persons	44,517	100.0
Persons with an occupation.....	13,913	31.2
No specified occupation	17,561	39.5
Men	4,125	—
Women	13,436	—
Students (adults)	2,433	5.5
Children	10,295	23.1
Others	315	0.7

Even assuming that all of the refugees with no specified occupation were economically inactive, a ratio of less than two fifths is rather low, considering the relatively large number of property owners among the Jews in the period of the Weimar Republic. The figures in Table XXIII may reflect, on the one hand, the changes which had already occurred during the first years of Nazi domination, whereby Jews were increasingly deprived of their wealth and the number of persons who could live on their incomes was reduced; on the other hand, they may also reflect the high ratio of *Chalutzim* among these immigrants. Many of the "pioneers," perhaps the majority, had no occupations and were dependent on their parents but upon their arrival in Palestine

registered as agriculturists, for which calling they had received some training. Another striking fact is the high ratio of children, comprising almost a fourth of the total, the reasons for which have been discussed above.

The occupations reported by this group of refugees are detailed in Table XXIV.¹¹ It is interesting to compare the distribution recorded in Table XXIV with that of the Jewish population in Germany as shown by the census of 1933 (in percent):¹²

Agriculture	1.0
Industry and handicraft	19.1
Trade, insurance, communications and transportation	52.5
Public service and professions	10.7
Domestic service	0.7
Independent, no occupation	16.0
	<hr/> 100.0

¹¹Based on *ibid*, Table VI.

¹²*Die Glaubensjuden im deutschen Reich*, p. 25.

TABLE XXIV

GAINFULLY OCCUPIED GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO PALESTINE,
JANUARY 1, 1933 TO MARCH 31, 1939, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION

Occupation	Number	Percent
All occupations	13,913	100.0
Agriculture	2,324	16.7
Industry and handicraft	3,363	24.1
Textiles.....	84	0.6
Leather.....	48	0.3
Wood.....	429	3.1
Metals.....	596	4.3
Building.....	907	6.5
Printing.....	126	0.9
Chemicals.....	98	0.7
Clothing.....	509	3.7
Food.....	372	2.7
Miscellaneous.....	194	1.4
Transportation.....	92	0.6
Commerce.....	3,848	27.7
Liberal professions.....	3,560	25.6
Medicine.....	1,236	8.9
Education.....	481	3.5
Engineering.....	379	2.7
Arts.....	121	0.9
Law.....	459	3.3
Religion.....	102	0.7
Officials.....	635	4.6
Miscellaneous.....	147	1.0
Unskilled labor.....	726	5.3

There is a striking difference between the occupational structure of the two groups. In the first place, agriculture and the liberal professions were much more strongly represented among the

refugees than among the general Jewish population in Germany. The strange fact that there were 17 times more farmers among the refugees than among the larger group is due to the fact that the *chalutzim* registered as farmers although their agricultural experience may have been very limited. On the other hand, the disproportionately large number of professionals among the refugees may be explained by the fact that they were the first victims of anti-Jewish legislation and had to leave Germany at an earlier date and in greater proportion than the other occupational groups. The converse applies to the group in commerce. The low ratio of merchants among the refugees, half that shown by the 1933 census, may be partly explained by the lesser degree of persecution directed against this group in the earlier years of Nazi domination. In addition, some of those formerly engaged in trade joined the *chalutzim* and were registered as farmers. The high percentage of the "independent, no occupation" category among the German Jews as against the small percentage of "unskilled labor" among the refugees, may have its explanation in the fact that until 1933 there were many persons living on their income and savings while such a category was practically nonexistent among the refugees.

The figures regarding the occupational distribution of the refugees upon entry into Palestine already show, in the large number registered as farmers, the influence of economic factors and ideals connected with the upbuilding of the Jewish national homeland. The same forces also operated to change the occupations of refugees after arrival. The ratio of German-Jewish refugees at present concentrated in agriculture in Palestine is much greater than that shown by Table XXIV. Those who remained in the cities also changed their occupations in a great number of cases, as shown by a sample study conducted by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine during the closing months

of 1935.¹³ The survey covered 572 gainful workers, comprising, together with the other members of the families involved, a total of 1,311 persons. The inquiry dealt with age, family and financial status and former and present occupations. As may be seen from Table XXV, all but a small fraction of these workers were between the ages of 20 and 40.

TABLE XXV
SAMPLE GROUP OF REFUGEES IN PALESTINIAN CITIES, 1935,
CLASSIFIED BY AGE-GROUP

Age-group	Number	Percent
All ages	572	100.0
20-30	307	53.7
31-40	201	35.1
41-50	47	8.2
Over 50	17	3.0

As was to be expected, the younger groups were more strongly represented among those refugees who turned to new occupations than in the refugee population as a whole. Over half of the sample group were in the age-group of 20 to 30 and over one third were between 31 and 40 years old. Those aged 41 to 50, who represented a fairly large part of all refugees from Germany, formed but a small fraction of those who adopted a new occupation, while the oldest group, comprising a sixth of all refugees, was scarcely represented in the sample group. The results of the survey are in accord with the well-known rule that occupational readjustments tend to be less frequent as workers grow older, becoming very infrequent after 50.

¹³See Ina Britschgi-Schimmer, *Die Umschichtung der juedischen Einwanderer aus Deutschland zu staedtischen Berufen in Palaestina* (mimeographed).

Among the persons who changed their occupations, 24 percent were "capitalists" according to the official classification (having £1,000 upon entry) and about half (49.5 percent) were admitted as workers under the labor schedule. Among the German-Jewish refugees as a whole, on the other hand, precisely the reverse is true. (Table XXVI) The tendency to change occupations is naturally far stronger among immigrants without means than among the more prosperous class. A comparison of the former occupations of the persons studied with their new vocations is highly instructive; of the 572 workers surveyed, data are available for the 487 men included in the sample group.¹⁴ (Table XXVI)

TABLE XXVI

SAMPLE REFUGEE GROUP IN PALESTINIAN CITIES, 1935,
CLASSIFIED BY FORMER OCCUPATION

Occupation	Number	Percent
All occupations	487	100.0
Agriculture	5	1.0
Industry and handicraft	61	12.5
Transportation	5	1.0
Commerce	263	54.0
Academic professions	133	27.4
Other professions	15	3.1
Others	5	1.0

As Table XXVI shows, there were almost no former agriculturists while the ratio in industry and handicraft was half that among all

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Appendix, Table I.

the refugees; the ratio in the professions was somewhat higher and in commerce twice as high. It appears that persons formerly engaged in industry and handicraft felt the need for changing their vocation less frequently than the others, particularly those practising in the professions and to a greater degree those engaged in commerce. Because of their very limited knowledge of the local languages and conditions, former merchants and salespeople were able to persist in their former occupations only in exceptional cases. Let us now consider the new vocations adopted by the same group. (Table XXVII, p. 371)¹⁵

More than half of all those who changed their occupations were concentrated in building and metals or were employed as drivers. This certainly reflects the situation in Palestine during the years of rapid economic development, when the construction industries on the one hand and transportation on the other took first place in the economic life of the country. However, it also corresponds to the tendency of refugees (as of almost all immigrants to Palestine) to enter occupations contributing most directly toward the upbuilding of the homeland. In the same connection the handful who shifted to the manufacture of clothing is noteworthy. Unlike the earlier Jewish immigrants to the United States, those entering Palestine have not been attracted to this industry, for which the market is of course comparatively limited.

In the statistics of the United States there is, unfortunately, no way of isolating the refugees from other Jewish immigrants; the very detailed reports published in former years by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, classifying the data by country of origin, were discontinued after 1932. For the occupational distribution of refugees we must therefore rely on statistics concerning Jewish immigration to the United States as a whole. However, in view of the very high percentage of refugees from Germany

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Tables I-III.

and Austria among these immigrants, the available figures may properly be utilized in the present study. Table XXVIII shows the occupational distribution of the 69,110 gainful workers among the Jewish immigrants since the middle of 1932.¹⁶

TABLE XXVII

SAMPLE REFUGEE GROUP IN PALESTINIAN CITIES, 1935,
CLASSIFIED BY NEW OCCUPATION ADOPTED

Occupation	Number	Percent
All occupations	487	100.0
Building	130	26.7
Metals	64	13.1
Drivers	51	10.5
Manufacture of furniture	39	8.0
Commerce	38	8.0
Restaurants	28	5.7
Manufacture of bricks	18	3.7
Electricity	17	3.5
Chemistry	17	3.5
Transportation	14	2.8
Street cleaning	12	2.5
Manufacture of clothing	11	2.2
Others	48	9.8

¹⁶All tables dealing with the occupational distribution of refugees admitted to the United States are based on data published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. For the tabulation of this material the authors are in several instances indebted to the National Refugee Service, Division of Statistics, Research and Report.

TABLE XXVIII

JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1932 TO
JUNE 30, 1943, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

Occupational category	Number	Percent	Ratio of all gainful workers in percent
All categories	167,928	100.0	100.0
Professions	15,047	8.9	19.8
Commercial	31,724	18.9	41.9
Skilled	20,798	12.4	27.6
Servants	3,985	2.5	5.3
Laborers	863	0.5	1.1
Miscellaneous	3,180	1.9	4.3
No occupation	92,328	54.9	—

Comparison of Table XXVIII with Table XXVII shows, in the first place, that the percentage of persons with no occupation was greater among refugees in the United States than in Palestine. This may be ascribed to the fact that there is nothing comparable to the *chalutzim* among the refugees entering this country. The number of agriculturists included under laborers and "miscellaneous" is insignificant among the latter group when compared to the situation in Palestine. The percentage of skilled workers is almost the same in both cases while, on the other hand, the ratio in commerce is much higher in the United States. This may be explained in part by the fact that the bulk of refugees came to the United States relatively late, at a time when the elimination of German Jews from the remaining economic positions, including commerce, became an important fact or the difference may also be due in part to the fact that in the United States there has been no such transfer from commerce to agriculture as occurred in Palestine.

It is no less interesting to draw a comparison between the occupational structure of the refugees and that of Jewish immigrants to the United States before the advent of Nazi rule. During the five-year period 1925-1929 the distribution was as follows:¹⁷

Professional	3.8
Skilled	19.4
Miscellaneous	16.2
No occupation	60.6

There were fewer persons with no occupation among the refugees than among the earlier immigrants. This is due chiefly to the fact that German Jews have smaller families than those of East European origin. Moreover, before 1933 the immigration of relatives of American citizens was favored and among these the percentage of dependent and inactive persons was naturally very high. The ratio of those practising in the professions, already five times as high among the Jewish immigrants of 1925-1929 as among the earlier arrivals before the First World War, was more than double among the refugees. The professional group became refugees earlier and in relatively (in some years even absolutely) greater numbers than other occupational groups. These figures typify the unique character of refugee immigration into the United States which brought to this country hundreds of prominent university teachers and former high government officials, thousands of physicians, lawyers, bankers, artists, editors, writers, etc.¹⁸ The skilled workers among the refugees comprised little more than half the ratio of this category among the "normal" immigrants. Tailors, in particular, are practically lacking among

¹⁷A. Tartakower, *Yidishe Emigratzie un Yidishe Emigratziepolitik*, p. 75 (Yiddish).

¹⁸Bruno Kisch, "The Jewish Refugee and America," *The Jewish Forum*, January, 1942, p. 3; see also Norman Bentwich, *The Refugees from Germany*, p. 36 f.

German-Jewish refugees. On the other hand, the ratio of persons engaged in commerce is much higher among refugees, exceeding the entire category of miscellaneous occupations for the years 1925-1929. If the categories of commerce, laborers and "miscellaneous" for the years 1932-1941 are added together to make up a category corresponding to the "miscellaneous" of 1925-1929, the resulting ratio is 50 percent higher.

The characteristics of German-Jewish refugee immigration to the United States become even clearer if we limit ourselves to the last five years, when the rate of immigration into the country (as far as the first three years are concerned) was much greater than in the years immediately preceding and when the immigrants admitted consisted almost entirely of refugees.

During the first two years there was no marked difference from the average for 1933-1940 but the third and fourth year showed many remarkable changes. (Table XXIX) The professional category increased sharply, while the percentage in other occupations, especially skilled labor, fell. *For the first time in the history of Jewish immigration into the United States, in 1940-41 and in 1941-42 more professionals than skilled laborers entered the country.* Apparently, under the highly complicated conditions of immigration prevailing during the war, the professional groups and the merchants, probably having on the whole a higher intelligence as well as greater means than the other groups, were more successful in overcoming the existing difficulties. On the other hand, it may be that the figures already show the effect of the German war policy of blocking the emigration of Jewish skilled workers so that, while continuing and even intensifying the persecution, the skills of the trained workers could be exploited. In any case, this group of recent Jewish immigrants to the United States during the two years ended June, 1942, with one quarter of all economically active persons in the professional

and half in the merchants' group, is the purest example of refugee immigration one can imagine.

The trend of development during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1943, seems to be somewhat different, with skilled workers again predominating over professional and even commercial elements. The figures, however, are too small to enable us to draw any important conclusions from them. The possibility is not excluded that they reflect to some extent the very cautious policy of the immigration authorities, who, in carefully considering each application for a visa, may treat more favorably the applications of persons with skilled trades and professions than those of commercial elements.

This analysis of the occupational categories of refugees admitted to the United States may be concluded with a brief glance at the distribution within the professional group. (Table XXX, p. 376)

TABLE XXIX
JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1938 TO
JUNE 30, 1943, CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION

Occupational classification	Number					Percent				
	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
All immigrants.....	43,450	36,945	23,737	10,603	4,705	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional.....	3,860	3,224	2,467	1,075	595	8.9	8.6	10.3	10.2	12.6
Commercial.....	8,619	7,006	4,841	1,970	628	19.5	19.2	20.7	18.6	13.4
Skilled.....	5,256	4,290	2,217	1,048	763	12.3	11.5	9.3	9.8	16.3
Servants.....	1,196	439	190	33	15	2.6	1.2	0.8	0.3	0.4
Laborers.....	156	261	74	26	18	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.5
Miscellaneous.....	658	613	420	223	196	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.2	4.3
No occupation.....	23,705	21,112	13,528	6,233	2,490	54.7	57.1	56.8	58.7	52.5

TABLE XXX
JEWISH IMMIGRANTS PRACTISING PROFESSIONS ADMITTED TO THE
UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1938 TO JUNE 30, 1943, CLASSIFIED
BY SPECIFIC PROFESSION

Specific profession	Number					Percent				
	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
All professions	3,860	3,224	2,467	1,075	35	11.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Clergymen	169	127	91	48	90	28.3	3.8	3.8	4.5	8.8
Engineers	325	316	343	155	65	12.7	9.8	13.9	14.4	13.2
Lawyers	432	402	327	110	274	35.4	12.5	13.3	10.2	5.9
Physicians	1,126	832	470	175	595	100.0	25.9	19.2	16.3	15.2
Teachers	497	488	310	110	52	4.2	15.2	12.6	10.2	10.9
Others	1,311	1,059	926	477	79	8.3	32.8	37.2	44.4	46.0

The following observations based on Table XXX are valid for the professional group among refugees in general: (a) There is a high percentage (on the average, over a third; in the last two years, almost a half) in the category of "others," comprising chiefly writers and artists. Under existing conditions in Nazi-occupied Europe, no possibility whatsoever remains for such persons in their home countries. (b) The second highest category consists of physicians. Of all the liberal professions, apart from writers and artists, these practitioners are least able to adjust themselves to the conditions imposed by the Nazis in the Third Reich. Engineers and lawyers may, at least for a time, be absorbed in subsidiary occupations connected with their former work (for instance, as skilled workers or communal employees), while teachers may find work in the newly established special schools for the Jewish population, but no such opportunities are open to physicians. (c) However, as is evident from Table XXX the ratio of physicians fell steadily during the war years. Whereas in 1938-39 there were more than twice as many physicians among the immigrants as lawyers or teachers and more than three times as many as engineers, their preponderance in 1939-43 declined considerably. This relative decline was evidently a result of the growing need for their services during the war.

For the occupational structure of German-Jewish refugees in European countries, we have figures only regarding Great Britain. This information was obtained during the registration of "enemy aliens" (including non-Jews) following the outbreak of the war. Data have been published for 15,671 registered refugees, a number certainly large enough to throw light on the occupational structure of these immigrants at the time of registration.¹⁹

¹⁹F. Lafitte, *The Internment of Aliens*, pp. 38-39.

TABLE XXXI

REFUGEES RESIDING IN GREAT BRITAIN, SEPTEMBER, 1939,
CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION

Occupation	Number	Percent
All occupations	15,671	100.0
Farmers	729	4.7
Manufacturers	2,931	18.5
Clothing	901	5.6
Textile	1,036	6.6
Leather goods	494	3.2
Metal	259	1.6
Chemistry	191	1.2
Instrument makers	50	0.3
Professionals	3,582	23.7
Physicians	1,704	10.7
Pharmacists	289	1.7
Teachers	1,579	10.0
Architects	113	0.7
Engineers	87	0.6
Workers	1,801	10.8
Technical	720	4.6
Tailors	1,081	6.2
Domestic servants (women)	6,628	42.3

The most striking feature of Table XXXI is of course the tremendous number of domestic servants, comprising over two fifths of all registered refugees. This figure, however, is undoubtedly a result, in part, of the administrative practice in the admission of refugees to England; of all categories of refugees, domestic servants, who were in great demand before the war, were most readily admitted. Thus, many thousands of refugee women came over as servants although not previously engaged in this occupation; despite the fact that they registered as such, there is no way

of knowing whether or not all or most of them actually were serving in this capacity.

However, even ignoring the servants, the table is still highly revealing. In the first place, it contains no commercial category at all; either the figures were insignificant or were not published. The ratio of farmers, on the other hand, is five times as high as it was among the Jews in Germany. Even supposing that only half of them were farm workers and that others registered as such in order to be admitted to the country, the fact remains that in England many refugees turned to agriculture. The intensive character of farming in England may answer very well to their needs and inclinations. The professional group showed a ratio higher than that of the manufacturers. Among the professionals, physicians, as in Palestine, were the leading group but, unlike the latter country, they were almost equalled by teachers. Apparently, scholars and teachers went to Great Britain in greater numbers than to Palestine, trusting to find a place in the extensive network of higher schools and colleges there.

Interesting figures regarding the occupational distribution of German-Jewish refugees residing in the Union of South Africa were revealed by an inquiry conducted during the year 1937 by the South African Central Committee of German Refugees. The survey comprised 2,373 persons or about half of the entire number of refugees who had entered since 1933. (Table XXXII, p. 381)²⁰

Table XXXII presents a typical picture of a community of new immigrants on the way toward occupational readjustment. After a few years the old occupational distribution of German Jewry had practically disappeared, especially the high ratios in the professions and commerce. Only industry, employees and workers to-

²⁰Congrès Juif Mondial, *Beitraege zum Studium der wirtschaftlichen Leistungen der juedischen Emigranten in den Jahren 1933-1938*, p. 232 (mimeographed).

gether, managed to maintain the position of this category and even to better it. Over one third of all the refugees were concentrated in handicraft and industry; if we ignore persons with no occupation, over half of the remaining number fell into these two categories. An interesting feature is the great number of clothing factories established by the newcomers, thereby creating a new branch of industrial activity in South Africa, just as was done in the United States forty or fifty years ago and in recent years by the refugees in Great Britain, Holland and other countries.

TABLE XXXII

GERMAN-JEWISH REFUGEES RESIDING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1937,
CLASSIFIED BY OCCUPATION

Occupation	Number	Percent
All workers	2,373	100.0
Industry (employers) *	232	9.9
Commerce **	188	7.9
Liberal professions ***	71	2.9
Boarding house managers	22	0.9
Barbers	22	0.9
Garage owners	12	0.4
Other self-employed	10	0.3
Workers	984	41.6
Industry	292	12.4
Handicraft	366	15.4
Office employees	195	8.3
Journalists {	88	3.7
Musicians {		
Personal services	42	1.8
No occupation	832	35.2

*Distributed as follows: clothing, 97; electrical, 25; food, 24; leather and textiles,

**Distributed as follows: retail, 88; agents, 52; wholesale and import, 46; others, 9.

***Including 12 physicians and 28 in the fine arts.

24; painters, 18; wood, 14; chemical, 9; building, 5; laundry, 5; printing, 2; others, 9.

There were almost twice as many workers among the refugees residing in South Africa in 1937 as self-employed persons. This represents a very substantial change of social structure, which may be explained by the difficult economic situation of the majority of refugees. This factor also explains the rather low percentage of persons with no occupation which, incidentally, was even lower in earlier years; in 1936, for example, these constituted more than 15 percent. Subsequently, following the new legislation which severely restricted the admission of the refugees but made it possible to bring over relatives of persons already resident in the country, this category increased. But even 35.1 percent is a much lower ratio than among the rest of the population in South Africa, where persons with no occupation amount to 50-60 percent of the total.

No statistical data are available regarding the occupational distribution of refugees in countries other than those surveyed in the foregoing pages. In Czechoslovakia the Central Aid Committee for Refugees from Germany in 1937 gave the following ratios (in percent): artisans, 40; merchants and commercial employees, 17; liberal professions, 22; women, children and others, 21.²¹ However, these figures cannot be regarded as characteristic of the Jewish refugees since they comprise non-Jews as well (in Czechoslovakia the number of non-Jewish refugees was very large) and secondly, they refer only to persons supported by an agency, leaving out the self-supporting elements.

7. IMPORT OF CAPITAL BY REFUGEES

It is a well-known fact that in the first years of Nazi domination Jewish refugees from Germany were able to take along with them a part of their capital. The type of refugee who was robbed

²¹*Menschen auf der Flucht: Drei Jahre Fuersorgearbeit fuer die deutschen Fluechtlinge. Herausgegeben von der Demokratischen Fluechtlingsfuersorge*, p. 11.

of all his belongings and had to depend upon public and private assistance upon arrival became common only about 1939, when the Nazi authorities began to enforce more ruthless measures of spoliation. Wartime refugees, of course, were unable in most cases to carry along with them any considerable part of their property. During the period 1933-1938, however, substantial investments were made by German-Jewish refugees in many countries, especially in Great Britain, Palestine, and the United States. Unfortunately, it is scarcely possible to obtain the figures either as to the number of refugee capitalists or the sums invested by them. Only with regard to Palestine are there any data. The statistical records of the Jewish Agency, and especially of its Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, contain figures both as to the amount of capital invested by the refugees and the number of persons who brought that capital into the country.

The amount transmitted from Germany to Palestine through the Haavarah agency, together with sums placed at the disposal of Jewish immigrants to Palestine by the German Reichsbank, made a grand total of 139,000,000 Reichsmarks, equivalent to £8,000,000. An indication of the number of persons importing capital is given by the immigration statistics published by the Palestine Government. (Table XXXIII)²² As pointed out in Chapter IV, immigrants are admitted to Palestine under several categories of entry certificates. The two main classes consist of persons possessing not less than £1,000 admitted on "capitalist certificates" and of workers not required to import capital but who having a definite prospect of employment are admitted under the so-called labor schedule.

²²Based on the *Report of the Central Bureau*, Table IV, p. 72 f.

TABLE XXXIII
GERMAN-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO PALESTINE, JANUARY 1, 1933 TO
MARCH 31, 1939, CLASSIFIED BY OFFICIAL CATEGORY

Year	Total		Capitalists		Labor Schedule		Others	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
All immigrants	44,509	100.0	16,529	37.1	15,885	35.6	12,095	27.9
1933	6,803	100.0	2,982	43.8	3,129	46.0	692	10.2
1934	8,489	100.0	3,128	36.9	4,082	48.0	1,279	15.1
1935	7,447	100.0	2,666	35.9	2,871	38.6	1,910	25.6
1936	7,896	100.0	2,790	35.4	2,605	33.0	2,501	31.6
1937	3,280	100.0	1,368	41.7	980	30.0	932	28.3
1938	6,138	100.0	2,037	33.2	1,389	22.6	2,712	44.2
1939 (first quarter)	4,456	100.0	1,558	34.9	829	18.6	2,069	46.5

During the period as a whole the number of persons arriving from Germany on capitalist certificates was larger than the number admitted under the labor schedule. (Table XXXIII) Only in the first three years was there some very slight difference in favor of the laborers. After 1936, when the Palestine Government adopted a policy of greater restriction of Jewish immigration, affecting particularly the immigration of workers whose quota is fixed every six months, the ratio of capitalists began to exceed that of laborers by increasing margins, reaching almost 100 per cent during the first quarter of 1939. (Table XXIV)²³ Except for 1937, however, the share of capitalists in the total immigration did not rise. The relative figures of both capitalist and labor-schedule immigrants were strongly affected in 1938-1939 by the students and all persons dependent upon Palestine residents. The rise of the relative number of "others," a category comprising growth of this category from its insignificant position in 1933-1934 may be connected with the development of the Youth Aliyah and the tendency to establish immigrants to bring their relatives from Germany.

TABLE XXXIV

RATIO OF GERMAN JEWS TO ALL IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO PALESTINE, JANUARY 1, 1933 TO MARCH 31, 1939, IN PERCENT

Year	All Immigrants	Capitalists	Laborers
Total	25	49	19
1933	25	55	17
1934	23	43	20
1935	13	29	11
1936	29	59	24
1937	34	68	34
1938	54	78	36
1939 (first quarter)	69	72	55

²³Report of the Central Bureau, p. 74.

For the entire period, as Table XXXIV shows, the percentage of German-Jewish refugees among capitalist immigrants was twice as high as among all immigrants, whereas their percentage among workers was considerably lower. These differences were most marked in the early years. In later years the disproportion was cut down but up to the last moment Jewish immigrants from Germany contributed relatively more capitalists and fewer workers than Jewish immigrants from other countries, especially Poland, which, together with Germany, played the most important rôle in Jewish immigration into Palestine.

The amount of capital brought into Palestine by Jewish refugees may also be illustrated by the following table:

TABLE XXXV
JEWISH CAPITALIST IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE, 1937-1941

Year	Capital imported (in £ millions)	Jewish immigrants with £ 1,000 minimum
Total	6,750	31.4
1937	1,275	5.6
1938	1,753	7.9
1939	2,606	8.2
1940	802	4.8
1941	314	4.9

From this table it appears that very considerable sums were brought into Palestine by those immigrants, who, incidentally, do not comprise the total number of capitalists arriving in that period. The figures cited in Table XXXIII are somewhat higher, probably because not all persons admitted to Palestine on capitalist certificates registered their fortunes afterwards, so that the total amount of invested capital may be somewhat higher. Yet

even the sum of over 30 million pounds is impressive enough. It may also be noted that, while the number of capitalists entering Palestine in 1940 and 1941 was, as a result of the war, far less than formerly, dropping to one third and one eighth, respectively, in comparison with 1939, the imported capital did not shrink in the same proportion. Whereas, in previous years, people had apparently left some capital behind in the European countries, the tendency now was to burn all bridges behind them and to invest everything in Palestine.

As for the United States and Great Britain, such estimates as we possess indicate that even larger sums have been invested there by refugees than in Palestine. In the United States, the figures of the Foreign Property Control show that, apart from the capital of a few rich immigrants, approximately one and a half billion dollars have been brought in since 1933. Another estimate, which takes into account only the refugees as such, is that \$300,000,000 have been invested in the United States by a few wealthy refugees and some \$350,000,000 more by others, a total of nearly two thirds of a billion dollars. The investments of German-Jewish refugees in Great Britain were estimated by the London *Economist* in the middle of 1938 at £12,000,000.²⁴

²⁴Schibsy, *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

CHAPTER XII

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE LIFE OF REFUGEES

*Introductory—The Political and Social Aspect—The
Struggle for Bread—The New Life—The Cultural Problem
—Conclusion*

1. INTRODUCTORY

The tremendous difficulties of solving the Jewish refugee problem in its present form are the result not alone, nor even primarily, of the great number of refugees. In the first years of the Nazi rule in Germany, the actual number of refugees did not exceed a few tens of thousands a year, yet these difficulties were felt from the very start. Moreover, there was a period in the history of mankind, not more than seventy or eighty years ago, when the absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants was no problem at all. There must therefore—as explained in our first chapter—be very important economic, political, and psychological factors today which complicate the situation and render it vastly more difficult than that which obtained sixty or a hundred years ago. Hence we must study this situation, for only thus shall we be able to understand the difficulties and to discover the means, if any, of overcoming them.

2. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECT

The world of the nineteenth century was mostly one of liberalism and progress. The enormous economic development following the Industrial Revolution with its many inventions raised the standard of living of the population, enlarged the absorptive capacity of the various countries, and created a general spirit of

optimism which stimulated the progress of society. The feeling of solidarity with oppressed peoples and the desire to aid them were a natural consequence of this state of affairs. The same world which helped the Greeks and other nations to regain their independence saw in refugees victims of brutal oppression who had to be assisted and whose existence had to be secured either by fighting their oppressors or by finding new homes for them. Such was the world's reaction when a stream of political refugees left Germany in the middle of the century. Such, too, was its reaction when the first Jewish refugees from Czarist Russia made their appearance in the early 80's. Not only was Russia condemned for her oppressive policy, but the refugees were welcomed in all countries and every aid was extended to them. The appeal directed to the persecuted Jews at mass demonstrations in New York, following the anti-Jewish riots in Russia of 1881-82, to leave their inhospitable countries and come to the United States, was symbolic of the spirit which prevailed at that time.¹ The refugee was not only welcome in the new country, he was also necessary for its development. It is only if we bear this last point in mind that we can understand the complaint of the leading Argentine newspapers of the 80's that Jewish refugees were going to the United States only, although they might find their bread and freedom just as easily in Argentina as in the United States.

Nothing remains of this spirit at the present time. Economic life is much more complex today than it was a century ago, and liberalism is desperately fighting for its existence. As against the liberal economic policy of an earlier day, new ideas have arisen, beginning with socialism and ending with communism, fascism, and national socialism. The two last-named ideologies proclaim, as against the slogan of universal liberalism and socialism, a policy of brutal nationalism which does not recognize anything

¹Simon Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte des juedischen Volkes*, Vol. X, p. 150.

beyond the interest of one's own people, and looks upon the slogans of progress and humanity as harmful and reprehensible relics of the past. It is from countries dominated by such ideologies that the stream of refugees is coming today. There are other countries which, although not formally adhering to these ideologies, are not far from them, especially in their nationalistic policy, and which, therefore, will not agree to admit refugees. But even those countries which are trying to preserve the old ideals of liberalism and progress have to overcome great difficulties in handling the problems of immigration and refugees. Apart from economic difficulties which loom larger now than in the last century, the liberal governments must be careful to maintain their old ideology and to withstand all efforts to import the new totalitarian slogans; and since refugees may bring such ideologies with them, they are on that account more or less unwelcome. This strange contradiction between liberal ideology and restriction of immigration even—and in many cases especially—where refugees are concerned, is one of the distinctive marks of the present era. "The stranger within the gate" is no more a subject of special care: he is not wanted at all.²

Today the refugee is regarded first of all as a stranger, an alien; only secondarily is his personal tragedy taken into consideration. The distance between the citizen and the alien was never so great as now. The chances of a refugee getting a new home and being treated there in a spirit of real hospitality are, consequently, insignificant compared with former times.

Closely connected with this is the problem of the refugee's activities. Formerly it was taken for granted that the refugee was a free and equal man, and that his activities—especially the political ones—ought not to be restrained. On the contrary, the

²S. Lawford Childs, *Refugees: A Permanent Problem in International Organization*, p. 212 ff.

refugee was considered, precisely because of his political views, a more valuable asset to the country than the ordinary immigrant who came only to seek his bread. Nowadays the political activities of refugees are in most cases deemed undesirable. If—and this is normally the case—those activities are directed against the former country of the refugee, they may disturb the relations between it and his new country. Despite the ever deepening ideological differences between totalitarian and democratic countries, the wish prevailed until the outbreak of the present war—and in many countries it prevails even today—to avoid an open clash. The activities of refugees were apt to provoke international resentments and so were frowned upon and, in many cases, even forbidden. But, on the other hand, there often existed a suspicion that the refugee might have some connections with his former country and might misuse his position to render services to it. The highly developed system of secret police and spying in the totalitarian countries caused almost every person coming from there to be suspect in the eyes of the democratic countries. Nobody knows the number of spies among the refugees; in all probability it is insignificant when compared with the number of real refugees. However, the fact that there are spies and provocateurs disguised as refugees increased, naturally, the reluctance of the various countries to admit any refugees at all.

The same strange development which caused the liberal countries to close their doors to refugees in general, despite the feelings of sympathy for their sufferings, also influenced their special policy toward Jewish refugees. One of the main causes of the plight of the Jewish refugee is the fact that he is a Jew, apart from his social or political views or activities. The antisemitic propaganda, raised to the point of madness in Nazi Germany, is rapidly spreading from country to country. The liberal and democratic countries are fighting against this movement of hatred,

both because of its undermining of the legal position of one part of the population, and because of the serious troubles caused by it in the life of the country. From this point of view, any increase of the Jewish population appears undesirable since it is liable to strengthen the wave of antisemitism in the respective countries; hence the closing of the borders to Jewish refugees as a method of combating antisemitism. The Jewish refugee thus is twice a victim of antisemitism: he is being ousted from the antisemitic countries, and he is being denied admission to the democratic ones on the theory that the best way to ward off antisemitism is to keep out the Jews. This strange paradox is characteristic of one of the greatest tragedies in the tragic history of the Jewish people.

3. THE STRUGGLE FOR BREAD

The economic difficulties encountered by the refugee in his new country are certainly no smaller than the political. In this respect, too, there is a great difference between the last century, when the refugee was—apart from his fortune and skill—considered a valuable asset to the new country, and the present period, when he is felt to be a burden, liable to aggravate the existing difficulties. A refugee with capital, or a refugee expert, may still be tolerated, since the danger of competition is not so great in these cases; on the contrary, new branches of economic activity may be established and new employment opportunities created. The refugee as an employer has, therefore, fewer difficulties to overcome than as a worker or a member of a liberal profession. Quite different is the situation of the refugee who depends on a job for his livelihood. In most cases he is unwelcome and suspect for a twofold reason: first, because he takes away the job which, in the view of the man in the street, should be reserved for the citizen; second, because, owing to his desperate plight, he may accept employment under conditions inferior to those preva-

lent and thus jeopardize the standard of living of the working class. Unfortunately, cases of exploiting the plight of refugees and paying them less than the other workers are well known in all countries.³ This, as well as the fear of an increase in unemployment through the influx of refugees, is the main reason for the unfavorable attitude of the labor movement manifest in the years immediately preceding the present war, just as it manifested itself in the development of anti-immigration sentiment in the most important immigration countries. On the other hand, the refugee, even if possessed of the same professional qualifications as the native worker, is handicapped by his poor knowledge of the conditions in the new country and, in most cases, also by his inadequate command of the language. This is felt to a lesser extent in the field of manual work, especially in industry, but is a great drawback in all other activities. In the United States, even familiarity with the language may not suffice to assure the possibility of employment, since, in a great many business offices and shops, a person with an "accent" is not employed. This handicap was not so great in the preceding period, when the new immigrant could find employment in certain industries (especially in the clothing industry) even without knowing the language of the country. Today, months and even years may pass before the refugee is recognized as an equal worker. In the meantime he may seek in vain an opportunity to earn his bread.⁴

All this refers to cases where it is possible for the refugee to pursue his old occupation. But such cases are certainly not the rule. Very often the refugee has to undergo a process of vocational readjustment if his quest for work and bread is to be crowned with success. No possibilities exist for former public officials to engage

³About this problem, see Gerhart Saenger, "The Refugee Here," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1940, p. 578.

⁴See Freda Heilberg, "Experiences, Attitudes and Problems of German Jewish Refugees," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, March, 1939.

in their previous callings; the opportunities for lawyers, commercial employees, physicians, teachers, journalists, and several other professions are strictly limited. The problem of vocational readjustment thus confronts a great number of refugees from the moment of their arrival in the new country. In most cases it is a problem of shifting from a liberal profession to manual work,—a very complicated process both from the physical and the psychological point of view.⁵ It is also a problem of weathering the period of transition during which the refugee cannot earn his bread at all or, at best, may be handicapped in his earning ability. And last but not least, it is a problem of lowering one's standard of living since, in almost every case, the refugee will earn less in his new occupation than he did in his old one.⁶ All these difficulties did not exist in the previous period. It is true that the majority of Russian Jewish immigrants in the 80's and subsequently had to seek new callings in this country. However, in most cases this did not involve passing from higher, liberal pursuits to inferior, manual occupations, neither did it necessitate the lowering of one's standard of living. In the old country most of them had a low standard of living, and the change in the new country was generally for the better. But among the refugees today there are very few, if any, who did not have more or less secure positions in their old home, and who in their present occupations are not worse off materially than formerly.

This constitutes the greatest difficulty of their new life.

4. THE NEW LIFE

The problem dealt with in this chapter is not merely an economic one. It has another aspect which is certainly no less impor-

⁵Saenger, *loc. cit.*, p. 582.

⁶See Ruth Z. Mann, "The Adjustment of Refugees in the United States in Relation to their Background," *The Jewish Social Quarterly*, September, 1939, p. 19 ff.

tant. The occupational readjustment means not only a lowering of the standard of living, but also a social degradation, at least in the eyes of the refugee and his fellow countrymen. The former judge, attorney-at-law, college professor, or managing director now becomes a tailor or taxi driver, and he feels this as a social calamity no less than as an economic setback. This is especially true of the German Jewish refugees, since in Germany social station and titles are more prized than in any other country. It does not matter that they now live in a country where the social distance between the various occupations is less felt than elsewhere, and where a man is valued for what he has rather than for what he does, since the refugee thinks in terms of his old country rather than the new. In this connection, mention should also be made of the vocational readjustment of women refugees, in especial their considerable transition to the rank of domestic servants, which in the majority of cases is regarded as a social degradation. Only in Palestine is this problem felt in a lesser degree, since there the vocational readjustment is in many cases dictated also by reasons of national ideology, and since there the refugee is surrounded by people whose social position is mostly the same as his own. But in all other countries the case is quite different. This social degradation is another of the tragedies of refugee life, and not the least of them.

Too, such a situation highly complicates the problem of merging of the refugee into the life of the new country. The refugee, surrounded in his daily life by people whose educational and cultural background is inferior to his own, feels no desire to associate with them beyond the limit of strict necessity; nor does he desire to participate in the unions, clubs, or other societies where he can meet his new colleagues. It is easier for him to remain in the circle of his countrymen where his former station and titles are recognized, where he speaks his own language and

forgets his present degradation. Hence the voluntary separation of many refugees from the majority of the population and the establishment of their own organizations, consisting of fellow nationals of the old country, which are regarded rather as a permanent form of the new social life than as transitory institutions aiming to mitigate the difficulties of the new social milieu. This tendency to create organizations composed of natives of the same country or even of the same city (the so-called *landsmannschaften*) is as old as the Jewish immigration into the United States, especially that from the East European countries; and today there are thousands of such societies which play an important part in the social life of American Jewry. But while the older *landsmannschaften* do not hamper the merging of the Jewish immigrants into the general life of the country, the organizations of the refugees have—at least for the time being—a far more exclusive character, although in the future they may assume the same rôle as the *landsmannschaften*.

In this connection a special problem arises: the problem of relations between the refugees and their children. The distance between the refugee and the social life of the new country does not exist for the second generation. The children meet at school other children from among the native population; they speak, play, and study together, and have no traditions to overcome. The child does not understand the meaning and the aims of the special social life of his parents. This growing distance between them and their offspring is felt by many refugees as a further hardship of their new life.

All these difficulties—the feeling of social degradation, the separation from the native population, and the growing cleavage between the first and the second generation—constitute what may be called the psychological problem of the refugee. But there are two more things which must be briefly dwelt upon, although they

cannot be stated as clearly as the preceding facts. We have mentioned the vocational readjustment of the refugee. However, this process, with all the difficulties it involves, is in the majority of cases far from being carried out systematically. Until the refugee finds a job which may provide a modest livelihood for him and his family, he has to exert a great deal of energy, try many different occupations and jobs, wait for weeks and months and sometimes even years, and in the meantime he must either starve or live on philanthropic doles. In some cases the wife is the only breadwinner in the family and the husband has to depend on her income. The danger of a moral breakdown exists in all such cases. A man who has been hunting for a job for months and dependent upon philanthropy or upon the earnings of his wife, after having formerly been a respectable and well-to-do citizen, will never be quite the same even after obtaining a position.

Somewhat less evident is the danger arising out of the new circumstances and the new conditions of life. Not only is the environment in the factory or shop new to the refugee; new to him are also the language and culture of the country, its views and mores, food and clothing, and all the other details of daily life. Besides the tragic developments of the last years before his arrival in the new country, and besides the bitter struggle for his daily bread, the refugee has to discard everything that used to be familiar and dear to him in former years. He has to become a different man. There are no doubt strong men who can adjust themselves to new circumstances without a wrench and without impairing their spiritual life. However, in many cases the tragedy of the refugee's existence remains stamped upon his soul for many years.

5. THE CULTURAL PROBLEM

The question of the new language and culture is more fundamental than may appear from what has just been said. The

language is necessary both for the daily life and for cultural activities. People who do not know the language have to suffer as far as their earning capacity and cultural life are concerned. It is hardly possible to get a position without knowing the language of the country, nor is it possible for a man to satisfy his cultural needs in a country whose speech he does not understand. The Yiddish culture, which was of such great importance to the earlier Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, enabling them to create a cultural atmosphere of their own, is of no use to the Jewish refugees from Germany.⁷

But there are other problems, too. The growing wave of nationalism makes people who do not use the language of the country less welcome than others, and in many cases it makes them undesirable. This problem is still more complicated with regard to German Jewish refugees, since German is not only a foreign tongue but the language of a nation considered a relentless enemy of both democracy and the Jewish people. For elderly persons and for those who have difficulty in acquiring the language and culture of the new country, many difficulties may arise out of this situation.

This reluctance to tolerate languages other than that of the country finds expression not alone in the sphere of personal sympathy or antipathy. There are countries which prohibit the use of foreign languages, especially in newspapers and in public life. For instance, in the two most important countries of South America—Argentina and Brazil—administrative orders have been issued forbidding or strictly limiting the use of foreign languages; the former prohibits their use at public meetings, while the latter bans the publication of all newspapers printed in such

⁷About the language problem, see Eduard Heimann, "The Refugee Speaks," *The Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 111 ff.

languages. While such measures are primarily aimed against Fifth Column propaganda in those countries conducted under the guise of German cultural activities, Yiddish and other languages of the Jewish refugees are also hit by them.

In this connection, another problem arises. The adoption of the language of the new country marks the first step toward cultural assimilation, which is the avowed goal of many countries at present. The liberal view of former decades—characteristic especially of the Western Hemisphere—which allowed every immigrant to remain loyal to his cultural heritage, no longer has the same force that it had 30 or 40 years ago. The rule, *cujus regio ejus natio*, is being enforced in many countries today just as, in its religious form, it was enforced in other ages. The difficulties arising from this situation for the refugee and the immigrant are obvious.

But there also exists the possibility of voluntary assimilation. Assimilation as a voluntary process of giving up one's national consciousness is a familiar phenomenon in Jewish life. It was known in all periods of Jewish history, but reached its acme in the second half of the last and in the first decades of the present century, as one of the most salient results of the process of emancipation.

The refugee movement of the last few years has caused a revival of assimilationist tendencies in their worst form, inspired solely by fear of persecution. The case of a group of German Jewish refugees, who changed their religion immediately upon arrival in South America, throws a significant light upon this tendency, which is an outgrowth of the Nazi terror among morally broken people. It is the tendency of the hunted game, which in its deadly fear tries to vanish as soon as possible among the trees. It is certainly not the tendency of all refugees. The terrible experiences of the last few years have brought many of them back to

their people. Both the compulsory assimilation of refugees dictated by the policy of many countries, and the voluntary one prompted mainly by fear of persecution and the desire to assume a protective coloration, exist nearly everywhere and constitute a great problem for the future.

6. CONCLUSION

Thus the problem of the refugee is fourfold: (a) gaining admission to a new land; (b) finding a new economic and cultural existence; (c) maintaining his morale; and (d) preserving his human and national consciousness.

We have seen how in each of these fields a fundamental difference exists between the problem of present Jewish refugee and that of the Jewish immigrant of former days. It is clear that no solution of the refugee problem can be found without first taking into consideration these most complicated details. Only as a result of such an inquiry will it be possible to frame a new policy of dealing with the refugee problem, the aim of which shall be to make the refugees normal and useful members of their new community and to strengthen the bonds between them and their people.

CHAPTER XIII

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID TO JEWISH REFUGEES

Introductory—The Nansen Organization and the Jewish Refugees—The High Commissioners for Refugees (Jewish and Other) coming from Germany—The Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee—The Bermuda Conference—The Failure of the Intergovernmental Agencies and the Reasons Therefor

1. INTRODUCTORY

The conviction that it is the duty of the whole civilized world to help the refugees, since they are victims of oppression and may not be able to find unaided the way to salvation, grew rapidly in both cases of the modern refugee problem: in the case of the refugees from Russia, and again in that of the refugees from Germany. The refugees fled to different countries; they had to be admitted there and given emergency aid; but soon it appeared that this aid, even when granted, was not enough and that efforts on a larger scale were necessary. These have been made to date by three factors in more or less close cooperation with one another: by private Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, by individual Governments, and by intergovernmental organs.

The help extended to refugees by the various Governments has been referred to in the preceding chapters. Its fundamental character is not easy to define. While humanitarian considerations may in many cases have played a rather considerable rôle, the desire to protect the political and economic interests of their own countries from the influx of refugees weighed no less heavily with them. The hesitant policy of many Governments in regard

to the refugees may be the result of these contradictory motives. Even the assistance given to refugees may sometimes be attributed to the desire to prevent competition between them and the native population or to expedite their emigration rather than to genuine human solidarity. It is quite otherwise with the refugee relief activities carried on by private organizations. In the overwhelming majority of cases, human solidarity is the mainspring of their activities, compared to which other motives, if any, play a secondary rôle. The fact that their sole concern is to help the refugees may explain why the efforts of private organizations have been considerably more successful than those of governmental or intergovernmental agencies, notwithstanding that the political and financial resources of the former are far more limited.

The position of the intergovernmental agencies is quite different. They are under no necessity to think primarily of the particular interests of any one country and they may initiate a policy from a much broader point of view than is generally possible for an individual government. On the other hand, the interest of the individual refugee, much as it must be considered, is by no means as decisive for intergovernmental agencies as it is for private organizations. The efforts of the former must be directed toward the solution of the refugee problem in such a spirit and in such a manner as will best serve the interests of mankind as a whole. The intergovernmental agencies may, therefore, be regarded as the real policy makers in the field of refugee aid, and a review of their activities may thus be of special interest, enabling us to find out what has been accomplished by them and what is the relation between their achievements and the fundamental aims which led to the creation of such agencies.

Intergovernmental aid to refugees was first introduced in the period following the end of the First World War. It was, first, the result of a realization that the tremendous task of helping

hundreds of thousands refugees or (as in the case of the Russian refugees) even millions could not be coped with by a single State. Second, it was closely connected with the formation of new international bodies, principally the League of Nations, which regarded the solution of the refugee problem as one of its tasks.

While only one international body was established to help the refugees of the nineteen-twenties, two or (together with the first one) even three tried to do the same for the refugees from Germany and other countries after 1933. In the case of Soviet Russia, the Jews were only partly involved, since their proportion in the total number of Russian refugees was rather small. On the other hand, the work done by the intergovernmental agencies for the refugees from Germany was in reality relief work for the Jewish refugees, who constituted the overwhelming majority. We will therefore devote only a few remarks to the Nansen Organization, which was intended to help mostly the refugees from Russia, and dwell at greater length on the two others whose importance for the Jewish refugees was—or, at least, was supposed to be—much greater.

2. NANSEN ORGANIZATION AND THE JEWISH REFUGEES

The Nansen Organization for Help to Refugees, or, as it was called after 1930, the Nansen International Office for Refugees, was established in 1921 and liquidated at the end of 1938. It had a special importance for those Jews who had left Soviet Russia together with hundreds of thousands of other Russian refugees, as well as Armenian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees. However, the help they received was more limited than that given to the other refugees. While the Russians, the Greeks, the Armenians, and several other categories of refugees had to be supported or brought to other countries, the Jewish refugees, who in most cases received generous help from Jewish organizations,

or from relatives, were dependent upon the Nansen Organization mainly in legal matters. Since all of them had been deprived of their Russian nationality, they had to be provided with documents enabling them to establish their identity and to travel. Tens of thousands of them received the so-called Nansen Passports, which in many instances they have carried to this day. Another case where help was needed was the danger of their expulsion from their provisional countries of refuge, a danger especially imminent in Poland. Through the intervention of the Nansen Organization, they were able to remain there until arrangements were completed for their emigration to other countries, especially to the United States and to Palestine. It ought to be mentioned that Jewish representatives participated in the Commission which the Nansen Organization sent in 1929 to South America to explore the possibilities of immigration and colonization in the countries of that continent.¹

After 1933, the activities of the Nansen Office were of some importance only in the case of refugees from the Saar, who came under its jurisdiction by virtue of a decision of the League of Nations Council on May 24, 1935,² and whose number was estimated in 1936 at 4,000, and in 1938 at 6,000, of whom 38 to 40 percent were Jews.³ But in this case, too, the number of Jews protected by the Nansen Office was very limited. The Nansen Office undertook to settle Saarlanders in Paraguay, but there were scarcely any Jews among the colonists. Following the Arrangement of July 30, 1935, whereby the Nansen Office was authorized to issue passports to the Saarlanders, a number of Jewish refugees

¹Concerning the results of the activities of the Nansen Office, see the two pamphlets by the President of its Governing Body, Michael Hansson, *The Refugee Problem and The Refugee Problem and the League of Nations*.

²Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 211.

³League of Nations, Nansen International Office for Refugees, *Report of the Governing Body for the Year ending June 30 1936*, p. 6. Cf. Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

from the Saar succeeded in obtaining such documents. As the legal and material position of the Saarlanders was much better than that of other refugees from Germany, there was less need for intervention by the Nansen office, especially as regards Jewish refugees, who succeeded in taking along large parts of their fortunes, and who also enjoyed the help of Jewish organizations.

3. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (JEWISH AND OTHER) COMING FROM GERMANY

This agency, whose importance to Jews is already evident from its official name, was created by a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 11, 1933. It resulted from the recognized necessity of solving the economic, social, and financial problems of the refugees through international collaboration. Since the Nansen Office was to be disbanded in the near future, and since it was thought desirable to place the case of the German refugees in the hands of an agency not too closely connected with the League of Nations so as not to antagonize Germany, then still a member of the League,⁴ it was decided to create an autonomous Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) coming from Germany, with a Governing Body composed of representatives of Governments and an Advisory Council made up of representatives of private organizations.

The following countries were invited to send representatives to the Governing Body: Netherlands, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The United States Government, on October 27, 1933, decided to participate in the High Commission and named Pro-

⁴James G. McDonald, "Letter of Resignation," *The Christian Century*, January 15, 1936, p. 102.

fessor P. Chamberlain of Columbia University as its representative on the Governing Body. It was the first country to accept the invitation, being followed by all the states invited, except Argentina, Brazil, and Spain, which did not give a definite answer but indicated that they would not cooperate.⁵

The Advisory Council consisted of representatives of private organizations, Jewish and non-Jewish. Among the Jewish bodies represented, the most important were the Agudath Israel, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Comité des Délégations Juives (forerunner of the World Jewish Congress), the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and the Jewish Colonization Association.⁶

The duties of the High Commissioner were to negotiate with Governments on technical questions, such as passports, identification papers, residence and work permits, and on the admission of refugees into countries where there was a chance of their absorption.⁷ An American, James G. McDonald, was invited to officiate as the first High Commissioner, but he resigned two years later (December 27, 1935) because of his dissatisfaction with the results of his activities and because of his realization that such an eminently political and social problem as that of the German Jewish refugees could not be solved by mere philanthropy but that, instead, efforts must be made to remove or mitigate the causes which were creating German refugees.⁸ In January, 1936, the President of the League Council appointed, as second High Commissioner, Sir Neill Malcolm, a high British official, whose functions were confined to questions of legal and political protection (legalizing the status of refugees, placing them in other

⁵Norman Bentwich, *The Refugees from Germany*, p. 63.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

⁷Louise W. Holborn, "The Legal Status of Political Refugees," *The American Journal of International Law*, October, 1938, p. 692.

⁸McDonald, *loc. cit.*, p. 101.

countries and finding them employment), while the task of material assistance was left to the private organizations.⁹ The following categories of refugees came under the protection of the High Commissioner: the refugees from the Saar as defined in the Arrangement of May 24, 1935, that is, Germans who had sought refuge in that region before its reunion with Germany;¹⁰ German refugees as defined in the Provisional Arrangement of July 4, 1936¹¹ and in the Convention of February 10, 1938;¹² refugees from the territory which formally constituted Austria by the decision of the Council of the League of Nations of May 14, 1938,¹³ and refugees from the areas ceded by Czechoslovakia to Germany as defined in the resolution of the League Council on January 17, 1939.¹⁴

It was thought that by methodical effort, and barring unforeseen circumstances, it would take two years to reabsorb the refugees and insure their settlement, their immigration and the assimilation of some of them in the countries in which they had taken refuge, and their preparation for other employment, and that the work would practically be finished by the end of 1938, so that its termination would coincide with the final liquidation of the

⁹*League of Nations Questions: The Refugees*, p. 40.

¹⁰League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 16th Year, No. 6, June, 1935; "Minutes of the Eighty-sixth Session of the Council, Held at Geneva from Monday, May 20th to Saturday, May 25th, 1935," p. 633.

¹¹League of Nations, *Intergovernmental Conference for the Adoption of a Status for Refugees coming from Germany. I. Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, Geneva, July 4, 1936*, Ch. I, Art. 1.

¹²League of Nations, *Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, Geneva, February 10, 1938*, Ch. I, Art. 1.

¹³League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 19th Year, No. 5-6, May-June, 1938, "Minutes of the Hundred and First Session of the Council, Held at Geneva from Monday, May 9th to Saturday, May 14th, 1938," pp. 367-368.

¹⁴League of Nations, *ibid.*, 20th Year, No. 2, February, 1939, "Minutes of the Hundred and Fourth Session of the Council, Held at Geneva from Monday, January 16th to Friday, January 20th, 1938," pp. 72-73.

Nansen International Office.¹⁵ However, the course of events in Germany frustrated this expectation. Only the consolidation of these two agencies could be accomplished. At the end of 1938, the Office of High Commissioner for German Refugees and the Nansen International Office for Refugees were merged into the the Office of High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees, regardless of the country they came from. His duties were to be as follows: To provide for the political and legal protection of refugees; to superintend the entry into force and the application of the legal status of refugees, as defined more particularly in the Conventions of 1933 and 1938; to facilitate the coordination of humanitarian assistance; to assist the Governments and private organizations in their efforts to promote emigration and permanent settlement; to keep in touch with the Governments concerned, maintain relations with the Intergovernmental Committee in London, and establish contact with private refugee-aid organizations, and to appoint representatives in the principal countries of refuge, subject to the approval of the latter. Like his predecessors, he was not to engage in any direct humanitarian activities. Sir Herbert Emerson was appointed the first League High Commissioner for Refugees in this form for a term of five years beginning January 1, 1939.¹⁶

The practical achievements of the Office of High Commissioner from its inception until the outbreak of war were not very encouraging. It succeeded in establishing contact with all private refugee-aid organizations and in coordinating their activities. It also was successful in legalizing the status of the refugees in

¹⁵League of Nations, *Refugees coming from Germany: Report submitted to the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by the High Commissioner, Sir Neill Malcolm, September 1, 1936*, p. 7.

¹⁶Resolutions on International Assistance to Refugees adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly of the League of Nations on September 30, 1938, quoted by Simpson, *op. cit.*, pp. 596-598.

several countries, specially in issuing new identification cards to refugees who had been deprived of their German nationality, and in reducing the number of cases where refugees were deported without sufficient reasons from their provisional countries of refuge, being driven like outcasts from country to country. The most important achievement from this point of view was the Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany concluded in Geneva, February 10, 1938. This Convention replaced the Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany which had been adopted, at the instance of the High Commissioner Sir Neill Malcolm, in Geneva on July 4, 1936.

While the Convention of 1933 was applicable to Russian, Armenian, and Turkish refugees, the Convention of 1938 dealt only with refugees coming from Germany. Chapter I declares that the terms "refugees coming from Germany" applies to (a) Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any other nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German Government; (b) Stateless persons not covered by previous Conventions or Agreements who have left German territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German Government. Chapter II asserts the right of refugees to move about freely, to sojourn or reside in the territories to which the Convention applies, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the different countries. Chapter III provides for travel documents to be issued to refugees by the countries of their provisional sojourn, entitling the bearer to leave the country where it has been issued and to come back; such documents as a general rule are to be valid for one year from the date of issue, and have to be endorsed with visas by the countries to which the refugees desire to proceed and with transit visas by the countries

of transit. Chapter IV limits the use of measures of expulsion in the case of refugees. Such measures are to be applied only when dictated by reasons of national security and public order and after granting the refugees a suitable period to make the necessary arrangements. Refugees are not to be deported to Germany unless they have been warned and have refused to proceed to another country. Chapter V treats of the legal standing of refugees and secures them the rights acquired under their former national law (such as rights resulting from marriage) and free access to the courts of law. Chapter VI regulates the labor conditions, stating that the existing restrictions on the employment of aliens shall not be applied in all their severity to refugees, and that they be automatically suspended in favor of refugees resident three or more years in the country, or married to a person possessing the nationality of the country of reference, or having one or more children of that nationality. Chapter VII grants refugees the most favorable treatment accorded to foreign nationals in cases of industrial accidents. The same applies to questions of social security (welfare and relief) dealt with in Chapter VIII, and to questions of education covered in Chapter IX. Provision is made in Chapter X for the establishment of school for professional readaptation and technical training of refugees in order to facilitate their emigration to overseas countries. No special duties, charges, or taxes are to be imposed upon the refugees, according to Chapter XI. Chapter XII exempts refugees from reciprocity; that is, it provides that the "enjoyment of certain rights and the benefit of certain favors accorded to foreigners subject to reciprocity shall not be refused to refugees in the absence of reciprocity." A number of general provisions are included in Chapter XIII in regard to the signing and ratification of the Convention, the accession to it and its denunciation, and also to its application in the colonies, protectorates, overseas and man-

datory territories of the High Contracting Parties and the right to make reservations concerning any of the articles of the Convention. The Convention was signed originally by Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Spain, France, Norway, and Netherlands. Belgium, Great Britain, Spain, and France made reservations as to the application of the Convention in their colonies and protectorates.¹⁷

In general, despite some inadequacies, this Convention was felt to be an important step towards legalization of the status of the refugees, and it was urged that it be extended to all emigrants and ratified by all democratic states.¹⁸ But apart from these legal achievements, not much was accomplished. The second task of the High Commissioner, to find countries where refugees might be settled, remained unfulfilled notwithstanding the vast amount of labor expended on it. The number of 5,000 refugees who, as Sir Neill Malcolm reported in 1938, had benefited from his personal interventions during his two and a half years of office, is not very impressive when compared with the total number of refugees. The only two countries which admitted considerable numbers of refugees, Palestine and the United States, did so without any intervention on the part of the High Commissioner, and the frequent interventions of the High Commissioner in other countries were not very successful. The consciousness that, in a general atmosphere of reluctance to admit refugees, not much could be done, was one of the reasons for Mr. McDonald's resignation, and the situation did not improve in the succeeding years; on the contrary, it grew more complicated from year to year. The reports regularly submitted to the League of Nations by the High Commissioner contained valuable material on the condition of

¹⁷League of Nations, *Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany*, Geneva, February 10, 1938.

¹⁸Oscar Jaszi, "Political Refugees," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 93.

the refugees and on their numbers, but could boast only very meager achievements in respect of real help extended to them. The bulk of such work continued to be done by private organizations.

4. THE EVIAN CONFERENCE AND THE INTER- GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

It was the realization that neither through the existing agencies of the League of Nations nor through private efforts could the present refugee problem be solved, which prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to call the Intergovernmental Meeting which convened at Evian, France, July 6, 1938. The Governments of 32 countries which could assist in finding a way out of the desperate situation were invited to send delegates to the Conference; a few other European countries interested in problems of emigration (especially Poland and Rumania) sent their observers; in addition, representatives of a great number of private organizations active in the field of refugee-aid or interested in refugee problems came to the Conference, and, although not officially admitted, were welcomed as guests and a number of them were given an opportunity to express their views before a special sub-committee of the Intergovernmental Meeting. Altogether, 39 private organizations were represented, of which the following 21 were Jewish: Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews; Jewish Colonization Association; German Jewish Aid Committee; Comité d'aide et d'assistance aux victims de l'antisémitisme en Allemagne; Comite voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen; the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association; Agudath Israel World Organization; American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; Council for German Jewry; HICEM; World Jewish Congress; New Zionist Organization; Alliance Israélite Universelle;

Comité pour le développement de la grande colonisation juive; Freeland League; ORT; Centre de recherches de solutions au problème juif; Jewish Agency for Palestine; Comité pour la défense des droits des Israélites en Europe centrale et orientale; Union des Sociétés OSE; Société d'émigration et de colonisation Juive EMCOL.¹⁹

A great number of memoranda were submitted to the Conference by the Jewish organizations. The most important of them were those of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the World Jewish Congress, the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, and a "Memorandum of Certain Jewish Organizations Concerned with the Refugees from Germany and Austria," which was signed by the Council for German Jewry, the Jewish Colonization Association, HICEM, the Joint Foreign Committee, the German Jewish Aid Committee, and the Agudath Israel, being also endorsed by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, although the Agency submitted a separate memorandum on Palestine problems.

Having chosen Myron C. Taylor, head of the American delegation, to act as its chairman, the Conference heard a series of reports on the existing situation and on the prospects of absorbing refugees in the different countries. Most of the delegates approached the problem from a humanitarian point of view; only a few of them touched upon its political aspect, condemning the persecutions in Germany. In the strongest terms this condemnation was voiced by the representative of Colombia.²⁰ Nearly all the delegates expressed their sympathy for the refugees but, with very few exceptions, were very careful not to assume any obligations on behalf of their Governments; on the contrary, they made every effort to point out the existing difficulties in absorbing new

¹⁹*Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 6 to 15, 1938. Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings of the Committee, Resolutions and Reports*, p. 49.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 25 ff.

refugees in their respective countries. The Conference then appointed two sub-committees, one on the reception of those concerned with the relief of political refugees from Germany (including Austria), to hear in executive session the representatives of the private organizations, and a technical sub-committee to hear in confidence the statements by the participating Governments on their immigration laws and practices and on the number and types of immigrants each was prepared to receive.²¹

The technical sub-committee reported, on the basis of the statements made to it by the delegations of the various Governments, that there were prospects for increased reception of refugees qualifying for admission under the immigration laws of the receiving country, that certain countries were willing to receive experienced agriculturists, others were ready to accept selected classes of workers for whom suitable employment was available, while still others were prepared to admit immigrants without occupational restriction and let them choose their employment.²² In order to make use of these opportunities, the Conference decided to establish a permanent Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees with headquarters in London. The scope of this Committee's activity was limited to emigrants, actual and potential, from Germany (including Austria).²³ The suggestions made by several representatives of private organizations that it include also the emigration problems of other countries (especially Poland) were, although supported by some delegates, for the time being not accepted. However, by declaring that the Intergovernmental Committee should "continue and develop" the work of the Evian Conference, the door was left open for the Committee to extend the sphere of its activity in the future.²⁴ It

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 24.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 51.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

²⁴Holborn, *loc. cit.*, p. 700.

was recommended that the Governments participating in the Committee should continue to furnish it confidentially detailed information regarding immigration possibilities and the existing laws and practices and that they should recognize suitable identification documents in cases where the refugees had no regular passports, but that they should not assume any obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration. Finally, it was agreed that the Intergovernmental Committee, headed by a Chairman and four Vice-Chairmen, should appoint a Director whose duties would be to improve the conditions of emigration and to conduct negotiations with the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement concerning opportunities for permanent settlement of the refugees.²⁵

At the next meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, held in London on August 3, 1938, George Rublee, an American, was appointed Director. In the course of his remarks at this meeting, Mr. Taylor declared that the Intergovernmental Committee must prepare for an exodus from Germany, during the next five years, of at least 600,000 refugees, among them Jews, half-Jews, and Roman Catholics.²⁶ Since then there have been three more meetings of the Committee, one in London on February 12, 1939, the second in London on July 19, and the third in Washington on October 17, of the same year. The last of these gatherings, which already took place after the outbreak of hostilities, discussed methods of meeting the refugee problems under war conditions, as well as the fate of the refugees in lands of temporary asylum. Reacting to a prediction made by President Roosevelt that the war would create from ten to twenty million new refugees, the Committee agreed that surveys of new areas of resettlement be proceeded with for possible use after the war, but declared that

²⁵*Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian*, etc., pp. 54-55.

²⁶Holborn, *loc. cit.*, p. 701.

it had no competence to expand its mandates beyond the terms of dealing with the refugee question of Greater Germany.²⁷

The relations between the League High Commissioner for German Refugees and this new Intergovernmental Committee were not very clear. Although the High Commissioner was present at Evian and delivered a report on the current situation, and although the Conference expressed its appreciation of the work done by the existing refugee services of the League and the studies of migration made by the International Labor Office and promised to cooperate with them, it is not easy to state the details of this cooperation. A certain overlapping of activities was inevitable and the necessity arose after a time to merge the activities of the two organizations. This was done in February, 1939, when Mr. Rublee resigned and was replaced by Sir Herbert Emerson, who was at the same time High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees, regardless of the country of origin.

The actual achievements of the Intergovernmental Committee were very modest. The Director started negotiations with the German Government to let the refugees take along part of their property when leaving Germany. This was done in accordance with the preamble of a resolution adopted at the Evian Conference, namely, that the collaboration of the country of origin be secured and that it be persuaded to make its contribution by enabling involuntary emigrants to take with them their property and possessions and emigrate in an orderly manner.²⁸ At the same time it was felt that one of the chief immigration difficulties at the time was that no country wanted to admit people without money, whereas many of the prospective immigrants had plenty of capital in Germany, but could not take it out.²⁹

²⁷*American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 42 (1940-1941), pp. 444-445.

²⁸*Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, etc.*, p. 54.

²⁹Clarence E. Pickett, "Difficulties in the Placement of Refugees," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 97.

A provisional agreement was reached between the Director and the representatives of the German Government whereby 150,000 Jewish wage earners—by which term were meant all men and unmarried women between 15 and 45 years of age who were physically and otherwise able to earn a living—were to be removed from Germany by means of a regulated emigration in the course of 3 to 5 years. Their dependents—some 250,000 persons—were to join them after they had established themselves in their new homelands. Persons over 45 years of age, or infirm, whose number was estimated at 200,000 were to be allowed to live in Germany quietly without being segregated from the rest of the population. The emigration of German Jewry was to be financed by means of a trust fund amounting to at least one-fourth of the existing Jewish wealth in Germany, which fund was to be used to buy equipment and capital goods for emigrants through an outside agency. The Haavarah method of transfer was to be used for Palestine. Emigrants were to be allowed to take with them their personal belongings, and no flight tax or other special contribution was to be imposed on them.³⁰ In the ensuing negotiations with the German Government, several provisions of this agreement were modified. The German Government insisted especially that the whole of Jewish wealth, and not merely 25%, as previously agreed upon, be taken over by a trust. Of this wealth, 25% was to be set aside to provide Jewish emigrants with German manufactures, such as farm machinery, tools, building materials, and hardware. What was to become of the remaining 75% was not stated.³¹

This plan was rejected by Jewish public opinion the world over as another method of blackmailing German Jewry and

³⁰*New York Times*, February 14, 1939.

³¹Eric Estorick, "The Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 141.

furthering the export interests of Hitlerite Germany. On the other hand, there was no particular eagerness on the German side to ratify this agreement, and so the negotiations had no tangible results. In July, 1939, the Intergovernmental Committee announced the establishment of a Coordinating Foundation, a semi-public Jewish and Christian body intended to facilitate the orderly emigration of German refugees. Supplied with a fund of \$1,000,000 and headed by Paul Van Zeeland, ex-Premier of Belgium, this body hoped to serve as an agency for the handling of refugee questions and the resettlement of exiles.³² However, the outbreak of the war virtually halted all efforts along these lines.

In the course of his testimony on November 26, 1943, at the House foreign Committee hearing on two resolutions providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe, Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long surprised the public by asserting that the little-heard-of Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees was actually attending to the matters for which the said resolutions proposed the creation of a special commission. Said Mr. Long:

There has been an agency of the American Government actually attending to these affairs for a little more than 4 years. There is now an international agency set up at the instigation and cooperating with the United States Government; and I think your committee will desire to consider whether any step you might take would be construed as a repudiation of the acts of the executive branch of your own Government, or whether the action which you might take would constitute a reflection upon the actions of the Intergovernmental body and the other governments, members of that body, which have been asso-

³²American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, *Aid to Jews Overseas: Report for 1939*, p. 16.

ciated with the American Government in its activities and which are currently very actively engaged in these matters.³³

On the same occasion Mr. Long read what purported to be the "new mandate" of the Intergovernmental Committee, to wit:

The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral and Allied states and organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The operation of the committee shall extend to all countries from which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse, for the purposes enumerated above, funds both public and private.

"In other words," Mr. Long added, "they are given plenary authority to do whatever they can, within and without Germany and the occupied territories."³⁴

Mr. Long's interpretation of this new mandate implied that the Intergovernmental Committee could undertake direct negotiations with Germany for the release of Jews and other persecuted peoples. This interpretation was characterized as "absolutely incorrect" by the head office of the Intergovernmental Committee, according to a news agency dispatch from London under date of December 17, 1943.³⁵

³³*Rescue of the Jewish and Other Peoples in Nazi-Occupied Territory, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, First Session, on H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352, Resolutions Providing for the Establishment by the Executive of a Commission to Effectuate the Rescue of the Jewish People of Europe, November 26, 1943, p. 32.*

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 34; see also p. 54.

³⁵Jewish Telegraphic Agency, *Daily News Bulletin*, December 21, 1943.

At the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee held in London on August 15 and 16, 1944, for the purpose mainly of adopting a constitution for the Committee, Sir Herbert Emerson said in the course of his report: "A very great deal of effort is necessary to obtain even small results." "When positive results are achieved it is often through the combined, or sometimes independent, efforts of a number of agencies."

Not much more successful were the efforts to secure immigration possibilities for the refugees; on the contrary, further restrictions on immigration were imposed by many of the Governments whose representatives had attended the Evian Conference. The only concrete achievement of the Intergovernmental Committee was its participation in the negotiations leading to the agreement concerning the colonization of refugees in Santo Domingo,—a small achievement, indeed, as we have seen in Chapter X. Far more important was the invaluable information gathered both in connection with the preparations for the Evian Conference and with the subsequent activity of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees. This material, which was largely compiled by the private organizations and submitted to the Committee, may prove of great value in the future and many suggestions made therein, which simply had to be filed away because of the outbreak of the war and the general atmosphere of uncertainty throughout the world, may eventually find their way to realization.

5. THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE

A new attempt to help the refugees by combining the forces of the two most powerful nations on earth—Great Britain and the United States—was made in April, 1943, when a conference of representatives of the Governments of these two countries met in Bermuda. The initiative in arranging this conference was taken

by the British Government, which had invited the Government of the United States earlier in the year to discuss jointly ways and means of aiding the refugees. Originally scheduled to be held in Ottawa, the conference was for technical reasons transferred to Bermuda. Its convocation was due to the mounting horror of public opinion in both countries at the wholesale extermination of the Jewish population in Nazi occupied or dominated countries of Europe, as well as to the conviction that something ought to be done to rescue not only the actual refugees, especially in the few remaining neutral countries (Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey), but also those who could still be removed from the Axis or satellite countries and brought to places of safety either in Europe itself or overseas. In addition, the two governments had been urged by public opinion to make the necessary arrangements with the Germans through neutral countries to permit the feeding of Jews in the Nazi-created ghettos.

Thus the program of the conference as envisaged or rather advocated by public opinion, speaking especially through Jewish but also through many Christian organizations and groups, was to cover the following four points: (a) to secure the position of the refugees in the neutral countries by means of a guarantee of their maintenance by the United Nations for the duration of the emergency; (b) to provide new homes for the refugees, especially in the United States and Palestine, by easing the immigration regulations there; (c) to remove by negotiations with the Axis Powers through neutral countries of as many Jews as possible, and (d) to ship a minimum of food to the people of the ghettos.

In point of fact, it was evident even before the Bermuda Conference began that the scope of its work would be much more modest. The terms of reference formulated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, by suggesting that "the refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race

or faith," turned it into a problem of refugees in the narrow, technical sense of the word. Moreover, stress was put on the purely exploratory nature of the Conference. Although the British delegation came to Bermuda with a proposal that the Conference consider the problem of "potential refugees," very little, if anything, was done in this direction. The efforts of various Jewish organizations (especially the Joint Emergency Committee for European Jewish Affairs and the World Jewish Congress) to have their representatives admitted to the Conference were fruitless, and the memoranda submitted by them seem hardly to have made any impression upon the delegates. No report on the proceedings of the Bermuda Conference and its decisions was ever published; only a brief, final communiqué was released to the press, wherein it was stated that "nothing was excluded" from the delegates' analysis of the refugee problem, and that "everything that held out any possibility, however remote, of solution of the problem was carefully investigated and thoroughly discussed." It was stressed that "the delegates at Bermuda felt bound to reject certain proposals" which might "interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations," or which were not "capable of accomplishment under war conditions;" that the "questions of shipping, food and supply were fully investigated"; that "a number of concrete recommendations" were agreed upon, but inasmuch as "the recommendations necessarily concern governments other than those represented at the Bermuda Conference and involve military considerations, they must remain confidential." From unofficial reports it appears that the Conference rejected the proposal to enter into further negotiations with the Axis countries for the release of at least part of their martyred Jewish populations; that it did not consider itself empowered to recommend shipping food to the ghettos; and that it was unwilling to recommend the setting up of temporary reception centers on an adequate scale for

European refugees in British or American held territories. It seems also to have been determined in advance that no proposal would be entertained to alter British policy in Palestine, nor would the United States, for its part, be asked to liberalize its administrative immigration policy.³⁶

The only concrete results of the Conference would seem to be certain recommendations concerning help to refugees in Spain, as well as in the Balkan countries, by enabling some of them to proceed to Palestine. Whether any steps have been taken to implement these recommendations and, if so, what are the results, has so far not been made public.

The question of intergovernmental machinery to handle the refugee problem in its new form was also discussed at the Bermuda Conference. But despite the considerable trend in public opinion favoring the creation of new machinery in view of the very unsatisfactory results produced by the present Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, it was decided to leave the refugee-aid work in the hands of this committee.

The disappointment with the accomplishments of the Bermuda Conference was very great and widespread, especially in Jewish circles. It was pointed out that the Conference had failed to do the real work, namely, to explore ways and means by which the Jews of Europe could be saved, and that, even as regards the problem of refugees in the narrow sense of the word, nothing was done to create immigration opportunities for them in the various Allied countries. It was felt that the months during which action was deferred pending the outcome of the Bermuda Conference were wasted months, and that we must begin now at the same point where we were before the Conference.

Nor were disappointment and criticism confined to Jewish

³⁶"The Bermuda Affair," *Jewish Comments*, published by the World Jewish Congress, No. 1, May 14, 1943.

quarters. As early as May 7 the correspondent of the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* reported how disappointing the results of the Bermuda Conference were to the British public.³⁷

And Alexander H. Uhl, who had attended the Conference as a representative of the press, spoke of the lack of "fierce determination to do more than seemed possible at the moment and a willingness to accept too easily arguments that so little could be done."³⁸

On May 19, 1943, Mr. Peake, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, made a statement in the House of Commons on the Bermuda Conference. In the spirited debate which ensued, much criticism was voiced by the M.P.'s. Miss Eleanor Rathbone, that ardent fighter for the rescue of the unfortunate refugees, was particularly severe. Here are a few sentences culled from her remarks: "The opening speeches at Bermuda—those dreadful speeches—breathed the very defeatism and despair. . . . The Governments seem to have shown very little sense of urgency. . . . How do the Governments achieve speed when they really care about a problem and think it of first-class importance? They do not do it through conferences in Bermuda or through the lengthy method of the ordinary diplomatic channels, but they do it through inter-communication on the spot. . . . Well, then in regard to the smaller problem, a problem which, nevertheless, concerns the possibilities of saving if not millions, possible hundreds of thousands, tens of thousands, and if not tens of thousands then thousands of human beings—would it not have been worthwhile long ago sending people to the spot, who could make a whole-time job in the key places?"³⁹

³⁷*Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, May 7, 1943.

³⁸"Public Opinion Can Force Refugee Aid," *PM*, May 9, 1943, p. 2.

³⁹*Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons, Official Report*, Wednesday, 19th May, 1943, Vol. 389, No. 67, Cols. 1135-36.

And Mr. Ridly, of the Labor Party, declared: "I heard, with some astonishment, that the two governments concerned were seriously considering the problems which had been discovered by the Conference. I always assumed that the two governments, especially ours, had been considering these problems for a long time."⁴⁰

Only the Conservative M.P., Mr. Mandes, felt "that that Conference has been a success,"⁴¹ a statement challenged by many of the speakers.

At the end of the debate, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden felt it necessary to speak at length about the refugee problem generally and about the Bermuda Conference. Of the latter he said:

I would like to say a few words about the Bermuda Conference. Unfortunately, it is true that all the recommendations of the Conference cannot be made public now. The two delegations agreed—and I think rightly—among themselves as to how much they would make public at this time, and they agreed that certain recommendations must remain confidential for the time being. Having seen those recommendations, I think that it is a wise precaution. The war cabinet have approved that report, the recommendations and the steps to be taken to put them in force. Let me say what I can about the recommendations which have been published. There is, first, the question of neutrals. It is true that some of the smaller neutrals who are neighbors to this Nazi tyranny bear a heavy burden just now and feel that they should have an assurance that when the war is over they will not be left to carry their burden alone. His Majesty's Government are ready to take their part in sharing the burden, and we want that assurance to be given to neutral

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Col. 1143.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, Col. 1163.

countries by the United Nations as a whole. At any rate, we are prepared to take our part in giving such an assurance.⁴²

6. THE FAILURE OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND THE REASONS THEREFOR

The foregoing account of the work done by the various intergovernmental agencies for aid to refugees suffices to show the poor results of their efforts. The Nansen International Office for Refugees, whose activities, especially in behalf of the Russian refugees, had been of considerable importance in the 1920's, did little or nothing for the German refugees; and the achievements of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, as well as of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, were even less encouraging. While some governments, unsatisfactory as their general attitude towards the refugees may have been, managed nevertheless to do rather important things for them (the best example of this in the early thirties was France and in the succeeding years Great Britain and the United States), and while the work of the private refugee-aid organizations deserves the highest praise, nothing of the sort can be said about the intergovernmental agencies.

The "pangs without birth and fruitless industry" of the intergovernmental agencies can hardly be considered an accident. There were several reasons why their work was doomed to failure. These reasons were both psychological and organizational in character. Psychologically it was a most difficult undertaking for international organs to find a solution to the refugee problem at a

⁴²*Ibid.*, Col. 1201. See also *House of Commons—Debates Canada*, Vol. LXXXI, No. 107, Friday, July 9, 1943, pp. 4708-09, and editorial, "Can We Do Less," *New York Post*, June 21, 1943.

time when there was growing reluctance throughout the world to admit immigrants, and when the idea of international cooperation had lost much of its appeal. The chances of success were, accordingly, slight from the very outset, and they were still further reduced by grave organizational defects in the structure of both the High Commission and the Intergovernmental Committee. No real authority was conferred upon these two agencies. Whatever was attempted by them had to be done through negotiations with governments, or rather through interventions with governments, which were successful only in a limited number of cases. This may have some connection with the declining authority of all international organs, and particularly of the League of Nations, in the years preceding the present war; but, in the case of the intergovernmental agencies for refugees, this lack of authority was much more in evidence. It was even more evident in reality than may appear from the wording of the resolutions of the League of Nations and of the conferences by which such agencies were set up.

Another serious defect was the lack of means. The funds put at the disposal of these governmental agencies were limited to their administrative needs, and they were insufficient even for these, forcing the agencies to depend on subsidies from private organizations, which, of course, tended to reduce their authority and prestige still more. No funds whatever were given them for direct assistance to refugees, especially for assisting in their resettlement. Whatever was done in this field, was done by individual governments or, in a much larger measure, by the private organizations. The intergovernmental agencies could at best draw up plans or do some preliminary work without being able to do any practical work on a considerable scale; and this, naturally, undermined their authority still further.

There may have been some more reasons for their failure, but the four just mentioned—general reluctance to admit refugees, general disregard for the idea of international cooperation, the insufficient authority vested in the intergovernmental agencies, and the inadequate means placed at their disposal—are sufficient to explain their inefficacy. From this diagnosis it follows, however, that, since none of these reasons can be regarded as inherent in the idea of international cooperation in this particular field, the idea as such may be considered as vital today as it was a few years ago, and that its usefulness for the future, or rather the conditions under which it may prove useful, must be studied anew. We shall return to this question in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XIV

THE JEWISH PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

Political Aid—Organizational and Economic Aid—Transportation Aid—Aid in the Countries of Refuge and Settlement—Conclusions

1. POLITICAL AID

The problem of refugees is at bottom a political and not merely a humanitarian one. This truth was perceived long ago. The Russian Jewish refugee problem of the 1880's and in the following years up to the outbreak of the First World War was in its origin of a clearly political nature. It could therefore be solved—and ultimately was solved—by the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, when equality of rights was granted to the Jewish population. The same applies to the Russian refugees after the Soviet Revolution of November, 1917, and to the German refugees after 1933. However, the political character of the last two movements was more evident than in the case of the earlier exodus. The Russian Jewish refugees before World War I were impelled, at least to some extent, not only by political but also by economic motives. Being all, or nearly all, poor people, they were forced to seek their bread in other lands. But economic considerations counted incomparably less in the case of the refugees from Soviet Russia and not at all in the German refugee movement. Indeed, none of the refugees left Germany on account of poverty; they were simply forced out of the country.

Thus it is clear that a real solution of the present refugee problem can only be encompassed by means of political action. But, notwithstanding the transparent character of this fact, the political

endeavors in connection with the refugee problem are less conspicuous than the humanitarian ones. This is true of both the non-Jewish and the Jewish efforts. Neither the activities of the High Commissioner for German Refugees nor those of the Intergovernmental Committee had any real political character. The pressure brought to bear upon Germany to stop the persecutions or at least to allow an orderly emigration of its unwanted Jews, and to let the emigrants take a part of their property with them, played a lesser rôle in the activities of the intergovernmental agencies than their efforts to legalize the status of refugees in the countries of refuge and to find permanent homes for them. The general atmosphere of appeasement which prevailed in Europe before the present war and the fear of offending Germany were certainly the underlying motives of this strange policy. This may also explain somewhat the character of the Jewish endeavors. Since the chances of arousing the conscience of the civilized world against the persecutions in Nazi Germany to a point where the latter might be impelled to change her policy were slight, the Jewish organizations thought it advisable to concentrate their efforts upon relief, passing over the political aspect of the problem. But there may also have been other reasons for this attitude, namely, doubts as to the efficacy of political action in behalf of the refugees in a period of growing anti-Jewish sentiment in the world, and fear of disturbing the atmosphere in Germany still more. Because of this last reason, the large Jewish organizations active in Germany were careful not to inject any political note into their aid to refugees lest they be denied the right to continue their work there. Political activities for the benefit of refugees on the part of Jewish organizations have therefore been less frequent and less conspicuous than relief activities. They must nevertheless be mentioned first because they form—with or without the will of the various organizations—the basis upon which

other activities are conducted. Besides, there are Jewish organizations which combine political action with their relief efforts.

The political activities carried on thus far in the interest of the refugees may generally be divided into three categories: (a) Those intended to arouse the conscience of mankind against Nazi Germany and to force her to halt the persecutions; (b) those aiming to assure the refugees a lawful existence either in their present habitations or in new countries; (c) those striving to create or enlarge the possibilities of solving the Jewish refugee problem through the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people.

This last category of activities, although supported by several organizations, is being carried on primarily by one, namely, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which is charged with the task of building the Jewish National Home in the Land of Israel. Now the Jewish Agency was, of course, not established for the purpose of solving the problem of Jewish refugees, at least not in the ordinary sense of the word. It was formed by the Zionist Organization which has existed, in its present form, since 1897—although organized efforts to build up Palestine were already made in the early eighties—and whose aim is the development of Palestine as a homeland for the Jewish people, recognized by the law of the nations. The political efforts of the Jewish Agency in behalf of the refugees consists in convincing governments and public opinion throughout the world that there is room enough for the refugees in Palestine and that they ought to be allowed to settle there. As the decision concerning the number of immigrants to be admitted rests with the British Mandatory Government, this means in reality influencing that Government,—not an easy undertaking in view of the strained relations between the Arab and the Jewish populations and the consequent endeavor of the British authorities to limit the immigration of Jews as a means of

appeasing the Arabs. Although the absorptive capacity of Palestine economically has proven to be quite considerable, these political obstacles have so far been insurmountable. Among the political achievements of the Jewish Agency since 1933, first mention should be made of the agreement with the German Government whereby Jewish emigrants from Germany going to Palestine were enabled to take with them a substantial part of their fortune through the medium of a special institution, the "Haavarah." The Jewish Agency was also represented on the Advisory Council of the High Commissioner for German Refugees and at the meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee. A series of memoranda were submitted to these bodies on various occasions, describing the Jewish work in Palestine and the absorptive capacity of the country, and stressing the necessity and advisability of directing the stream of Jewish refugees thither. In a very exhaustive manner this was done in the memorandum presented at the last session of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees which took place at Washington in October, 1939. Therein it was stated that, since a permanent solution of the refugee problem must be found, and since such a solution could not be attained through a process of infiltration but only through systematic and organized colonization, Palestine above all other countries filled the requirements for such a solution. All other countries were either closed to immigration or unsuitable for settlement, whereas Palestine had proved her capacity for absorbing immigrants and was incomparably better prepared to receive additional numbers of refugees. The immigration figures for Palestine were given and contrasted with the smaller figures for all other countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United States, and Uruguay. Three factors were then shown to have been responsible for the development of Palestine, namely, immigration, the influx of capital, and the idealism of

the settlers. The possibilities of an expansion of Palestinian agriculture and industry were explained and the figure 2,800,000 was given as the number of persons who could be settled permanently in Palestine, in addition to the present population.¹ These political activities of the Jewish Agency for Palestine are being continued. Public opinion is being informed about the need and advisability of solving the Jewish refugee problem by concentrating the refugees in Palestine.² There are a few other bodies (notably the New Zionist Organization) which are doing the same kind of work although on a smaller scale. It should be mentioned, however, that the important part played by Palestine in solving the Jewish refugee problem is acknowledged by nearly all factors, Jewish and non-Jewish, which are occupied with this problem, including organizations which are opposed to the idea of establishing the Jewish National Home in Palestine. This virtual unanimity found striking expression at the Evian Conference, where, among the numerous memoranda submitted by Jewish and non-Jewish associations, there was scarcely one which did not stress the importance of Palestine from this point of view.

The political activities of all other Jewish organizations in connection with the refugee problem have been directed—as stated above—towards enlightening public opinion about Nazi Germany, legalizing the status of refugees, and seeking new homes for them through negotiations with the League of Nations and with individual governments. The most active international body in this field is the World Jewish Congress. Being the successor of the Comité des délégations juives, which was formed at the end of the First World War to champion Jewish rights at

¹Memorandum submitted to the Officers of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees on the Occasion of its Session in Washington, D. C., by the American Emergency Committee for Palestine Affairs and the United Palestine Appeal. The full text of this memorandum will be found in Appendix II.

²See, for example, Israel B. Brodie, *The Refugee Problem and Palestine*.

the peace conference, and which continued to exist after the conclusion of peace, the World Jewish Congress makes aid to refugees one of the most important parts of its program. Already at the Second Jewish World Conference held in Geneva September 5-8, 1933, or three years before the final emergence of the World Jewish Congress, a resolution was adopted which stated that the problem of German Jewry, owing to the anti-Jewish persecutions in Hitlerite Germany, had become a problem of refugees, and that it constituted an international calamity in view of the constantly increasing number of German Jews forced to seek refuge in all the countries of the world. Hence such a problem could only be solved through international action. The Conference urged the League of Nations and the International Labor Office to take the necessary steps to achieve a solution of this problem in a manner similar to that previously employed in the case of the Russian and other refugees. The attention of the world was drawn to the need of placing a considerable number of the refugees in Palestine. The League of Nations was also exhorted to grant the necessary protection to those German Jewish refugees who were without passports and to secure for them freedom of movement. The refugee-aid committees in the various countries were urged to employ their funds efficiently, to sustain the morale of the refugees, and to have them take part in the work done to help them.³

The Third Jewish World Conference, convened in Geneva about a year later, hailed the work of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, on whose Advisory Council the World Jewish Congress was represented, but expressed its disappointment at the unsatisfactory results obtained so far and saw the reasons for this failure in the narrow basis on which the

³*Protocole de la IIe Conférence Juive Mondiale, Genève, 5-8 septembre, 1933, pp. 94-100.*

work was undertaken and in its limited sphere of action.⁴

The refugee problem was exhaustively discussed at the First Jewish World Congress in Geneva, August 8-15, 1936. The Congress, which was welcomed by Sir Neill Malcolm, League High Commissioner for German Refugees, expressed the hope that the High Commission would be able to alleviate the plight of the refugees and formulated a series of demands for the legalization of the residence of refugees in the countries of refuge, prevention of their deportation to Germany, and granting them the right to work.⁵ In the meantime, the World Jewish Congress took the initiative in creating a liaison committee of private organizations to be attached to the Office of the High Commissioner. This committee was established in its final form in London, December, 1936, and it participated in preparing the draft of the Geneva Convention of February, 1938, concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany. An important memorandum was submitted by the World Jewish Congress to the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian, July, 1938. The memorandum stressed the importance of the meeting as the only hope of hundreds of thousands of persecuted Jews and protested against the situation in Nazi Germany where the fundamental principles of justice and humanity were trampled under foot. The participating governments were urged to exert pressure upon the German Government and to bring it about, at least, that Jews emigrating from Germany be permitted to take a part of their property with them. At the same time, the attention of the meeting was called to the fact that Jews were being persecuted not in Germany alone and that the refugee problem might spread to Jewish communities in several other European countries; Rumania, Hungary, and Poland were cited

⁴*Protocole de la IIIe Conférence Juive Mondiale, Genève, 20-23, août, 1934, pp. 92-93.*

⁵*Protocole du Premier Congrès Juif Mondial, Genève, 8-15 août, 1936, pp. 345-350.*

as examples. The existing immigration possibilities were discussed and the importance of Palestine as a country of refuge and settlement stressed. The memorandum went on to show that the problem of the present refugees could no more be solved without international cooperation than that of the Greek refugees a decade and a half before. In the concluding part of the memorandum, several legal questions concerning affidavits, the problem of stateless persons, and identity documents for refugees, were discussed.⁶ The chairman of the Administrative Committee of the World Jewish Congress, Dr. Nachum Goldmann, was received on July 8 by the Sub-Committee for the Reception of Organizations concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees coming from Germany (including Austria) at the Evian Conference. In the course of his remarks on the occasion, Dr. Goldmann dwelt upon the necessity of helping all Jewish refugees from European countries and of halting the Nazi Government's practice of depriving refugees of their property; he also stressed the importance of retraining the refugees vocationally and preparing them for overseas settlement.

In the tragic years following the Evian Conference, the political activities of the World Jewish Congress for the benefit of refugees were intensified. They may be divided chronologically into the following periods: (a) Interventions on behalf of refugees from Austria who crossed illegally into the adjacent countries, as also of refugees from the Sudetenland after the Munich Pact. Such interventions were especially necessary with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland to prevent the deportation of refugees newly arrived in those countries. (b) Interventions on behalf of refugees considered enemy aliens on account

⁶*Report of the Administrative Committee of the American Jewish Congress, submitted to the 1938 Session, October 29-31, VI, World Jewish Congress, pp. 62-67 (mimeographed).*

of their German nationality after the outbreak of the war and interned first in France and, after the collapse of the French army in the summer of 1940, also in Britain. Strenuous efforts were needed in both cases to convince the authorities that the refugees, being themselves victims of Nazi oppression, should not be treated as enemy aliens and deprived of their personal freedom. (c) Interventions on behalf of refugees interned in unoccupied France by the Vichy Government so that they might be treated more humanely and allowed to proceed to other countries. Such interventions were made either directly or through the good offices of certain governments, especially the American Government. (d) Special efforts to obtain visas for refugees, which were most successful in the case of the United States (*e.g.*, the issuance of so-called "emergency visas," enabling persons particularly endangered in Europe to come to the United States for the duration of the war), but were also made in many other countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, etc.) (e) Efforts to have refugees without visas or with invalid visas admitted into certain countries, or to prevent their deportation, or to get them released from internment (Curacao, Jamaica, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain). (f) Care of refugees in Russia, whose problem, from a political point of view, is to get permission to leave the country and go to some other country, mostly to Palestine. Great efforts have been made in this field by the World Jewish Congress, but so far with but very meager results owing to the attitude taken by the Soviet authorities, who consider the refugees Soviet nationals and as such subject to the general ban on emigration from Russia. (g) Care of Jewish refugees in North Africa whose release from the internment camps and provision with food and employment had to be effected as soon as British and American forces occupied that territory.

As a good example of recent political activities of the World

Jewish Congress in the field of refugee aid one may cite the memorandum submitted by it to the Intergovernmental Conference in Bermuda (April, 1943). This memorandum, which, together with the two memoranda of the Joint Emergency Committee for European Jewish Affairs and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, formed the basis of the Jewish demands on the Bermuda Conference, consisted of a covering letter to the delegates, followed by a statement on the destruction of Jewish life in Europe, the attitude of the United Nations, and the need for action in order to save the remnants of European Jewry. Endorsed and incorporated in the memorandum was a 12-point Jewish program for the rescue of Jews from Nazi occupied countries which, among other things, suggested that an appeal be made to the governments of the United States, England, and the Republics of Latin America to admit more refugees from Nazi-occupied territories—a special appeal being directed to England to open the doors of Palestine for Jewish immigration—as well as that stateless refugees be given identification papers analogous to the Nansen passports, and that the United Nations give financial guarantees to all such neutral states as have given temporary refuge to Jews coming from Nazi-occupied territories and provide for their feeding and maintenance and eventual evacuation.⁷ Since then the World Jewish Congress has intensified its rescue work, establishing a special department for this purpose headed by Dr. A. Leon Kubowitzki.

Besides these two organizations, the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the World Jewish Congress, political activities in aid of refugees have been carried on by many other bodies. Indeed, there is scarcely a Jewish political organization whose program

⁷*Memorandum submitted to the Bermuda Refugee Conference by the World Jewish Congress, April 14, 1943, the full text of which will be found in Appendix III. See also Program for the Rescue of Jews from Nazi Occupied Europe, submitted to the Bermuda Conference by the Joint Emergency Committee for European Jewish Affairs, April 14, 1943.*

of activity does not embrace the problem of refugees. The leading Jewish organizations of this type in the United States are the American Jewish Committee, the Jewish Labor Committee, and the American Jewish Congress; the first two intervene from time to time in concert, while the activities of the last-named in this field are merged with those of the World Jewish Congress. Of such endeavors by Jewish organizations abroad, the work of the British Board of Deputies and of the former Joint Foreign Committee as the common agency of the Board of Deputies and of the Anglo-Jewish Association deserves to be mentioned first. Frequent interventions with the British authorities in all matters pertaining to refugees have been made by this body and, of late, also by the British Section of the World Jewish Congress. The Board of Deputies keeps its members and the whole body of British Jewry regularly informed on the existing situation in the field of refugee aid. It has participated in a number of international conferences devoted to refugee problems, and was represented on the liaison committee of the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany. A special Aliens' Committee gathers data on behalf of the Board from the official reports on Parliamentary debates containing questions and answers concerning aliens and refugees. A difficult task confronted the Board upon the outbreak of war when tribunals were set up by the British Government to decide the fate of the refugees of German origin, who technically became enemy aliens. In conjunction with the refugee-aid organizations, efforts were made to obtain for the refugees the status of "refugees from Nazi oppression," that is, of friendly aliens not subject to any special restrictions.⁸ These efforts had to be renewed in the second half of 1940, after the French collapse, when a great many of the refugees were interned and partly deported

⁸The London Committee of Deputies of the British Jews, Generally Known as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, *Annual Reports*, 1933-1939.

to Canada and Australia. The political aid given to the refugees both by the Board of Deputies and by the British Section of the World Jewish Congress consisted in constant intercessions with the authorities, submitting memoranda to the Government, and raising this question in Parliament. As a result, the lot of the interned refugees was considerably improved.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ECONOMIC AID

While the political activities to aid the refugees aim primarily to mobilize public opinion throughout the world and to secure better treatment and immigration opportunities for them, material help is needed to enable the refugees to live until new economic positions are found for them. This material assistance is necessary even in the refugee's own country since, in most cases, he has been deprived of his livelihood for months and even years before his departure; in addition, he must be prepared and even trained for a new life; furthermore, his transportation to the new country, which is to be his permanent home, must be provided; and, finally, adequate help has to be given after his arrival there, since he is a newcomer there and has to start life afresh. In many cases, when the refugee is obliged to seek a temporary home before proceeding to his final destination, material aid has to be extended there, too.

Of these four fundamental forms of relief, only the first and last will be discussed in this section, since they are handled by the same organizations. The problems of transportation and of aid in the countries of refuge and settlement will be dealt with later on. An exception will be made only in the case of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, whose activities in the home countries of the refugees and in Palestine itself are so closely interwoven that a separation of the two types of work is well-nigh impossible.

The help given to refugees both in their former countries and in the new cannot, naturally, be separated from general relief. The refugee is mostly taken care of by the same organizations, and even in the same manner, as other needy persons. However, this is not always the right method and the harm done by it may sometimes exceed the good. By treating the prospective or actual refugees like paupers, no different from hundreds of others who have lost their livelihood through physical or mental disabilities, not only may their human dignity be hurt but their creative energy crushed. Local relief organizations which often engage also in refugee-aid work are, therefore, not always the proper bodies for such activities. More than in any other field of social work, great national or even international efforts are needed in order to put the refugee-aid work upon definite and appropriate principles and to safeguard the self-respect and the interests of the refugees.

Of the great number of organizations active in this field, the following are of special importance either because of the wide scope of their activity or because of their guiding principles:

(a) *The Jewish Agency for Palestine*.—We have already mentioned this body in connection with the political activities in behalf of the refugees, and we shall mention it again in the following sections dealing with the problems of transportation and of aid in the countries of immigration. This is proper and fitting, since there is scarcely another Jewish organization with so quasi-governmental a character and such a broad scope of activity as the Jewish Agency. Its refugee-aid work, as far as the emigration of German and Austrian Jewish refugees to Palestine is concerned, was done through the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, established in 1933 as an organ of the Agency, and supported also by the British Council for German Jewry. The London office of this Bureau worked in close coopera-

tion with several organizations carrying on activities in aid of German Jewish refugees, especially with the German Palestine Pioneer Organization Hechalutz, and with the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Kinder und Jugend-Aliyah (Association for Child and Youth Immigration to Palestine), whose seat was originally in Berlin and then transferred to London. While the London office was mainly occupied with negotiations with other organizations and with arranging the selection of those who were to go to Palestine, the work in Palestine itself was directed by the Jerusalem office in cooperation with the important self-help organization of the German Jews in Palestine, the Hitachduth Olej Germania (known since 1938 as Hitachduth Olej Germania v'Olej Austria). According to a report published in 1939, the Hitachduth Olej Germania v'Olej Austria had 26 branches with 6,000 dues-paying members.⁹ Up to the outbreak of war, over a million pounds was disbursed by the Central Bureau in aid to German Jewish refugees in Palestine, more than half of this amount being spent for agricultural colonization, one quarter for the "Youth Aliyah" (immigration of German Jewish youth to Palestine), and the remainder for training in agriculture and handicraft, for social services, credits, cultural purposes, and administration.¹⁰ The refugees were partly settled in special colonies for German Jews and partly absorbed by the existing labor settlements in Palestine. The settlement of the refugees, up to the beginning of the present war, entailed an expenditure of more than a quarter of a million pounds (about 73 pounds per capita). Besides, a special company was formed for middle-class colonization under the name of RASSCO (Rural and Suburban Settlement Company, Ltd.),

⁹Hitachduth Olej Germania v'Olej Austria, *Der Weg der deutschen Aliyah: Rechenschaft, Leistung, Verantwortung*, p. 18 ff.

¹⁰The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, *Report to the XXI Zionist Congress and to the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Geneva*, p. 18 ff. (hereafter cited as Central Bureau, *Report*).

whose capital was largely subscribed by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews. The total investment of this company during the first two years of its activity (April, 1937-April, 1939) amounted to 180,000 pounds.¹¹

A task of vital importance was the transfer of Jewish capital from Germany to Palestine. A special institution was established for this purpose, the Haavarah, which, from November, 1933 until July, 1939, succeeded in transferring a total of 105 million Reichsmarks, which, together with the amount of foreign currency placed at the disposal of Jewish immigrants to Palestine by the German Reichsbank, made a grand total of 139 million Reichsmarks, a sum equivalent to 8 million Palestinian pounds.¹² The greater part of this amount was transferred in the form of goods. The average received by the clients of Haavarah from their Reichsmark holdings was higher by far (three times and, in the last years, even five times higher) than the average exchange rate of the Sperrmark which was the only possible way to save a part of their capital for Jews emigrating to countries other than Palestine. The activities of Haavarah were directed by a Board comprising representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Vaad Leumi (Jewish National Council of Palestine), the German Zionist Organization, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, and the Hitachduth Olej Germania. Despite the obvious importance of the Haavarah agreement with the German Government, it was severely criticized in some circles, who regarded it as a method of promoting German export interests and thereby strengthening the Nazi Government. A bitter controversy arose over this question within the Zionist Organization itself, as well as in many groups opposed to Zionism which pointed to the Haavarah agreement as proof of its opportunism. However, in a majority of cases, public opinion, both

¹¹Central Bureau, *Report*, p. 32 ff.

¹²Central Bureau, *Report*, p. 44 ff.

Jewish and non-Jewish, was rather inclined to stress the positive aspects of this agreement as the only realistic approach so far to a financial solution of the German refugee problem.¹³

Another important endeavor for the benefit of German Jewish refugees was the organization of the Youth Aliyah (immigration) into Palestine. In the first years of its activity, that is, until March, 1939, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Kinder- und Jugend-Aliyah succeeded in bringing 4,635 Jewish children to Palestine, first educating and preparing them for their future life in Palestine, and then placing them in various settlements or in schools in that country. Of this number, 3,229 children came directly from Germany, 935 from Austria, and 270 from Czechoslovakia, while 33 came as German Jewish refugee children temporarily sheltered in various European countries. Only 139 children hailed from Poland, and 29 from Rumania, in a first attempt to transplant the idea of Youth Aliyah in those two countries.¹⁴ More than 300,000 pounds were spent on these activities. Part of the expense was defrayed by the parents of the children and by the Jewish communities in Germany by the transfer of funds through the Haavarah, but the greater part had to be raised abroad, especially by Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, which collected almost two-thirds of the necessary amount.¹⁵ In addition, efforts were made to bring German Jewish children to Palestine and place them with individual families. However, although many thousand families registered their willingness to adopt such children, no more than a few hundred were brought to Palestine on this basis owing to the hesitancy of the Palestine Administration.¹⁶

¹³Dorothy Thompson, *Refugees: Anarchy or Organization*, pp. 52 and 106-108.

¹⁴Central Bureau, *Report*, p. 51.

¹⁵*Five Years of Youth Immigration into Palestine, 1934-1939*, published by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, p. 5 ff.

¹⁶About the history and problems of the Youth Aliyah, see Bracha Habas, *Sefer Aliat Hanoar* (Hebrew), the standard work on the subject.

The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews also covered the cost of social services to the immigrants from Germany (and later also to those from Austria and Czechoslovakia), which in the first half of 1933 amounted to no less than 14,000 pounds. This work was carried on mainly through the Social Service Department of the Vaad Leumi and its local branches in cooperation with the Hitachduth Olej Germania v'Olej Austria and afterwards also with the self-aid organization of immigrants from Czechoslovakia, the Hitachduth Olej Czechoslovakia.¹⁷

Although the Central Bureau is a subsidiary of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, its funds are provided not only by the Jewish Agency, but to a very considerable extent also by the British Council for German Jewry, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the Jewish Colonization Association. These funds have been used not only to cover the cost of German Jewish colonization in Palestine, but to grant substantial subsidies to the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland for its refugee-aid work, as well as for relief, vocational training, and traveling expenses of refugees in various countries. The Palestine expenses of the Central Bureau are, however, entirely defrayed by the British Council and the Jewish Agency.

(b) *Council for German Jewry*.—This British organization deserves to be mentioned next because its efforts, although largely concentrated on Palestine, were also devoted to the refugees in several other countries, especially in Britain itself. It was formed in 1936, replacing the Central British Fund for German Jews. Formally the Council for German Jewry was to represent the Jewish communities of both the United States and Great Britain, but in reality only the British section of the Council developed an important activity, whereas in the United States, the relief activities, especially the fund-raising work, remained in the hands

¹⁷Central Bureau, *Report*, p. 64 ff.

of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which, however, closely cooperated with the British Council. The original program of the Council was to bring about the orderly emigration of 100,000 Jews from Germany over a period of four years by training and retraining prospective emigrants vocationally and by coordinating the existing agencies concerned with bringing aid to German Jews. But the course of events forced the Council to change its plans.¹⁸ It soon appeared that the German Government, persevering in its policy of ruthless oppression and aggravating it from year to year, would never agree to a regulated Jewish exodus over a long period of years; moreover, with the annexation of Austria and later of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia, the number of actual and potential refugees grew enormously. The British Council, accordingly, had to appeal three times to the public for funds for its activities: once in 1936, when nearly a million pounds was collected; next a special Austrian appeal was issued immediately after the German occupation of Austria in March, 1938, which netted £170,000, while a third campaign, conducted immediately after the November, 1938, anti-Jewish riots in Germany, yielded almost £600,000 more. In addition, special campaigns for funds were waged in Australia and South Africa, producing £30,000 and £100,000, respectively.¹⁹ With the growing influx of refugees into England, a large part of the collected funds, which in the first years had been applied to relief and vocational retraining activities in Germany and to the colonization of refugees in Palestine, had to be spent on refugee-aid work in Great Britain itself. Thousands of refugees arriving in that country were supported and enabled to emigrate overseas or trained for more suitable occupations.

With the assistance of the Council, a considerable number of

¹⁸Council for German Jewry, *Report for 1938*, p. 5.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 6-7, 21.

refugee children were brought over to England and placed in schools and homes; and, through a system of exchange clearing with Germany on account of the contributions of the Council to the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, several hundred German Jewish children and students were enabled to study in British schools and colleges. The Council also helped students and scholars, especially from Austria, to continue their scientific researches. Apart from this, important relief work was done in Germany in the field of agricultural and technical training of potential refugees and especially in assisting them to emigrate. In Austria, where the danger of mass starvation arose immediately after the German occupation, the Council helped nearly 25,000 people by means of soup kitchens and doles and then by training them and assisting their emigration.

Very considerable were the Council's activities in Palestine, where the work done by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews was given strong support, especially in the fields of farm colonization, Youth Aliyah, and the agricultural and mechanical training of the refugees. Several Austrian scholars and scientists were appointed on the staff of the Hebrew University with the help of the Council. At the same time, the refugee-aid work in nearly all European lands, as well as in several Latin American countries and in Shanghai, was supported by the Council. Subsidies were also granted for the emigration aid work carried on by HICEM. The Council cooperated with the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees from Germany and was one of the private organizations represented at the Evian Conference.²⁰

It should also be noted that, besides the considerable sums raised by the Council for German Jewry, a non-sectarian body known as the Lord Baldwin Fund, headed by the former Prime

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 8-16.

Minister, raised upwards of £250,000 in 1938 for general refugee assistance,²¹ which sum was increased to over £500,000 in the following years.²²

(c) *American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee*.—Although the refugee-aid activities of the British Council for German Jewry in a large number of countries other than Palestine are certainly worthy of mention, the most important work in this field has been done by another organization, namely, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (commonly abbreviated to J.D.C.). This great relief body, whose history goes back to World War I, it having started its activities in the first months of that war and continued them without interruption to this day,²³ has also played a leading role in the refugee-aid endeavor. Immediately after the outbreak of Jewish persecutions in Nazi Germany, the J.D.C. embarked upon its activities there, taking an active part in the creation of the *Zentralausschuss fuer Hilfe und Aufbau* (Central Committee of Jews in Germany for Relief and Reconstruction). A special campaign to meet the new emergency was launched in the United States, which yielded \$1,350,000 in cash and pledges.²⁴ Since then refugee-aid work has constituted an integral part of the activity of the J.D.C., being carried on in cooperation with several other organizations, foremost among them the Council for German Jewry, the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA), and HICEM. The J.D.C. was instrumental in the establishment of other refugee relief organizations in this

²¹Nathan Caro Belth, "The Refugee Problem, *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 41 (1939-1940), p. 385.

²²Norman Bentwich, "Wartime Britain's Alien Policy," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, February, 1942, p. 47.

²³About the history of the J.D.C. and its activities before the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany, see Joseph C. Hyman, *Twenty-five Years of American Aid to Jews Overseas*, Chapters I-V.

²⁴*Report on the Activities of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for the Year 1933 and the Early Months of 1934*, p. 9.

country, such as the German-Jewish Children's Aid to care for German-Jewish children brought to the United States, and the National Coordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Immigrants Coming from Germany, which was intended to centralize all activities in behalf of German refugees in America,²⁵ and out of which grew the present National Refugee Service. Likewise the Refugee Economic Corporation, whose object is the economic reconstruction and the settlement of refugees from Germany and other countries on a business basis,²⁶ was established with the help of the J.D.C.

However, the activities of the J.D.C. in behalf of the refugees have, from the outset, not been confined to the United States. Aid was extended to German Jewry through its own organizations, especially through the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland and, after the annexation of Austria, also through the Kultusgemeinde (Jewish Community) of Vienna. With the dispersion of the refugees to the four corners of the earth, the activities of the J.D.C. became correspondingly far-flung. Even before the outbreak of the war, the J.D.C. operated in more than 50 countries.²⁷ With the commencement of hostilities, new countries were added, and the scope of the J.D.C.'s activities grew afresh, embracing not only the German Jewish refugees, as had been the case before, but also the Jewish refugees from many another European country. According to its annual reports, all kinds of refugee-aid work are conducted by the J.D.C.: aid to prospective refugees in the countries from which they are being ousted, aid in the countries of their temporary sojourn, transportation aid, and assistance in building up new livelihoods in the countries of final settlement. While the relief activities, both in the emigration

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁶*Aid to Jews Overseas: Report on the Activities of the American Joint Distribution Committee for the Year 1935*, p. 87.

²⁷Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

and in the immigration countries, have been carried on through other organizations—in Germany through the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, in Austria and the Protectorate through the Jewish Communities of Vienna and Prague—and while, in the field of transportation aid, the work of HICEM has been subsidized, the refugee-aid activities in the European transit countries are conducted directly by the J.D.C.'s European office, formerly located in Paris and now in Lisbon. The following figures are significant: The general relief expenditures of the J.D.C. from October, 1914 until December, 1939, amounted to nearly \$100,000,000, of which over \$11,000,000 or more than 10%, was spent for repatriation and refugee aid.²⁸ But, whereas the general relief expenditure rose during the year 1939 from about 90 to 99 million dollars, or exactly 10%, the disbursements for repatriation and refugee aid increased in the same period from \$5,700,000 to more than \$11,000,000, or nearly 100%—i.e., ten times more than the other branches of the Committee's work. The sum of \$1,200,000 was spent by the J.D.C. during 1940 for relief in Germany, most of it for refugee aid; over \$800,000 was spent in the same year for the refugees in France, \$76,000 in Portugal, \$260,000 in Switzerland, \$275,000 in Belgium (until its occupation by the Germans), \$105,000 in Holland (until its occupation), \$106,000 in Yugoslavia, more than \$500,000 in Central and South America, \$190,000 in Shanghai, etc.²⁹ Even in 1941, despite the evergrowing difficulty of transmitting funds to the occupied territories, these activities were continued. More than \$2,000,000 was transmitted in that year to Axis held or controlled countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, etc.),

²⁸The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, *Aid to Jews Overseas: Report for 1939*, p. 46.

²⁹*Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1940 and the First 5 Months of 1941*, pp. 17-40.

nearly \$500,000 to South and Central American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chili, Cuba, Curacao, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Uruguay, etc.), and \$370,000 to China; and all these amounts were actually used for refugees.³⁰ In 1942, the sum of \$1,289,615 was appropriated for emigration and \$3,516,600 for work in Allied or neutral countries, all of it actually for refugees, which may also be true of the funds secured in Axis occupied or controlled territories (Poland, China, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Italy, etc.) with the understanding that they would be repaid after the war.³¹ In 1943, the J.D.C. allocated \$10,453,000 for its work of relief and rescue and reconstruction throughout the world, while the need in 1944 was estimated toward the end of 1943 at more than seventeen million dollars.^{31a}

In order to help the refugees and to conduct relief activities in Germany and Nazi-occupied countries without supplying the Nazi regime with American dollars, the J.D.C., through an agreement with the German Government, established a method of clearing, whereby prospective emigrants deposited certain sums with the Jewish relief committees in Germany or in German-occupied countries, and the J.D.C. in return paid the cost of their passage aboard vessels operated by non-German shipping lines. This system, known as "emigration clearance," was first instituted in connection with the J.D.C.'s relief program for the Jewish committees in Germany; subsequently it was extended to Austria, the Protectorate, the puppet state of Slovakia, and, during the early part of the war, also to Nazi-occupied Poland, Holland, Luxem-

³⁰*Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1941 and the First 5 Months of 1942*, pp. 39-40.

³¹*Aiding Jews Overseas—A Report for 1942 by the Chairman of the National Council of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee*, pp. 7 and 21-22.

^{31a}*The Rescue of Stricken Jews in a World at War: A Report on the Work and Plans of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, as contained in Addresses delivered at its Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting, December 4th and 5th, 1943*, pp. 7 and 28.

bourg, etc. There was no fixed relationship or rate of exchange between the local currency deposited and the dollar cost of transportation. Wealthier emigrants were expected to supply a larger amount of the local currency than those not so well-to-do, and this excess payment was used to cover the transportation costs of the needy and destitute emigrants.³² Similar arrangements were made in Nazi-controlled countries, such as Hungary and Rumania. A different but equally effective system of clearing was established in unoccupied France. Under U.S. Treasury Department licenses, francs were bought from the Bank of France and released to designated relief committees there, while the dollars which the J.D.C. paid for the account of the Bank of France at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York were frozen by U.S. Treasury regulations and could not be released to the Bank of France for overseas use without permission from the U. S. Government.³³

A special Transmigration Bureau was founded by the J.D.C. in June, 1940, to serve American relatives and friends of prospective emigrants who had been requested to make available funds for transportation to countries of immigration. By May, 1941, the Transmigration Bureau had accepted nearly \$4,000,000, involving over 29,000 individual passages, in payments by relatives.³⁴ But as the war spread, the possibilities of emigration became extremely limited, and so the Transmigration Bureau liquidated its activities in 1942, after having accepted, in its two-year existence, the sum of \$5,250,000 from 22,000 individuals in the United States and South America for the transportation of refugees, and

³²Irwin Rosen, "A New Venture for the J.D.C.," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, June, 1941, pp. 368-369.

³³*Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1940 and the First 5 Months of 1941*, p. 10.

³⁴Fanny Adlerstein, "Assistance to Overseas Communities," *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 43 (1941-1942), pp. 92-93.

after having actually accomplished the emigration of 14,000 men, women, and children who might otherwise have been trapped.³⁵

(d) *Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland*.—As a splendid example of refugee-aid work done in a country of emigration, one may cite the record of the central organization of German Jewry, the *Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland*. While in the first years of the Nazi rule in Germany the relief activities were conducted by two independent organizations, one of which, the *Zentralausschuss fuer Hilfe und Aufbau*, looked especially after the vocational retraining of prospective emigrants, and the other, the *Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland*, cared for their transportation, the activities of all Jewish relief and welfare organizations in Germany were, beginning with 1935, united within the framework of the *Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland*.³⁶ The latter established a special committee on emigration as one of the four committees (emigration, economic relief, social service, and fund-raising) charged with the conduct of its work. All Jewish institutions in Germany active in the field of emigration were represented on this committee, foremost among them being the *Hauptstelle fuer juedische Wanderfuersorge*, the *Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland*, and the *Palaestinaamt* of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.³⁷ Funds for the activities of the *Reichsvertretung* were raised to a very great extent in Germany itself and were supplemented by grants from Jewish organizations abroad, among which the contributions of the J.D.C. and, in later years, the Council for German Jewry, were the largest.

A great task of organizing the would-be emigrants, retraining them, and securing their transportation was performed by the

³⁵*Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., for 1941 and the First 5 Months of 1942*, pp. 7-8.

³⁶*Informationsblaetter*, 1935, Nos. 4-5, p. 34.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 1936, Nos. 1-2, p. 2 ff.

Reichsvertretung; special attention was given to the migration of families. In January, 1936, a Central School of Emigration was established to train prospective emigrants in agriculture, the handicrafts, and domestic service.³⁸ The organ of the Reichsvertretung, the monthly *Informationsblaetter*, frequently printed precise data on immigration possibilities in various countries throughout the world and on the existing emigration laws of Germany, especially in regard to taxation and the transfer of capital. The Jews of Germany were warned against haphazard emigration and constantly advised to undergo vocational retraining and to learn the language of the new country before proceeding there. Advice was also given as to the proper attitude to be taken by the refugees in the new countries. The Emigration Service of the Reichsvertretung was the main item of expenditure in its budget; in 1938, for example, RM.2,000,000 out of a total budget of RM.5,000,000 was devoted to that service, and another million and a half was applied for retraining purposes, which, in effect, was also for emigration. These activities were also continued during the war despite the fact that, with the impoverishment of German Jewry, nearly all the necessary means had to come from abroad, and despite the incessant persecution of the leaders of the Reichsvertretung by the Nazi authorities. The general budget of the Reichsvertretung rose in 1940 to RM.45,000,000 on account of the tremendous increase in relief activities in Germany itself, where almost the entire Jewish population had to be supported. But in this budget the expenditures for general emigration were RM.6,800,000, for emigration to Palestine upwards of RM.1,000,000, for emigration service RM.100,000, and for training and retraining, including preparation for emigration, RM.3,700,000. Thus, over 25% of the entire budget for 1940 was devoted to refugee-aid work.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 6 ff.

With the Nazi ban on all Jewish emigration from Germany in October, 1941, these activities of the Reichsvertretung came to an end. Their importance in the preceding years can, however, scarcely be overestimated; they played a most effective part in insuring the organized and systematic character of the Jewish emigration from Germany, as long as this was possible.

3. TRANSPORTATION AID

While the aid granted to the refugee either in his country of origin or in the transmigration countries formed the most important part of the activities of the organizations mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter—in the case of the Jewish Agency, the extremely important work in Palestine must be added—there are other organizations which are devoted to the special problem of providing for the transportation of refugees to new countries. This task was not unknown in previous times, for among the transportation aid bodies there are, or until recently were, some which have done this kind of work since the opening years of the present century, and even earlier. There is a great difference, however, between the previous periods and the present. Whereas, thirty or forty years ago, the most important task in this field was to grant subsidies to refugees for their transportation and to guard against their being swindled by agents and go-betweens of every sort, who took away the refugee's last penny, today this problem, although still existing, is of minor importance compared with the tremendous task of obtaining visas and complying with the endless, complicated formalities in order to get the refugees out of one country and into another. Paradoxical as it may sound, in nearly all countries which have been forcing out their Jewish inhabitants in recent years, the laws concerning emigration are so complicated that only a few refugees have been able to overcome the administrative and legal obstacles. Such

has been the case in Nazi Germany from the outset; such, too, it was in Poland before the present war, and such it became in all other European countries which were under Nazi occupation or influence. Additional difficulties arose on account of the currency regulations in those countries, which made the departure of the refugees even with only a fraction of their property an exceedingly complicated affair. On the other hand, the difficulties and formalities involved in securing a visa for another country, which did not exist before World War I, are today even greater than those connected with leaving a country. This situation already existed in the years immediately after the First World War, when it appeared that many immigration countries were reluctant to admit new immigrants. It then became evident that, apart from the efforts to liberalize the immigration policies of the various countries, everything must be done to help the emigrant pass through the maze of complicated regulations and obtain his visa; and the numerous emigrant aid societies which sprang up in the various countries of Europe regarded this as one of their most essential activities. After 1933, when the problem of refugees from Germany and later from other countries began to assume its present form, these administrative difficulties grew tremendously as a result of governmental measures to check the influx of refugees. The transportation aid organizations are thus faced with the task not only of arranging for transportation in the technical sense—certainly not an easy matter, especially in wartime—and of extending material help to refugees, but also of surmounting the barriers arising from legal and administrative restrictions which, in reality, are directed mainly against the refugees.

The leading international Jewish body in this field is HICEM, whose name is a combination of the initials of the three organizations which originally set it up, namely, HIAS (Hebrew Shelter-

ing and Immigrant Aid Society), ICA (Jewish Colonization Association), and Emigdirect. This organization, formerly established in 1926, is an outgrowth of developments in the early years after World War I, when HIAS, an American body, undertook to organize the stream of Jewish emigration from Europe and established offices in several European countries out of which, in the succeeding years, developed independent organizations closely connected with HIAS. At the same time, ICA, which had been active long before that war in the field of Jewish emigration from Europe, renewed its work. In order to avoid overlapping in this field, the two organizations, together with Emigdirect (another Jewish emigrant aid body founded in 1921), decided to merge their emigrant aid activities in all countries—except the United States where the work is carried on by HIAS alone—and established the HICEM, which has since become the foremost organization in the field of Jewish emigration and immigration.

Its refugee-aid activities commenced immediately after the outbreak of Jewish persecutions in Nazi Germany in 1933, when 5,425 German Jewish refugees were taken care of by HICEM,³⁹ and they have continued on a large scale ever since. It cooperated in the formation of refugee-aid committees in the countries adjacent to Germany, and strove to prevent the chaos resulting from aimless wandering from one country to another. After a time, HICEM succeeded in directing the great majority of the refugees under its care to overseas countries.⁴⁰ A very considerable number of the refugees, especially those who went to countries other than Palestine, had their transportation arranged for them by HICEM. According to the report submitted at the Conference on Immigration convoked in Paris by HICEM in July, 1936, over 14,000

³⁹Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de la Direction Générale pour l'année 1933*, p. 176.

⁴⁰Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de la Direction Générale pour l'année 1935*, p. 160 ff.

refugees were brought by it from Germany to other countries in the first three years of the Nazi reign of persecution;⁴¹ by the end of 1940, this number had grown to almost 40,000. Whereas, in the past, the activities of HICEM had consisted merely in organizing the emigrants, giving them the necessary advice, and attending to the highly complicated formalities connected with their departure and with obtaining visas for the countries of immigration, it was necessary, in the case of the refugees, also to defray part or all of their transportation expenses. This, naturally, increased the expenditures of HICEM tremendously. Nearly \$600,000 was spent for its refugee emigration activity during the first three years of the Nazi regime,⁴² and thereafter its expenditures for this purpose grew from year to year, amounting to almost one million dollars in 1940. These sums were partly supplied by HICEM itself and partly contributed by the J.D.C., ICA, and the British Council for German Jewry. Since the outbreak of war, HICEM has had to take care not only of the German Jewish refugees, but also of the refugees from all other countries. The former distinction between refugees (mostly from Germany) and "normal" emigrants (mainly from Poland and a few other East European countries) have vanished altogether, and all the activities of the organization are now devoted to refugees. Strenuous efforts have been made to maintain the scope of the work despite the war developments. For months and even years the offices of HICEM were kept open in the East European countries, foremost among them the office in Warsaw, under Nazi occupation, which succeeded in maintaining contact with the relatives

⁴¹*Ten Years of Jewish Migration: The Activities of the HIAS-ICA Emigration Association (HICEM), Report to the Conference on Jewish Emigration, Paris, June 29-July 1, 1936; Chapter 5, "The Activities of HICEM for the German Jewish Refugees,"* p. 4 (Yiddish, mimeographed).

⁴²*Aid to Jews Overseas: Report on the Activities of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for the Year 1935*, p. 64.

of Polish Jews in the United States, and the office in Vilna, which arranged the emigration of a considerable number of the refugees living in that city to overseas countries.⁴³ Even the occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union did not halt the activities of the HICEM offices in Vilna, Kaunas, and Riga, which were permitted by the Soviet authorities to carry on in cooperation with the Intourist, the Soviet travel agency. Groups of emigrants were routed via Vladivostok to the United States and via Constantinople to Palestine.⁴⁴ The central office of HICEM, located in Paris before the war, was partly removed to Brussels and then, after the Nazi occupation of Belgium and the collapse of France, to Lisbon with a branch office in Marseilles. The work of providing for the transportation of the refugees, and even of rescuing them from Germany, was continued by these offices. Over 5,000 refugees were directly helped to emigrate from Europe to overseas countries during the year 1940.⁴⁵ Between June, 1940 and December, 1941, HICEM facilitated the emigration from Europe and the Far East of approximately 25,000 men, women, and children, 10,000 of whom required and received material assistance.^{45a} During 1942 the offices of HICEM in Lisbon, Marseilles, and Casablanca were instrumental in organizing the emigration of more than 5,000 men, women, and children, of whom 80% came from unoccupied France, 15% were temporarily domiciled in Portugal, and 5% hailed from other neutral countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.^{45b} From the outbreak of the war until the end of 1943, 16,421 Jewish refugees were able to undertake their journey overseas thanks to the financial assistance

⁴³*HIAS Activities in the United States and Overseas*, 1939, pp. 13-15.

⁴⁴*HIAS Activities in the United States and Overseas*, 1940, p. 12.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 29.

^{45a}*HIAS, Rescue Thru Emigration: Annual Message and Reports, 1941*, p. 10.

^{45b}*HIAS, Rescue: Annual Message and Reports, 1942*, p. 6.

of the Refugee Transportation Fund, established by HICEM with means supplied by the J.D.C. and HIAS.^{45c}

Although a non-political body and stressing this character, HICEM cooperates with other bodies, including political organizations, active in behalf of refugees. It has cooperated, among others, with the League High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the J.D.C., and the World Jewish Congress. It was also represented at the Evian Conference. Several semi-political measures had to be undertaken in order to help stranded refugees, especially those refused admission to overseas countries and threatened with deportation to Germany. In the first months of the war, important work was done by it to rescue from French internment camps those German refugees who had visas for overseas countries or expected to get them before long. These endeavors were renewed—under totally different conditions—after the French collapse, when tens of thousands of refugees were confined anew in the concentration camps of Vichy France.

The activities of HICEM are also carried on in several overseas countries, especially in South America, where most of the existing immigrant aid societies are subsidized by it. (Their work will be described in the next section.) Altogether, HICEM is active in over 30 countries, including those of the Far East.

Among the organizations with which HICEM has cooperated and which have played a considerable part in helping refugees, special mention should be made of the Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland (before 1935, the name had been Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden). This important German Jewish body, which was created in 1901 to assist the Jews of East European and Oriental countries, did fine work in the field of Jewish emigrant aid even before the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany. Indeed,

^{45c}HIAS, *Rescue Now! Annual Message and Reports*, 1943, pp. 6-7.

the first international Jewish conference devoted to problems of emigration was convoked by it in Franfort-on-Main in 1904.⁴⁶ But while, prior to 1933, the activities of the Hilfsverein had been concentrated on East European Jewish emigration, acquiring special importance in the field of transmigration through Germany, where hundreds of thousands of migrants were helped, after 1933 the nature of its work changed radically as regards both the people affected and the aid extended to them. Instead of East European emigrants, the German Jews themselves were the object of these activities, and the help given comprised not merely grants of money, but in the first instance information about the possibilities of emigration, attending to all the formalities connected with it, and arrangements for the transportation of the emigrants. Already in the first year of these new activities, 60,000 people sought advice from the Hilfsverein, and the transportation of almost 8,000 persons was arranged at a cost of more than 300,000 marks.⁴⁷ Although it was the policy of the Hilfsverein to warn the Jewish population not to emigrate except in emergency cases but to hold on to their positions in Germany in a modest way rather than seek new homes, this policy could not long be continued. The scope of its refugee-aid work expanded from year to year. In order to avoid overlapping in the activities of the various organizations engaged in this field, an agreement was reached under the auspices of the central relief agency of the German Jews, the Zentrallausschuss fuer Hilfe und Aufbau, whereby emigrants going to Palestine were taken care of by the Palaestinaamt (Palestine Office) of the Jewish Agency in Berlin and those destined for other countries by the Hilfsverein, while the repatriation of non-German nationals to their countries of origin was

⁴⁶About this conference and the organization created by it, see *Dreissig Jahre Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*, p. 80 ff.

⁴⁷*Report of the Hilfsverein on its Activities during 1933*, pp. 5 and 10.

arranged by the Hauptstelle fuer juedische Wanderfuersorge, which also extended aid to persons wandering from place to place inside Germany itself.

From 1934 on, accordingly, the Hilfsverein concentrated its efforts on the stream of refugees from Germany flowing to countries overseas with the exception of Palestine. More than 20,000 persons were given guidance and advice in the course of that year and the transportation of over 3,000 of them was arranged at a cost in excess of RM.200,000. With the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws and the resulting process of eliminating the Jews from virtually all fields of endeavor in Germany, the scope of the Hilfsverein's work expanded considerably. Some 400 to 500 persons monthly were helped to emigrate from Germany during 1936. In all, the transportation of almost 5,000 persons to overseas countries and over 700 to European lands was arranged in that year. The subventions to individuals for transportation, which had totaled less than 100,000 marks annually before the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany, grew to upwards of 1,500,000 in 1936. Where, prior to that year, only two branch offices of the Hilfsverein had existed in Germany (in Hamburg and in Bremen), apart from the main office in Berlin, their number increased to 14 in 1936 so as to enable people in all parts of the country to arrange for their emigration.⁴⁸ An important magazine, entitled *Korrespondenzblatt ueber Auswanderungs- und Siedlungswesen*, was published year after year, containing precise information on almost every country in the world, the possibilities of settling in it, and Jewish life there. Plans to organize Jewish emigration from Germany on a solid basis were discussed and prepared by the Hilfsverein in the first years of Nazi rule. The settlement of 12,000 German Jews annually in countries other than Palestine, at a cost of one million dollars, was proposed; special

⁴⁸*Die Arbeit des Hilfsvereins der Juden in Deutschland, 1936, p. 24.*

groups of emigrants had to be organized for this purpose. But this plan, as well as the previous one of keeping the Jewish exodus from Germany down to a minimum, could not be realized under the existing conditions. The number of refugees grew by leaps and bounds. In 1937, an average of 100 persons a day were given advice on their emigration problems. In 1938, the daily average was 500. Of the 10,000 German Jews who went to overseas countries in 1936, the majority were aided by the Hilfsverein either with advice or money; more than 13,000 were assisted in 1937, and nearly 30,000 in 1938. At the same time the subsidies granted to refugees had to be increased from year to year. The average subsidy to a refugee grew from RM.68 in 1934 to RM.148 in 1935, RM.285 in 1936, and RM.330 in 1937.⁴⁹ The Hilfsverein, being unable to cover the enormous expenses out of its income, was subsidized by the J.D.C. and the British Council for German Jewry. With the creation, early in 1939, of the Reichsvereinigung der deutschen Juden (Reich Union of the Jews in Germany) as an all-embracing body, incorporating several existing organizations and replacing all others, the Hilfsverein became its Department of Emigration. The tremendously increased emigration that year, as well as the emigration during the early years of the war, was directed by Hilfsverein only in Germany proper, while the emigrant aid work in Austria was carried by the Kultusgemeinde (Jewish Community) of Vienna, and in the Protectorate by the Kultusgemeinde of Prague.

A few words about the transportation aid activities in behalf of refugees going to Palestine and those repatriated to their countries of origin. The transportation of German Jewish refugees to Palestine was directed by the Palestine Office of the Jewish Agency in Berlin. This office received the labor entry certificates and distributed them among prospective emigrants. It was instru-

⁴⁹*Informationsblaetter*, March-April, 1938, p. 26.

mental in procuring the special entry permits for capitalists. It arranged for the transportation of all refugees going to Palestine and subsidized the transportation of needy persons, whose number was considerable from the outset. In addition, all activities connected with the training of prospective emigrants to Palestine, and particularly the labor training (*hachsharah*) of Jewish youths enrolled in the Hechalutz organizations, were under the supervision of the Palestine Office. The work done by it was thus quite considerable. Already in 1933, more than 30,000 persons desirous of emigrating to Palestine were given advice, while 3,700 of them were actually helped to emigrate. The number of those who applied to this office for guidance and advice grew from year to year, for, unlike emigration to other overseas countries, which was often arranged by the refugees themselves with no outside help, there were comparatively few cases of emigration to Palestine without recourse to the services of the Palestine Office. Out of 8,500 persons who emigrated to Palestine in 1934, 7,500 received advice from this office, while over 4,000 were financially assisted by it at an expenditure of RM.350,000. These expenses were partly defrayed by the Jewish Agency and partly by the Zentrallausschuss fuer Hilfe und Aufbau out of funds contributed by the J.D.C. and in later years also by the Council for German Jewry.⁵⁰ Beginning with 1938, the existing Palestine Offices of the Jewish Agency in Vienna and Prague took over the care of refugees proceeding to Palestine from Austria and from Czechoslovakia. In the early years of the war, the Palestine Offices of the Agency in various countries undertook to bring to Palestine a number of Jewish refugees from Poland and from other countries.

Very important, too, was the work of repatriation done in Germany after 1933. Despite the different terminology, this, too,

⁵⁰About the activities of the Palestine Office in Berlin, see *Aliyah, A Selection of Articles and Reports on the Immigration Problem*, Vol. III, p. 83 ff. (Hebrew).

was at bottom refugee-aid work, the only difference between it and the work done by the Hilfsverein being that the former concerned non-German nationals who were forced to return to their countries of origin (mainly Poland, but also Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, etc.) with which, in most cases, they had no contact whatever, having long since been absorbed into the economic and cultural life of Germany. However, because of the many legal differences between this emigration and that of German nationals, it was decided to entrust cases of this kind to a different relief body, namely, the Hauptstelle fuer juedische Wanderfuersorge. This organization had been in existence for several years, its original object having been to help Jewish transients, mostly East European Jewish laborers returning from France and other West European countries via Germany to their homelands. The new activities of the Hauptstelle differed from those of the Hilfsverein and the Palestine Office in that, although considerable, they tended to decrease rather than increase, since the number of foreign nationals among the German Jews was far from large and, after the mass deportations of the first years of the Nazi regime, not many were left. Whereas, in 1933, 18,694 repatriations were taken care of by the Hauptstelle at an expense of almost 200,000 marks, the number of cases dropped to 11,236 in 1934 and to 9,998 in 1935, the last figure including not only foreign nationals repatriated to their countries of origin, but also those German Jews who for reasons of personal safety left the smaller inland towns for the larger cities of Germany itself and were also aided by the Hauptstelle.⁵¹ This internal migration accounted for 45% of the cases handled. In the following years, this process of decline continued, no more than 630 Jews being repatriated in 1937.⁵² The mass deportation of more than 15,000

⁵¹*Aid to Jews Overseas: Report on the Activities of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for the Year 1935*, p. 9.

⁵²*Informationsblaetter*, January-February, 1938, p. 7.

Polish Jews from Germany to Poland toward the end of 1938 could not be handled in the same way because of its sudden and swift nature. The deportees had to be taken care of in Poland itself, where a special organization was created for this purpose, as will be related in the next section.

Local transportation committees have been established in a number of other countries, being in most cases supported either by HICEM or by the J.D.C. Their work consists in providing for the maintenance of the refugees during their sojourn in the respective countries and arranging for their further transportation. In some cases, they also have to intercede with the authorities to permit the refugees to stay longer if their departure cannot be effected immediately. Committees of this sort existed in nearly all European countries before the war. They were suppressed when the Nazis occupied the greater part of Europe, only the committees in Switzerland, Portugal, and Sweden being left. The refugee-aid committee in Portugal acquired special importance when many refugees streamed into that country after the French collapse in order to proceed to overseas countries from there. Over 14,000 refugees were taken care of by this committee with the assistance of HICEM. Nearly all of them were sent on their way to various countries overseas and only a handful were left in Portugal at the end of 1941, especially after the influx of refugees was stopped by the restrictive policy of the Portuguese Government. The same applies to the refugee-aid committees in Morocco (Casablanca and Tangier), established after the fall of France, which committees combined immediate relief work with the task of securing transportation to other countries for the refugees. With the growing restrictions on the admission of refugees into Portugal, the importance of Casablanca as a base from which Jewish refugees could sail for overseas countries was still further increased. The refugee-aid committee there was faced with the

necessity not only of arranging for the transportation of the refugees but of protecting them from the local authorities, whose attitude was unfriendly, in line with the policy pursued in metropolitan France. Practically all refugees arriving at Casablanca were interned, and steps had to be taken to send them away to other countries as soon as possible. The situation, of course, changed radically after the landing of American and British forces in North Africa, as recounted in Chapter VI.

4. AID IN THE COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT

The formation of refugee-aid committees in virtually all countries where Jewish refugees have tried to find new homes since 1933, or the concentration of the activities of the already existing immigrant aid organizations on the refugees, is due to the fact that the refugees have to cope with many difficulties in the first period after their arrival in the new country, and that these difficulties are generally greater than those encountered by ordinary immigrants. This problem was discussed in an earlier chapter, and it only remains to be said that the number of refugees deprived of all means and in many cases broken physically and spiritually by the inhuman persecutions grew greatly, especially in the last few years, and the social service agencies were consequently faced with new tasks. Not only had the refugee to be taken care of on account of his poor knowledge of the language and ways of the new country, not only had his maintenance to be provided in the first period after his arrival and a way found to create a new livelihood for him, but in many cases his physical and spiritual health had to be restored and he had to be reaccustomed to a normal social life. Hence the need of adapting the activities of the existing immigrant aid societies to this new situation as well as of establishing new organizations for these specific tasks.

Apart from Palestine, which has already been discussed, the largest organizations of this kind exist in the United States, which has absorbed the greatest number of refugees. Foremost among these bodies is the National Refugee Service. Its history is closely connected with the course of events since 1933. Immediately after the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany and with the coming of the first wave of refugees from there, a number of organizations, both Jewish and general, were created to help these newcomers. The aim of these organizations was either to help refugees generally (e.g., the Emergency Committee in Aid of Political Refugees, the American Christian Committee for German Refugees, the Refugee Economic Corporation), or to help refugee scholars (the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars, *Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland*, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Physicians), or to help refugee children (German Jewish Children's Aid, Inc.). On the other hand, there are several organizations which, although originally created for other purposes, have since 1933 devoted a considerable part of their activity to refugee problems (the National Council of Jewish Women with its branches, especially in New York and Brooklyn, the International Migration Service, the Jewish Social Service Association, the Women's Division of the American Jewish Congress, etc.). In addition, local relief committees sprang up in a large number of American cities. The necessity soon arose to coordinate the activities of all these organizations in order to avoid overlapping and a waste of social energy. Accordingly, it was decided in 1934 to set up a National Coordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Emigrants Coming from Germany. The object of this Committee was to correlate the work of the German refugee committees in the United States, to act as a central registry and clearing bureau for all organizations interested in the refugee problems,

to explore possibilities of employment throughout the country, and to organize local committees for distribution purposes. Among the organizations embraced by the National Coordinating Committee were two Christian bodies, namely, the Committee for Catholic Refugees and the American Committee for Christian German Refugees, to prove that provision for the refugees was not, even in the narrowest sense, a Jewish problem and that the refugees came from all faiths.⁵³ In the main, however, its activities were devoted to Jewish refugees, who constituted the great majority.

From the very outset, the National Coordinating Committee was much more than its name indicates. Being strongly supported by the J.D.C., it developed into a central agency for German Jewish refugees, which provided for their maintenance in the first period after their arrival in the United States, gave them the necessary information, established English and vocational retraining courses for them, and endeavored to find them employment. Although it was not intended to supplant the organizations affiliated with it, it tended more and more to become their parent body, as it were, upon which they were dependent both materially and morally. This fact ultimately found expression in the field of organization, too, when, in June, 1939, it was decided to change the name of the National Coordinating Committee to the "National Refugee Service," and make it the central service agency for Jewish refugees not only from Germany, but from other countries as well.⁵⁴ Thus a permanent central body for refugee-aid work came into being which today is the largest organization of its kind in the world. The expenditures of the National Refugee Service were approximately two and a half million dollars in

⁵³William Haber, "Assisting the New American," *Social Work Today*, December, 1939, p. 19.

⁵⁴*Refugees . . . 1939: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.*

1939, three and a half million dollars in 1940, and three million dollars in 1941. Practically all refugees arriving in this country apply to the National Refugee Service for advice or material help. In 1939, more than \$1,200,000 was spent for temporary cash assistance to refugees, the average monthly number assisted being 4,271; 4,912 jobs were secured; over 3,500 persons in New York and other crowded port cities were resettled in inland communities in order to facilitate their absorption into the economic and cultural life of the country and thereby hasten their Americanization; more than 25,000 applications for assistance and advice on migration problems were handled. A special retraining service was established and courses in citizenship and in English made available to the newcomers; 218 loans, totaling more than \$71,000, were made to refugees to help them in business enterprises; 460 refugee children were placed in foster homes; special assistance was given to groups of physicians, scholars, musicians, scientists, and rabbis, while efforts were also made to settle a certain number of refugees on the land as tillers of the soil.⁵⁵ All this in 1939. The same activities, on an even larger scale, were continued in 1940: upwards of \$1,300,000 was spent for immediate relief, those assisted averaging 7,000 a month; 4,935 were placed in jobs; over 5,100 were resettled in communities outside New York; 500 refugees received vocational retraining either in private trade schools or in courses sponsored or operated directly by the National Refugee Service; 896 loans, aggregating \$170,000 were granted to enable refugees to set up in business and become self-supporting, while an additional \$12,000 was advanced in loans to farm settlers. The complex problems of prospective immigrants were handled by the Migration Department of the National Refugee Service through more than 8,000 individual interviews, through 50,000 letters received, and

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

through tens of thousands of telephone calls, telegrams, and cables. Altogether, 321,000 requests for advice, service, and information were received by this agency in 1940.⁵⁶ In 1941, more than \$1,800,000 was disbursed in financial assistance, whose recipients averaged 6,640 a month; 6,565 were provided with employment; 3,169 were resettled; 1,000 refugees were entered in 75 retraining courses in New York and in a number of other cities; over \$230,000 was advanced in loans which, besides setting up business enterprises, helped refugees buy farms, retrain, or practice medicine and dentistry. By the end of the year, the services rendered by the Migration Department alone reached the staggering total of 101,676, while the requests for information and service from refugees and their friends received by the NRS during 1941 totaled 238,500.⁵⁷ In the following years of the war the scope of NRS activities contracted owing to the diminished influx of new refugees, as well as to the growing labor scarcity which made the placement of refugees much easier and at the same time rendered their material condition much better. The monthly average of persons given direct cash relief in 1942 did not exceed 4,220, while in December of that year the number dropped to 3,064. There were 5,800 job placements, mainly in war industries, and 660 placements of professionals and other specialists, many of those so placed being elderly persons, as skilled and young persons had no difficulty in finding employment; in addition, 520 refugees were given vocational retraining to fit them for war work. Loans, numbering 1,359 and aggregating \$195,521, were made during the year to help refugees set up business enterprises or to establish themselves in some profession, while 770 individuals were resettled. The expenditures of the

⁵⁶*Refugees . . . 1940: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.*

⁵⁷*Refugee . . . 1941: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.*, pp. 6-15.

NRS during that year amounted to \$2,216,700, a decline of more than \$800,000 from 1941.^{57a} This trend continued throughout 1943. The NRS relief and family roll steadily declined, so that by the end of the summer, 1943, it numbered approximately 1,200 families comprising 2,700 individuals. Of the 2,547 placements during 1943, more than one half were of persons over 50 years old, and about one-quarter of persons over 60. The 386 loans advanced, amounting to \$105,518, were exceeded by the repayments. The total expenditures of the NRS in 1943 were \$1,500,000. The reduced scope of actual activities caused the organization to concentrate on the needs of the future, when immigration would increase in volume and the problem of reuniting families would become one of the most urgent of the postwar period.^{57b}

The resettlement work of the National Refugee Service has developed into one of the most important branches of its activity. There is a field staff which maintains contact between the central office in New York and the more than 900 local committees which act as coordinators and as distributing centers for resettled refugees. From the inception of this work in 1937 to the end of 1941, a total of 13,500 refugees were resettled.⁵⁸ This is not the first time in the history of Jewish immigration into the United States that efforts are being made to remove part of the Jewish immigrants from the congested cities on the Atlantic seaboard to the interior of the country, where it may be easier to find employment for them. The same thing was already attempted in the first two

⁵⁸*Refugees . . . 1940: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc., p. 10; Refugees . . . 1941: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc., p. 12.*

^{57b}*Refugees . . . 1943: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, pp. 3-13.*

⁵⁸*Refugees . . . 1940: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc., p. 10; Refugees . . . 1941: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc., p. 12.*

decades of the present century by an organization specially created for the purpose, the Industrial Removal Office, which functioned from 1901 to 1922; but the present attempt is more systematic and meeting with a greater measure of success. Special efforts are necessary to overcome the tendency of communities throughout the country to accept only the younger, more adaptable, and more employable refugees for resettlement, leaving the older people in New York.⁵⁹

Despite the ever increasing difficulty of obtaining American visas during the war, every effort is made to help American relatives and friends of refugees still in Europe to bring them over to the United States. Following the centralization of visa control in Washington in July, 1941, a special affidavit unit was set up by the NRS to meet the overwhelming demand for assistance in the filing of the necessary documents under the new procedure.⁶⁰ Much had to be done, also, to protect the interests of the refugees as aliens in the United States, especially as regards German nationals. With the entrance of the United States into the war, this problem became very acute and imposed new and serious responsibilities upon the organization.⁶¹

Unlike the NRS, which was but recently created for the special purpose of helping refugees, the second largest organization of the kind, HIAS (Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society of America) already has several decades of activity behind it. HIAS, in its present form, came into being in 1901, as the result of a union of two organizations for sheltering and helping immigrants. Its activities before World War I and during the first few years after that war in the various European countries were men-

⁵⁹Albert Abrahamson, "The Refugee Problem," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, December, 1941, pp. 253-255.

⁶⁰*Refugees . . . 1941: The Annual Report of the National Refugee Service, Inc.*, p. 15.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

tioned earlier in this chapter. But, while the immigrant aid work in Europe and later in other parts of the world was taken over by special organizations in which HIAS, ICA, and the local Jewish population were represented, in the United States HIAS remained the only organization for aid to immigrants and refugees until the formation of the National Coordinating Committee and subsequently of the National Refugee Service. Efforts were made to limit the activities of HIAS to the reception of the refugees upon their arrival in this country and extending the necessary help to them in the first days, and to have the NRS look after their resettlement, retraining, and final establishment. In practice, however, it is not always easy to adhere to this line of demarcation, and there certainly is some overlapping in the endeavors of the two organizations.

The present refugee-aid activities of HIAS commenced immediately after the outbreak of Jewish persecutions in Germany in 1933. They necessitated a great additional effort on the part of the organization and many changes in its system of operation. Where, formerly, immigration to the United States had originated in efforts made by Americans to bring over their relatives from Europe, the reverse was true in the case of the German refugees. The harassed German Jews tried desperately, through the Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland, to establish contact with their relatives or friends in the United States in order to get the affidavits necessary for admission to the country, and the effort involved in tracing these relatives and friends and obtaining their affidavits imposed an additional burden upon HIAS, with which the Hilfsverein cooperated. All the services of HIAS, especially its information and advice bureau, its affidavit division, its international service, its pier service, its Ellis Island bureau, its special office in Washington, its remittance and employment bureaus, its department for tracing relatives, and its shelter department were put

at the disposal of the refugees. The number of persons dependent upon the help of HIAS from the moment of their arrival in this country grew enormously. In 1939, 24,917 nights of shelter and 133,769 meals were given to refugees. The average number of refugee-immigrant occupants of the HIAS shelter facilities increased during that year to 300 per night, with the result that additional accommodations had to be secured in private hotels at the expense of HIAS. Nor was it only food and shelter that were supplied to the refugees, but clothing and medical care as well.⁶² In 1940, the number of nights of shelter given to refugees at the HIAS building in New York grew to 52,346, while, owing to overtaxed facilities, 9,081 more nights of shelter were provided in hotels; as many as 215,779 meals were served to refugees, and 1,436 of them were helped to find business opportunities or work.⁶³ In the following years of the war, the number of actual refugee-immigrants cared for by HIAS dropped considerably on account of the decline in immigration. The number of nights of shelter was 33,819 in 1941, 10,463 in 1942, and 5,351 in 1943; the number of aliens discharged by the immigration authorities into the custody of HIAS was 12,494 in 1941, 2,735 in 1942, and 1,264 in 1943. On the other hand, there was a considerable increase in the legal difficulties caused by wartime regulations relating to the admission of immigrants and the treatment of so-called "enemy aliens." Hence the annual expenditures of HIAS, including very substantial subsidies to HICEM, not only could not be reduced, but, on the contrary, grew from an average of half a million dollars per annum in the 1930's to \$762,479 in 1941, \$838,151 in 1942, and nearly a million dollars in 1943.^{63a}

⁶²*HIAS Activities in the United States and Other Countries, 1939*, pp. 8 and 27-28.

⁶³*HIAS Activities in the United States and Overseas Countries, 1940*, p. 28.

^{63a}*HIAS, Rescue Thru Emigration: Annual Message and Reports, 1941*, pp. 23-25; *Rescue: Annual Message and Reports, 1942*, pp. 17-19; *Rescue Now! Annual Message and Reports, 1943*, pp. 18-21.

Besides the NRS and HIAS, there are several other refugee-aid organizations in this country for specific tasks, but most of them are either incorporated in the NRS or in the J.D.C., or at least closely cooperating with them. Of those incorporated in the NRS, mention should be made of several aid committees for displaced foreign scholars which have succeeded in placing a great number of the latter on the faculties of American colleges and even in establishing a special institution of learning for them, the University in Exile at the New School for Social Research. Very interesting but without striking results were the efforts to establish a special refugee child-care agency, the German-Jewish Children's Aid, Inc. (now known as the European-Jewish Children's Aid), organized in 1934 under the auspices of the National Council of Jewish Women for the purpose of bringing over, with the consent of the American authorities, German Jewish children in order to rear and educate them in this country. However, the underlying idea of this agency, to establish in the United States a kind of Youth Aliyah, which has been so successful in Palestine, did not materialize, and no more than a few hundred children have so far been brought to the United States by this agency, which is now affiliated with the NRS. (At the close of 1943, the European-Jewish Children's Aid had in its charge most of the 940 children who had come since 1934.⁶⁴) All children have been placed either with childless couples or with families having other children of their age. All of them are required to be sent to school. No children are permitted to be sent to institutions. The homes found for the children must have religious and cultural backgrounds similar to those which the children have left. The children are admitted to the United States for permanent residence and are

⁶⁴*Refugees . . . 1943: Report of the National Refugee Service*, p. 8.

eligible for citizenship when of age.⁶⁵

A special institution was created in 1934 under the name of Refugee Economic Corporation to care for the economic reconstruction and settlement of refugees on a business basis. The funds for this institution were provided mainly by the J.D.C. The scope of its activity is not limited to the United States, but includes also the Central and South American countries, Palestine, Australia, and the Philippine Islands. According to the report of the Refugee Economic Corporation for 1938, the Loan Funds established by it were in operation in the following countries: the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Philippine Islands, South Africa, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland. In the United States, loans were made to individual farmers, and a farm colony was founded in North Carolina. In Australia, two associations were established: one to help refugee farmers, and the other to help refugees who had the necessary qualifications for launching new industrial enterprises. In Mindanao, the second largest and least developed of the Philippine Islands, a tract of about 12,500 acres of good farm land was purchased and preparations made to settle from 600 to 800 upon it, but the outbreak of the war halted this project for the time being. Altogether, the Refugee Economic Corporation spent some \$55,000 in the first three years of its existence, but further appropriations were made totaling nearly half a million dollars, a considerable part of which was applied to the refugee-aid work in Palestine, especially to the housing of refugee children.⁶⁶ In this connection, mention should also be made of the Dominican Republic Settlement Asso-

⁶⁵Harold Fields, *The Refugees in the United States*, p. 145 ff. Concerning the educational problems involved in the activities of the German-Jewish Children's Aid, Inc., see Betty Mazur, "The German Child Transplanted," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, September, 1940, pp. 173-175, and Henry J. Selver, "Problems in Placement of Refugee Children," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, December, 1939, pp. 214-221.

⁶⁶Refugee Economic Corporation, *Annual Report*, 1938 (previous reports published in 1936 and 1937).

ciation (DORSA), an American institution for colonizing refugees in Santo Domingo. Its work was briefly discussed earlier in the book.⁶⁷ It cooperates closely with the J.D.C.

Of the great number of American Jewish organizations which, though originally created for other purposes, have devoted a considerable part of their efforts to refugee-aid, the following two deserve special mention:

(a) *The Jewish Agricultural Society*, founded in 1900 by the Baron de Hirsch Fund to encourage farming among Jews in the United States. Since 1935, the Society has directed its attention to refugees arriving in this country who wish to become farmers. The number of refugee cases handled was very modest at first but grew in the following years. By the end of 1937 only 173 cases had been recorded; in 1938 there were 651; in 1939, 988; in 1940, 892; in 1941, 651; in 1942, 362; in 1943, 163, raising the total for the period under consideration (1935-1943) to 3,880 cases. During the same period, through the direct instrumentality of the Society, 324 refugee families from 11 European countries were established on farms in 12 States (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia), but mostly in New Jersey, and mainly on poultry farms. To this number must be added others who acquired farms on their own initiative or on the advice of refugees previously settled, and so it is estimated that there are well over 4,000 refugees who have found a home and a living on farms in the United States. In order to help refugees acquire farms and operate them, loans aggregating \$536,245 had been granted by the close of 1943; and of this amount, \$243,133 had been paid back. Early in 1940, a refugee training farm was established near Bound Brook, N.J., where short but intensive courses were given in the rudiments

⁶⁷See ~~MOORE~~

pp. 318-319 above.

of certain branches of farming; however, owing to insufficient attendance caused by the war, the farm was abandoned at the end of 1942.⁶⁸ The results of all these activities are certainly striking, although it remains to be seen how many of the refugee farmers will persevere in the face of the rigors of their new life. The present auspicious trend in American agriculture certainly favors such experiments.

(b) *The National Council of Jewish Women*, already mentioned in the present chapter. This organization was founded in 1893, and, long before the advent of the Nazi regime in Germany, was already engaged in aiding Jewish immigrants, especially unaccompanied Jewish women, meeting them at the dock, sending them on to their destination, helping them in their problems of adjustment, and assisting them in becoming naturalized. With the outbreak of persecutions in Germany and the resultant influx of refugees into the United States, the organization decided to come to their aid. A Committee on German Jewish Refugee Problems was formed in the spring of 1935, which assisted a great many refugees by providing additional training facilities for them in order to supplement their preliminary instruction in various trades and professions. Special activities were undertaken in aid of refugee children. In addition, the whole of its immigrant aid apparatus was put at the service of the refugees.⁶⁹

The refugee-aid work in Palestine forms an integral part of the activity of the Jewish Agency, and especially of its Immigration Department, which is one of its most important organs. No distinction is drawn by this Department between immigrants and

⁶⁸The Jewish Agricultural Society, *Annual Reports*, 1935-1943. See also, Gabriel Davidson, *Our Jewish Farmers and the Story of the Jewish Agricultural Society*, Chapter V, "Refugees," pp. 125-144.

⁶⁹Erika Mann and Eric Estorick, "Private and Governmental Aid of Refugees," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1939, p. 144 ff.

refugees, since neither the former nor the latter are regarded as ordinary immigrants but rather as people returning to their homeland to share in the building of the Jewish National Home. Hence the terms "immigrant" and "refugee" are scarcely used in Palestine for those coming to settle in that country. Instead they are called *olim* ("newcomers"). In recent years, a new term has been introduced for refugees entering illegally—*i.e.*, against the will of the local British authorities—*maapilim*; but even in this term the refugee character is not implied at all. The machinery of the Jewish Agency is used for the benefit of the refugees coming to Palestine even before their arrival there, since their transportation (at least that of refugees coming legally) is arranged by the Agency. Upon their arrival in Palestine, the refugees are immediately taken in hand by the organs of the Jewish Agency or, in the case of working people, by the organs of the General Federation of Jewish Labor in Palestine (*Histadruth Haovdim*), which cooperates closely with the Agency. The refugee is given shelter and medical care, and efforts are made to incorporate him into the economic life of the country in the most suitable way from the point of view of the general interest.⁷⁰ A special branch of activity has been developed in the last few years to help the illegal immigrants, who, when caught by the authorities, are interned and threatened with deportation. Strenuous efforts are made by the Jewish Agency to save such persons from deportation after the horrors of their voyage to Palestine in unseaworthy vessels where they are at the mercy of the crew and often denied food and other necessities. In no other country is this problem of illegal immigrants so complicated or so tragic as in Palestine, and nowhere else are similar efforts made to save them and to integrate them into the normal life of the country.

⁷⁰Concerning the activities on behalf of immigrants arriving in Palestine, see *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, 1937, pp. 364 ff; 1939, p. 313 ff.

With the growing number of refugees and the multiplying complications in their situation, the need arose to create, independently of the machinery of the Jewish Agency, other organs which would cooperate with it in helping the refugees. Such organs are, first, the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, whose activities have already been described, and second, the self-help association of the German Jews in Palestine, known as Hitachduth Olej Germania. For the Polish Jewish refugees, a special aid committee was set up in Jerusalem which succeeded in collecting funds for its activities among the local Jewish population and from several organizations abroad, especially the World Jewish Congress; something in the same direction is also being done by the Polish Government-in-Exile and by the Hitachduth Olej Polania, the self-help association of the Polish Jews in Palestine. The most important charitable activities are, however, carried on by the Department of Social Welfare of the Vaad Leumi (Jewish National Council of Palestine). This Department, which was created in 1931 to fight poverty among the Jewish population of Palestine, centered its efforts largely on helping refugees, especially those among them who, being middle-class people, could not be taken care of by the General Federation of Jewish Labor. Shelters were established for such people both in Tel Aviv and Haifa; care was taken of their children to enable the parents to look for employment; information and advice was supplied through a network of local offices in several parts of the country; small loans were advanced to refugees to enable them to establish themselves in Palestine; the wandering of refugees from place to place was regulated to prevent aimless and chaotic migration. At the important conferences frequently called to discuss the problems of welfare work in Palestine, refugee-aid activities occupy a conspicuous place. All these endeavors have contributed greatly to the mitigation and elimination of the hardships

of the refugees' life in Palestine, even in the case of elements which are not absorbed by the labor movement, or of persons whose means are insufficient for them to establish themselves immediately after their arrival in the country.⁷¹

A few words about the refugee children arriving in Palestine. We have already mentioned the organization of the Youth Aliyah (immigration) into that country. In the first years of the Nazi rule, before the persecutions had assumed their most brutal form, many German Jewish parents thought of remaining in Germany, at least temporarily, and sending their children to Palestine to be educated and prepared for their future life in that country. So they eagerly availed themselves of the opportunities afforded by the Youth Aliyah and they defrayed the necessary expenses by means of transmissions within the limits of the Haavarah agreement. For those young people whose parents were unable to contribute, or who had no parents, funds were provided by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews or by agencies cooperating with it. The work of the Youth Aliyah was soon combined with the work of colonization. Through a series of agreements with the existing agricultural settlements of the Jewish workers, the young people were colonized there at a per capita cost of 60 pounds, which is less than half the cost of incorporating an adult immigrant into such a settlement. In return for the sum of 60 pounds, which is paid to the settlement as such, the boy or girl in question is accepted as an equal member of the colony, devoting part of his or her time to education and the rest to the actual work of the settlement. This experiment may have important results not only for the solution of the refugee problem, but for land settlement in Palestine generally.⁷²

⁷¹Executive of the Jewish National Council of Palestine, *The Social Work of the Council*, p. 24 ff. (Hebrew).

⁷²*Five Years of Youth Immigration, 1934-1939*. Published by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

As against the vast refugee-aid activities in the United States and, to a certain extent, also in Palestine, the efforts in other countries are of a much more modest nature. The refugee-aid work in most of them is carried on by Jewish immigrant aid societies which date from pre-Nazi times; and even where new organizations have been formed to help the refugees, most of them do not bear the character of refugee-aid bodies like the NRS in America, but of immigrant aid societies generally. Such has been the case both in the transit countries, through which the stream of refugees passed on its way to countries of final settlement, and in the immigration countries themselves. In France, for instance, the Central Committee for the Protection of Jewish Immigrants, established in 1927, began in 1933 to devote much of its activity to German refugees. Already in the first three years of the exodus from Germany, more than 5,500 refugees were sent on to other countries by this committee, 2,500 of them to overseas countries and 1,500 to European countries, while the rest were repatriated to their countries of origin. The committee was also active in obtaining permission for the refugees to stay and work in the country. Besides this work of removing the refugees from France, which was subsidized by HICEM, there arose the need of helping them during their sojourn in France. For this special purpose the Comité National de Secours aux Réfugiés Allemands was established in July, 1933, the considerable budget of which was covered with funds raised locally and supplemented by subsidies from the J.D.C., the Central British Fund, and a few other organizations. Most of its means were spent for emergency relief to refugees, such as feeding, lodging, medical care, and cash assistance. The refugees from other countries during the first year of the present war were mostly cared for by the Federation of Jewish Organizations in France. Several other general organizations (Agriculture et

Artisanat, Hechalutz, ORT, OSE) endeavored to help the refugees in that country. The breakdown of France and the subsequent process of rapid pauperization of French Jewry greatly complicated the refugee-aid work. Where, previously, fifty percent of the sums spent for refugee relief came from French sources, now the entire expense had to be covered by American contributions.⁷³ At the same time, the expenditures for refugee-aid grew tremendously as a result of the new influx of refugees and of the special problem created by the situation in the internment camps. It was also necessary to remove the children from the camps, where they were threatened with starvation, and to save the children of those refugees who were not interned but whose lot was often no better than that of the internees. This work was done by OSE and was largely financed by the J.D.C.⁷⁴

In Great Britain, the local activities for the relief of the German Jewish refugees were carried on by the German Jewish Aid Committee, which established a number of departments for the various branches of its work, the most important being the Immigration, Training and Employment, and Overseas Settlement Departments.⁷⁵ After the outbreak of war, a relief committee for Polish Jewish refugees was added.

In Belgium, the well-known Jewish welfare society EZRA did much from 1933 on to help the refugees from Germany by interceding with the local authorities on their behalf. In addition, a special Comité d'Aide et d'Assistance aux Victimes de l'Antisémitisme en Allemagne (Committee for Relief and Constructive Aid to the Victims of Antisemitism in Germany) was formed in

⁷³Fanny R. Adlerstein, "Foreign Department," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, June, 1941, p. 377.

⁷⁴*Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1940 and the First 5 Months of 1941*, p. 22.

⁷⁵About the activities of this committee, see *Bulletin of the Coordinating Committee for Refugees*, May, 1939, pp. 6-8, and Joseph L. Cohen, *Salvaging German Jewry*, pp. 9-10.

1933, which functioned until 1938, spending a considerable sum—about 8,000,000 Belgian francs—on its program of activities.

In Holland, the Montefiore Society, established in the 80's of the last century, was instrumental in creating a special refugee-aid committee,⁷⁶ and when this committee discontinued its activities, the Montefiore Society took over the work. By the end of 1937, nearly 8,500 refugees had been assisted either with cash grants or by having their transportation arranged for them. A special shelter was established for refugees in Amsterdam, the cost of maintaining it being wholly defrayed by the Society. Just before the outbreak of the war, approximately 7,000 out of the 30,000 refugees in that country were being supported by the Jewish community; in addition, 715 out of 1,500 children brought to Holland after the German pogroms of November, 1938, were being cared for.⁷⁷

Noteworthy, too, was the refugee-aid work in Czechoslovakia as long as that country remained free and independent. In the first five years of its existence, the Democratic Refugee-Aid Committee (Demokratische Fluechtlingsfuersorge), established in 1933, spent close to a million Czech crowns extending material aid to more than 1,500 refugees and legalizing the stay of nearly 5,000 refugees in that country.⁷⁸ In 1938 the Committee established offices in Paris, London, and Oslo in order to rescue as many refugees as possible. More than 430,000 crowns were raised during that year alone, and by March, 1939, seventy per cent of the clients had been removed to other countries of refuge,

⁷⁶About the work of this committee, see *Vijf Jaren Vluchtelingen hulp: De Arbeid van het Comité voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen, 1933-1938*.

⁷⁷*Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1940 and the First 5 Months of 1941*, p. 26.

⁷⁸*Fuenf Jahre Flucht, Not und Rettung*, herausgegeben im Selbstverlag von der Demokratischen Fluechtlingsfuersorge, p. 15.

European and overseas.⁷⁹ Besides the Democratic Committee, the following refugee-aid bodies existed in Czechoslovakia, where many political émigrés had sought refuge: the Social Democratic Relief Committee; the Private Employees' Union (Einheitsverband der Privatangestellten), a trade union which very generously assisted those German refugees who had been members of the corresponding trade union in Germany; the Committee for the Relief of German Emigrants (Hilfskomitee fuer deutsche Emigranten), and the Association for Aid to German Emigrants (Vereinigung zur Unterstuetzung deutscher Emigranten). The last two helped mostly Communists and their fellow travelers. The Jewish refugees were at first assisted by the Jewish Relief Committee and later by the Social Institute of Czechoslovakian Jewry. By the end of 1935, all these committees together had helped over 8,000 refugees, for whose relief 8 million crowns had been raised.^{79a}

The expenditures of the Jewish Social Institute for refugee-aid in the prewar period exceeded one million crowns a year. After the Munich pact, additional numbers of Jews, who had to leave the country, had to be assisted along with the refugees. An Office for Refugees in Czechoslovakia was established, which estimated the number of refugees in that country on November 1, 1938, at 91,625 (exclusive of the German refugees who had arrived before the occupation of the Sudetenland). This number grew from day to day, and by February, 1939, had risen to 186,000, of whom about 16,000 were Jews.^{79b} At the time Hitler entered Prague (March 15, 1939), what remained of Czechoslovakia still har-

⁷⁹*Jahresbericht der Demokratischen Fluechtlingsfuersorge fuer die Zeit vom Jan. 1 bis Dez. 31, 1938* (also in French), pp. 2 and 13.

^{79a}Czech, National Committee for German Refugees, *Memorandum zur Deutschen Fluechtlingsfrage in der C.S.R.*

^{79b}Sir John Hope Simpson, *Refugees: A Review of the Situation since September, 1938*, p. 36.

bored 6,000 refugees from Germany, among them 5,000 Jews.^{79c}

In the short interval between Munich and the German occupation, the Jewish community of mutilated Czechoslovakia raised sums running into millions of crowns for refugee aid, which sums were increased by contributions from the J.D.C. and other foreign organizations.

In Turkey, Switzerland, the Free State of Danzig, and a few other transmigration countries, the refugees were helped by the existing emigrant aid societies.

Of the refugee-aid activities in the East European countries in the period before the war, mention should be made of the great effort made by the Jewish community of Poland to cope with the tragic problem of the mass expulsions of Polish Jews from Germany begun in October, 1938. Already in the preceding years, several thousand Polish nationals had been repatriated to Poland and a special relief committee established for them in Warsaw. But inasmuch as this was a moderate influx, and nearly all the refugees had relatives in Poland who took care of them, the resulting burden on the Polish Jewish community was rather small. No more than some 200 families in Warsaw and a few dozen in the province had to be supported by the committee, whose expenses during 1938 did not exceed 68,000 zlotys (about \$13,000). The situation changed radically, however, when in October of that year mass arrests and expulsions of Polish citizens were started in Germany. In the course of a few days almost 15,000 persons were seized and put across the Polish frontier, more than 9,000 of them at the Polish border town of Zbonszyn. At first the Polish authorities allowed the refugees to proceed to the interior, where they could at least expect to receive temporary help from friends or relatives; but after a few days the authorities had a change of heart and interned over 5,000 refu-

^{79c}Kurt Grossmann, "Refugees in Peril," *The Manchester Guardian*, March 28, 1939.

gees at Zbonszyn. Immediate relief measures were necessary to succor both the interneees and the other refugees, whose plight was desperate. The first funds for the relief work were advanced by the Warsaw office of the J.D.C., but soon a General Relief Committee for Jewish Refugees from Germany in Poland was formed under the chairmanship of Chief Rabbi Professor Schorr, which thereupon embarked upon a country-wide relief campaign.⁸⁰ In the first eight months of its activity, three and a half million zlotys (nearly \$700,000) was spent, more than half of which sum was raised by the Polish Jews themselves and the remainder contributed by the J.D.C. as well as by the Jewish communities of various European countries. A registration of refugees in 116 localities with an aggregate Jewish population of almost a million and a half showed that there were 14,876 refugees, of whom 10,857 required support.⁸¹ The most pressing was the relief work at Zbonszyn, where over 5,000 interned refugees had to be fed, clothed, and saved from demoralization arising from the hardships of their life and from enforced idleness. No less urgent were the legal problems, especially in view of the agreement concluded between the Polish and German governments which enabled the refugees, under certain conditions, to return to Germany for a short period in order to liquidate their businesses there and to bring back their families, from whom many of them had been torn away. A special division of the Relief Committee endeavored to secure employment opportunities for the refugees or to arrange for their emigration. In the first eight months of the committee's work, 673 refugees were helped to go to other countries, 258 of them to Palestine, 154 to England, 82 to the United States, and

⁸⁰About the work of this committee, see A. Haffka, *The Activity of the General Relief Committee for Jewish Refugees from Germany in Poland* (mimeographed).

⁸¹For exact data concerning the different localities, see *ibid.*, pp. 50-54.

the rest to other countries.⁸² At the same time the number of those interned at Zbonszyn was reduced to 2,250. A special convention of representatives of Jewish communities met in Warsaw on March 20, 1939, at which it was reported that 16,000 zlotys was being spent daily and more than 500,000 zlotys monthly for the refugees.⁸³ It was decided to raise this amount by voluntary contributions and, if necessary, also by special taxes levied upon the Jewish communities. This great effort on the part of Polish Jewry, at a time when it was itself contending with growing impoverishment, is certainly noteworthy.

Turning now to immigration countries other than Palestine and the United States, we find extensive refugee-aid activities going on there also. To begin with the countries of South America, the refugee-aid work there is today carried on by a great number of organizations (including several self-help societies of refugees), of which the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) should be mentioned first. Founded in 1891 by the celebrated Jewish philanthropist, Baron Maurice de Hirsch, to solve the problem of the Russian Jews by means of land settlement, the Jewish Colonization Association has from the outset engaged in activities not only in this field, but in many other branches of Jewish social work. A capital of £2,000,000 was put at its disposal by Baron de Hirsch and augmented after his death to £8,000,000, thereby securing its financial basis and obviating the need of any fund-raising activities. Its colonizing efforts in Argentina succeeded in establishing a considerable number of Jewish farm settlements with an aggregate population of over 30,000. Through this work and the numerous cultural and economic institutions centering around it, the groundwork was laid for the social activities of the Jewish population in that and other South

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 37.

American countries. In addition, the work of Jewish colonization in a number of other countries (Brazil, Canada, Palestine, Russia, Poland, Turkey, Rumania, etc.) was aided by ICA, while important activities were started even before World War I in the field of Jewish vocational training and of assistance to emigrants from Eastern Europe. All these endeavors were continued after that war, but the emigrant aid work of ICA was merged with that of HIAS. After the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany, efforts were made by ICA to settle a number of German Jewish refugees in its farm colonies in Argentina, and a special settlement of German Jews, the colony of Avigdor, was established in January, 1936. Sixty-five families, numbering 368 persons, were settled there in the years 1936-1937,⁸⁴ and others were to follow until the maximum of 150 families in the colony should have been reached. The prospective settlers underwent preliminary agricultural training in Germany. Each settler received from 50 to 75 hectares of land. Altogether, 87 refugee families, comprising 535 individuals, had been settled by ICA in Argentina up to the end of 1937.⁸⁵ Besides, other refugee-aid activities in South America have been influenced by ICA either directly or through the two agencies founded by it together with HIAS and with the J.D.C., namely, HICEM and the American Joint Reconstruction Foundation. HICEM, whose funds are provided jointly by ICA and HIAS, has received several additional grants since 1933 to enable it to meet the mounting expense of the transportation of refugees. The American Joint Reconstruction Foundation, created in 1924 by the J.D.C. and ICA to promote the Jewish cooperative movement in Eastern and Central Europe, decided in 1939, in view of the great influx of Jewish refugees into South America, to

⁸⁴Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de la Direction Générale pour l'année 1937*, p. 22 ff.

⁸⁵Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 479.

extend its activities to that continent, and appropriated \$80,000 for this purpose. (In the preceding years, the A.J.R.F. had established special loan associations for German Jewish refugees resident in England, France, Palestine, Yugoslavia, and the United States.⁸⁶) Since the start of the present war, ICA being a British corporation, has been forced greatly to curtail its activities; the regular budget of HICEM is now covered mostly by HIAS and that of the A.J.R.F. by the J.D.C.⁸⁷

Apart from ICA, refugee-aid work in South American countries is carried on mostly by local organizations. In Argentina, the Society for the Protection of Jewish Immigrants (SOPROTIMIS for short), established in 1922, started its refugee-aid activities upon the arrival of the first groups of German Jewish refugees in that country. Besides putting its organizational machinery at their disposal, receiving the newcomers, intervening with the immigration and consular authorities in their behalf, training them, helping them find employment, granting them loans, and extending special aid to the women in order to protect them from the menace of white slavery, SOPROTIMIS prevailed upon the authorities to admit the belongings of the refugees duty-free and arranged for the transportation of those refugees who had to go to other countries, especially to Paraguay. In the case of a number of refugees arriving in Argentina merely on visitors' visas, it was instrumental in having such visas exchanged for regular immigration visas. Besides SOPROTIMIS, a special self-help organization of German Jews in Argentina, known as the Hilfsverein deutschsprechender Juden, was formed in 1933 to help the refugees from Germany. This body has granted material

⁸⁶Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de la Direction Générale pour l'année 1937*, pp. 147-148.

⁸⁷About the activities of ICA, see Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de la Direction Générale, 1933-1939*.

assistance to refugees and established an agricultural school for them in Rio Negro.

In Brazil, the refugee-aid activities were conducted by various charitable organizations and by the local office of HICEM until 1935, when a Coordinating Committee for German Jewish Refugees was set up, while a special Committee for German Jewish Refugees was established in Sao Paulo. Besides the general work of receiving the refugees and giving them the necessary aid, these committees have to protect them from the restrictive immigration policy of the Brazilian Government, initiated years ago and aiming to prevent all immigration into that country. In all other South American countries, the refugee-aid work is carried on by local immigrant aid societies; however, in some of them (Paraguay, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador), special committees have been established for German Jewish refugees, or else the local societies of resident German Jews have undertaken to care for them. The problem there is not only to help the refugees morally and materially, but to combat the anti-refugee propaganda, which is very strong in some of these countries and has given rise to legislative or administrative measures intended to limit or prevent altogether the further influx of refugees. The same applies to the countries of Central America as well as to Mexico and Canada, where refugee-aid activities are conducted by local immigrant aid societies or by the general relief organizations.⁸⁸

In South Africa, the South African Board of Deputies, as the central coordinating body of the local Jewry, took care of the refugees, but there was also a South African Fund for German Jews, whose object was to help them and especially to find them

⁸⁸About the activities of the refugee-aid committees in Latin America, see *Ten Years of Jewish Emigration (1926-1936): Report submitted to the Conference on Jewish Emigration, June 29-July 1, 1936, Part Four: "Immigration Countries"* (Yiddish); see also, Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de la Direction Générale, 1933-1939*.

employment. All these activities have been halted in the last few years, no more refugees being admitted into that country. In Australia, the National Council of Jewish Women and the Australian Jewish Welfare Society are responsible for the few refugees admitted there. In the Far East, the Far Eastern Jewish Central Information Bureau for Immigrants, established in Harbin at the outbreak of World War I, was active as a relief agency for Jewish refugees. After the commencement of hostilities between Japan and China, this Bureau was forced to suspend its activity and a special relief committee was established for the German Jewish refugees, and later for all refugees, in Shanghai. Much was done by this committee to mitigate the lot of the refugees, whose number grew from year to year and, after the start of the present war, even from month to month, Shanghai being practically the only place where refuge could be sought by thousands of people unable to obtain visas to other countries, or prevented from proceeding there by wartime transportation difficulties. The Shanghai relief committee was unable to raise the necessary funds among the local Jewish population and had to rely on subsidies from abroad, mainly from the J.D.C., which were not sufficient to cover the necessary expenditures. Thus, despite the aid afforded by the relief committee, the situation of the refugees was very trying,⁸⁹ which affected the relations between the refugees and the committee and caused considerable friction among the refugees themselves, especially between the German Jewish refugees and the more recent fugitives from East European countries.

As stated above, local relief committees for Jewish refugees exist today in nearly all countries of the world. Even such out-of-the-way countries as India, Burma, the Philippine Islands,

⁸⁹For details, see *Aiding Jews Overseas: Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. for 1940 and the First 5 Months of 1941*, pp. 38-39.

Mauritius, etc., have, or until the outbreak of war had, such committees. Just as there is hardly a country where the refugees have not sought to find a new home since 1933, so there is scarcely one in which the local Jewish community, however small, has not tried to help the refugees either with its own resources or with the support of the larger and wealthier Jewries of other countries, especially that of the United States.

This chapter would be incomplete if we did not mention that several efforts have been made since 1933 to coordinate the activities of the Jewish private organizations in the field of refugee aid. Already in the last days of October, 1933, a conference was called for this purpose in London and was attended by representatives of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Comité des Délégations Juives. There were also delegates from the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Jewish Colonization Association, the Agudath Israel, and from several Jewish communities in Europe, the United States, and Palestine. The conference aimed to initiate a united Jewish endeavor for the German Jewish refugees. Several subcommittees (on migration, on relief outside Germany, on aid to academic victims, on reconstruction) were set up and a number of resolutions adopted, but no real activities resulted from this conference.⁹⁰ Similar efforts were made in the succeeding years, especially in connection with the Evian Conference, but the results were equally disappointing.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The account of the refugee-aid activities of the Jewish private organizations given in the preceding pages shows the vast extent

⁹⁰Joint Foreign Committee, *Conference for the Relief of German Jewry, Reports and Resolutions*, p. 40.

of the work done by them, compared with which the efforts of both the governmental and the intergovernmental agencies fade into insignificance. There is scarcely a problem in the life of the refugee which has not been tackled by these organizations. Not only did they try to help the refugees even before they left their homelands, then during their voyage, and finally in their new countries, but they developed important political and colonization activities which ordinarily can hardly be undertaken by any but public authorities. Whereas the governmental and intergovernmental agencies were generally unable to afford the refugees effective aid commensurate with the magnitude and urgency of their need, the private organizations were far more successful in every field of their endeavor. They succeeded in obtaining visas for refugees in an atmosphere of growing reluctance to admit immigrants; their work of colonization (especially the colonizing activities in Palestine, but to a certain extent also in Argentina and Santo Domingo) made it possible for large numbers of refugees to be absorbed, whereas nothing could be achieved in this field by public authorities. And it is no accident that the only successful effort to save at least part of the property of the refugees, — namely, the Haavarah agreement with the German Government on the basis of which considerable sums were brought to Palestine, — was made by a private organization, while the efforts of the intergovernmental bodies in this direction, — for example, the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Committee with the selfsame German Government, — produced no results. Nor, incidentally, should it be overlooked that even the expenses of the intergovernmental agencies were in several cases paid, at least partly, by the private organizations.

It is not easy to state the amount of money expended by the Jewish private organizations on refugee-aid activities, since in many cases no exact figures are available. But even an approxi-

mate account may suffice to show the magnitude of the effort. The sum of over 1,000,000 pounds was spent until the outbreak of the present war by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine; in addition, a special company for middle-class colonization was formed which, in the first two years of its activity, expended almost 200,000 pounds. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, from its inception on November 27, 1914 until December, 1939, disbursed upward of \$11,000,000 for repatriation and refugee work out of a total expenditure of about \$114,000,000. In the course of a single year, 1939, more than \$5,000,000 was spent by the J.D.C. for refugee aid. The outlay of HICEM for transportation of German Jewish refugees amounted to \$700,000 in the first three years of the Nazi rule in Germany; thereafter the expense mounted from year to year, rising to almost a million dollars in 1940. Beginning with 1933, the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland and the Hilfsverein jointly spent hundreds of thousands and later millions of marks for refugee aid, their combined expenditures for this purpose soaring to over 3,500,000 marks in 1938 and to more than 12,000,000 marks in 1940. The National Refugee Service spent nine million dollars on its refugee-aid activities in the first three years of its existence, while the expenditures of HIAS for this purpose were certainly not under three million dollars. Even if we allow no more than ten or fifteen million dollars extra for the refugee-aid work of other Jewish bodies (among them so important an organization as ICA which, unfortunately, does not publish its budget), and even if we admit that there may be some overlapping in the amounts named above because of subsidies granted by one organization to another, we shall hardly be mistaken in assuming that some thirty or forty million dollars were spent by the Jewish private organizations on refugee aid in the period from 1933 until the end of 1941. This is certainly a

conservative estimate, or rather an understatement. An estimate made by the High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Emerson, in his report to the League of Nations, put the amount of cash from private sources disbursed for refugee-aid work from 1933 until the outbreak of the war at £10,000,000 or, together with contributions in kind and the help given by private families, at £15,000,000.⁹¹ To be sure, this estimate covered all the relief activities, and not merely the Jewish. However, if we take into consideration the leading part played by Jewish organizations in this field, as well as the enormous amounts spent by them during the present war, the figure given by us is certainly not far from the truth.

Never before in the history of mankind was such an enormous amount spent for refugees by private organizations. The sum of £12,000,000 was disbursed in the effort to solve the problem of the Greek refugees in the years 1923-1930, but this amount was advanced by the League of Nations, on whose behalf the settlement of these refugees was undertaken. The sum of £1,500,000 spent during the same period for settling the Turkish refugees coming from Greek territory, was furnished by the Turkish Government. The immense amounts which were required to solve the problem of the two (according to some authorities, three) million Russian refugees after the Soviet Revolution, and whose total cannot even approximately be stated, were also supplied mainly by governments (primarily by the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments), compared with which the considerable contributions made by the private organizations (ZEMGOR, the Russian Red Cross, the Federation of Russian War Invalids) played only a secondary rôle. Only in the case of the Jewish refugees of the last eleven years has everything, or almost everything, been done by Jewish private organizations.

⁹¹League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Report submitted to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by Sir Herbert Emerson, Geneva, 1939, p. 9.*

This appreciation of the work done by the Jewish private organizations should not blind us to the weak spots in their activities. We must remember that this work is being done not by one but by several organizations, and since there is no central body to coordinate their efforts, there certainly are cases of overlapping; also, cases of strained relations and friction between different organizations may be noted. No such thing happens in Palestine, where the authority of the Jewish Agency is sufficient to concentrate everything in its hands. To be sure, in a number of cases agreements have been concluded between different organizations to coordinate their activities, for instance, between the J.D.C. and HICEM, between HICEM and national refugee-aid organizations in various countries, and between the NRS and various relief committees in the United States. But these, though important, are exceptions; as a rule, activities are carried on independently by different organizations and inevitably result in a certain amount of confusion, which is even more undesirable in this case than in any other social work.

No less a handicap is the inadequate authority of the private organizations. The work of relief can certainly be done efficiently by them, in many cases even more efficiently than by the public agencies, which, by the very nature of their constitution, are less adaptable to the ever-changing circumstances. But, in all cases where stronger pressure and greater authority are needed, especially where the final solution of the refugee problem is attempted by means of repatriation, or of final settlement in the countries of temporary sojourn, or through colonization, the efforts of private organizations are bound to prove futile. True, the governmental and intergovernmental agencies formerly active in this field were no more successful than the private organizations; but this was due to the limitations imposed upon these agencies, reducing their authority and also denying them the funds necessary to

start activities commensurate with the extent of the refugee problem. Once these limitations are abolished and a new intergovernmental agency set up, clothed with sufficient authority and supplied with ample means, infinitely greater results may be expected than can ever be achieved by private organizations.

But it is not only in this field that the work of private organizations is necessarily inadequate. Even in the sphere of temporary assistance given to refugees, where most remarkable results have been achieved, a great deal of unpleasantness arises because of the insufficient separation of this work from the usual charitable activities for the poor. The danger arising from this state of affairs has already been mentioned. It is especially great where the refugee-aid work is conducted by local or national philanthropic organizations. But even in the special refugee-aid organizations, there is not always sufficient understanding of the real object of their activities, which is to make of the refugee a normal and useful member of his new community and to treat him accordingly; hence their daily work is marred by improper methods and much harm is inadvertently done. Cases of friction between the refugees and the staff of the relief organizations are often caused by the strained nerves of the refugees after the grueling experiences preceding and following their flight. But there are also cases where the refugee is right in his outburst against being treated like a pauper; and still worse is the situation if he acquiesces in this treatment and accepts the rôle of an object of charity. Incessant control over the refugee-aid activities by competent bodies or individuals is necessary to avoid such perils.

The following conclusions may be drawn from what has been said here as to the future of the refugee-aid organizations:

(a) Independently of the new machinery which may be created after the war to solve the refugee problem, the activities of

the private organizations should be continued and given governmental support, since the work done by them and their experience not only justify but necessitate their existence in the future.

(b) A clear-cut separation should, however, be effected between the activities of the charitable societies and those of the refugee-aid organizations in order to avoid as far as possible the methods of philanthropy and to keep in mind the fundamental aim of the refugee-aid work, namely, to integrate the refugees at the earliest possible time into the economic and social life of the country in which they now reside, or to which they may be directed upon the final solution of the problem.

CHAPTER XV

THE SOLUTION

Introductory—Repatriation—Absorption in the Countries of Temporary Refuge—Emigration—International Cooperation in Solving the Jewish Refugee Problem—The Rôle of the Jewish People—From Refugees to Builders of a Jewish Future

1. INTRODUCTORY

The present Jewish refugee problem being the result of external forces acting independently of the will of the people concerned, its solution cannot be expected without a clear policy that will combine the social resources of the Jewish people with efforts by governments and international agencies, if and when such agencies are established after the war. The problem of more than two million people who have been expelled or forced to flee from their countries of origin¹ will never be solved without an extraordinary effort on the part of society. New ways must be sought commensurate with the grave complications of the problem.

Apart from the temporary relief which is today administered in many countries and which certainly cannot be regarded as a solution, and apart, too, from cases where refugees have already

¹Winfried N. Hadsel (see his article, "Can Europe's Refugees Find New Homes?" in *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 1, 1943, p. 111) estimates that 16 million people have been displaced in Europe, of whom "perhaps half are still in their own countries, but have fled or been expelled by the enemy from their normal district of residence and are living under conditions which are in greater or less degree abnormal." It is safe to assume that more than 4,000,000 Jews belong among those who have been displaced, and that over two million of these "displaced" Jews are refugees or persons deported from their countries.

found permanent homes in new countries and the problem of their individual existence has been solved, there are three ways of solving the Jewish refugee problem. One is to enable the refugees to return to their homelands once the reason for their flight or expulsion from them has ceased to exist. Another is to enable the refugees to remain permanently in the countries where they now are and where their existence is far from secure legally or economically or both. And there is a third way for those for whom neither the first nor the second solution is feasible, namely, final emigration to another country. This last may, in turn, be subdivided into two fundamental categories: ordinary migration, in order to be absorbed into the existing branches of economic activity in the new country, and colonization, whose aim is to create new settlements and to build a new life for the refugees.

None of these ways excludes the others. All three can be employed at the same time. A situation may arise where refugees will be permitted to return to their old country, but not all of them will be able or willing to do so; instead, some of them will be absorbed by their present countries of refuge, while others will seek new homes. In the case of the Jewish refugees, all three ways have been tried with more or less success. It is our purpose in this chapter, first, to examine briefly all these methods of solving the Jewish refugee problem; second, to survey what has been done so far in regard to these solutions; and, thirdly, to suggest what should be done in the future to obtain the desired results.

2. REPATRIATION

Although logically the first method of solving the refugee problem, repatriation is the least popular. In Jewish history there is only one striking example of a mass repatriation of refugees, but even in that case it was accomplished only several decades after the deportation from the homeland. This was the return

of the Jewish exiles from Babylon to Palestine in the sixth century B.C.E. There may have been a few other cases in the Middle Ages where Jews, after being expelled from certain places, were allowed to return and did so. But in the overwhelming majority of cases this did not happen; in particular, none of the mass flights mentioned in the preceding chapters ended in the repatriation of the refugees. Neither the Spanish nor the Russian Jews returned to their home country after having left it. The same is true of the present refugees. There were some cases in the first years of the Hitler regime where German Jews returned to their homeland because they did not succeed in establishing themselves abroad or because of homesickness. But the brutal treatment of such persons, who were frequently put in concentration camps, deterred all others from following their example. The idea of solving the refugee problem by repatriation was generally regarded as devoid of any practical importance before the outbreak of the present war.² The same applies with even greater force to the refugees of this war, who, even if a return were possible, have nothing to look forward to in their home countries as long as these are under Nazi occupation or influence.

However, contrary to the experience of previous decades and centuries, there may be considerable possibilities of repatriating the Jewish refugees after the war, which, as appears most probable at this writing, will end in a crushing defeat for Nazi Germany. The Jewish refugees from Poland and Czechoslovakia, Belgium and France, as well as many other European countries, left their homelands not because they were ousted by or afraid of the local population. They were simply frightened away or driven out by the Germans. And as soon as German domination comes to an end in all these countries, nothing — at least from

²Robert W. Ditchburn, "The Refugee Problem," *Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, June, 1939, p. 288; Sir John Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*, p. 529.

the legal and psychological point of view — will stand in the way of their return home; on the contrary, the common sufferings with the local population during the years of the occupation will have strengthened the mutual bonds and may counteract the antisemitism which was very much in evidence in some of these countries — especially in Poland — even before the Nazi occupation.

Quite different will be the situation in Germany, as well as in such countries as Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia, which have voluntarily embraced the Nazi ideology. The collapse of the Nazi regime may, officially, have the same consequences here as in other European countries, namely, the restoration of equality of rights for all the inhabitants, but the psychological effects of the period since 1933 will not be obliterated overnight. The tremendous propaganda of hatred which has been increasingly carried on for many years will have profoundly influenced both the respective people and the Jews. The Germans may oust the Nazis and reestablish a democratic and progressive regime, but their minds will remain poisoned for years, perhaps even for decades. The German Jews may be permitted, nay, encouraged to return to their old country, but the memory of the terrible injustice done to them will never vanish from their minds. A considerable repatriation of German Jews can, therefore, hardly be expected.

But even in other countries the problem is not so simple as it may seem at first glance. In all probability there will be no legal obstacles to the return of the Jewish refugees; but whether there will exist economic possibilities for a mass repatriation is quite another question. The postwar economic situation in the European countries will certainly be a very difficult one owing to the impoverishment of the population, and it will remain so for many years until the ruin wrought by the war and the German

occupation will have been repaired. The problem of securing the existence of the repatriates and of integrating them into the economic life of the country, from which they have been ousted and their positions or businesses in many cases taken over by non-Jews, will therefore be one of the most difficult. Nevertheless, no scheme for the reconstruction of the war-stricken countries of Europe can be entertained which does not include provisions for repatriation.

In any event, it may be assumed that the number of repatriated people after the war will be considerably less than the actual number of refugees, and that for hundreds of thousands of the latter other ways of salvation will have to be found.

3. ABSORPTION IN THE COUNTRIES OF TEMPORARY REFUGE

We must therefore look to the other two ways mentioned above, which may prove no less expedient than the method of repatriation. Both ways were already known, at least partially, in earlier centuries. That Jewish refugees flee to the first place they can get to and only after a time try to find a permanent home, is a rule which has been followed almost universally in the long history of Jewish martyrdom. It happens at times that the country of temporary refuge ultimately absorbs the refugee. This was the case with the Jewish refugees in Turkey and in Holland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; this, too, was the case with the Jewish refugees in France and in England after the Russian pogroms of the 1880's; and, finally, this was also the case with the many Jewish refugees of recent years. Tens of thousands went to various countries as visitors or as transmigrants and remained there. They did it because they either had no legal or physical possibility of proceeding to another country, or because they did not wish to migrate further. Some of these refugees will have to be admitted as permanent settlers in their provisional countries

of refuge. Whether this will be done in considerable measure remains to be seen. Certainly this cannot be expected in Europe. Even before the war it was evident that the great masses of Jewish refugees provisionally admitted to such countries as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and to a certain extent also France and England, could not stay there indefinitely since they could not be absorbed into the economic life of the country and in many cases they had to be segregated from the rest of the population and kept in special camps in order not to depress the domestic labor market. After the outbreak of the present war, the few countries which admitted refugees (Rumania and Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia and Hungary, and subsequently Portugal, Switzerland, and Spain) did so with the express understanding that the refugee would remain there for a short time only, and Portugal even proceeded to arrest and intern those who were not able to leave. No change in this respect can be expected in the future. Many of the smaller countries of Europe will not be able to absorb the refugees who are there for the time being unless some opportunities are found during the process of reconstruction. But even in the large countries — Great Britain may be cited as the most striking example — the problem of final admission of the refugees is far from solved even theoretically. As for the Soviet Union, there certainly will be no legal difficulties in having the large numbers of refugees permanently admitted; but whether the country will be able to absorb them economically is another matter.

The situation in other parts of the world and especially in the Americas may be different. First the legal aspect of the problem must be considered. There are several thousand refugees in the United States who came here as visitors and who cannot or do not wish to go back to their former countries. In addition, several thousand were admitted as visitors for the duration of the war

on the basis of the so-called emergency visas granted in order to save them from imminent danger in Nazi Europe. In many cases they, too, may not want to return. It will certainly not be difficult to absorb them into the economic life of this country. The same is true of several South American countries, especially Brazil, where the number of refugees with visitors' visas is quite considerable. They all can, and should, be granted the rights of regular immigrants. A further requisite is a more generous naturalization policy on the part of governments, which could make an important contribution to the solution of the present refugee problem by amending the domestic law in favor of domiciled refugees, by reducing the fees for poor applicants, and by greater promptitude in dealing with application.³

This is the way in which both the legal and the economic problem of the refugees residing in countries outside Europe can in most cases be solved. Quite different, however, as pointed out above, is the problem of the refugees in Europe itself. And since a very conservative estimate puts the number of actual Jewish refugees in various European countries at 200,000, apart from the Jewish refugees living on Russian territory, a satisfactory solution must be found for them also. Such a solution can be attained chiefly by emigration.

4. EMIGRATION

(a) *Infiltration*

By the term "infiltration," contrary to common usage, we understand any emigration which does not begin with an agricultural settlement, regardless of whether it is a mass emigration or a limited one, whether it is organized or not, and whether it is carried out independently or on the basis of an agreement concluded with the government of the immigration country concerned.

³Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 537.

The decisive criterion for us is whether the immigrants are absorbed into the existing branches of economic activity in the new country, or whether a new economic life is built beginning with land settlement as the foundation.

From an economic point of view, possibilities of infiltration, as far as large numbers of immigrants are concerned, exist only in countries which are highly developed economically. The dumping of refugees into economically backward countries can only result in failure and antisemitic agitation. This has been the case in a number of South American countries, such as Peru, Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia, and this is one of the reasons for the reluctance to admit refugees into other countries. But there are countries which could absorb considerable numbers of refugees without much difficulty. Foremost among these are the United States and nearly all the British Dominions, where ample possibilities exist for absorbing not only industrial workers and artisans, but persons of other occupations as well. However, as shown by the developments of recent years, economic possibilities are not sufficient to assure the admission of refugees. Indeed, the refugees may often be, at least from the legal point of view, in a worse position than the ordinary immigrant, since he has no country to support his interests. But even the position of an emigrant was far from satisfactory long before the war, owing to the general reluctance to admit immigrants, a reluctance which grew from year to year, reaching its climax on the eve of the conflict because of the additional fear of spies and Trojan Horses.

As long as such motives persist, there is no hope that infiltration will play an important part in the solution of the refugee problem. Only if the present war ends, as we fondly hope, in the triumph of liberal and democratic principles, and if these principles — contrary to what happened after the First World War — are

⁴Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 531.

really observed, can the problem of migration and, with it, the problem of refugees be solved.

But, apart from this basic problem of human relations, there are many others which should be taken into account in connection with the question of infiltration. The existent possibilities of absorbing refugees do not necessarily assure their absorption in their present occupations. To the contrary. Experience shows that, even in countries like the United States, Argentina, or South Africa, good opportunities may exist in industry but not in commerce or the liberal professions. The problem of vocational readaptation may therefore confront a great many of the refugees. It may be more complicated in the case of refugees from Germany, the overwhelming majority of whom are former merchants, doctors, or lawyers, and it may be less serious in the case of the refugees from Poland, among whom handicraft and industrial labor were more common even in the past. But the problem exists everywhere and can hardly be affected by the course of events. The same applies, in somewhat lesser degree, to the problem of language, as well as to the problem of the mobilization of refugees and of their sentiments. From this point of view, the Jewish refugee problem constitutes an integral part of the general problem of Jewish migration, which can only be solved through a sound and broad-minded policy based on the organization of the immigrants and on their cultural and professional retraining. However, the difficulties in the case of refugees are greater than in that of ordinary immigrants. The refugee has neither the time nor the patience which may be taken for granted in an immigrant under normal conditions. Violently uprooted from his former life, with an inferno of persecution behind him and a most uncertain future before him, his nerves frayed, the refugee has no time for retraining but must earn a living as soon as possible if he and his family are not to go

hungry. On the other hand, the positive aspects in the situation of the refugee as compared with the ordinary immigrant, which were conspicuous in former decades and centuries, are less evident now. As long as the refugees consisted of people persecuted for their religious or political beliefs, they were in most cases persons of a higher cultural and moral calibre and in a better position to cope with the difficulties of their new life. But today the refugees are for the most part the same ordinary people as other immigrants, and there is no counterbalance to their added trials and tribulations. The same situation will in all probability prevail in the future also, even if the general attitude toward immigration should be more favorable than at present.

Accordingly, infiltration can only to a limited degree be regarded as a method of solving the Jewish refugee problem, although every effort should certainly be made to utilize this remedy.

(b) *Colonization*

By colonization as a means of solving the refugee problem we mean emigration which sets out to build a new economic life upon the basis of agricultural settlements. There may also be cases of combined agricultural and industrial colonization, that is, where industrial activities are developed among the settlers in addition to their agricultural work. From the Jewish standpoint, this kind of settlement is of particular importance. It follows from our definition that we cannot speak of colonization where the refugees are not allowed to establish their own communities. Whether our definition is applicable where the agricultural settlement, although theoretically open to all refugees, remains predominantly Jewish, as in the case of Santo Domingo, depends upon several other factors, primarily upon the degree of the settlers' consciousness.

Apart from sentimental factors to be discussed presently, the main difference between colonization and the other solutions of the refugee problem consists in the degree to which the activities initiated are of general economic importance to the countries concerned. Colonization, if undertaken in uninhabited or thinly-populated countries, is in most cases a blessing to them. Hence no difficulties are encountered on the part of the governments of the respective countries, unless they are opposed to the idea of compact colonization, as has been the case several times during the last decade. But, as against this very positive feature, many others may be cited which render this solution of the refugee problem rather problematical. To begin with, colonization, at least in the first period, is more expensive than the other methods mentioned above. Vast sums are needed in order to establish agricultural settlements and to insure their existence until they become self-supporting. For land settlement in the British Empire, for instance, it is usually estimated that £1,000 to £1,200 is the minimum required for a family, and a more common figure is £2,000.⁵ Not only for hundreds of thousands but even for mere thousands, this method can hardly be taken into consideration as a way of securing their future unless extraordinary means are mobilized. It has therefore been suggested that, while infiltration along existing lines of emigration should be the policy of the private organizations, governments should take action to initiate and promote the colonization of refugees.⁶ Again, the retraining problem is more complicated in the case of colonization. Not only the vocation of the refugees must be changed, but also their mode of living.⁷ A refugee who goes over to industrial work may stay in the city and even maintain his former standard of cultural and social life; this is impossible in the case of an agricultural

⁵Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

⁶Ditchburn, *loc. cit.*, p. 290.

⁷About this problem, see Bruce Bliven, *The Jewish Refugee Problem*, pp. 19-20.

settler, who must renounce his former habits and start a new life. Lastly, as a corollary of what has just been said, colonization is more risky than all other forms of vocational readjustment. While an artisan or an industrial worker who yesterday was a merchant or white collar worker may persevere in his new occupation, an agricultural settler will often be tempted to leave his new calling because of the great hardship it entails and because economic success does not come easily and, in most cases, cannot be expected in the first years. The general condition of agriculture, which in most countries is less favorable than that of industry and other pursuits, may also tend to increase the number of disappointed and broken people, who will be prompted to return to the city instead of continuing the uphill struggle in the rural settlements.⁸ Of course, the problem of climate must also be taken into consideration. The question whether the colonization of white people is feasible in tropical climates has not yet been adequately investigated, although, as far as Jews are concerned, they appear to do fairly well in moderate tropics.⁹ In the case of Jewish refugees, an additional handicap must be taken into account, namely, the unwillingness of the native population to have them admitted into the country in question.

All these reasons explain why, notwithstanding the great number of plans for colonization put forth in recent years as a solution of the Jewish refugee problem (Kenya, Rhodesia, Australia, British Guiana, Madagascar, Alaska, etc., etc.), nothing, or practically nothing, was done to realize them.¹⁰ Apart from

⁸About colonization as a method of solving the refugee problem, see David H. Popper, "The Mirage of Refugee Resettlement," *Survey Graphic*, January, 1939, and Dorothy Thompson, *Refugees: Anarchy or Organization*, Part Four, "This Still Empty World," p. 80 ff.

⁹A. Grenfell Price, "Refugee Settlement in the Tropics," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1940, p. 660.

¹⁰About all these plans and their results, see "Projects for Jewish Mass Colonization," *Jewish Affairs*, Vol. I, No. 4, November, 1941.

Palestine, where quite different factors were at work, and apart from the settlement on the land of a handful of refugee families in South America, only the colonization of some 400 persons in Santo Domingo is worthy of mention, and even their future is uncertain. Nor does this diagnosis apply only to the recent attempts at refugee colonization. In previous decades, too, efforts at Jewish colonization were frequently made, but rarely with success. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there have been only three cases of at least partially successful Jewish colonization, namely, the colonization of Jews in Argentina, in Russia, and in Palestine. In the first, the colonization was backed mainly with very substantial means; in the second, by the power of the State; in the third, by the enthusiasm and national consciousness of the settlers. The Jewish colonization in Argentina, after reaching the total of some 4,000 farming families half a century ago, has not progressed since. The Jewish colonization in Russia met with considerable success when it was undertaken in the first years of the nineteenth century and again after the Soviet Revolution, but came to a standstill in recent years. The colonization of Biro-Bidjan, despite the imposing amount of propaganda lavished upon it, did not proceed as rapidly as the Soviet Government desired. Very encouraging, on the other hand, have been the successes achieved in Palestine. In that long neglected country, in not much more than fifty years, a community of half a million people has been brought into being, one-fourth of whom are engaged in agriculture, which, by the use of modern methods, has attained a high degree of prosperity. The Jewish agricultural colonization in Palestine seems also to have had a more stable character than in other countries. The reasons for this may be found in the basis of that colonization. The driving force of Jewish colonization in all countries other than Palestine was, apparently, not strong enough to insure success in the specific

conditions in which all such colonization had to be carried out. The complete change in the mode of living, and especially the transfer of city people to villages, can be successfully accomplished only when stronger motives than poverty are brought into play. The Soviet Government has sought, so far without satisfactory results, to stimulate them by proclaiming the establishment of a Jewish autonomous province in Biro-Bidjan and by mobilizing the Jewish Communist youth for the work of colonization. In Palestine, on the other hand, sentimental motives have been of decisive importance and may serve to explain the success of Jewish colonization there. Refugee colonization is no exception to this rule. The refugees have fled to avoid persecution, and history abounds with examples of successful colonization undertaken by refugees. The upbuilding of the United States, to cite the most famous instance, was initiated by refugees. But this argument is not so convincing as it may appear at first blush. The refugees of past centuries were people accustomed to farm work, or at least to physical labor, and merely had to renew their old pursuits in the new country, whereas, in the case of the present Jewish refugees, a radical change of occupation is coupled with a change of country. And what is certainly no less important, the refugees of previous centuries were people consciously suffering for their religious or political beliefs and so were in nearly all cases morally superior persons, whereas, among the refugees of today, average people are no less represented than those with special qualities of character and education. Colonization by such people is more complicated than it was in other decades and centuries.

Much depends, of course, on political conditions. The Jewish colonization in Palestine suffered in the last years before the present war from the constant clashes between the Arab and the Jewish inhabitants, as well as from the policy of the Mandatory

Government, which tried to appease the Arabs by imposing artificial limitations on Jewish immigration and on Jewish purchases of land in Palestine. On the other hand, international recognition of the Jewish National Home (not to say the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth there, which may be expected as one of the results of World War II) would certainly stimulate Jewish colonization in that country.

It follows from the foregoing that, in all probability, the most important results of Jewish colonization in the future may also be expected in Palestine, and that the solution of the Jewish refugee problem depends to a considerable degree on the work done in that country. As for Jewish colonization in other countries, the possibility of modest achievements is not excluded; however, efforts should be made to find new forms of colonization, better suited to the Jewish mentality and to the conditions of life in the new country. Industrial colonization may serve as an important outlet in this field, and its structure as well as possibilities should be carefully studied.

5. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SOLVING THE JEWISH REFUGEE PROBLEM

As stated above, the different ways of solving the Jewish refugee problem need not be regarded as mutually exclusive. They can easily be combined, and should be combined, in order to put an end to this most complicated problem in the history not only of the Jews but of mankind. If, of the more than two million Jewish refugees, some are repatriated to their respective countries of origin, others absorbed in the countries of temporary refuge, and the remainder settled in other countries either by means of infiltration or of colonization, then all these remedies together may prove effective enough to bring about the solution of the problem after the war. But it would certainly be erroneous to

suppose that this solution can be attained by the efforts of the Jewish people alone. In order to repatriate the refugees, or to enable them to settle permanently in their present countries, or to organize their emigration to other lands, the approval, nay, the cooperation of the countries which are to absorb the refugees must be obtained. Yet even this form of cooperation cannot be regarded as sufficient. The enormous amount of money needed to arrange for the transportation and settlement of hundreds of thousands cannot possibly be raised by a single people, nor can one people do the extremely complicated organizational and legal work involved in so stupendous an undertaking. The recognition of this fact was dominant even before the present war and special international agencies, described in an earlier chapter, were set up to solve the problem of the refugees from Russia and, subsequently, also of the refugees from Germany. The failure of these agencies, especially of the High Commission for German Refugees and of the Intergovernmental Committee created by the Evian Conference, was due not only to the abnormal atmosphere then prevalent throughout the world, but also, as we have already explained, to grave faults in their structure and program.

For a solution of the refugee problem, accordingly, we propose that a new international agency be created after the war. And in order to avoid the mistakes and disappointments of the past, the new agency should be based on the following principles:

(a) It should be recognized as the supreme international body in all questions pertaining to refugees, and, although cooperating with the various governments and private organizations, it should be vested with sufficient authority to enforce its decisions if necessary.

(b) The proposed agency should not only prepare plans and secure the legal means of executing them, but also conduct the

work of repatriation, emigration, and colonization, and pay the costs of these activities.

(c) The funds necessary for the activities of this agency should be contributed either by a new League of Nations or by all the States of the world, since the solution of the refugee problem is the concern of all mankind.

(d) The proposed agency should consist of official representatives of governments.

(e) Its activities should be limited to a definite period of time within which the refugee problem must be finally liquidated.

The cooperation of Jewish organizations with experience in emigration activities should be enlisted, but they would have to work mainly under the control of the new intergovernmental machinery. An exception would have to be made in regard to the colonization of Palestine, which was carried on in the past, and will certainly be continued in the future, by the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the representative body of the Jewish people and recognized as such by international agreements. The cooperation of the intergovernmental agency in this particular field should be limited to the furnishing of adequate financial aid, while the practical work of colonizing the refugees in Palestine had best be left to the Jewish Agency, whose experience in this domain is unrivaled. The same course might perhaps be pursued with respect to the colonizing work done by other Jewish organizations, especially the colonizing activities in Argentina under the direction of the Jewish Colonization Association.

This scheme — a comprehensive program of solving the refugee problem prepared in all its details by experts, and sponsored and carried out by an authoritative international body — might, in time, produce the desired results. Even so, the solution of the Jewish refugee problem will not be an easy task. But given the

will, it can be accomplished if the prevailing atmosphere after the war will be different from that of the prewar years, and if the refugees will be treated, as they should be, as equal and useful members of society.

Until a definitive and radical solution of the refugee problem along the lines suggested above has been found, the refugees will have to be cared for by the existing intergovernmental machinery, especially by the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, which is charged both with the protection of refugees and with the resettlement of those who cannot or do not wish to be repatriated after the war or to be left where they are at present. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA for short) will play a rather important part in the process of repatriating the refugees and of assisting them before their repatriation. The problem of displaced persons (which term, of course, includes refugees) was thoroughly discussed at the first and second sessions of the UNRRA Council (Atlantic City, November, 1943 and Montreal, September, 1944, respectively), at which decisions were reached enabling this intergovernmental agency to grant its assistance and to cooperate in the effort to repatriate such persons, regardless of their nationality.

6. THE ROLE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

In the preceding section we proposed the creation of a new intergovernmental committee, vested with adequate authority and supplied with ample funds, to solve the refugee problem.

The question arises, What will be the relations of the Jewish people as such with the intergovernmental body? The Jewish people is, of course, vitally interested in refugee-aid activities, not only because the overwhelming majority of refugees from the European countries are Jews, but because of the close connection between the solution of the refugee problem and the establishment

of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It is therefore patent that no effective machinery for the solution of the refugee problem could be set up in which the Jewish people was not represented, or in whose decisions it had no voice. This problem of the participation of the Jewish people in what is being done for the refugees by the intergovernmental machinery was partially solved before the war by the additions of an advisory council both to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany and to the Intergovernmental Committee, on which councils certain important Jewish organizations were represented. But this solution can hardly be considered satisfactory since both councils had a purely advisory character, and since, moreover, the Jewish members of these councils represented only their particular organizations and not the Jewish people *qua* a people. This mistake must be avoided in the future. Adequate representation of the Jewish people on the new intergovernmental committee must be secured.

This is obviously a difficult problem. The proposed intergovernmental committee is to consist of government representatives; the Jewish people has no government of its own and it can scarcely be supposed that it will have a full-fledged government after the war, even if the Jewish right to a National Home in Palestine should be recognized more clearly than has been done hitherto. Within the limits of the legal and political ideas now current, no people without full sovereignty can be represented on an intergovernmental committee; after the war, however, many ideas will have to be changed. Even so, it will not be easy to find a formula that will secure for the Jewish people representation on intergovernmental agencies on the same footing as other peoples who have countries of their own, and who will have to provide both the authority and the financial means for the proposed intergovernmental activity.

There will also arise another problem. Who is to be the representative of the Jewish people and how is he to be appointed? The Jewish people does not form one body, neither from the political nor from the organizational point of view. As far as Palestine questions are concerned, this united representation may be realized without difficulty, since the authority of the Jewish Agency for Palestine — at least in matters of immigration and colonization — is recognized by nearly all sections of the Jewish people, as it is also recognized by international pacts; but beyond this no unity exists at the present moment. The World Jewish Congress is today the most representative Jewish international agency, but there are organizations not affiliated with it. It will therefore be no easy matter to bring about a common representation recognized by the whole, or at least by the great majority, of the Jewish people.

There are, at least theoretically, two ways of solving a problem like this. One would be to establish a World Jewish Representation, an idea now being discussed in Jewish circles. Such a body, speaking on behalf of the entire Jewish people, might certainly be authorized to represent it on all kinds of international or intergovernmental agencies. Should, however, the establishment of a World Jewish Representation prove impossible, the feasibility of a special Jewish agency to cooperate with the intergovernmental machinery must be taken into consideration. The various Jewish committees and organizations, especially those which are politically, organizationally, or financially active in the field of Jewish migration and refugee aid, could be won over to the idea of cooperating at least in this one respect by creating a common agency to represent them all on the intergovernmental committee. It would, of course, be advisable to grant the refugees themselves proper representation on such an agency.

A few words are necessary about the Jewish rôle in this inter-

governmental machinery. As explained in the preceding section, all possible solutions of the refugee problem — namely, repatriation, final settlement in the present countries, further emigration and colonization — will have to be tried. It will be the task of the intergovernmental committee to decide on these solutions in specific cases and to procure the necessary means. However, there is danger that, in the difficult circumstances after the war, being overburdened with many other problems, governments may follow the path of least resistance and try to solve the refugee problem either by mass repatriation or by sending the refugees on to other countries without first making sure of the possibilities of their settlement there. It will devolve upon the Jewish representatives to obviate this peril. The repatriation of refugees, although highly desirable — provided they consent — and although it may be favored or at least not hampered by the governments, will not always be the most expedient solution. There may be many cases where, owing to the great impoverishment of the respective country (for instance, Poland), or owing to the very strained relations between the Jews and the surrounding population after years of propaganda of hatred (as in Germany), it would be inadvisable to let the refugees return in masses. The same applies to mass immigration to countries whose possibilities for the absorption of immigrants have not been sufficiently explored. It will be the duty of the Jewish members of the committee to see that no motive of a more or less opportunistic character, but rather the real interest of the refugees, is made the basis of any decision reached. Active and energetic Jewish participation in the work of the committee and a thorough inquiry before anything is undertaken are the prerequisites to success.

Within the frame of this general problem, certain others may arise that will necessitate a special effort by the intergovernmental committee and its Jewish members. Such a problem of excep-

tional magnitude will be presented by the refugees in Soviet Russia. Their number, as far as the Polish Jewish refugees in Russia are concerned, is estimated at half a million; in addition, there are hundreds of thousands of Russian Jewish refugees who fled before the invading German armies to the interior of the country. But, while the problem of Russian Jewish refugees may be considered a domestic problem of Russia, so that its solution after the war within the scope of the general development of that country may not encounter special difficulties, the problem of the Polish Jewish refugees is sure to be more complicated. Whether any of them will have to be repatriated remains to be seen. Possibly the number to be repatriated may be limited, since many groups will prefer not to be repatriated both because of the impoverishment of their former country and because of the rather unpleasant memories of the past. One part will go to other countries, especially to Palestine, which is regarded by many refugees as the cherished goal of their wanderings. It may happen, however, that many of them, perhaps even the majority, after years of their new life in Russia, will desire to remain there. This may create a new problem of international policy, especially if the people concerned should be recognized as foreign nationals (at present most of them are considered Russians by the Soviet authorities). Because of the great numbers involved, and because of the peculiar position of Russia among the nations, which cannot easily be compared with that of other nations, special difficulties will have to be overcome. A similar problem arose during World War I when hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews fled or were driven by the authorities to the interior of the country, where they succeeded in creating new economic positions for themselves and where they preferred to stay rather than go back to their old homes. However, the problem is far more complicated today, both because of the foreign nationality of the refugees

and because of the radically different social and economic conditions. A tremendous amount of work will have to be done before this problem can be solved, and the outcome will largely depend upon the Jewish members of the intergovernmental committee.

One final remark concerning the spiritual side of the problem. So far we have been speaking mostly about the economic and social aspects of the refugee problem and, in connection with it, we have discussed the activities of the proposed intergovernmental committee and of the Jewish representatives thereon. But it is not only necessary to save the Jewish refugees from starvation and to provide new economic positions for them; no less important, from the Jewish point of view, is to preserve the ties between them and their people. No real solution of the refugee problem is possible without taking this necessity into account. Unfortunately, it is not only neglected but even opposed by some nations and governments. The theory which regards the cultural assimilation of the refugee as an essential condition of his being admitted into a country and allowed to settle there, is one of the guiding principles of many countries at the present moment and may remain so in the future if no adequate steps are taken to combat it. The intergovernmental committee as such will hardly be able to fight against such a view; on the contrary, it may be tempted to act upon this theory in order to overcome the difficulties which may arise in the first years after the war. It will therefore be incumbent upon the Jewish representatives to be on guard in such questions and to awaken the consciousness of the members of the committee and, through them, of the influential circles of the world to the fact that there is no conflict between the loyalty of the refugee to his new country and his loyalty to his own people. The importance of such a policy can scarcely be overestimated.

The problem of Jewish representation on the new intergovernmental committee for refugees after the war is, accordingly, of

particular importance from the point of view of both the interests of the refugees and the interests of the Jewish people as such. Every effort should be made to have this representation assured as soon as possible.

7. FROM REFUGEES TO BUILDERS OF A JEWISH FUTURE

The question of the relations existing between the Jewish refugee and his people, which was briefly mentioned in the preceding section, deserves to be discussed at some length.

The problem of the Jewish refugee is generally considered today mainly from the point of view of their present sufferings and of securing a better future for them as individuals. At best it is regarded as one of the most striking examples of the intolerable political and social conditions now prevalent in the world, and it is assumed that the manner in which it is solved may serve as a test of whether or not these conditions can be ameliorated. Accordingly, very few if any efforts have been made to treat this problem from the standpoint of the Jewish community as such, although it is evident that the overwhelming majority of the Jewish refugees were driven from their former countries precisely because they were Jews. This grave error has been made both by the refugees themselves and by the governments and institutions engaged in refugee-aid activities. The only important exception has been the refugee stream which has found its way into Palestine. Although in this case, too, a number of refugees have gone there simply in order to solve their individual problems by finding new livelihoods in lieu of the ones left behind in Germany, this consideration plays an insignificant role compared with the motive of the great masses of men and women to whom their new life in Palestine is part of their ideal of building the Jewish National Home. This is also evident in the activities of the organizations responsible for the refugee-aid work in Palestine. This work is

being done either directly by the Jewish Agency for Palestine or by organizations subsidiary to this agency and acting in close co-operation with it. Even purely philanthropic organizations like the British Council for German Jewry or the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee have had to adapt their refugee-aid activities in Palestine to this fundamental character of the work of the Jewish Agency.

In all other countries, however, the situation is quite different. The refugees are primarily anxious to get away from the atmosphere of persecution and to find new livelihoods. At best, efforts are made to establish a spiritual bond with the new country. The Jewish community as such receives less support from these Jewish individuals in their new diaspora.

There is only one way to remedy this situation and bring about a final solution of the problem of the Jewish refugees not only from a legal and economic but also from a moral point of view. It is to strengthen their ties with their own people as well as with their new country and to make them aware of their duties to both. The task of educating the Jewish refugees to a consciousness of their twofold duties is not an easy one. It could best be done by the self-help organizations of the refugees, whose activities would, of course, have to be influenced and directed in a suitable manner.

Of no less importance is influencing the policy of governments. As long as the erroneous notion prevails that there is a contradiction between devotion to Jewish traditions and loyalty to the new country, no important achievements can be expected in this field. After the war, when, it is hoped, many old ideas will be thrown into history's waste basket and a new world of human understanding will arise, the concept of real citizenship may assume a different form and the frequent intolerance of today give way to real harmony of interests between peoples and states.

It may be asked why so much importance is attached to the Jewish consciousness of the refugees and their participation in the life of their people. Three contingencies may be considered in connection with this question, namely, the emigration of Jewish refugees to Palestine, their repatriation, and their emigration to other countries.

The answer is quite obvious in the first case. The part of the refugees in the building of the Jewish National Home is certainly no smaller, and perhaps even greater, than that of the other elements of the population. For the refugees form today, and may form for many years to come, the bulk of the Jewish immigration into Palestine, and no project of colonization can be undertaken without them. In cases where the problem of Jewish refugees will be solved by repatriation, Jewish life in the countries concerned may in very large measure depend upon the consciousness and activities of the repatriated refugees. The general atmosphere in Europe, especially in those countries through which the frenzy of antisemitism in its German form has swept, will for years and possibly generations remain far from stabilized despite formal democracy and official equality of rights for all citizens. In such a period no less may depend upon the attitude of the different elements of the population—in our case, the Jewish element—than upon the will of governments or upon international control. A dignified attitude on the part of the Jews, stressing their ties with the Jewish people and at the same time their will to cooperate in the reconstruction of their country and in securing its freedom and democratic character, may be the best solution of the problem.

Not so clear is the situation in the new countries of settlement, but the problem certainly exists there also. Scores of Jewish communities have in recent years sprung up in various countries where formerly there were no Jews at all, or where the number of Jews was insignificant. Because of the hard struggle for bread and

of the uncertain, in some cases unfriendly, attitude of the surrounding population, as well as because of the lack of any Jewish tradition, there is grave danger of moral deterioration. Many refugees may be tempted to forsake all higher aims in their lives and to think only of satisfying their material wants. This in turn may tend to lower them in public estimation, and thus a vicious circle will be created in which the Jewish future in all these countries may be imperiled.

There is only one way out of this dilemma and that is to strengthen the Jewish consciousness of the new Jewish settlers as well as their awareness of their duties to the new country, broaden their views and aims and thereby secure both their honor and their future.

This is why the problem of educating the Jewish refugees and influencing their inner development is of such paramount importance. No dignified individual or group future can be assured to the refugees unless these conditions are fulfilled. But the Jewish people as such is also vitally interested in the solution of the problem. It cannot afford to lose a large part of its present numbers or to dispense with their cooperation in securing the Jewish future. The building of the Jewish National Home, whose final stage may be expected after the war, may not at once bring about the solution of the Jewish question as such. The majority of the Jewish people will remain scattered all over the world, and though their position will certainly be affected by the important economic and cultural work done in Palestine, their final fate both as individuals and as a people will depend primarily upon the extent and depth of their Jewish and human consciousness. Preparing refugees for this sort of life means, therefore, making them not only architects of their own fortune, but builders of a better and more dignified Jewish future.

If this goal should be attained and if, from among the hundreds of thousands of these homeless, hunted men and women, there should arise fighters for the freedom of their people and of all mankind, the miracle of Babylon and of Plymouth may yet be repeated. Refugees have built the future and glory of many nations; they may do this once again in Jewish life after the war. In that event, the ordeal of the last eleven years will not have been in vain; a glorious revival will follow the martyrdom of the past.

APPENDIX I

THREE MEMORANDA SUBMITTED TO THE EVIAN CONFERENCE, JULY 6, 1938

A. MEMORANDUM OF THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

The World Jewish Congress which represents Jewish communities and organizations in 33 countries — including the majority of Jewish organizations in East European countries — deems it its duty to expound to the Evian Conference the views of the Jewish groups which it represents with regard to the problems which the Conference is called upon to consider. The World Jewish Congress is aware that the Evian Conference is not solely concerned with the Jewish but with the more general problem of assisting political refugees. As, however, the majority of victims of political persecution in certain countries belong to the Jewish community, we are convinced that the problem of Jewish refugees should stand in the centre of the Conference's deliberations.

I. In the name of millions of Jews, the World Jewish Congress wishes to thank the President and Government of the United States for convening the Conference. In the early days of the anti-Jewish persecutions which followed the advent of the national-socialist regime, several European States offered generous hospitality to a large number of Jewish refugees from Germany. This, however, is far from having solved the Jewish refugee problem, such as it has developed during the last few years. Hence, the historical importance of the Evian Conference which is the first attempt to evolve a constructive and all-inclusive solution of the refugee problem. The Conference is the only hope of hundreds of thousands of Jews who are today barbarously persecuted and evicted from positions which they have held for centuries. At a time when policies of brutal force and oppression of political, racial and religious minorities disgrace our century, the initiative of President Roosevelt has been a ray of hope; may it serve to save a part at least of the victims and to give them new opportunities.

II. Naturally, the attention of the Conference will focus on the situation of the Jews in Germany. It is not necessary to enumerate all

the iniquitous measures and barbarous persecutions visited upon the Jews since the advent of the Third Reich and which, since the annexation of Austria, have turned into a veritable orgy of bestial wantonness. While during the first years of the national-socialist regime, Jewish citizens of the Reich, although deprived of their rights, still had certain possibilities of leaving the country and lawfully taking with them part of their property, today German authorities resort to arrests which run in thousands, and other arbitrary cruelties designed to terrorize German Jews, whom special fiscal provisions and expropriations deprive of any possibility of taking abroad the least fraction of their property. Germany is endeavoring to compel them to leave the country in a state of complete destitution. The Conference at Evian would fail in its duty if it did not raise a firm protest against this shocking system which tramples under foot the fundamental principles of justice and humanity.

The governments represented at Evian owe it to themselves to condemn in unequivocal terms the persecution of men, women and children whose only crime is to belong to a people which gave the world the Ten Commandments and whose creed inspired the world's greatest religions.

Apart from the ethical aspect of the problem, it will be practically impossible to provide shelter and a possibility of making a new start to hundreds of thousands of German Jews if they are driven out of Germany in a state of complete destitution. It is contrary to fundamental principles of justice and international law that a nation should arrogate to itself the right of despoiling and expelling part of its citizens, compelling other nations to provide for destitute paupers. In the last five years, humanity has witnessed untold iniquities. It is time to ascribe limits to barbarity.

We beg to entreat the Conference to do everything in its power to bring the German government to modify their methods, and to obtain at least that Jews emigrating from Germany be allowed to take part of their property abroad. Surely, even under the German currency legislation, ways and means may be found to organize a system under which Jewish property might lawfully be transferred abroad, provided there is a minimum of goodwill on the part of the German government. If this is not achieved, it will hardly be possible to organize a large-scale emigration of the Jews from Germany, however eager and self-

sacrificing the cooperation of the private organizations and however generous the contributions in favor of Jewish refugees from Germany, since the task to be tackled will be nothing less than to find new homes for at least 200,000 or 300,000 Jews from Germany within the next few years.

III. It is desirable that the Evian Conference should not confine itself to consider the case of German Jews, which, although the most painful, is but one of the aspects of the refugee problem. Following the nefarious example set by Germany, several European states have, for some time, been enacting legal and administrative measures designed to evict the Jewish population from employment and professions, to deprive Jews of their nationality and to force them to emigrate. In so doing, these states are violating their constitutions which guarantee to Jews equality of rights, and disregard the rights pledged to Jewish minorities by the peace treaties. We venture to think that one of the most urgent tasks incumbent upon the Evian Conference is to reaffirm the principles of equality of rights of the Jews in all countries, and to remind the States of Eastern Europe that they have no right to create new masses of refugees through driving out of their boundaries their Jewish citizens.

In all the countries where they have lived, often for centuries, the Jews have always fulfilled their political and civic duties and exposed their lives for their fatherland just like other citizens. It seems natural that equal duties should imply equal rights.

We do not propose to state here the Jewish case as a whole, such as it exists in the countries of Eastern Europe, nor to present in full the Jewish emigration problem, since according to its terms of reference, the Evian Conference is to deal solely with the refugee problem; it must nevertheless be pointed out that an acute Jewish refugee problem is developing in a number of East European States. To quote but one example: in Rumania, the revision of the nationality of Jewish citizens was devised and is being carried into effect with the sole object of depriving a large number of Rumanian Jews of their rights as Rumanian nationals. Through administrative difficulties and pettifoggery they are in danger of losing their Rumanian passports and consequently the right to live and work in Rumania. These people,

merely because they are Jews, are banished from their fatherland, compelled to emigrate and turned into refugees.

In Hungary, a law conflicting with all principles of equality of rights, has limited the number of Jews in most professions, with the result that tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews are doomed to lose their positions and to leave Hungary where they can no longer earn a living. There is no doubt that these people must be regarded as refugees.

Similar processes are under way in Poland and other countries. We venture to hope that the Evian Conference will consider practical help to be extended to these refugees coming from Eastern Europe. We beseech the Conference to admit these categories of Jewish refugees to the benefit of any measures that it may decide in favor of political refugees, and to include them within the purview of the organizations to be created by the Conference.

The situation of these Jewish citizens of East European countries, difficult as it was before the war, has deteriorated to an alarming extent, especially during the last few years. The growing jingoism which of late has become rampant in many nations has led to an increasingly grim struggle of the majority against the minority populations, depriving growing numbers of Jews of any possibility of earning their livelihood. In Poland, 38% of the Jews are supported by public charity, while the standard of living of 40% of the Jewish masses of Eastern Europe is far below what is regarded as the barest minimum.

It does not seem irrelevant, in connection with the forthcoming discussion on the possibility of finding new immigration outlets for Jewish refugees from Central and Eastern Europe, flatly to deny the widely spread opinion that practically all the Jewish would-be emigrants are traders. This view is belied both by the structure of the Jewish population in their countries of residence and the structure of Jewish emigration before the war. Thus, in Poland for example, 43% of the Jews are working in industries and crafts and only 32% in trade and commerce. Out of the 992,330 Jews who immigrated to the United States during the period 1900-1925, 598,403 or 60.3% engaged in industry; 219,735 or 22% found employment as servants or untrained workers; 28,792 or 2.4% took up agricultural work; and

19,620 or 2% the professions. Only 100,147 or 10% of the Jewish immigrants engaged in trade and commerce. The remaining 25,633 Jewish immigrants equaling 3.1% were divided among other occupations.

The same is true as regards Jewish immigration to South American countries. In many of the latter, Jewish immigrants contributed to create new industries, thus helping to increase the economic independence of these countries.

In examining the possibilities of opening up new immigration territories for Jewish refugees it should be taken into account that the most productive form of immigration would be land settlement in hitherto uncultivated areas. There are many areas which could serve for agricultural settlement; while it is true that this form of immigration is a slow and costly one, since it requires years of preparation and training of the would-be settlers, it must be admitted that, in the long run, it yields the best results. Naturally, this type of emigration could only be practised in countries which possess large uncultivated areas and are willing to open them up for agricultural immigration.

It is important that European countries which may not be able to admit large numbers of refugees, should throw open to would-be emigrants from Central and Eastern Europe their highly technical and agricultural training centers, provided that when their training is completed, the students shall emigrate to overseas countries.

IV. The Jewish refugee problem cannot be discussed without taking into account the immense possibilities of Palestine as an outlet for Jewish immigration. The majority of the Jewish people has recognized a long time ago that nothing short of creating a Jewish State can restore the normal structure of the dispossessed Jewish community. The development of Palestine after the war confirmed this view. In the last twenty years, Palestine has absorbed 300,000 Jewish immigrants. This figure represents half of the total Jewish migration movement of the postwar years. We shall not attempt to present a record of Jewish achievement in Palestine within this short period. These 300,000 immigrants have not only found a home and the happiness of a new life, but for the first time in many centuries the bases of a Jewish National Home have been laid, with a normal social structure founded upon Jewish agriculture, with great possibilities for expan-

sion and absorption of further hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants. Before the Arab riots broke out in Palestine in 1936, the annual Jewish immigration figure had reached 65,000.

It is not up to the World Jewish Congress to analyze in this paper figures and views justifying estimates of the future immigration absorptive capacity of Palestine. These data will be found in the Memorandum of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. It should, however, be noted that the best experts on Jewish economy in Palestine agree that, provided normal conditions are restored and possibilities afforded for undisturbed Jewish activity in Palestine, the country may be expected to absorb, in the coming years, an annual immigration quota of 60,000 to 100,000 people.

For partial reasons alone, the Evian Conference cannot afford to neglect the Palestine problem. It is up to the Conference to do everything to move the Mandatory Power to restore normal conditions within the shortest possible time and to fulfill its solemn pledge to found a Jewish National Home in Palestine through reopening the country for Jewish mass immigration.

V. The Jewish people are unable to solve their refugee problem single-handed. They need political and financial help of non-Jews in organizing and financing a vast migration movement. Jewish emigration has not the support of a government. It is an irresponsible movement of a people, an overwhelming majority of whom are now destitute and whose well-to-do elements are unorganized and dispersed throughout the world, while central Jewish organizations have no power to tax them. It would not be the first time that an international problem of the scope of Jewish emigration should be solved through international cooperation and financial assistance. Let us refer to the precedent of international financial assistance in effecting the transfer of 1,400,000 Greeks from Turkey to Greece under the auspices of the League of Nations. In the course of four years (1920-1924) 300,000 Greek families were transplanted from Asia Minor to Greece. It is not without interest to note that most of these 300,000 families were composed of old people, women and children, many of the young men having perished in the war.

The occupational structure of the Greek emigrants was not particularly favorable, and it was certainly not better than that of the Jewish

emigrants today. The Greek emigrants included a high rate of city-dwellers such as traders, shopkeepers, etc., and very few young men, while the would-be Jewish emigration includes over one million young people aged from 20 to 25 years.

The Greek migration proved possible because the League of Nations had guaranteed an international loan of over 12,000,000 pounds sterling, while private American organizations had contributed large sums of money. We realize the difference between the Jewish would-be emigrants and the Greeks who had behind them their own country and government. The Jewish people have no country of their own, but their achievement in Palestine has shown the Jewish people can provide immense means for a truly constructive solution of the Jewish problem. It is clear, however, that Jewish funds alone would not suffice for the requirements of Jewish migration. Only through international funding, and in the first place through an international loan, may it prove possible to mobilize the funds necessary to build a Jewish National Home in Palestine and organize soundly a large-scale Jewish emigration to overseas countries.

Such an international financial transaction could be based upon two elements: in the first place, the property left behind by Jewish refugees in their country of origin, provided agreements are concluded with the governments of the countries concerned permitting the liquidation of such assets; and secondly, the assets to be created by Jewish emigrants in the immigration countries. A system of credits could be organized upon this twofold basis.

VI. The present Memorandum does not attempt to go into details; it confines itself to outline general principles. Nevertheless, we venture to draw the attention of the Conference to certain legal problems, a rapid settlement of which is of the highest importance.

When the time comes to settle groups of immigrants in various countries, it will be necessary to take care that formalities connected with admission be simplified as much as possible. In particular, it will be necessary to stipulate that affidavits and financial sureties for immigrants may be provided not only by their next-of-kin but also by other persons and organizations. Experience has shown that otherwise it may, in some cases, prove impossible to utilize to the full the available immigration quotas.

On the other hand, it is necessary to solve the increasingly urgent problem of the stateless. A growing number of states are resorting to denationalization of citizens whom they regard as undesirable. Beside the German legislation, this provision has now been embodied in the legislations of Poland and Rumania. Most of the denationalized persons are refused admission to all countries, either because their case is not covered by any convention in force or because new conventions have not yet been ratified by their countries of origin. This is the case of the conventions concerning refugees coming from Germany, which very few countries have so far ratified. No state has yet ratified the convention of February 10th, 1938, concerning refugees coming from Germany.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to secure legitimation papers for refugees, for even the States which are signatories of the Provisional Arrangement of 1936 deliver identity documents only to refugees who undertake immediately to leave their territories, a proviso which deprives these papers of any value. Finally, persons who wish to leave the Reich have no possibility of securing identity documents under the convention now in force.

It would be desirable that to the Permanent Committee which, it is hoped, will be set up by the Conference, be adjoined a Consultative Committee, comprising representative of leading refugee relief organizations, so that their experience may serve a good purpose. The Consultative Committees of the High Commission for Refugees coming from Germany have been an encouraging precedent.

Let us sum up the desiderata outlined in this Memorandum:

I. We venture to hope that the Conference will raise a protest against the wanton anti-Jewish persecutions in Germany and reaffirm the equal rights of Jews in all countries.

II. We respectfully request the Conference, insofar as it will consider the Jewish refugee problem, not to confine its efforts to Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria but to consider also the tragic situation of Jewish refugees coming from countries of Eastern Europe. The organizations to be created by the Conference should be assigned the task of assisting refugees, whatever the country from which they are coming; the definition of "refugee" should apply to any Jew compelled to leave his country because he is a Jew.

III. We entreat the Conference to consider the possibility of placing at the disposal of Jewish emigrants uncultivated areas with a view to Jewish agricultural settlement.

IV. We venture to urge the Conference not to confine itself to seeking immigration outlets for refugees but to envisage also the problem of financing emigration. Although *a priori* financial aid of governments for emigration purposes may appear impracticable, the fact should nevertheless be considered that, however large, the sums collected by private organizations will be inadequate to finance the migration of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and consequently the organizations to be created by the Conference should study ways and means of financing mass emigration. They should, first of all, be empowered to negotiate with the governments of the emigration countries, in particular the German government, with a view to obtaining that refugees be authorized to take away their property, for otherwise any plan of mass emigration will be doomed to failure.

V. We take the liberty of hoping that the Conference may take into account the special importance of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, capable of sheltering large numbers of political refugees, and that it may commend political and financial measures liable to facilitate Jewish immigration in Palestine.

In closing, we wish to renew the expression of our gratitude to all the delegates to the Evian Conference. The Jewish community the world over has placed great hopes in the Conference. We fervently hope that the Conference may succeed in restoring to active life hundreds of thousands of distressed refugees, among whom there are so many young men and women, enthusiastic, self-denying and eager to work. In justifying the hopes of so many unfortunate people, the Conference shall have fulfilled a historic mission.

STEPHEN S. WISE

*President of the Executive Committee
of the World Jewish Congress*

B. MEMORANDUM OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

1. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine have given international recognition to the right of the Jewish people to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine. In formulating this policy it was emphasized that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice... the right and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." Thus an international confirmation has been given to the Zionist conception that the Zionist aims are fully compatible with equality of status for the Jews in the countries they inhabit, both as regards the rights and the duties of citizenship. Zionism has never considered enforced Jewish emigration as a legitimate means for countries to rid themselves of their Jewish population, or artificially to reduce the numbers of Jewish population. Emigration is a right of the individual citizen, but not a duty, and must be free, and not compulsory.

2. Jewish history has largely been a history of migrations. Thus between the 'eighties of the nineteenth century and the Great War, about three million Jews migrated from Eastern Europe to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, South Africa, Argentina, etc. Since the war, the need for emigration has increased, especially in the new states of Eastern Europe. The Jews, being engaged in the more vulnerable branches of economic activity, have suffered much more from the prolonged depression than other sections of the population. Moreover, agricultural depression has driven great numbers of peasants into the towns, where they compete in occupations hitherto largely practised by the Jews. In many cases non-Jewish merchants, artisans, and professional men, successfully exploit antisemitic boycott slogans against their Jewish rivals; and frequently receive support from the States, which, when faced by economic difficulties, make the Jew a scapegoat. In certain countries, such as Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, the "moderate" nationalists seek to achieve the economic elimination of the Jews by "peaceful" legal means, while the extremists would resort to violence in order more rapidly to attain this aim. Both wish for the forcible emigration of the Jews.

3. In Germany the Jews even in 1933 formed less than 1 per cent. of the population and there has never been the same problem of acute economic distress and competition as in Eastern Europe. But the deliberate policy of the German Government has since 1933 reduced the

Jews to economic pauperism, and deprived them of human and civil rights. The treatment of the Jews in Germany and still more in Austria forms the extremest and most brutal chapter of the Jewish tragedy in Eastern and Central Europe.

4. Hundreds of thousands of Jews would leave Central and Eastern Europe if countries could be found to receive them. But the severe restrictions of the postwar period have reduced Jewish immigration to a mere fraction of its former size. The world today is divided into countries in which Jews cannot live, and countries which they must not enter.

5. The Jewish people throughout the world trust that the representatives of the Governments assembled at Evian on the generous initiative of the President of the United States, will emphatically protest against the persecution by any country of any section of its inhabitants on racial, religious, or political grounds, and in particular against the policy of physical persecution, economic extermination, and expulsion, which has reached its worst forms in Germany and Austria. It is further hoped that countries which are still able to admit numbers of immigrants without any harm to their own citizens will apply a bolder immigration policy; this would give immediate relief to large numbers of victims of persecution and would ultimately benefit the countries which receive them.

6. In the postwar ordeal of the Jewish people, Palestine has been their consolation and hope. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate have opened the way for the realization of the age-old dream of the Jewish people. Between 1918 and 1937 the Jewish population of Palestine increased from 60,000 to 416,000, and from 10 per cent. to over 30 per cent. of the total population.

7. The Jewish economic structure in Palestine widely differs from that in other countries. Zionism aims at a normalization of Jewish economic life; this requires a firm agricultural foundation for the Jewish economy in Palestine. The work is slow and difficult; there are obstacles in the way of acquiring the necessary land and adapting it to modern agriculture, and further in transforming a people urbanized for centuries into successful agriculturists. But there has been constant progress. In 1922 there were 75 Jewish agricultural settlements with a population of 15,000; in 1938, 223 settlements with a population of

105,000, of whom 60,000 (including dependents) are directly engaged in agriculture. The area of Jewish land has increased from about 140,000 acres in 1918 to some 350,000 acres today. Jewish citrus plantations have increased twelve fold since 1922, and now cover an area of 40,000 acres. The area of citrus land owned by Arabs has also shown a remarkable increase — from 5,500 to 34,000 acres; the large sums of money paid by Jews to Arabs for land have enabled them to advance from extensive to intensive methods of cultivation.

8. Jewish industry and handicraft in Palestine have greatly developed. According to Jewish Agency returns, in 1922 the number of Jewish workshops and factories was 1,850, with a personnel of 4,750, a capital investment of £600,000, and an annual output of £9,000,000. The Palestine Electric Corporation (built up mainly by Jewish capital and labor) sold 11,500,000 KWH in 1932, and 71,000,000 in 1937 (about three-fourths to Jewish consumers).

9. The building of houses, factories, workshops, roads, bridges, etc., constitutes a most important element in the development of the country. From 1932 to 1937 over £20,000,000 of Jewish capital have been invested in building (exclusive of building undertaken by the Government, and international companies). In spite of the depression of the last two years, this industry gives employment to over 11,000 workers.

10. The great change which has been brought about in the occupational distribution of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine is illustrated by the following figures from the Workers' Census conducted in March, 1937, under the auspices of the General Federation of Jewish Labor. The Census showed a total of 104,000 (including members of agricultural collective and cooperative settlements, agricultural and industrial workers, clerks, teachers and members of the liberal professions). These, together with their dependents numbering 95,000, accounted for almost half of the total Jewish population. Of the 104,000, no less than 36,000 had been without definite occupation in the lands of their origin, while 8,000 had been merchants. Of the 25,000 workers now engaged in Palestinian agriculture, less than one-tenth have previously been agriculturists; and of the 56,000 urban laborers, less than one-half have previously been manual workers.

11. Of the 135,000 Jews who have left Germany since 1933,

42,000 have entered Palestine and 48,000 other overseas countries. 25,000 have returned to their countries of origin; 20,000 have been admitted to European countries, many of them still without leave to reside permanently or to accept employment.

Of the German-Jewish immigrants into Palestine, 77% were under 40 years of age, and 30% of the total were under 20. 40% of the German-Jewish immigrants to Palestine belong to the so-called capitalist category, *i.e.*, are members of families in possession of a minimum capital of £1,000. The transfer of this capital has been effected mainly through an agreement between the German Government and the Haavarah Trust and Transfer Office organized for that purpose.

The non-capitalist German-Jewish immigration has, for the most part, been absorbed in agriculture and industry with the aid of Zionist funds or the special relief funds collected in England, America, and elsewhere. Altogether in the five years approximately £1,000,000 has been provided for settling in Palestine German-Jewish immigrants without capital of their own.

The skill and organizing ability of the immigrants from Germany have been a valuable asset in the development of the country. Some 14,000 have established themselves on the land. The physician or lawyer from Germany working as a poultry farmer, industrial laborer, 'bus or lorry driver, is now common in Palestine. In addition, a relatively large number of German Jewish scientists and members of the liberal professions have found an opportunity of continuing their work in Palestinian institutions, such as the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Haifa Technical Institute, the Daniel Sieff Research Institute of Rehovoth, the Hadassah Hospital, the Workers' Sick Fund Hospitals, or else in private practice as physicians, engineers, lawyers, etc.

A special feature of the German-Jewish immigration is the Youth Aliyah, *i.e.*, boys and girls of between 14 and 17 were brought as immigrants to Palestine without their parents, and are educated and trained to a knowledge of agriculture or handicrafts in the agricultural settlements or in different Jewish institutions. Of 2,200 young people who had thus been brought to Palestine up to April 1, 1938, more than 900 have already concluded their training, of whom three-fourths have taken up agriculture.

12. The Palestine Royal Commission of 1936 (*Report*, p. 129)

writes thus about the influence which the Jewish immigration and reconstruction work had in the past on the development of the country and on the Arab population:

- (i) The large import of Jewish capital into Palestine has had a general fructifying effect on the economic life of the whole country.
- (ii) The expansion of Arab industry and citriculture has been largely financed by the capital thus obtained.
- (iii) Jewish example has done much to improve Arab cultivation, especially of citrus.
- (iv) Owing to Jewish development and enterprise, the employment of Arab labor has increased in urban areas, particularly in the ports.
- (v) The reclamation and anti-malaria work undertaken in Jewish "colonies" have benefited all Arabs in the neighborhood.
- (vi) Institutions, founded with Jewish funds primarily to serve the National Home, have also served the Arab population. Hadassah, for example, treats Arab patients, notably at the Tuberculosis Hospital at Safed, and the Radiology Institute at Jerusalem, admits Arab country-folk to the clinics of its Rural Sick Benefit Fund, and does much infant welfare work for Arab mothers.
- (vii) The general beneficent effect of Jewish immigration on Arab welfare is illustrated by the fact that the increase in the Arab population is most marked in urban areas affected by Jewish development. A comparison of the census returns in 1922 and 1931 shows that six years ago, the increase per cent. in Haifa was 86, in Jaffa 62, in Jerusalem 37, while in purely Arab towns, such as Nablus or Hebron, it was only 7, and at Gaza there was a decrease of 2 per cent.

13. The remarkable economic prosperity of the period 1932-1935 suffered the first check through the outbreak of the Abyssinian War and the consequent unrest. The Arab strike of 1936 and the period of violence and sabotage which has continued, with some variations,

until now, have had their effect on the economic development of the country. The situation has been further aggravated by the uncertainty which still prevails with regard to the political future of Palestine. These factors have resulted in the reduction of immigration, but the marked decrease from 62,000 in 1935 to 30,000 in 1936 and 10,500 in 1937 is substantially due to the admittedly arbitrary restrictions imposed on it by the Mandatory Government pending a decision on major policy, and to the severe currency restrictions of the countries of emigration. Jewish emigrants from Germany and Austria are now faced with still greater difficulties in realizing even a small part of their property.

14. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the upbuilding of the National Home has continued without interruption. In the past two years some 20 new agricultural settlements have been established, some of them in country which has been derelict for centuries. In this period the paralysis of Jaffa Port by the Arab strike has led to the creation of the Jewish Port of Tel-Aviv. Jewish labor has gained a greater share of employment in Haifa Port and has established itself more firmly in road-building and other public works. Thousands of young Jews have enlisted in the ranks of the supernumerary police force, and are taking their full share in defending Jewish life and property.

15. The question of how many Jewish immigrants Palestine may ultimately be able to absorb cannot be answered now with any degree of certainty, since it depends largely on factors beyond the control of the Jews. But given more or less normal conditions of immigration and economic development, an approximate estimate may be attempted.

Prospects of agricultural development in Palestine have considerably improved in recent years; many areas formerly considered to be waterless, or nearly so, have been found to possess ample underground water supplies. So far only about 100,000 acres of land have been irrigated of which some 75,000 acres are under citrus. Careful calculations have, however, proved that Palestine's known water resources would suffice for the irrigation of a further 375,000 acres. There is not therefore the problem of land shortage which at one time was given so much prominence. One acre of irrigated land produces roughly five times as much as an acre of unirrigated land, and five acres of

irrigated land form an economic holding for a Jewish farmer. When, in due course, the 375,000 acres of irrigated land are brought under cultivation, and new markets have been created or found for their produce, they will be capable of supporting at least 60,000 farming families. If the newly irrigated land were planted with citrus, or put under some other form of intensive cultivation, the number of additional families provided for would be even greater, since $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres of citrus land will support a family. At present only 14% of the total Jewish population live directly by agriculture; the remaining 86% earn their livelihood by industry, handicrafts, trade, or in the liberal professions. Even assuming that for every farming family there are not five, but only three non-farming families, it would mean that 180,000 such families could be established alongside with those of 60,000 farmers, which would amount to an additional population of about 1,200,000.

16. The possibilities of additional settlement would be further increased by the extension of development work to the vast area in the south, the Negeb. It might be still further increased if Transjordan, whose economic development depends entirely on fresh capital and the growth of population, were in some way brought within the orbit of Palestine, either by an agreed extension of Jewish colonization into Transjordan, or by a process of transfer of population on the lines suggested by the Royal Commission.

17. The tempo of immigration during the next few years obviously depends on the restoration of normal conditions for the influx and employment of capital. It is, however, an essential condition for a large Jewish immigration into Palestine, or any other country, that immigrants should not be prevented from taking with them their capital. The present German practice perpetrates gross injustice on would-be emigrants, and is moreover unfair to the countries of immigration. If large numbers of immigrants are to be absorbed by Palestine, its rapidly developing economy stands in continual need of fresh capital. From 1933 to 1936 Palestine absorbed an annual immigration of between 30,000 and 62,000. There seems to be no reason why immigration of this or even larger size should not be maintained during the next few years.

18. Palestine holds a unique position among the countries of

Jewish immigration. It is the only country to which the Jew comes with international sanction, "as of right and not on sufferance." It is the only country where the Jewish immigrant does not find a fully-developed economy to which he has to adapt himself, but where he creates a new Jewish economic structure embracing all branches of national life. The reconstruction of the Jewish National Home in Palestine realizes an age-old ideal, and this alone could call forth the strength necessary for the work which has been achieved in Palestine.

19. It is the earnest hope of the Jewish Agency for Palestine that this Conference will find ways and means to alleviate the fate of suffering Jewry in Central and Eastern Europe; to find fruitful openings for Jewish immigration in various countries, and will pay special attention to the great possibilities offered by Palestine for the solution of the Jewish problem.

C. MEMORANDUM OF CERTAIN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH THE REFUGEES FROM GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

I. INTRODUCTORY

The Jewish Organizations, signatories of this Memorandum, welcome most sincerely the initiative which has been taken by the American Government, has been responded to by the Governments of a large number of States, and has resulted in this Conference.

They trust that the Conference will seek to deal not only with the immediate alleviation of the problem, by finding openings and devising means for a larger emigration from Germany and Austria, but also with the deeper causes of the trouble. The problem is in no way exclusively a Jewish problem. A large part of the victims of persecution in Germany and Austria belong to the Christian Churches, though they may be partly of Jewish origin. The signatories, however, are concerned with the Jewish aspects of the problem, and it is on those aspects that they would wish to submit some observations.

II. PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS IN GERMANY

The persecution of the Jews in Germany began in March, 1933, when the National Socialist Party came into power. The measures taken by the German Government against the Jews and "non-Aryans"

are set out in the Letter of Resignation of Mr. James G. McDonald, the first High Commissioner for the Refugees coming from Germany, which was addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in December, 1935. That document will no doubt be communicated to the Conference. It is necessary only to add that, since its date, the pressure against the Jews and non-Aryans has been relentlessly and continuously aggravated.

The German Government has not only excluded the Jews completely from public life and brought about the ruin of thousands in the professions by cutting off their livelihood; it has also deprived the Jews who were engaged in commerce and industry of the greater part of their property. Nearly all the larger enterprises in which Jewish capital was engaged have been "Aryanized"; their Jewish directors or proprietors have been removed and replaced by Aryans. Jewish businesses, shops and industries of all kinds have been systematically boycotted; and in the smaller places and villages it has been made impossible for them to exist. When the Jew, having liquidated his affairs in Germany, wishes to emigrate, he is subjected to further measures of confiscation. If the value of his property exceeds 50,000 Marks, he has in the first place to pay an emigrants' flight-tax of 25% of the total value of his property; this measure, though introduced before the present Government came to power, and directed against all persons leaving Germany, particularly affects the Jewish emigrant who is forced to leave. The proceeds of the liquidation of the property, after payment of the tax, are placed to an account of "Sperrmarks"; and the emigrant has been able to receive in foreign exchange only a small and rapidly diminishing percentage of their nominal value. At one time it was 30%, but it has rapidly fallen, till recently it was less than 10%. And a decree issued by the Government of the Reich a few weeks ago, prohibits for the time being any Jew from taking out any part of his property in foreign exchange. All Jews in Germany have been required to make a declaration to the Government of their property, whether in the country or abroad. While the reasons for this measure have not yet been stated, there are reasons to fear that their property will be taken over by the Government for the purpose of its economic plan.

III. THE AGGRAVATION IN AUSTRIA

The annexation of the former Austria last March was followed im-

mediately by a persecution of Jews and "non-Aryans" and political opponents, still more virulent and intensive than in Germany. Marshal Goering, in outlining a four-year plan for the reconstruction of Austria, stated as part of the plan that the Jews should be completely forced out of Vienna. The number of Jews by confession in that city is about 170,000, and in Austria altogether 185,000. The number of non-Aryans—Jews converted to Christianity or persons of partial Jewish race—is believed to be greater. The racial legislation of the Reich was applied forthwith in all its severity. Moreover, the National Socialists, who during recent years have perfected the technique of persecution, have set out to ruin the Jews by a systematic economic destruction and a systematic maintenance of panic. For some weeks there was widespread lawlessness and brutality; shops and private houses were looted; hundreds of persons were assaulted; there was a daily toll of suicides. All the shops in the principal parts of the city were transferred to "Aryans"; Jewish industries were placed under the control of "Aryan" Commissars. Most of the Jewish businesses have been confiscated either directly or indirectly, or placed under conditions such that the Jewish owner is compelled to dispose of his enterprise at any price. If any one holds out, he is arrested on any charge or no charge, and held in confinement until he signs away his property and gives a declaration that he will "voluntarily" leave the country within a short period. During the last weeks thousands of Jews of all classes have been arrested, and many of them sent to concentration camps. The German authorities demand a rapid and impossible emigration, and do not allow the emigrants to take out any part of their property. The Jewish population, which was distinguished in culture and intellect, is being turned systematically into a community of beggars.

IV. SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The persecution of the Jews in Germany has had its repercussion in Central Europe where already the economic position of the Jews was precarious. The anti-Jewish feeling in Poland, Rumania and Hungary has been alarmingly intensified by the example and propaganda of Germany. It threatens a Jewish population of over 5,000,000. Of these, 3,200,000 are in Poland, where they form nearly 10% of the whole population; 900,000 in the Kingdom of Greater Rumania; 450,000 in Hungary. The 400,000 Jews in Czechoslovakia have enjoyed full civic equality; but the

position of those in the area of the Sudeten may now be imperiled. The physical and economic distribution of the Jews in those countries is, owing to the repression of centuries, unevenly balanced. A large proportion are gathered in the principal cities and engaged in commerce or the liberal professions. Today the economic function of those who are middlemen is impaired, because on the one hand the development of state enterprises and state-aided associations has dispensed with that activity in many callings; and on the other hand a new middle-class growing up within the racial majority resents the competition of a minority people. In Poland a large part of the Jewish population has thus been reduced to hopeless poverty; in Rumania a Government was recently in power which had as its program a thoroughgoing antisemitic program. Although that Government has fallen, the possibility of antisemitic measures is a constant menace.

V. IMPOSSIBILITY OF MASS EVACUATION

Emigration cannot be a solution of the problem in view of the vast numbers affected. Even if it were proposed to emigrate only the young persons under the age of 40, numbering about 2,500,000, it would not be possible to find countries willing to absorb so large a number, and the cost of promoting it would be altogether prohibitive. The primary remedy must be found within each country where the mass of the Jews are living, by a radical readjustment of their economic life. The Jew must be given the opportunity of taking his part in the different branches of the national economy; emigration can only be a secondary solution.

The Jewish bodies appeal to the Governments represented at the Conference to take a stand against a persecution which threatens to multiply refugees and to make the problem hopelessly unmanageable. And it is hoped that it will be made clear that a Government is not entitled to deprive any section of its citizens of their legal and human rights. On the other hand, the Jewish situation in Poland and the other countries requires serious study, with a view to measures of economic reconstruction, which will also create fresh opportunities for the general population. If the Jewish capacities are freed and directed to new occupations, they will strengthen the national economy.

VI. EMIGRATION FROM GERMANY SINCE 1933

The Jewish Organizations have recognized that, in order to save the

young Jewish generation who have no hope in Germany, a program of directed emigration is necessary. Immediately following the persecution of 1933, 50,000 people of whom the large majority were Jews fled to the adjoining European countries. It was the aim of the Jewish bodies in Germany, and of those helping them, to prevent any recurrence of panic emigration, and to assure, as far as possible, that those leaving Germany should proceed to a definite destination overseas or in Europe where they would have a fair prospect of being able to settle. The efforts were intensified after the Nuremberg legislation of 1935. The Council for German Jewry was then formed to coordinate further the efforts of the British and American Organizations, and to meet the aggravation of the economic distress of German Jewry. The Council adopted a plan to facilitate the departure of 25,000 persons a year for four years, as far as possible being young men and women under the age of 35, and children; and to settle them partly in Palestine, partly in countries overseas, and, in smaller measure, in Europe. To that end it was hoped that a fund of £3,000,000 would be subscribed over the period of four years. The total sums that have been raised in Great Britain and America by the Organizations during the five years, for the help of German Jewry, amount to about £3,500,000; and large sums have also been collected in European countries for the maintenance and assistance of the refugees in those countries. Special collections have been made for the assistance of particular sections, such as the academic and intellectual exiles. Altogether it is estimated that a sum of over £5,000,000 has been contributed to public bodies specially concerned with the refugees, and spent during the period; and in addition, large sums have been devoted to similar purposes by other organizations and by individuals whose help to relatives and friends has amounted to a figure that cannot be estimated.

VII. TRAINING

It was recognized that the young Jewish generation must be prepared for productive manual occupations in the countries to which emigration must be directed; and that, in order that many of those who were forced out of their previous commercial and professional callings should have a fresh chance, they should receive a retraining for an occupation for which there was more demand in another country. The central Jewish body in Germany, Die Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, there-

fore established centres of training for boys and girls between the ages of 14 and 18. The vocational training is divided between agriculture and artisan trades. It was impossible to provide sufficient places in Germany; and with the assistance of Jewish communities abroad, training schemes for German Jews were established in several European countries. About 5,000 persons a year have been trained, and of those half the men and one-third of the women have received an agricultural training.

VIII. RESULTS OF EMIGRATION EFFORTS

Since 1933 there has been a total emigration from Germany of about 140,000 Jews, of whom the large majority went overseas. It is estimated that another 100,000 Jews below the age of 40 still remain in Germany. The principal country of immigration has been Palestine, in which over 40,000 have been settled. The majority have turned to manual work, about one-quarter being engaged in agriculture. About an equal number have been distributed between different countries in the American continent. Many have gone to the United States, where their relatives gave affidavits that they would not become a public charge, and so made it possible for them to obtain immigration permits within the German quota. Emigration to the countries of South America has been partly of a similar character. Those who have gone to the European countries for permanent settlement have in large part been absorbed in professional, commercial or industrial occupations. A special effort has been made to take children straight from school and place them in countries overseas where they can be prepared for productive life. In this way about 2,000 have been trained or are training in Palestine, mainly for agriculture, and several hundreds have been placed in the United States and in England.

IX. UNASSISTED EMIGRATION

The larger part of the emigrants since 1933 have been able to establish themselves with their own means. Special arrangements have been in force hitherto for the transfer of property by those migrating to Palestine. Through a system of controlled export of German goods to that country persons depositing £1,000 in the Reichsbank have been able, after a delay, to receive foreign exchange to that amount, and so enter the country in the class of capitalists. These facilities have been greatly

reduced in recent months. The emigration of persons with some small capital has provided opening and employment in the new homes for refugees without capital. That has been particularly the case in Palestine where many of the immigrants have established factories or other industries.

X. COST OF ASSISTANCE

Where persons have been assisted to emigrate, a contribution has usually been made by the emigrant or his family, and the cost incurred has been restricted to the transport, the landing money required in the country of immigration, and the means for maintenance during the first months. Experience has shown that the average cost to the Organizations, when the emigrant goes to an urban community, is £80 per head. The cost of settlement on the land is many times greater. It cannot be less than £700 for a family in an existing agricultural community; and the numbers which can be absorbed during the first period in undeveloped countries are small. It is emphasized, then, that the main solution of the emigration problem has hitherto been, and will continue to be, found by absorption of refugees into large communities and not by settlement in undeveloped countries. At the same time, settlement on the land and the opening of new areas for immigrants in the less populated countries are of special value as a nucleus for future immigration.

XI. ORGANIZED IMMIGRATION BENEFICIAL

While repudiating the policy of mass evacuation as being neither possible nor equitable, the Jewish Organizations recognize the urgent need of facilitating the immigration of an increased number, particularly from Greater Germany, for whom existence has become impossible in their present homes. If carefully directed to a large number of countries, such immigration should have a beneficial effect. It is the lesson of earlier movements which were started among oppressed peoples and minorities, that the immigrants have helped to establish new trades and industries. That was the case with the Huguenots who sought refuge overseas, with the exiles who left Germany for the United States after 1848, with the thousands of Jews who left Russia after 1882 to escape the Tsarist tyranny. The Jewish immigrant has a high level of intelligence and discipline and is remarkably adaptable. Surveys that have been

made of the economic activity of the refugees from Germany in several countries since 1933, indicate that they have created employment, not only for themselves, but also for substantial numbers of the people of the country. It is obvious, too, that they have increased the demand for commodities in the countries of their residence.

XII. PALESTINE AS A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION

Palestine has a special status as a country of Jewish immigration, because Great Britain, the Mandatory, together with the League of Nations and the American Government, has endorsed the policy of facilitating there the establishment of a Jewish National Home. During the four years 1933-1936, when the policy of the Palestine Administration was being guided by the principle of allowing immigration on the basis of economic absorptive capacity, the numbers who settled in the country totaled 164,000 (1933—30,000, 1934—42,000, 1935—62,000, 1936—30,000). Palestine, moreover, is a country with which Jewish hope has been associated from time immemorial, and a large proportion of the refugees would prefer to settle there for idealistic reasons, if they had the opportunity. Jewish immigration has been the chief factor in the remarkable development of the country during recent years; and the coming of the German Jews has contributed in an eminent measure to the economic and cultural development. It is hoped, therefore, that whatever contribution Palestine can make towards the problem of the refugees will be fully utilized, and that it will be found possible to reestablish the principle of economic absorptive capacity as the factor to govern the amount of Jewish immigration.

XIII. COST OF LARGER EMIGRATION FROM GERMANY

The evacuation of the Jewish population in Greater Germany, which numbers no less than 500,000 persons, taking the estimated average cost of £80 per head, would require a total sum of £40,000,000. If it were proposed to emigrate only persons under the age of 40, who are estimated at 200,000, the cost would be £16,000,000. That figure, moreover, would not take into account the larger amount required for the settlement of a proportion on the land. If only one thousand families a year were settled, an additional sum of £700,000 would be required annually. In addition, funds would be necessary for training enterprises and for the maintenance

of some of the refugees in countries of immediate refuge pending emigration. Unless the Governments represented at the Conference are able to secure some measure of cooperation from Germany, it does not appear to be possible that orderly and planned emigration can be carried out. It is clearly indispensable that the emigrants with means should be able to transfer their property, and in the meantime, that the Jews may have the possibility of maintaining an existence. If conditions of panic and demoralization are engendered, as is the case today, the problem becomes insoluble.

XIV. FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

The Jewish bodies are anxious, as they have been during the last five years, to assist, with their material means and organization, in carrying out an ordered emigration and in preparing the young generation to be useful citizens in a new country. At the same time, a plan of emigration adequate to provide for the needs of those leaving Greater Germany cannot be executed through voluntary contributions, even in the measure which has been given during recent years. The Jewish communities have made unprecedented efforts, and there cannot be any expectation that voluntary funds can be raised in larger measure. The conclusion is that the main source from which funds should be provided is from the property of the emigrants themselves.

If the authorities of the Reich wish to promote a large emigration of German Jews, they must be prepared to release the property which the emigrants possess, and to facilitate such exchange arrangements with other communities as are practicable to that end.

XV. ORGANIZATION

It is necessary also that facilities should be given for an expert organization to be established in Austria, as it has been in Germany, for the careful selection of emigrants, their training for productive occupations, and the choice of destinations where they may be established. It is particularly urgent that steps in this direction should be taken in Vienna, where the demand for a large emigration has been forced upon a stricken community which was unprepared. The experience that has been obtained in Germany should be made available for their assistance. It is hoped, too, that the Conference will be able to establish a small Executive body

which will direct and supervise the emigration, and be in a position to conduct negotiations with the German authorities as well as with the Governments of the countries of immigration. Every effort will be made by the Jewish bodies to ensure that only fit and well-qualified persons emigrate, that they are prepared by manual training and otherwise for life in the new countries, and that they are adjusted to the new circumstances and looked after in their new homes by responsible committees who will see that they do not become public charges.

XVI. COOPERATION OF THE JEWISH BODIES WITH GOVERNMENTS

The Jewish Organizations feel that they are appealing to the general spirit of humanity when they ask the Governments represented at the Conference to exercise in these matters the greatest liberality. Moreover, a liberal policy towards intelligent and qualified emigrants cannot fail to bring benefit to the countries receiving them.

The voluntary organizations have for some years been in the closest touch with the High Commissioner for the Refugees from Germany appointed by the League of Nations. The work of the High Commissioner, as it has hitherto been defined, is mainly concerned with the juridical aspects of the problem. The need of an organ representing the Governments which will be directly and specifically concerned with emigration and settlement has long been apparent. And it is hoped that one outcome of the Conference will be to bring it into being. The achievement of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, which was established under the auspices of the League, is an indication of the benefit of international governmental aid.

The signatories hereto would again assure the Conference that they are prepared to assist the Governments to the limit of their powers in finding a solution of this international social problem. But it is obviously one which cannot be solved by philanthropy alone or by any efforts of the Jewish community alone, but requires a combination of Government action and voluntary organization.

Signed on behalf of The Council for German Jewry.

SAMUEL.

Signed on behalf of The Jewish Colonization Association.

O. E. D'AVIGDOR GOLDSMID.

Signed on behalf of The Hias-Ica Emigration Association.

JAMES BERNSTEIN.

Signed on behalf of Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of
Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association.

NEVILLE LASKI.

LEONARD G. MONTEFIORE.

Signed on behalf of the German Jewish Aid Committee.

OTTO M. SCHIFF.

Signed on behalf of Agudas Israel World Organization.

J. ROSENTHAL.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, which is submitting a separate
Memorandum on the Palestine aspects, endorses this Memorandum.

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE OFFICERS OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES ON
THE OCCASION OF ITS SESSION IN WASHINGTON, D. C.,
BY THE AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

I. THE STATUS OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The officers of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, meeting in Washington on October 17-18, 1939, face an intensification of the problem which, on July 6, 1938, brought together at Evian-les-Bains, France, the representatives of twenty-nine nations upon the suggestion of President Roosevelt for the discussion of the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees driven from their homes by racial and political persecution.

The whole of civilized mankind continues to be concerned with a solution of the problem, as is attested by the functioning of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees. Formed as an outgrowth of the Evian Conference, the Committee has been confronted during the past year with obstacles of steadily increasing magnitude. Even before the outbreak of war, a solution to the vexing question of finding permanent homes for large numbers of the exiles from Greater Germany was rendered most difficult by various economic, political and psychological factors.

Today the Committee is called upon to resolve these issues:

- (a) the extent to which homes can be opened for refugees;
- (b) the method by which such colonization is to be furthered;
- (c) the most promising havens for large-scale immigration in relation to:
 - (1) permanent solution of the refugee problem;
 - (2) least costly financing to assure maximum returns from the funds available.

This Memorandum is presented to the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee on behalf of the American Emergency Committee for Palestine Affairs and the United Palestine Appeal as an expression of the deep concern of American Jewry with the outcome of the conference and as an earnest of their resolution and good faith in urging that the inescapable answer to any consideration of large-scale colonization of refugees is Palestine.

The American Emergency Committee for Palestine Affairs represents all sections of American Jewry concerned with the upbuilding of the Jewish homeland in Palestine. The United Palestine Appeal is the central instrument of American Jewry to finance every phase of the reconstruction program in Palestine.

In presenting a memorandum emphasizing the unique importance of Palestine for the solution of the refugee problem, these agencies simultaneously affirm their interest in and approval of any colonization project which contributes to the salvation of refugees, wherever hospitable nations and governments open their doors in welcome to an harassed people. The need for refugee colonization is so urgent and great that only the most far-reaching and universal generosity on the part of all civilized lands can meet it. It is because we feel that Palestine can contribute so immeasurably to such a program that we press its claims.

THE EFFECT OF WAR ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The outbreak of war in Europe has magnified the problem with which the nations were faced at Evian. Several plans for group resettlement which were advanced in 1938 and investigated and reported on in 1939 will possibly be abandoned. In several instances so vast an outlay of funds would be required for preliminary exploration of resources that colonization in areas now largely uninhabited must for the present at least be deemed impracticable.

Yet the abandonment of these projects comes unfortunately at a time when the refugee problem is most aggravated. During the last year of general peace in Europe, approximately 140,000 people emigrated from Greater Germany. Many of these did not find permanent homes but only transient stopping-places. The onset of war has resulted in bringing under the regime of the German Government additional hundreds of thousands who, in conformity with German law, will find no opportunity

for survival. As a residue of troubled peacetime there still exist in various European lands, belligerent and neutral, scores of thousands of other refugees who have not yet been absorbed into the economy of the countries which provided haven. Lacking permanent homes and prospects of a future in their present environment, they—quite as certainly as the masses lately escaped from Poland—represent the unresolved problem now before the Intergovernmental Committee. The removal of a maximum number of refugees to permanent homes becomes more than ever imperative because of the especial severity with which war-time conditions in Europe will fall upon the refugees, whether they be at large or in internment camps.

Various projects will undoubtedly be considered by the Intergovernmental Committee. The necessity of applying the most rigorous criteria of judgment as to their physical and financial feasibility is underscored by prevailing conditions. If private charity is to be challenged to a measure of generosity that will cope substantially with the problem, there must be offered a scheme or schemes whose large-scale, constructive nature will evoke the outpouring of large funds for fruitful purposes.

THE CRITERIA FOR COLONIZATION

A distinguished British economist has said that only systematic, large-scale settlement can solve the refugee problem in view of the staggering need for immigration opportunities. There are three fundamental requirements for mass settlement schemes:

- (1) a large immigration and an expanding economy;
- (2) an influx of substantial capital;
- (3) the character of the social and psychological factors in the immigration country.

If the refugee problem is to be solved it cannot be through a process of "infiltration" but only through systematic and organized settlement.

AMERICAN JEWRY WILL GIVE FUNDS FOR PALESTINE

It is the theme of this Memorandum that Palestine, above all other countries, fills the requirements for such organized settlement.

It is the conviction and the pledge of the sponsors of this Memorandum that the adoption of a program by the Intergovernmental Committee, in cooperation with the British Government, to further large-scale settle-

ment of refugees in Palestine will be met by a readiness on the part of Jews in the United States to furnish the substantial sums that will be required for the execution of such a program.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, supreme representative of the Jewish people in the upbuilding of Palestine, for which funds are raised in the United States by the United Palestine Appeal, stands ready to accept tens of thousands of new Jewish settlers and would welcome the realization of conditions making possible their entry. The opening of the doors of Palestine on a broad scale would be met among American Jewry with the subscription of whatever funds, public or private, might be necessary for their speedy integration into the life of that land.

WHY PALESTINE

A large-scale settlement program in Palestine is urged because:

- (a) Palestine has indisputably proved its capacity for absorbing immigration;
- (b) Palestine is incomparably prepared to accept additional masses of refugees;
- (c) Up to the present time, it has been tragically and generally true that:
 - (1) countries unsuitable for settlement and without economic value have been suggested for the refugees; and
 - (2) vast expanses of undeveloped but potentially fertile territories throughout the world have been closed to immigration.

II. PALESTINE: AN ANSWER TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

A. The Immigration History of Palestine

The question of the availability of Palestine as a haven for refugees is interwoven with the rôle it has played in accepting and absorbing the victims of oppression during the past twenty years and especially since emigration began from Germany in 1933. On June 30, 1939 an estimate in official sources gave the Jewish population of Palestine as 460,000 and the combined population of other groups, Moslems, Christians and others, as 1,043,000. The rise in the Jewish ratio, according to these figures, indicates that Jews now constitute at least 30 percent of the

population of the country as against 17 percent in 1931. More than eighty percent of the Jewish increase has been accounted for by immigration.

Jewish immigration into Palestine totalled 30,327 in 1933; 42,359 in 1934; and 61,854 in 1935. When political restrictions were introduced in 1936, the registered Jewish immigration for that year declined to 29,727; in 1937 registered immigration totalled 11,400 and in 1938 it rose again to 12,868. To these figures must be added a considerable number of unregistered migrants.

It is estimated by the Jewish Agency for Palestine that 30,000 Jews have entered Palestine from January 1, 1939 through September. Of that number, some 10,000 came into Palestine in the last quarter.

Palestine has been consistently in the forefront among countries able and ready to accept new immigrants. Its relation to other refugee-receiving lands is reflected in the following table of net immigration:

Net Immigration Record: 1933-1937

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	Total 1933-1937
Argentina	—	1,500	16,500	18,200	27,300	63,500
Australia	—	—	1,000	1,700	5,900	8,600
Brazil	29,200	26,600	8,300	—	—	64,100
United States	—	—	—	4,900	25,000	29,900
South Africa	1,700	4,100	6,100	10,000	4,200	26,100
Uruguay	—	400	1,600	2,700	3,000	7,700
Palestine	30,327	42,359	61,854	29,727	11,400	175,667

Thus, Palestine not only received more immigrants than any other country but equalled the number absorbed by all other major overseas immigration centers combined. It should be noted that the figures for Palestine immigration refer almost exclusively to Jews while statistics for the other countries include both Jewish and non-Jewish immigration.

The economic classifications of the elements which have found their way to Palestine during the past seven years stamp an overwhelming majority as refugees and not as immigrants in the usual sense. The men, women and children who have landed on its shores are people driven to flight by discrimination, grinding poverty and ruthless persecution in their native countries. It is estimated that of the total of more than 215,000 who have arrived in Palestine since 1933, some 65,000, accord-

ing to the Jewish Agency for Palestine, are émigrés from Greater Germany. The others have come from lands in Central and Eastern Europe where their economic position was rendered as precarious as it might have been in Germany itself.

(1) *Dynamic Versus Static Concept of Immigration*

A broad view of the refugee problem must consider

- (1) the realities of the achievements in Palestine; and
- (2) the potential growth, as determined by the resources of the country and the special incentives toward their development.

It may be said, indeed, that Palestine itself is the outstanding proof of the colonizing capacity of the Jewish people, challenging and disproving any allegation as to their unadaptability of the soil and giving encouragement to all lands to welcome the refugees as pioneers.

The determination of the absorptive capacity of Palestine cannot be based on any history of the country in relation to its past as a desolate, neglected land. The success of Palestine's growth in the past two decades represents the dynamic as opposed to the static concept of immigration in its bearing on a country's development.

(2) *Primary Factors Responsible for Palestine Dynamism*

Three primary factors are responsible for the dynamism of Palestine's advance:

- I. Manpower
- II. Capital
- III. Idealism

The possibilities of more immigration and larger development are related to such factors as:

- (a) The determination of "cultivability" in relation to Palestine's area;
- (b) the expansion of agriculture; in turn, dependent on
 - (1) methods of cultivation
 - (2) discovery of water resources and introduction of irrigation
 - (3) the restoration to production of "uncultivable" land
- (c) the extension of industry, based upon
 - (1) the growth of the past two decades
 - (2) the enlargement and diversification of industries

- (3) the economic value of immigration to industrialization
- (4) the influx of capital; public and private
- (5) Palestine's industrial rôle in the Near East
- (d) the enlargement of services; such as
 - (1) public works
 - (2) transportation
 - (3) maritime activities

B. "Cultivability" and Palestine Soil

The phrase "uncultivability" is a key to Palestine's agricultural growth. The area occupied by Jews today was land previously uncultivated and regarded as uncultivable which Jews, with patience, skill and resources, rescued from oblivion.

The total area of Palestine is 10,400 square miles or 26,319,000 dunams (approximately four dunams to an acre). In determining the cultivable area, the Government always deducts 12,577,000 dunams, the area of the Negeb, southern Palestine, 46 percent of the total area. The Palestine Government has stated that 8,760,000 dunams of the balance represent cultivable land. Figures of the Jewish Agency for Palestine cited to the Royal Commission place the cultivable area at 9,197,000 dunams, exclusive of the Negeb (also called the Beersheba district). But a definition of "cultivability" is vital. The Palestine Government regards cultivable land as "land which is actually under cultivation or which can be brought under cultivation by the application of the labor and resources of the average Palestinian cultivator." The standard for this definition is, therefore, the Arab peasant employing a wooden plow.

The Government does not take into consideration: the discovery of water resources and the development of irrigation or the evolution of intensive methods of cultivation. These various factors will determine the absorptive capacity of Palestine. The Government definition does not, for example, make a distinction between "cultivable" and "irrigable land." Palestinian experience has shown that the yield of one dunam of irrigated land is equivalent to that of five unirrigated dunams. Experience has also indicated that a family of five persons can subsist comfortably upon the income derived from 130 dunams of dry land or 25 dunams of irrigated land.

- (1) *Possibilities for 2,800,000*

F. Julius Fohs, noted American expert who has conducted hydrographic surveys of Palestine over a period of many years, has said that if the available water resources in Palestine are conserved, it is possible to irrigate 3,500,000 dunams, *exclusive of the Negeb, after providing for the civil and industrial uses of a population of 2,500,000.*

If, then, the 3,500,000 dunams are irrigated, in addition to the land already cultivated, the area will accommodate some 184,000 families or 920,000 persons. This figure compares with the present total maximum agricultural population of Palestine of 632,600. To the figure of 920,000 persons deriving sustenance from the land must be added those who will be engaged in subsidiary village occupations. Upon the assumption, on the basis of an average economically universal, that each peasant enables two persons to follow urban pursuits, Palestine holds forth possibilities for the settlement of some 2,800,000 persons—and this only on land already situated for cultivation.

It should be noted that of 1,455,917 dunams of Palestine land in Jewish possession today, 939,000 dunams are regarded as cultivable. And of the latter number, 452,000 dunams represent land *made cultivable* by Jews.

(2) *Valley of Jezreel As Example of "Cultivability"*

An outstanding example of the transformation by Jews of "uncultivable" into cultivable land is the Valley of Jezreel, known also as the Plain of Esdraelon. In 1913 the entire area supported only a few scattered, nomadic Arab families. It was infested with malarial swamps. Those sections which were not marshy were unirrigated and had returned to the desert. Today, there dwell in the Valley more than 18,000 persons who have converted the sand and the marshes into orange groves whose yield averages higher than 105 exportable cases per dunam. This was territory deemed "uncultivable" under the standards of the Government definition.

(3) *Huleh and Beisan Areas*

What of other areas not considered "cultivable" by the Government? A consideration of the Huleh and Beisan basins reveals that they are not at all beyond reclaim. The Huleh basin was a stagnant marsh several years ago. How fruitful that area once was is reflected in Genesis 49:20 in which Jacob, prophesying for his sons, says: "Out of Asher his

bread shall be fat, and he shall yield royal dainties." The land of Asher was Huleh. Josephus described Huleh as "a beautiful and pleasant land blessed greatly by nature. All kinds of plants grow there—nut trees usually in temperate countries are found side by side with the date palms which flourish in hot climates, while figs and olives, which require a hot climate, are not lacking." When, in 1933, Jewish capital purchased the basin as a concession for development, it acquired a desolate, disease-ridden swamp. Today the area is being drained and reclaimed. It might be noted that the Jewish concessionaries have agreed to reserve some 15,700 dunams of the area of 57,000 dunams of lake and marshland which they acquired, for the Arab cultivators who now cultivate on the margin of the lake as the water recedes after the rains. This area is to be reclaimed and provided with major drainage and irrigation channels by the Jewish institutions free of charge to the Arab cultivators.

The Beisan basin covers 119,000 dunams, excluding the town and suburbs of Beisan. Although its water supply is plentiful, it has until now supported an Arab population of only 4,900. With its water resources intelligently utilized, the Beisan area will also support a greatly increased populace.

C. Agricultural Development

(1) *Methods of Cultivation*

These two areas—the Huleh and Beisan—by no means exhaust the possibilities for reclamation; but they demonstrate the flexibility of the concept of "cultivable" area.

Today there are over 250 Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine. Of that number, 51 have been established in the last three years. How many people can be established on the land is dependent, among other things, on methods of cultivation. The intensified methods introduced by Jewish farmers have enlarged the productive capacity of the land beyond any figure which might have been envisaged twenty or even ten years ago.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Jewish development of Palestine has been its occupational restratification in relation to agriculture particularly. The growth of Jewish agricultural production has kept pace with the growth of the Jewish population. In 1922 some 15,000 persons, or 18 percent of the Jewish population, were classified as rural.

Today the percentage has risen to 27 percent and the total Jewish rural population is some 120,000.

On the basis of five persons to a family, in addition to neighboring village and urban economic dependents, computation shows that an additional 200,000 people can be added to the population of Palestine just through the conversion of the two waste lands of Huleh and Beisan alone.

Five Persons on Five Dunams

Experiments conducted at the Jewish Agency Agricultural Experiment Station at Rehoboth have shown that even the basis of 25 dunams as the minimal area necessary for the maintenance of a family may be far too high in the light of the newest methods of soil cultivation. One family has subsisted for three years on a plot of only five dunams, deriving sufficient income from the produce of that land to maintain five persons. The effect of widespread employment of such new agricultural techniques throughout the country would be no less than revolutionary and would necessitate a further drastic revision upward of the ultimate number of persons whom the land of Palestine can sustain. Such expansion of cultivable area, with its resulting increase in rural settlement, would have important effects upon every aspect of the economic life of the country. At present the mean density of population per square kilometer of cultivable area in Palestine in 96, as compared with 196 in France and 458 in Egypt. It becomes obvious that the danger of overpopulation is therefore inconsequential.

(2) *Water Resources and Irrigation*

Through the utilization of existing water supplies, irrigation can be extended to areas now being cultivated extensively on dry land. Of the 4,293 individual farms in Palestine—excluding citrus groves—1,560 lie in categories progressively higher than the average of 30 dunams. If such individual areas were reduced to an average of 30 dunams, an additional 4,200 farm units would be made available. Thus the total number of farms in Palestine might be almost doubled.

The extent of possible exploitation of all water resources has not yet been fully gauged, inasmuch as the Government has not as yet conducted a far-reaching hydrographic survey of the country. Investigation by experts of the Jewish Agency has shown that water supplies now known are sufficient to provide a flow of 421,448 cubic meters per hour. Accord-

ing to their estimate, 2,142,695 dunams or 61 percent of the total of 3,914,650 dunams of level land could be adequately irrigated by existing reserves. It might be emphasized, however, that the fullest realization of the potential irrigability of Palestine must be await a complete hydrographic report.

(3) *Possibilities of the Negeb*

The contribution that the exploration and exploitation of the resources of southern Palestine, the Negeb, could make to the solution of the refugee problem is incalculable. The only inhabitants of this vast area, almost half of Palestine, are some thousands of roving Bedouins. In ancient times, by use of dams and deep wells the country supported a population of roughly 300,000. Thus far no action has been taken to expand the search for water resources and to open the area for colonization.

(4) *Agricultural Advance*

The produce of Palestine agriculture today varies from the cereals and legumes commonly grown in temperate climates to the fruits native to sub-tropical lands. In the fertile groves of the Emek, in the Beisan Plain, along the central shore of the Mediterranean, and in the uplands toward the River Jordan, there grow wheat, barley, durra, sesame, maize, oats, kersenneh, lentils, beans, and peas. Among other crops are tobacco, fodder for dairy cattle, and vegetables. Fruits cultivated include the citrus, melons, olives, grapes, almonds, figs, apples, pomegranates, apricots, pears, peaches, plums, bananas, dates, quinces, and strawberries.

Citrus

To meet the demands of the European market, the citrus production has been enormously expanded, until today Palestine ranks as the second largest citrus exporting country in the world. During the growing season just past, the country exported a total of 15,310,346 cases of citrus valued at £4,370,000, as against exports of 2,470,000 cases with a value of £745,000 in the 1930-31 season. Total shipments were 910,548 cases in 1913-4. The area under citrus cultivation has been expanded from 30,000 dunams in 1913 to 298,000 dunams today. The export total during the season 1938-1939, which represented a 34 percent increase over the shipments of 1937-38, brought growers, according to the figures of export

cooperatives, a net profit of 2/6 per case. The largest single importing country was England, which took 60.4 percent of the total shipped, while Holland, Belgium, and Sweden ranked next in volume. It is of interest to note that, except for Great Britain, the largest takers of the Palestinian citrus crop are not at war.

The expansion of agriculture has not been confined to citrus alone. It is estimated that the area of fruit plantations in the country, including olives but omitting citrus, is 921,564 dunams, of which 785,671 are fruit-bearing. In 1938 production on this land totaled 133,768 tons valued at £977,535.

Grains

Because of the high price of land, the primary objective of Jewish agriculture has been improvement in yield per unit. The yield of wheat, for example, has been raised by irrigation and intensive cultivation from 70 kilos a dunam to 130 to 140 kilos. Barley production has been expanded from 50 to 60 kilos per dunam to 180. Jewish vegetable production averages 2,000 kilos per dunam, as against a previous average of 500 to 800.

Dairy Yield

By the importation of improved breeds of cattle from Holland, Jewish dairy experts have been enabled to increase the average annual yield per cow from 700 litres to nearly 4,000 litres. During the quarter January-April of 1939, Jewish milk production rose to 11.96 million litres, a 5 percent gain over the first quarter of 1938. The rate of increase sustained during the past thirteen years is shown by comparison with the figure for the entire year of 1926, when the output came to 7,000,000 litres for the twelvemonth. In 1922 Jewish farms produced only 130,000 litres of milk.

Production of eggs in the first quarter of 1939 rose to 21.08 million pieces, compared with 17.30 million in the first quarter of 1938 and 14.82 million in the corresponding period of 1937. During the entire year 1938 egg production totaled 48,337,000 as against 39,457,000 in 1937, and only 150,000 pieces in 1922. As a result of the introduction of the Leghorn from the United States, the average annual yield per hen has been increased from 70 to 144.

(5) The Contrast of Transjordan

In considering the relationship of psychological to physical factors, it is of interest to contrast the development of Palestine with that of

neighboring Transjordan, historically, legally and economically linked with Palestine. At the present the entire territory, consisting of 34,000 square miles, supports only 320,000 people. Transjordan, far more fertile than Palestine, and once described by George Adams Smith as a land where "water is plentiful, luxurious vegetation is almost universal and all agriculture prospers," could comfortably support a rural population of more than 750,000. If the possible village and urban settlers are added, the territory could be expected to support a total population of well over 2,500,000.

D. Industrial Development

The capacity of industry to absorb immigrants and the effect, in turn, of Jewish immigration upon the economic development of Palestine have been particularly notable in the past decade.

(1) *Census of Industries*

The first official census of Palestine industries, taken in 1928, states that industry in its larger sense was practically non-existent in Palestine before the World War and that machinery was virtually unknown. The growth of Jewish industry and handicrafts from 1921 to 1937 has been remarkably rapid, as shown in the following table:

		1921-2	1930	1933	1937	Percentage increase since 1933
Establishments	No.	1,850	2,475	3,388	5,606	65%
Personnel:						
Workers &						
Owners	No.	4,750	10,968	19,595	30,040	53%
Value of annual						
output	£	500,000	2,510,000	5,352,000	9,109,000	75%
Capital	£	600,000	2,234,000	5,371,000	11,637,300	108%
Horsepower	HP.	880	10,100	50,500	106,495	110%

Since 1921 the personnel in Jewish industry has increased six times, the output seventeen times, the capital eighteen times and the machinery and equipment to an even greater degree.

The rapid diversification of the Palestinian economic structure may be shown by a summary of the major products of its factories and work-

shops. Today Palestine produces in growing volume oils, silks, wines and spirits, flour, rice, all types of building material, including cement and bricks; paints, perfumes, a wide variety of electrical products, plate glass, fine steels, cotton yarn and piece goods, aluminum ware, as well as such specialties as manufactured chocolate, artificial teeth, and leather goods.

Despite disturbed conditions both within and outside the country, there has been a continuance of new investment in industrial enterprises during the past several years. Political factors having no relation to the economic outlook of the country have tended to constrict the flow of private capital, but expansion has proceeded nonetheless.

(2) *Electric Power Development*

A stimulating example of the ability of Jews to utilize the resources of Palestine is provided in the history of the Palestine Electric Corporation, founded and directed by a Jewish engineer. Its growth from 1926 through 1938 shows its effect upon the lives of thousands of people, its relationship to industrial development and the progressive reduction of the price of current.

Year	No. of Customers	Current in KWH	Gross Income	Cost per KWH
1926	6,550	2,343,764	£66,791	28.5 mils
1929	9,303	3,634,838	90,847	25.0
1932	15,113	11,590,350	145,512	12.5
1935	53,246	50,352,193	488,443	9.7
1936	66,537	65,495,957	582,765	8.9
1937	75,805	71,265,889	611,051	8.6
1938	80,384	72,253,610	711,364	8.5

In the past three years, the sales of industrial power have shown important increases. Industrial consumption of current rose by 28 percent in 1937 as against 1936; by another 12 percent in 1938; and during the first six months of 1939 industrial sales once more rose by 16.2 percent over the corresponding period of last year.

(3) *Dead Sea Chemical Resources*

The development of extractive industries in the Dead Sea area has been another important index. During 1938, 47,496 tons of potash were produced, as against 29,082 extracted in 1937. Exports of Palestine

Potash, Ltd., for the first five months of 1939 totaled 33,481 tons, as against 21,228 for the similar period of 1938.

It might be noted that in the first quarter of 1939 the United States bought 8,212 tons of Palestine potash valued at £49,272; Japan, 7,186 tons for £43,116; and Belgium 4,213 tons at £25,278. The total valuation of potash exports in the quarter was £160,398. In 1938 the production of potash, 47,496 tons, was valued at £284,976 as against 29,082 tons extracted in 1937 to the value of £174,672.

(4) *The Influx of Capital*

Typical of most new countries has been the excess of imports over exports. The unfavorable trade balance of Palestine can be traced not alone to the importation of consumption goods but also to the purchase by local industry of capital goods and raw materials which, employed in the industrial establishment of the country, promote a greater degree of self-sufficiency. The effect of this trend is shown in the steady decrease of per capita imports during the past few years.

In 1933, the excess of imports over exports represented a sum of \$36 per capita. Yet, despite the growth of the population since that time, the excess was reduced in 1938 to \$21 per capita. Thus it may be inferred that a mounting proportion of the country's requirements is being met by local supply.

Such a relatively important article as domestic aluminum ware is a case in point. In 1933 the country imported 100 percent of its requirements. But in 1938, after local enterprise had been established, only 12 percent of the aluminum ware required was imported. In 1933 all beer consumed in the country was imported. In 1938 local production accounted for 73 percent of consumption.

An encouraging sign of sound development is the increase in both quantity and valuation of exports other than citrus fruits. During 1938, for example, exports of potash rose by \$550,000 over 1937; cotton piece goods by \$51,000; books by \$42,000; fruit juices by \$36,000; and chocolate by \$38,000.

(5) *Palestine's Industrial Rôle*

No summary of the industrial prospects for Palestine can be complete without reference to the strategic geographical position of the country. At the crossroads of the two or perhaps the three main arteries

of Europe, Asia and Africa, Palestine is admirably located to expand the volume of her exports. The exploitation of the potential market of the Near and Middle East would bear the most intimate relation to the enlargement of the industrial plant.

During the past twenty years hundreds of millions of dollars in public and private capital have been invested in the Jewish enterprises of Palestine. In other new countries during the period of development such capital was borrowed from outside. Debts thus created were serviced by the creation of new debts. The burden of interest remained heavy, and the capital burden grew even after the beginning of actual production.

Palestine is fortunate, and perhaps unique among new countries, in that its capital for development is not borrowed. Broadly speaking, the industry of Palestine is self-owned. Thus there exists a healthy economic base for further industrial progress.

E. Enlargement of Services

Development of new opportunities in agriculture and industry will inevitably absorb a great number of additional immigrants and begin a new cycle of general economic expansion.

The economic value of immigration in industrialization has been cited by Lord Winterton in connection with the absorption of refugees in England. New labor opportunities were created for 15,000 British industrial workers as a direct outcome of the initiative of Jewish refugees from Germany, he stated. Thus, the absorption by Palestine of skilled workmen involves not alone the saving of individual lives but establishes new opportunities for thousands of other refugees.

(1) *Public Works, Etc.*

Coincidental with the gains shown in private fields are public works projects now under consideration. A summary of the plans of the Tel Aviv Municipality may indicate to some extent the enormous tasks which the local governing bodies of Palestine may undertake during the next few years. Tel Aviv itself is the outstanding example of the transformation of waste into valuable land. Started some thirty years ago on a sand dune near Jaffa, Tel Aviv today harbors some 175,000 Jews.

The Tel Aviv Municipality is beginning work on a new drainage system to cost £650,000. The project, which will require four years to complete, is self-liquidating. A new water supply system is proposed, at a

cost of £450,000. A beach promenade from Jaffa to the Tel Aviv port, with a wide tree-lined esplanade and lanes for pedestrians and motorists, will cost £500,000 and will employ 4,000 men for three years. Improvement of the city's internal roadways, at an outlay of £400,000, is contemplated. Plans for a hospital adequate to serve Tel Aviv and its surrounding colonies, with 600 beds, involve an expenditure of £250,000. The extension of the city's airport is now being carried forward, with 750 men at work. Other proposals call for a town hall, municipal housing developments, a bus terminus, and an animal quarantine station at the port area. Execution of these projects represents an outlay of £2,000,000 and will greatly increase general employment.

(2) *The Tel Aviv Port*

The growth in foreign trade has meant a corresponding expansion of facilities for handling cargo. Today Palestine has three major ports, at Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jaffa, which during the year 1938 handled cargo valued at £20,597,938.

The rise of the port at Tel Aviv has been a significant economic phenomenon of the past three years. Only a loading jetty in 1936, the Tel Aviv port has grown rapidly until today it employs nearly 1400 dock workers and provides the central means of support for fully 10,000 workmen. During the first half of 1939 the net registered tonnage of ships arriving at the port totaled 1,025,341 as against a tonnage of 563,363 during the first half of 1938. Imports during the first six months of 1939 were 85,280 tons as against 51,185 during the first half of last year, and exports rose to 41,441 tons as against 27,410. With the harbor at Haifa taxed by an annual tonnage greater than that anticipated at the time of its construction, prospects for increased diversion of traffic to Tel Aviv will involve additional port construction and employment of new dock labor.

The correlation between private industry and public enterprise is so close that any important growth in output of either industry or agriculture is paralleled almost immediately by corresponding increases in allocations for public projects. Accordingly, a rise in the rate of general production will encourage the expenditure of new sums for (1) internal transportation: the building of new roads, the purchase of automobiles, buses, trucks, and railway rolling stock; (2) sea transport: the expansion of the present Jewish fleet; (3) travel by air: purchase of additional

planes, construction of new airports; and (4) increased appropriation by the Government for public construction and social services.

(3) *Maritime Activities*

More than one-third of Palestine's sea coast of 180 kilometers is in the possession of Jews. Increasing attention is being given to the development of maritime occupations. There are over 2,000 Jewish workers at the Tel Aviv and Haifa ports, as stevedores, porters, lightermen, dock workers, customs officials, inspectors.

At the present time 500 young Jews are being trained as mariners. Graduates become deck-boys, ordinary sailors and able-bodied seamen. In addition, Jewish fishermen are being developed. The purchase of fishing vessels, the training of fishermen, the breeding of species and the testing of waters are all being financed by Jewish public funds. Considering the tens of thousands of families who earn their livelihood from the sea it is not too much to hope that thousands of Jewish refugees may ultimately find footholds economically in Palestine through the fishing industry.

(4) *Jewish Aviation*

Jewish civil aviation has received substantial stimulus in the past few years. Palestine has flying services connecting it with neighboring countries in the Near East, as well as serving as a center of transportation from Europe and Africa to Asia. New planes are being constantly imported and a number of schools for the training of airmen have been established. More than 300 young men are enrolled in gliding clubs throughout Palestine. Thorough courses in practical and theoretical flying are being increasingly attended. Included among the refugees in Palestine today are many pilots who have had long experience in commercial and military aviation and many aeronautical engineers, mechanics, etc.

F. Proposals for Refugee Absorption in Palestine

The Jewish Agency for Palestine recently submitted a series of proposals which offer the basis upon which the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees may proceed with the program of directing large-scale immigration to Palestine. These proposals deal with the following types:

- (a) children between 12 and 15;

- (b) youths between 15 and 17;
- (c) pioneers (chalutzim) between 18 and 35;
- (d) transitory camps to serve as temporary encampments for immigrants until they are ready for absorption in settlements or towns.

The extent to which facilities for immigration will be provided will determine in largest measure the size of the funds that can be made available.

Costs of Settlement

(a) The Jewish Agency has estimated that there would be a cost of £130 per head for the erection of buildings and for the initial average amount involved in the absorption of new immigrants, either in existing settlements or industrial occupations. This figure would apply to the group between 18 and 35.

(b) The costs involved in the transitory camps include the erection of camps and buildings at £17 per head and maintenance at the rate of £2 per month.

In addition, the Jewish Agency for Palestine would require funds for instruction of the refugees, supervision and social welfare needs.

The enrichment of every phase of Palestine life has accompanied the influx of the refugees. Scholars, physicians and musicians, for example, have opened new avenues of cultural activity. Many of the refugees have been absorbed in such institutions as the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Haifa Technical Institute, the Daniel Sieff Chemical Research Institute, the Jewish Agency Agricultural Experiment Station and in the Hebrew school system generally. The physicians who have come to Palestine have made the country the medical center of the Near East. The distinction of the Palestine Symphony Orchestra is sufficiently heralded to have attracted Arturo Toscanini and other world famous musicians as conductors.

G. Who Will Supply the Funds?

The officers of the Intergovernmental Committee cannot be unaware of the new situation that exists as a result of the war. Countries which previously contributed substantially to the upbuilding of Palestine and to other relief and rehabilitation enterprises are being compelled by domestic obligations and regulations to cut their support drastically or are completely unable to participate.

To the Jews of America, as never before, falls the largest responsibility of executing any scheme related to the solution of the refugee problem.

Again the American Emergency Committee for Palestine Affairs and the United Palestine Appeal must reiterate that their constituency is prepared and eager to accept the full responsibility of providing the financial resources that will be forthcoming if only a sound, reasonable and constructive scheme to continue with the extraordinary development of Palestine is publicly sponsored by the Intergovernmental Committee.

III. EFFECT OF JEWISH DEVELOPMENT UPON ARABS

It is pertinent to this Memorandum to point out that the influx of Jewish manpower, capital, skill and vision into Palestine has brought about a remarkable transformation of the economic, cultural and physical status of the Arabs. Any summary of the present economic position of the Arab in Palestine, as contrasted with his status under Ottoman rule before the World War, reveals benefits stressing the greatly improved standard of living in all its phases.

The rate of gain among the Arab population can be attributed not alone to immigration but to an increased birthrate. Improved social services, whose costs are in large part borne by the Jewish community, have cut the Arab death rate without affecting the high degree of Arab fertility.

The scourge of Palestine during the long years of its undisturbed infertility was the Egyptian eye disease trachoma, which, according to the census of 1931, had completely blinded one person and destroyed one eye of two others in each hundred of the Palestinian population. The country was long ridden with endemic malaria, not only in the swampy regions of the plains, but even in the hills. Wells and cisterns were breeding places of the *Anopheles* mosquito, the carrier of the disease. The program of draining swamps through the reclamation of large tracts of land, combined with a large-scale campaign of popular education, has served to free the people from the menace of malaria and to reduce considerably the threat of trachoma.

(1) *Gains in Arab Population*

Gains in public health have been mirrored almost immediately by corresponding increases in Arab population. While the number of Arabs in neighboring countries throughout North Africa and Asia Minor has

remained static during the past twenty years, the number of Arabs living in Palestine has increased to the present total of 1,015,000 from approximately 664,000 in 1918. The increase in Arab population has been largest in the zones where Jewish development has been most marked. Between the census years of 1922 and 1931 the Moslem population increased most in the towns which have a large Jewish population. Thus, in Haifa the Moslem community increased by 117 percent, in Jaffa by 71 percent and in Jerusalem by 48 percent. The further removed the town from Jewish influence, the smaller has been the increase in Arab population. At Jenin it increased by only 14 percent and at Nablus by only 8 percent. A similar gain is shown in agricultural settlements, particularly those dependent upon nearby Jewish colonies.

The mortality rate among Arabs fell from 31.4 per thousand in 1927 to 22.3 per thousand in 1935. The rate of Arab infant mortality dropped from 213.4 per thousand in 1927 to 125 in 1938. This compares with the present mortality ratio of 211 per thousand in neighboring Transjordan.

(2) *Benefits to Arab Agriculture*

The improved standard of living has been particularly noticeable in Arab agriculture, which has benefited from Jewish colonization. Cereal cultivation, extensive and unprofitable, has been supplanted in many areas by intensive farming. Poultry and dairy farms have replaced wheat and barley fields, and fruit trees of all kinds have been planted. In 1922 the Arabs had only 22,000 dunams (5,500 acres) planted to oranges, but in 1937 the area of Arab citrus plantations had increased to 135,000 dunams, representing an augmented value of \$50,000,000.

Despite the diversification of agriculture, however, the wheat yield grew from 44,000 tons in 1933 to 103,000 tons in 1935. Between 1922 and 1937 the area planted by Arabs to vegetables grew seven-fold from 20,000 dunams to 140,000 dunams. Nor has this growth been restricted to agriculture alone. In 1922 a total of £600,000 was invested in Arab industry. By 1937 this total had shown a 417 percent increase to £2,500,000.

The effect of Jewish immigration, far from driving the Arab off the land, has been to encourage Arab cultivation of hitherto untended tracts. During the postwar period from 1921 to 1937 the area under cultivation

in Palestine was increased from 5,014,000 dunams to 8,000,000 dunams. Of this total, the Arab percentage grew from 4,700,000 dunams to 7,400,000 or a gain of 57 percent.

(3) *General Economic Advance*

The income which Arabs have received from the sale of land has been of tremendous economic advantage. Peasants have sold their surplus land at a price of \$50 to \$75 per dunam. In Transjordan, land of the same quality brings only one-twentieth of this price. It follows, then, that an Arab farmer, working with five members of his family from dawn to dusk on a plot of 100 dunams and deriving from that combined effort only \$150 a year, stands to benefit greatly by selling part of his plot for \$3,500 and utilizing the proceeds of that sale to introduce more productive methods of cultivation on the remainder of his land.

Jewish immigration has raised the level of Arab agriculture also by development of extensive urban markets in Palestine, prepared to pay high prices for all types of agricultural produce. Annual sales of Arab farmers to Jews approximate \$7,500,000 each year. Jews have spent £750,000 annually on products of Arab quarries and industries. They have paid £250,000 annually in rent to Arabs and £250,000 in wages to Arab labor.

(4) *Arab-Jewish Cooperation*

It is the will, the intention and the resolution of the Jewish community of Palestine to achieve a *modus vivendi* with the Arab population. Continued growth will bring increasing evidence of that will and simultaneously enable the Arab peoples, under the example and with the encouragement of the Jewish immigrants, to achieve their fullest creative capacity, so that Jew and Arab together may build a flourishing, peaceful, free Palestine.

IV. SUMMARY

During the past two decades the rate of growth of the Jewish community of Palestine has been by far the most rapid in the modern history of colonization. A Jewish social structure which supported 83,794 people in 1922 has expanded six-fold. There has arisen in Palestine a new Jewish agriculture, a flourishing commerce and an expanding Jewish industry.

Spread throughout the country is a network of schools in which nearly 70,000 Jewish children are enrolled. The Hebrew University has been built in Jerusalem. The Hebrew language has been reborn and Palestine has become the cradle of an extensive new Hebrew literature. The Palestine Symphony Orchestra, an enterprising and varied Hebrew theatre, numerous daily, weekly and monthly publications in Hebrew, and other aspects of an expanding spiritual and cultural life point to the healthiness of Jewish communal existence.

It is now urged upon the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees that the rich resources already established in Palestine provide the soundest foundation for a large-scale immigration program designed to speed the liquidation of the refugee problem permanently and constructively. These are the facts which stand out in relation to Palestine:

- (1) American Jewry will give funds for Palestine because of the conviction that it fills all the requirements for organized mass settlement.
- (2) Palestine has proved its capacity to absorb immigrants. 30,000 entered between Jan.-Sept., 1939.
- (3) Jewish ability to transform so-called "uncultivable" land into cultivable areas opens the possibility of settling 2,800,000 persons.
- (4) Jewish intensive farming is swiftly reducing the acreage required for agricultural livelihood.
- (5) The known and untapped water resources hold the secret of wide agricultural expansion.
- (6) Jews have proved themselves farmers in Palestine.
- (7) Jewish initiative, capital and skill have created an expanding industry which will be able to absorb increasing numbers of refugees.
- (8) Public works, transportation, maritime activities and related programs hold possibilities for large refugee influx.
- (9) Definite programs for refugee absorption have been worked out by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which has the experience and which can obtain the finances.

- (10) Because of the European situation, American Jewry must bear almost complete responsibility for any rehabilitation program. Deep convictions of American Jews with respect to Palestine must guide the Intergovernmental Committee in offering large-scale, constructive refugee settlement program.

The propulsive power of Jewish idealism, as exemplified in the progress of Palestine since the end of the World War, is recognized as a factor quite as real, if not as tangible, as the immigration of hundreds of thousands of new settlers and the importation of millions of dollars in new capital. This force, combined as it is today with the desperation stemming from Jewish misery in many sections of Europe, is a powerful stimulant to a resurgence of Jewish upbuilding and colonization. Added to the economic factors which point to expanding opportunity for new immigrants, it bears most pertinently upon a solution to the problem with which the Intergovernmental Committee is occupied.

APPENDIX III

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE BERMUDA REFUGEE CONFERENCE BY THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, APRIL 14, 1943

I. THE DESTRUCTION OF JEWISH LIFE IN EUROPE

The Nazis have never concealed their determination to destroy European Jewry. As late as March 14, 1943, Dr. Goebbels, in an interview given to foreign press representatives, declared:

Germany is firmly convinced that the Jews are an international disease which must be exterminated in Europe.

In his broadcast to the German people on February 18th, when he exhorted them to "total mobilization," Dr. Goebbels made this reference to protests of the United Nations:

If hostile foreign countries raise a sanctimonious protest against our antisemitic policy and shed hypocritical crocodile tears over our measures against Jewry, that cannot prevent us from doing what is necessary. Germany in any case has no intention of yielding to this Jewish threat, but intends rather to exercise against Jewry our prompt and, if necessary, our complete and most radical suppression.

In his New Year's Message (1943) to the German People Hitler made clear his intentions:

... And if furthermore I gave assurance that the hope of international Jewry to destroy the German and other European nations by means of a new World War will be the gravest error committed by Jewry for thousands of years, that it will in any case not destroy the German nation but will exterminate itself.

Starvation has probably been the most effective method of destroying the Jews. Many ways are employed to prevent Jews from eating their daily bread. Restrictions against them are such that Jews, unlike others, find it almost impossible to obtain anything except their allotted rations, even when these are available. Segregated behind urban ghetto walls

they cannot search the countryside for food. The barbed wire of the ghetto prisons as well as their systematic pauperization deny to them, except in rare cases, the food of the black market.

There exists a number of anti-Jewish food decrees and practices which spell in the aggregate slow death. Shopping hours for Jews are, in all Nazi-controlled countries, limited to two hours in the afternoon, when the shops are practically empty. Moreover, the ban on the delivery of food to Jewish homes made it impossible to circumvent the shopping-hour restrictions with the aid of Gentile friends. In addition, stamping ration cards with the letter J, or issuing cards of a distinct color, have been other devices to insure discrimination against Jews. Furthermore, mass expulsion of Jews from villages, and expropriation of all rural Jewish property, made it impossible, at least for one section of the population, to enjoy the fruits of their toil. The deliveries of food in the ghettos depend entirely on German transfer offices; the Jews are forbidden to buy or even to accept gifts from outside of the ghetto. Finally, in this connection, it may be recalled that leaving the ghetto is punished by death.

Even worse is the situation with regard to the character of the food and the rations themselves. The Jews receive practically none of the essential protective and vitamin foods. They get no meat, fish, poultry, milk, dairy products, fruit or vegetables. They may purchase none of the foods which are still unrationed, none of the items which are distributed on the basis of the consumer lists, none of the semi-rationed items. More and more rationed staples are entirely denied to them; and of such rationed food as they may still receive, they are allotted not more than half of the normal rations. As a rule, the weekly rations for Jews in Polish ghettos amount at best to a pound of black bread, two ounces of so-called pams or marmalade, one ounce of sugar, and perhaps a few potatoes. They receive no other food. 400 calories is the daily ration of a ghetto-Jew as compared with a nutritional minimum of 3,000.

The result of these starvation rations is a decimation unparalleled in any other group. So, for instance, in the Warsaw ghetto alone, during the year 1941, 47,428 Jews perished. This would amount to about one out of ten. Spotted typhus and tuberculosis are rampant.

Most terrible is the situation of the children. In 1941, the death rate among Jewish children in the Warsaw ghetto was estimated to be thirty times as high as among the Polish children.

A Swedish journalist who visited Warsaw in 1941, wrote:

Hunger in the ghetto is frightful. The inhabitants seem to be living corpses. Their faces and eyes are sunken. . . . Jewish life in ghettos is tragic, gloomy and hopeless. The Jews wait and long for a new Moses.

A Hungarian visitor in 1942 described in the following words the German capital:

The Jews of Berlin are very pale. Their faces are waxy as if already wearing a death mask. When I pass by one of these Jews, I could hear his bones softly rattling.

What has happened since is cloaked in darkness and horror. Last summer Herrmann Backe, German Food Minister, was said to have proposed the mass extermination of Jews as a food conservation measure.

The practice of large scale deportation has proved a no less effective instrument of extermination. Under the impact of a fanatical hatred and a migromania which does not stop even before his own kinfolk, Hitler is moving hundreds of thousands of Jews in overcrowded and locked cattle-cars, with little if any belongings, with insufficient food, for long journeys, to discover at the arrival at the "unknown destination" how many of them have perished en route. There is on record an official statement made last summer by Himmler's special expert for deportations, *Obersturmfuehrer* Hiege, to the effect that thirty percent of the deportees perish en route. The Jews are permanently on the move: from Germany, Austria, and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to the fortress reservation of Terezin, from there to Poland, from Poland to the Soviet Nazi front.

The greater part of these people may be used by the Nazis for their war effort as long as they can serve this purpose. There is no doubt that they are destroyed as soon as they are no longer of any use to the Nazi war machine. In the meantime, conditions of living, housing, and labor are such that the process of destruction continues automatically.

As a consequence of this policy, many ancient Jewish communities have disappeared, and there are today in Europe a number of countries which have practically no more Jews. The Jewish population of Germany has been reduced from half a million to 25,000; in Austria, from more than 200,000 to 5,000; in Slovakia, from 80,000 to 15,000. Estonia and

Danzig are completely *judenrein*; and the same is virtually true also of Yugoslavia. What Jews remain in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, are, with few exceptions, concentrated in the so-called reservation of Terezin.

The great Jewry of Poland has been reduced from three and a quarter million souls to several hundred thousand. The remainder, with the exception of some half million who fled during the Polish Campaign and at the beginning of the Soviet-Nazi war to Asiatic Russia, have perished. Warsaw, the greatest Jewish community in Europe, was first concentrated in a small ghetto where living conditions were such that the death toll was appalling. And in February, 1943, a German newspaper, *The Donauzeitung* of Belgrade, confirmed the reports current throughout the world to the effect that the community had practically disappeared and the ghetto area was made accessible to the general population.

II. THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The leaders of the United Nations have from time to time denounced in unequivocal terms the outrages which the Nazi authorities have perpetrated on the Jewish populations in the countries under Axis control, and they have made it clear that they propose at the conclusion of the war to bring the Nazi criminals to justice. The most important of these pronouncements was the following joint statement of the United States and the European members of the United Nations, published on December 17th, 1942:

The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslav governments and also of the French National Committee (Fighting French) has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler's oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.

From all the occupied countries, Jews are being transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to Eastern Europe.

In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi slaughter house, the ghettos established by the German invader are being

systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly skilled workers required for war industries.

None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation or are deliberately massacred in mass executions.

The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women and children.

The above mentioned governments and the French National Committee condemn in the strongest possible terms this bestial policy of coldblooded extermination.

They declare that such events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom loving peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny.

They reaffirm their solemn resolution to insure that those responsible for the crimes shall not escape retribution and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.

The reading of this statement by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons was followed by a demonstration of sympathy with the Jewish victims of Nazi oppression without precedent in the history of the House.

The legislature of the United States expressed its sympathy in the following resolution, adopted by the Senate on March 9th, 1943, and concurred in by the House of Representatives on March 18th, 1943:

Whereas the American people view with indignation the atrocities inflicted upon the civilian population in the Nazi-occupied countries, and especially the mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children; and

Whereas this policy of the Nazis has created a reign of terror, brutality, and extermination in Poland, and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That these brutal and indefensible outrages against millions of helpless men, women, and children should be, and they are hereby, condemned as unworthy of any nation or any regime which pretends to be civilized;

Resolved further, That the dictates of humanity and honorable conduct in war demand that this inexcusable slaughter and mistreatment shall cease and that it is the sense of this Congress that those guilty, directly or indirectly, of these criminal acts shall be held accountable and punished in a manner commensurate with the offenses for which they are responsible.

On March 23rd, 1943, the House of Lords adopted the following resolution on the motion of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and has since been placed on the Order Paper of the House of Commons by nearly three hundred of its members:

That in view of the massacres and starvation of Jews and others in enemy and enemy-occupied countries, this House desires to assure His Majesty's Government of its fullest support for immediate measures, on the largest and most generous scale compatible with the requirements of military operations and security, for providing help and temporary asylum to persons in danger of massacre who are able to leave enemy and enemy-occupied countries.

Particular attention is drawn to the following excerpts from the speech made by the Archbishop of Canterbury, as reported by the Associated Press:

He said that it was inevitable to contrast the solemn declaration made by the United Nations last December 17th with the very meagre action that had followed. Difficulties were great but the Government should be spurred on to greater rapidity of action.

He urged that steps be taken to carry out a promise given by the Colonial Secretary that Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian Jewish children and accompanying adults would be admitted into Palestine; he proposed that visas be granted for Great Britain at least to all those refugees able to reach this country who have husbands, wives or children already here; he suggested that blocks of visas be granted British Consuls in Spain, Portugal and perhaps Turkey for issuance at their discretion to refugees reaching those countries; and he asked that neutral nations be encouraged to admit additional refugees by guarantees from the United Nations to relieve them of a stipulated proportion of the refugees after victory or sooner, and by offers of supplies and financial aid for their care.

The Archbishop said that there was a suggestion he would put forward more tentatively, but that he thought ought to be seriously considered; that through some neutral power an offer should be made directly to the German Government to receive Jews in territories of the British Empire, and other Allied Nations if they agreed, on a basis of so many a month. Such an offer would very likely be refused and then Hitler's guilt would stand out all the more clearly.

In conclusion, he declared that his chief protest was against *procrastination*, asserting that it had taken five weeks after December 17th for the British Government to approach the United States, and then *six* weeks for the American Government to make the reply in which it had suggested a meeting of representatives for preliminary exploration. The Jews were being slaughtered at the rate of tens of thousands a day, and it should at least be urged that when this meeting occurred it should be not only for exploration but to reach decisions.

It had in the meantime become abundantly clear that the declarations and statements of governments and legislatures have no effect on the determination of the German Government to carry out its policy of extermination and that the only hope for the surviving Jews of Axis-occupied Europe was their removal to places of refuge, whether temporary or permanent, provided by the United Nations or neutral countries.

On January 20th, 1943, more than a month after the publication of the declaration of December 17th, Lord Halifax expressed in a note to the United States the concern of the British Government over the situation. It was not until five weeks later, on February 25th, 1943, that Secretary of State Cordell Hull proposed that British and American representatives should meet in Ottawa to undertake a "preliminary exploration" of the problem, the place of meeting for this Conference being subsequently changed to Bermuda. This note was made public on March 3rd, 1943 following the great public demonstration held at Madison Square Garden, New York, on March 1st, 1943 under the auspices of the American Jewish Congress in conjunction with national church and labor bodies.

III. THE NEED FOR ACTION

Many months have elapsed since it became apparent that the Nazi Government was determined to carry through its policy of extermina-

tion to its bitter end, and it is four months since the United States and the European members of the United Nations gave public and formal expression to the feelings of horror with which the destruction of a whole people was being watched by the civilized world. It cannot but be regretted that hundreds of thousands of Jews have been allowed to perish while the leaders of the democratic nations have been in the process of formulating a policy which even now has got no further than "preliminary exploration."

The warnings of retribution uttered repeatedly by the most authoritative spokesmen of the democratic world have had no deterrent effect on the enemy. There remain only two ways in which the total destruction of the Jewish population on the continent of Europe can be prevented: 1. The sending of supplies under proper safeguards to places of detention and remnants of Jewish communities which survive and 2. To remove as many Jews as possible from Nazi-controlled areas to places of refuge.

All the Jewish organizations concerned with the problem, whether in the United States, Great Britain or elsewhere, have worked out plans for submission to the Conference, and the substance of these several proposals is virtually the same. The program submitted by the Joint Emergency Committee for European Jewish Affairs, a copy of which is appended, represents the views of all the major Jewish organizations in the United States. A similar Joint Committee in Great Britain has drafted a virtually identical program. The World Jewish Congress urges the Conference most earnestly to give the closest study to these proposals.

If the gravity of the problem is not recognized, and action not taken immediately, the victory of the United Nations may mean nothing to the worst victim of Nazi barbarism. Dead communities cannot be restored to life.

Program for the Rescue of Jews from Nazi Occupied Europe

I. The United Nations should approach the German Government, and the governments of the states it now partly dominates or controls, through the Vatican or neutral governments like Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Argentine, with a view to securing their agreement to the release of their Jewish victims and to the emigration of Jews to such havens of refuge as may be provided.

II. The United Nations should, without delay, take steps to designate and establish a number of Sanctuaries in Allied and neutral countries to accommodate substantial numbers of Hitler's victims and to serve as havens of refuge for those Jews whose release from captivity may be arranged for, or who may find their way to freedom through efforts of their own.

III. The procedure that now prevails in the administration of the existing immigration law in the United States, which acts as a deterrent and retardation of legal immigration under the established quotas, should be revised and adjusted to war conditions, in order that refugees from Nazi-occupied territories, within such quotas, may find Sanctuary here.

IV. Subject to provisions for its national security, England should be asked to provide for receiving a reasonable number of victims escaping from Nazi-occupied territories and to provide for their accommodation for the duration.

V. The possibilities in several British territories, both in Africa and in the Caribbean, should be explored without delay. Sanctuary has already been afforded to thousands of refugees in these territories and there is room for many more, if not for permanent settlement, at least for the duration.

VI. The United Nations should urge the Republics of Latin America to modify such administrative regulations that now make immigration under the law extremely difficult, and to endeavor to find temporary havens of refuge for a substantial number of refugees.

VII. Overriding prewar political considerations, England should be persuaded to open the doors of Palestine for Jewish immigration and the offer of hospitality made by the Jewish Community of Palestine should be accepted.

VIII. The United Nations should provide financial guarantees to all such neutral states as have given temporary refuge to Jews coming from Nazi-occupied territories and to provide for their feeding and maintenance and eventual evacuation. The neutral states should be guaranteed that the refugees will not become a public charge and that they will be transferred to permanent Sanctuaries as soon as possible.

IX. In order to do away with the lack of identity which many stateless refugees present, and to give them sponsorship and protection, an arrangement similar to that which existed under the League of Nations should be established and the stateless refugees should be given identification passports analogous to the "Nansen" passports.

X. In view of the fact that mass starvation is the design of the Nazi regime, the United Nations should take appropriate steps without delay to organize a system for the feeding of the victims of Nazi oppression who are unable to leave the jurisdiction and the control of the Axis.

XI. It is submitted that the United Nations undertake to provide the financial guarantees that may be required for the execution of the program of rescue here outlined.

XII. The United Nations are urged to establish an appropriate inter-governmental agency, to which full authority and power should be given to implement the program of rescue here outlined.

APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES

The United States and United Kingdom delegations examined the refugee problem in all its aspects, including the position of those potential refugees who are still in the grip of Axis Powers without any immediate prospect of escape.

Nothing was excluded from their analysis and everything that held out any possibility, however remote, of solution of the problem was carefully investigated and thoroughly discussed.

From the outset it was realized that any recommendation that the delegates could make to their Governments must pass two tests: would any recommendation submitted interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations and was the recommendation capable of accomplishment under war conditions?

The delegates at Bermuda felt bound to reject certain proposals which were not capable of meeting these tests.

The delegates were able to agree on a number of concrete recommendations which they are jointly submitting to their Governments and which it is felt will pass the tests set forth above and will lead to the relief of a substantial number of refugees of all races and nationalities.

Since the recommendations necessarily concern governments other than those represented at the Bermuda Conference and involve military considerations, they must remain confidential. It may be said, however, that in the course of the discussion the refugee problem was broken down into its main elements. The questions of shipping, food and supply were fully investigated.

The delegates also agreed on recommendations regarding the form of intergovernmental organization which was best fitted, in their opinion, to handle the problem in the future. This organization would have to be flexible enough to permit it to consider without prejudice any new factors that might come to its attention.

In each of these fields the delegates were able to submit agreed proposals for the consideration of their respective Governments.

APPENDIX V

LIST OF CAMPS AND HOMES FOR EMIGRANTS AND INTERNEES IN SWITZERLAND

Labor Camps and Homes	No. of Inmates Nov. 30, 1943	Kind of Inmates	Kind of Activity
LABOR CAMPS FOR INTERNEES:			
1. Ampferrhoehe, Aargau	130	Jews of various countries	Road-building, etc.
2. Andelfinger near Winterthur	149	Gentiles (French, Yugoslavs)	Reclamation of land
3. Arisdorf, Baselland	147	Jews of various countries	Road-building, etc.
4. Birmensdorf near Zurich	180	Jews of various countries	Clearing of woodland
5. Bonstetten near Zurich	153	Jews of various countries	Clearing of woodland
6. Bourrignon near Delsberg	130	Orthodox Jews	Land clearance
7. Buerten, Baselland	34	Jews of various countries	Road-building, etc.
8. Chalais, Wallis	—	In preparation	Reclamation of land
9. Cossonay, Waadt	120	French students	Reclamation of land
10. Davesco near Lugano	97	Camp for youths	Reclamation of land
11. Egetswil near Kloten	141	Gentiles (French, Yugoslavs)	Reclamation of land
12. Gordola, Tessin	62	Political internees	Reclamation of land
13. Granges Lens, Wallis	60	Disciplinary camp	Ground leveling
14. Granges near Sion, Wallis	142	Italians	Reclamation of land
15. Hedingen near Zurich	149	Jews of various countries	Reclamation of land
16. Hintergulienthal, Solothurn	72	Gentiles (Yugoslavs)	Building drainage systems
17. Innertkirchen	11	Gentiles (Poles, etc.)	Gathering wood
18. Lajoux, Berner Jura	69	Gentiles (French)	Building drainage systems
19. Laufen, Berner Jura	14	Jews, Yugoslavs	Road-building, etc.
20. Le Chalute near Court	130	Orthodox Jews	Road-building, etc.
21. Les Enfers, Berner Jura	133	Gentiles (French, Yugoslavs)	Reclamation of land
22. Les Verrières, Neu-Aarau	200	Hollanders, Belgians	Road-building, farming

LIST OF CAMPS AND HOMES FOR EMIGRANTS AND INTERNEES IN SWITZERLAND

Labor Camps and Homes	No. of Inmates Nov. 30, 1943	Kind of Inmates	Kind of Activity
23. Mezzovico-Vira, Tessin	117	Jews of various countries	Reclamation of land
24. Moehlin, Aargau	132	Jews of various countries	Road-building, etc.
25. Montana, Wallis	—	In preparation	Excavations
26. Murimöos near Muri, Aargau	126	Deserters, lawbreakers	Peat-digging
27. Olsberg, Baselland	91	Jews of various countries	Road-building
28. Pian San Giacomo, Grisons	59	Russians	Reclamation of land
29. Pont de la Morge	140	Gentiles (French)	Farming
30. Raron, Wallis	95	Russians	Reclamation of land
31. Sierre, Wallis, and Montana	333	Jews of various countries	Reclamation of land
32. Tramelan, Berner Jura	128	Gentiles (French, Germans)	Farming
33. Visp, Wallis	122	Gentiles (French, Greeks)	Reclamation of land
34. Waldegg, Baselland	96	Jews of various countries	Road-building, etc.
	3,729		
LABOR CAMPS FOR EMIGRANTS:			
1. Locarno	89	Jews and Gentiles	Earthwork
2. Schauenberg, Baselland	74	Jews, mostly Orthodox	Road-building
3. Weiach, Canton Zurich	—	In preparation	Farming
RETRAINING CAMPS:			
1. Zuerichhorn, Zurich 8	90	Jews and Gentiles	Carpenters, shoemakers, tailors
INSTALLATION DETACHMENTS:			
1. Granges-Chalais	10		Camp installations

LIST OF CAMPS AND HOMES FOR EMIGRANTS AND INTERNEES IN SWITZERLAND

Labor Camps and Homes	No. of Inmates Nov. 30, 1943	Kind of Inmates	Kind of Activity
2. Laufen	9		Camp installations
3. Central Administration, Technical Division	1		Camp installations
38*	4,032		
HOMES FOR FAMILIES:			
1. Chamby near Montreux	192	Hollanders	Housework
2. Clarens near Montreux	132	Hollanders	Housework
3. Finhaut, Wallis	28	Jews and Gentiles	Housework, mending
4. Mont Pèlerin, ob Vevey	185	Hollanders	Housework
5. Morgins, Wallis	483	Orthodox Jews	Housework, mending
6. St. Cergue near Nyon	423	Jews and Gentiles	Housework, mending
HOMES FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS:			
1. Bienenberg, Baselland	145	Mostly Jewesses	Mending, etc.
2. Brissago near Locarno	166	Mostly Jewesses	Mending and laundering
3. La Chassotte, Freiburg	70	Jewish and Gentile women	School for the young
4. Moudon, Waadt	110	Mostly Jewesses	Mending, etc.
5. Neuhausen, Schaffhausen	90	Jewish and Gentile women	Mending
6. Sonnenberg ob Kriens	197	Jewish and Gentile women	Mending
7. Sumiswald, Berne	41	Jewish and Gentile women	Mending
8. Tivoli, Lucerne	269	Jewish and Gentile women	Mending, etc.

* The detachments are not reckoned among the camps.

LIST OF CAMPS AND HOMES FOR EMIGRANTS AND INTERNEES IN SWITZERLAND

Labor Camps and Homes	No. of Inmates Nov. 30, 1943	Kind of Inmates	Kind of Activity
HOMES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN:			
1. Langenbruck, Baselland	125	Mothers with small children	Housework
2. La Rosiaz and Beau Soleil	237	Mothers with infants, expect- ant mothers	
3. Serneus, Grisons	118	Mothers with small children	Housework
4. St. Niklaus, Wallis	22	Mothers with small children	Housework
5. Victoria-Montana, Wallis	146	Mothers with small children	Housework
HOMES FOR MEN:			
1. Hasenberg, Aargau	74	Jews of various countries	Making slippers
2. Magliaso, Tessin	88	Jews and Gentiles	Light indoor work
3. Schloss Burg near Flueh	67	Jews and Gentiles	Light indoor work
4. Vicosoprano, Grisons	126	Jews and Gentiles	Light indoor work
CONVALESCENT HOME:			
1. Monte Bré near Lugano	79	Jews and Gentiles	Light indoor work
TUBERCULOSIS STATION:			
1. Leysin	73	Jews and Gentiles	
EDUCATIONAL HOME:			
1. Herzberg, Asp, Aargau	37	Jewish and Gentile women	Domestic science school, etc.
64	7,755		
CENTRAL MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES IN ZURICH:			
1. Central warehouse, Zurich	55	Emigrants	Fresh supplies, etc.
Workshops, Zuerichhorn	8	Emigrants	Carpenters, shoemakers, tailors

LIST OF CAMPS AND HOMES FOR EMIGRANTS AND INTERNEES IN SWITZERLAND

Labor Camps and Homes	No. of Inmates	Kind of Inmates	Kind of Activity
	Nov. 30, 1943		
Dental and Technical Service	14	Dentists and technicians	Dental treatment, technical
Administration	9	Women and men	work
2. Repair Shop, Zurich 8	189		Laundering, mending, etc.
66	8,030		

LIST OF REFUGEE RECEPTION CAMPS EXISTING AT THE END OF OCTOBER, 1943

TER. INSP. 1	TER. INSP. 2	TER. INSP. 4
1. Hôpital, Lausanne	1. Buesserach	1. Cyrenbad
2. La Rosiaz, Lausanne	2. Guetschm Lucerne	2. Adliswil
3. Orphelinat, Lausanne	3. Felsberg, Lucerne	3. Wengibad
4. Signal, Lausanne	4. Lauterbach near Oftringen	4. Ringlikon
5. Tour Haldimand, Lausanne	5. Geishubelbad	5. Plenterplatz am Uetliberg
6. Champéry	6. Bremgarten, Aargau	6. Muenchwilten
7. Les Charmilles, Geneva	7. Menzberg	7. Hemberg, Togg
8. Champel, Geneva	8. Lostorf	
9. Cromptes, Geneva	9. Eichberg	
10. Varembe, Geneva		
11. Grand Hotes, Les Avants		

These reception camps contained from 5,000 to 6,000 refugees, who were under the control of the respective Territorial Inspectorates of the Swiss Army.

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III. ACTIVITIES AND REPORTS OF JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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Warren, Anna M., Chief of the Visa Di-
vision: 94, 112.

Warren, Lansing: 169.

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Washington: 93, 415, 432, 473, 555.

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Wedgwood, Josiah, M.P.: 230.

Weiller, General: 145.

Weimar Republic: 28, 364.

Weizmann, Dr. Chaim: 57.

Wells, H. G.: 228.

Werner, Alfred: 259.

Wertheimer, Ernst: 74.

Western Hemisphere: 10, 97, 399.

White Book on the Nazi Terror: 229.

White Paper: 65.

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Wiley, Samuel H.: 212.

Willinck, H. U.: 244.

Wilson, Senator Cairine: 328.

Winnipeg: 205.

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Wise, Stephen S.: 537.

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Women's Auxiliary Air Force: 256.

Women's Division of the American Jew-
ish Congress: 468.

Women's Royal Naval Service: 256.

Wordhead Commission: 61.

Workers Sick Fund Hospital: 541.

World Jewish Congress: 45, 47, 268, 272,
283, 312, 334, 412, 422, 433, 434, 436-
439, 460, 481, 520, 529, 534, 580, 587.

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World War I: 27, 36, 39, 42, 81, 448, 456,
473, 490, 493, 508, 522.

World War II: 91, 133, 134, 286, 291,
311, 515.

World Zionist Organization: 60, 61.

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482, 541.

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451, 491, 583.

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Zeeland, Paul van: 418.

ZEMGOR: 497.

Zielenziger, Kurt: 218.

Zionist Organization: 431.

Zondek, Bernhard: 74.

Zentralausschuss fuer Hilfe und Aufbau:
448, 453, 461, 464.

THE JEWISH REFUGEE

ERRATA AND ADDENDA

Page 137, footnote 8, line 3:

Omit: "Violation of a refoulement order did not entail any penalties."

Page 145, line 6:

Read: Henry Torrès.

Page 221, footnote 8:

Read: See Table XII, p. 354 below.

Page 293, subhead 4:

Read: ATTITUDE OF SWISS PUBLIC OPINION

Page 335, footnote 1, last line:

Read: contain the latest figures available for 1943. Cf. the figures for 1944:

TABLE Ia
JEWISH REFUGEES AND DEPORTEES IN 1944

Country of Origin	Refugees	Deportees from one country to another probably alive	Deportees within the limits of the same country
Poland	400,000*‡		250,000
Germany	285,000	75,000-100,000	5,000
Austria	100,000	10,000-20,000	2,000
France	30,000-35,000‡	50,000	
Protectorate	10,000	15,000	2,000-3,000
Slovakia	10,000‡	15,000	5,000
Hungary	10,000	Unknown	335,000
Rumania	70,000*‡		
Italy	5,000‡	Unknown	
Belgium	25,000‡	15,000	
Holland	25,000	20,000	
Yugoslavia	8,000‡	12,000	
Greece	3,000-4,000‡	10,000	
Luxembourg	1,500‡	1,500-2,000	
Denmark	5,000	1,000	

* Including evacuees to Russia.

‡ Excluding displaced within the liberated areas.

Page 336, Table I, column 1 across:

Omit: "(including evacuees)"

Page 336, Table I, column 2 across:

Change 665,000 to 705,000; change 5,261,000 to 5,301,000.

Page 340, Table II:

Change 5,261 to 5,301; change 2,600 to 2,640.

Page 346, Table VI:

Insert asterisk (*) after United States.

* The figures for the United States referred to the immigration years 1938-39, 1939-40, 1940-41, 1941-42, respectively.

Page 348, Table VIII:

Replace by new table:

TABLE VIII
JEWISH REFUGEES FROM GERMANY ADMITTED TO
PALESTINE, 1933-1940

Year	Number	Percent
Total	50,334	100.0
1933	6,803	13.5
1934	8,489	16.9
1935	7,447	14.8
1936	7,896	15.7
1937	3,280	6.5
1938*	6,138	12.2
1939*	9,490	18.8
1940*	791	1.6

* Including Austria.

Page 349, Table IX:

Change 1841 to 1941; change 50,755 to 50,750.

Change "Other immigrants" to Others (visitors).

Page 350, Table X, heading:

Read: GERMAN REFUGEES ADMITTED TO PALESTINE,
JANUARY 1, 1933 TO APRIL 1, 1939, CLASSIFIED BY
AGE-GROUP

Page 350, footnote 5, line 1:

Change cccclv to 451.

Page 354, Table XII, last line, column 4:

Change 1,935 to 1,535.

Page 364, Table XXIII, heading:

Before "Refugee," add: German.

Page 372, Table XXVIII:

Change 167,928 to 167,925.

Page 376, Table XXIX:

Change 10,603 to 10,608.

TABLE XXX
JEWISH IMMIGRANTS PRACTISING PROFESSIONS ADMITTED TO THE
UNITED STATES, JULY 1, 1938 TO JUNE 30, 1943, CLASSIFIED
BY SPECIFIC PROFESSION

Specific profession	Absolute Numbers					Percent				
	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
All professions	3,860	3,224	2,467	1,075	595	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Clergymen	169	127	91	48	52	4.2	3.8	3.8	4.5	8.8
Engineers	325	316	343	155	79	8.3	9.8	13.9	14.4	13.2
Lawyers	432	402	327	110	35	11.1	12.5	13.3	10.2	5.9
Physicians	1,126	832	470	175	90	28.3	25.9	19.2	16.3	15.2
Teachers	497	488	310	110	65	12.7	15.2	12.6	10.2	10.9
Others	1,311	1,059	926	477	274	35.4	32.8	37.2	44.4	46.0

Page 381, Table XXXII:

Column 1: Change "All workers" to Total.

Column 2: Change 984 to 983.

Page 384, Table XXXIII:

Column 1: After "1938" and "1939", add: including Austria.

Column 7: Change 35.6 to 35.0.

Page 385, Table XXXIV, column 3:

Change 49 to 40.

Page 456, lines 18-19:

Read: regarded this as one of their essential activities.

Page 478, footnote 67:

Read: See pp. 318-319 above.